Space Nuclear Power Plant Pre-Conceptual Design Report, For Information by Levine, B.
KA PL, Znc 
Khoh Atomic Power LabmaCloy 
Bedrtel Bern, Inc 
Betbb Abmic Power Labralvty 
PI 0. Bar 79 
Wed Mmin, PA 15122-0079 
January 27,2006 
The Manager The Manager 
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office Pittsburgh Naval Reactors Office 
United States Department of Energy United States Department of Energy 
Schenectady, New York West Mifflin, Pennsylvania 
Subject: Space Nuclear Power Plant Pre-Conceptual Design Report; for 
Information 
References: See Page 6 
Enclosure: (1) Space Nuclear Power Plant Pre-Conceptual Design Report 
Dear Sirs: 
This letter transmits, for information, the Project Prometheus Space Nuclear Power Plant 
(SNPP) Pre-Conceptual Design Report completed by the Naval Reactors Prime Contractor 
Team (NRPCT). This report documents the work pertaining to the Reactor Module, which 
includes integration of the space nuclear reactor with the reactor radiation shield, energy 
conversion, and instrumentation and control segments. This document also describes 
integration of the Reactor Module with the Heat Rejection segment, the Power Conditioning and 
Distribution subsystem (which comprise the SNPP), and the remainder of the Prometheus 
spaceship. 
BACKGROUND 
Project Prometheus was established in 2003 and included the goal of developing the first 
reactor-powered spaceship and demonstrating that it can be operated safely and reliably on 
long duration, deep-space missions for civilian space exploration. NASA's Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) had overall lead for the project. The initial application of space fission power 
being evaluated was for the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), a nuclear electric propulsion 
spaceship intended to perform deep-space scientific research. 
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In March 2004, the Naval Reactors Program was assigned responsibility for design and delivery 
of the Reactor Module for Project Prometheus. The spaceship is comprised of a multi-mission 
Deep Space System coupled with a mission specific Mission Module. The Deep Space System 
consists of two modules: 
1. The Reactor Module, which includes the nuclear reactor and the energy conversion 
equipment to produce electric power. 
2. The Spaceship Module, which includes the spaceship structure, radiator panels (heat 
rejection segment), electric power conditioning and distribution equipment (PCAD), and the 
ion propulsion system. 
In accordance with Reference (a), design responsibility for the Reactor Module (with the 
exception of the Aeroshell reentry protection cover) was assigned to the NRPCT, and the 
approval responsibility was assigned to DOE-Naval Reactors (NR). 
The NRPCT design strategy was to first assess potential reactor and energy conversion system 
concepts and to identify those that may be feasible to support the JlMO mission. This 
assessment, documented in Reference (b), identified the following reactorlenergy system 
concepts as having sufficient design space and feasibility for further evaluation to support the 
JlMO mission and launch schedule: 
P A direct cycle, gas cooled reactor with a Brayton energy conversion system 
> A heat pipe cooled reactor with a Brayton energy conversion system 
P A liquid lithium cooled reactor with a Brayton energy conversion system 
A liquid lithium cooled reactor with a thermoelectric energy conversion system 
P A lower temperature, liquid metal (e.g., sodium, potassium) cooled reactor with a Stirling 
energy conversion system 
The next step in the design process was to assess these potential concepts in greater detail, 
and to select one reactorlenergy conversion system concept for continued design development. 
In March 2005, the NRPCT recommended in Reference (c) that a gas cooled reactor with a 
directly coupled Brayton turbine energy conversion system be designed for Project Prometheus 
(see Figure 1). This system is likely capable of fulfilling the requirements for the envisioned 
missions, simplifies engineering development and testing, offers the fewest hurdles to 
development, and is extensible to surface missions. NR approved that recommendation in 
Reference (d). In September 2005, NASA priorities changed and NR Program participation in 
Project Prometheus was terminated. Closeout activities were initiated, including generation of 
this report. 
Enclosure (j) describes the pre-conceptual design work performed on the Reactor Module since 
the concept selection recommendation. Included are preliminary conclusions and technical 
perspectives. This report complements other significant reports, primarily: 
Reference (e) - spaceship design 
Reference (f) - the space reactor pre-conceptual design 
Reference (g) - the radiation shield design 
Reference (h) - the Instrumentation and Control architecture 
Reference (i) - structural materials 
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Module, preliminary mass predictions are higher than previous estimates for most parts of the 
plant. Preliminary reliability studies indicate that having one or two loops would likely provide a 
more reliable plant than having three or four loops. JPL had baselined the number of Brayton 
loops as four in prior spaceship studies. A decision on the appropriate number of Brayton loops 
was not made during this project closeout process.. This decision would have had to involve 
JPL and the spaceship designer to include overall spaceship mass trades, evaluations of 
alternate methods to accommodate angular momentum, parameter optimizations for each 
arrangement, and other aspects of spaceship and mission integration which were not done prior 
to project termination. 
Operatinq Power Levels 
The option of operating at full rated power over life or at two distinct power levels was being 
evaluated for power plant operations. Full power of approximately 185 kWe would have been 
used when propulsion was required, and potentially a lower power level (-40 kWe or less) 
would have been used when the spaceship was coasting during transit (propulsion not required) 
and during periods of scientific data collection once the spaceship arrived on station. To 
operate at a reduced power level, the reactor coolant temperature and the Brayton turbo- 
machinery operating speed would be reduced. Operating at lower power during the years when 
propulsion is not required would reduce overall stress on the system and could maximize 
Reactor Module lifetime. 
Desiqn Space 
Cycle analyses (heat balances) show that achieving system performance within the originally 
envisioned design space is challenging. Limiting the heat rejection area to 450 m2, the 
maximum heat rejection heat pipe temperature to 500 K and the maximum reactor coolant 
temperature to 1150 K can be achieved in plant configurations where one Brayton normally 
provides the total electrical output. The gas Brayton system performance is extremely sensitive 
to pressure drop differences among the arrangement options. Further optimization of system 
piping arrangements, or relief from some constraints (radiator area, heat pipe operating 
temperature, or reactor coolant temperature) would be required for systems with two or more 
normally operating Brayton units. Transient analyses show that a c!osed cycle system with 
multiple Brayton units is feasible, with no apparent system instabilities. However, parallel 
operation of multiple Braytons in a closed loop has never been demonstrated, therefore 
integrated system testing would be needed to confirm feasibility. Allowances for off-nominal 
parameters (e.g. temperatures and pressures) would need to be allocated early in the project to 
ensure design margin for component degradation over service life, transient performance, 
casualty recovery, instrument error, manufacturing tolerance, operating strategy, and associated 
operating bands. 
Technolonv Development 
The designs for major plant components (recuperator, gas cooler, Brayton turboalternator, 
valves, and piping) are within the bounds of current technology. Designing these components 
to be leak tight for the long life of deep space missions remains a development item. A more 
significant development item is a material system, combining all parts of the Reactor Module in 
contact with each other that will be compatible for the long duration of the deep space mission. 
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Extensive developmental testin 
decisions. 
g will be required earl! y in the project to support system design 
The capability and performance of the heat rejection system is intimately linked to that of the 
reactor system. High temperature water heat pipe performance and lifetime limits need to be 
fully characterized. These limits could have a significant impact on the ability to reach required 
mass goals and mission lifetime. 
Space Environment 
A reactor operating in space may generate a significant electrical charge buildup on the 
spaceship. Actions will need to be taken to characterize, test and mitigate this effect to ensure 
spaceship operations are not affected. 
The Reactor Module will require a micrometeoroid protection covering to prevent impact 
damage and chemical contamination from the space environment. This covering will complicate 
the thermal design, so this should be considered from the inception of design activities. 
Detailed information supporting these conclusions is contained in Enclosure (1). In addition, 
next actions required to pursue this design are included in each section of this enclosure. 
CONCURRENCES 
This report has been reviewed and concurred with by the KAPL Managers of Space Energy 
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Reactor Engineering. 
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The Reactor Module includes the primary elements needed to deliver the required electrical power to 
the rest of the Spaceship. This includes the nuclear reactor, reactor coolant, energy conversion 
equipment, reactor shield, support structure, and other supporting equipment. The Reactor 
Instrumentation and Control segment is also part of the Reactor Module, with the sensors physically 
located in the Reactor Module and the electronics located with the bulk of the other electronics in the 
Bus Segment of the Spacecraft Module. In accordance with Reference 1- 10, the design 
responsibility for all parts of the Reactor Module was assigned to the Naval Reactors Prime 
Contractor Team (NRPCT) and the approval responsibility is assigned to NR, with the exception of the 
Aeroshell. 
The set of elements needed to generate and manage, by distribution or rejection to space, the power 
created by the reactor, is frequently referred to as the Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP). The 
SNPP includes the Reactor Module, the Heat Rejection Segment, and the Power Conditioning and 
Distribution Subsystem. 
The Spacecraft Module includes all the spaceship systems other than the Reactor Module or the 
Science System elements. This includes the power management and distribution subsystem, the ion 
propulsion system, the heat rejection segment (radiator panels and heat transport system), 
telecommunications, control, and spacecraft structure. 
The Mission Module is mission specific and includes all science instruments and supporting 
equipment necessary to meet science requirements. The supporting equipment may have included 
the following: scan platform, turntable, associated electronics, booms, deployment devices, radiation 
shields, cabling, multi-layer insulation and thermal control devices, and flight software. 
The Reactor Module and the Spacecraft Module comprise the Deep Space Vehicle (DSV). This is the 
vehicle which is designed for multiple missions and thus does not include the science system 
elements located in the Mission Module. It does include the Science Computer and its core software 
that support the Mission Module. A spacecraft docking adapter (Docking Segment) is also included in 
the Spacecraft Module to support early on-orbit operations and docking with the interplanetary 
transfer stages. The docking adapter provides power, communications, and attitude control functions 
for the DSV in the post-launch phases through deployment and commissioning. 
A more complete view of the project system structure is depicted in Figure 1-2, taken from 
Reference 1- 3. All elements of the Prometheus Project fall within one of the four systems shown. A 
description of the four systems, as provided in Reference 1 - 3, follows: 
Launch System (LS) - The Launch System consists of the hardware, software, facilities, 
procedures, and personnel used to conduct launch operations. The Launch System includes the 
launch vehicle(s), transfer vehicle@), launch site facilities, and launch services. 
Deep Space System (DSS) -The Deep Space System consists of the hardware, software, 
facilities, procedures, and personnel used to design, integrate, and test the Deep Space Vehicle 
(See description of Deep Space Vehicle above). 
Science System (SS) - The Science System consists of the hardware, software, facilities, 
procedures, and personnel used to design, integrate, test, and operate the Mission Module. The 
Mission Module includes the instruments, its support engineering hardware (e.g., turntables, scan 
platforms, booms etc.), and mission-unique software. The Science System also includes the 
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1.2 Reactor Module Requirements 
Described below are the primary, high level requirements for Project Prometheus. The Level 1 JlMO 
Requirements (Reference 1 - 5) issued by NASA headquarters formed the basis for Level 2 Multi- 
mission (Deep Space Vehicle) and JIM0 (Mission Module) requirements. These include the resulting 
key requirements for the Reactor. At this stage of mission and technology definition, all requirements 
are preliminary and not fully defined. 
I I Principal Requirements Development 
The ambitious mission of orbiting and exploring the icy moons of Jupiter was developed to meet the 
Exploration Requirements for NASA (Reference 1- 4) and to support the "goal of developing the first 
reactor-powered spacecraft capability and demonstrating that it can be operated safely and reliably in 
deep space on long-duration missionsn (Ref 1- 4). The high level requirements for the JIM0 mission 
were developed and documented in Level 1 Requirements (Reference 1- 5) .  Because some 
requirements presented in Reference 1- 5 were still preliminary, some items are indicated as 
objectives or requiring further review. 
The Level 1 JlMO Requirements include the Development Technology requirements, which describe 
the primary technical goals required to enable a deep space mission, and the mission and science 
requirements, which describe delivery of the space vehicle to the Jovian system and operation during 
the science phase. The Level 1 requirements formed the central starting point for development of 
project requirements and conceptual design efforts. 
The Level 1 Development Technology requirements which ultimately drive the key reactor module 
requirements are as follows: 
The JlMO Project shall develop a Deep Space Vehicle for outer solar system robotic exploration 
missions that combines a safe, reliable, Space Nuclear Reactor with electric propulsion. 
The Deep Space Vehicle shall have a Payload Accommodation Envelope with a mass capability 
of no less than 1500 kg. 
The following Space Nuclear Reactor technologies shall be developed for Lunar and Mars surface 
power reactors: 7) Nuclear fuel, 2) Reactor core materials and coolants, and 3) lnstrumentation 
and Control. (This item was indicated as an objective - minimum requirement not yet defined.) 
Multiple studies and analyses were performed to develop and evolve the conceptual spaceship design 
required to satisfy the Level I requirements. These studies resulted in the configuration described in 
Figure 1-1 and numerous Level 2 documents detailing mission requirements, environments, hardware 
and software selection and validation requirements, safety and security requirements, science 
requirements, and many other aspects covering the design and validation of the JlMO mission. 
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Table d-1: Key Level 
Key Level 2 Requirement 
The Space Nuclear Reactor design shall 
utilize technologies that facilitate 
extensibility to surface operations. 
The Project shall use a Deep Space Vehicl~ 
that provides jet power greater than or equa 
to [I301 kW of primary thrust during thrust 
periods. 
The Project shall design the Deep Space 
Vehicle to have an operating lifetime greatei 
than or equal to [20] years. 
The Project shall use a Reactor Module that 
is capable of generating the maximum 
electrical power required by the Spaceship 
for cumulative minimum of ri0J years, and k 
capable of generating the minimum requirec 
electrical power for the rest of the operating 
- 
lifetime. 
The Proiect shall comdy with the 
prohetheus Single point Failure Policy as 
documented in the Prometheus Project 
P olicies Document 982-00057. 
The Project shall be able to autonomously 
detect and correct any single fault that 
prevents thrusting in less than or equal to [I 
hour]. ((Note: Missing thrust during many of 
the mission phases severely jeopardizes 
mission success, and therefore should be 
prevented or minimized.) 
The S~aceship shall survive without Grouna 
system commanding for at least [50] days 
in the presence of a single failure. 
The Project shall assure that all Science 
System hardware in its deployed 
configuration, except approved science 
hardware, shall remain within the protected 
zone of the reactor radiation shield. 
The Proiect shall obfain launch approval as 
specifieb in the Prometheus ~aunch  
Approval Plans. 
The Spaceship total dry mass at launch 
2 Requirements, Impacts, and Implementations I 
- 
-. 
-. 
! 
I 
-. 
r 
-. 
L 
i 
i 
-. 
-- 
-- 
I 
I 
compatible with Lunar and Mars pressure boundaries and external 
missions. surfaces with surface 
Impact on Reactor Module 
1 environments. 
200 kWe reactor module power output IPlant Electrical Power 200 kW 
Implementation 
shall not exceed [25, UUO] kg. 
Drives selection of design and materials] ~ u s t  consider compatibility of 
I 
required to deliver net thruster power. 
) Note: Values in [brackets] were not firm and - 
120 year life requirement. 
This re~uirernent ~ermits the o~t ion of I ~ r a d e  studies would be rewired 
Plant Thermal Power - 1 MW 
20 year life is long term requirement for 
very deep space missions. The JIM0 
requirement is for 12 years. 
Initial design efforts to support 15 
year operational life. 
Long term design goal is to satisfy 
reducing power inorder to conserve 
reactor energy or reduce pressure and 
temperature during non-thrust phases. 
This may maximize reactor module life 
for the most demanding follow-on 
to determine if reduction of'power 
would improve reactor module 
longevity. 
missions to the outer solar system. 
Single point failure locations shall be 
robustness to mitigate risk of failure. 
This requirement must be considered in I Robust and redundant svstem 
Where possible, redundancy 
avoided. Where this is not practical 
(e.g., reactor), must demonstrate that 
alternatives to single point failure are 
not avaiiabte and show sufficient 
would be part of the reactor 
module design. 
the design of instrumentation and 
control for a self-regulating plant and 
design for recovery from transients for 
which the module would be designed. 
1 time without reactor power. 
Coordination between the shield and IShieldina sufficient to reduce 
architecture for instrumehation 
and control. 
Automatic recovery from 
transients must be considered in 
system design. 
Must consider this, with other autonomy 
and single point failure requirements, in 
design of the control system. 
Design for redundancy and 
robustness wherever practical. 
The spaceship cannot survive in 
dew space for more than a short 
spaceship designs is required to assure 
that maximum dose levets are not 
exceeded. Shielding of local 
of various governing safety 
requirements would have to be 
elements. 
payload~eutron flux to 5E10 
nicm2 and payload gamma flux to 
25 kRad Si damaae and cover 
electronics will also be required. 
To meet this requirement, satisfaction 
thus 
roughly a 12' by 8 cone angle. 
Design features will be required to 
subject review. 
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The primary set of non-JIM0 specific Level 2 technical requirements was collected into the Multi- 
mission Project Derived Requirements, Reference 1- 6. The JlMO specific Level 2 technical 
requirements were given in Reference 1- 7. The Level 2 technical requirements which drive key 
aspects of the Reactor Module design are listed in Table 1-1. Accompanying each requirement is a 
statement of the impact on the Reactor Module. Also provided, where applicable, is a description of 
the implementation required to meet the requirement. 
Electric power output of the reactor module is one of the most important requirements because it 
ultimately drives system mass and volume. While thrusting, the majority of electric power is used to 
drive the ion propulsion thrusters. Minimum acceptable thrust (and thus power) was determined to be 
driven by the complex gravity fietds around the Jovian moons, where a minimum thrust level is 
required to achieve stable orbit and de-orbit of the moons. Due to the high mass of the JlMO vehicle, 
driven in part by the systems required to support the high voltage ion propulsion thrusters, the xenon 
propellant, the 1500 kg science payload, and the reactor module, an output power of 130 kWe for 
propulsion is required. The 200 kWe reactor module power output listed in Table 1-1 results after 
accounting for propulsion unit efficiency of 72%, conversion losses, transmission losses, and other 
vehicle power requirements. Explicitly stated, the required reactor output is estimated as follows: 
[(I30 kWe thruster output / 0.72 Propulsion Power Units Efficiency) + 5 kWe Vehicle Operation] 1 0.95 
Power Conversion and Distribution (PCAD) efficiency = 195 kWe (- 200 kWe). 
In addition to the key requirements addressed above, many other important requirements must be 
considered in evaluating, selecting, and demonstrating design options. Some of these are listed in 
the JIM0 Deep Space Vehicle Level 3 Key Driving Requirements, Reference 1- 8: some in 
Prometheus Project Environmental Requirements Document (ERD), Reference 1- 9: and others were 
still being developed. Some of the more important items for the Reactor Module are listed Table 1-2, 
with references as appropriate. 
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Reouiremen t 
Table 1-2: Additional Key Requirements 
Impact on Reactor Module 
Arrangements and overall sizing must fit within The Spaceship launch configuration shall be compatible with a 
Ism]  launch vehicle payloai fairing (dynamic envelope 
dimensions 4.5m diameter, 26m height), or smaller (Ref 1 - 8) 
The Spaceship shall accommodate the solid particle mission 
environments defined in {ERD) with a probability of meeting 
end-of-mission (€OM) reuuirements oreater than or eaual to 
. , 
0.99 ...( Ref I- 9 j  - 
The Spaceship shall be designed to accommodate the 
radiation environment specified in the Environmental 
Requirements Document (982-00029). (Ref 1 - 8) 
The Spacecraft Module shall be capable of rejecting 16821 kWt 
of heat from the Reactor Module. (Ref 1 - 8) 
The Prometheus flight hardware shall be designed and verified 
to meet applicable functional, performance, operation, and 
other design requirements without damage or degradation 
when exposed to the design environments specified herein fin 
ERD). (Ref 1 - 9) 
During no-thrust periods of Science Orbits, the Deep Space 
System shall continuously point a Spaceship-fixed vector to 
commanded directions in the target-centric reference frame to 
within 20, 20, and 20 mrad (3 sigma) about fhe reference frame 
X, Y, and Z axes respectively.. . (Ref 1 - 8) 
Note: Values in [brackets] were not firm and thus subject to re 
allocaied space inside the fairing. This mainly 
constrains the radiator area, which drives the heat 
balance design space of the Reactor Module. 
Protection from orbital debris and micrometeoroids 
is required, especially of the crucial pressurized 
components and moving assemblies. 
Solar, galactic and Jovian radiation sources, 
coupled with reactor radiation, must be considered 
during electronics selection, shielding trades and 
material evaluation. 
If radiator size is constrained, temperature and 
flow rate must be maximized to reject sufficient 
heat. This impacts the Reactor Module heat 
balance. 
In addition to particle and radiation environments 
described above, the module must withstand 
launch loads and other space environments. 
Section 10 has more details about environments. 
This requirement drives the need for positional 
stability of the spaceship. Counter-rotating 
Braytons, or alternate localized means to offset 
angular momentum, would be necessary to 
provide the needed stability. 
iew. 
Limits for several parameters such as mass and volume were still being developed in parallel with 
other reactor and space ship design efforts. Although precise values were not defined, failure to 
address the limits indicated would result in a design which would overly burden the rest of the vehicle 
and could even make design of a viable spaceship untenable. 
See Reference 1- 8 for a more complete listing of the driving requirements for the Deep Space 
Vehicle, which includes the reactor module. 
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Table 1-3: NASAJP 'L Prometheus Project Hierarchy Definitions 
Project 
Level 
2 
3 
Name 
- - - - -- 
Definition 
An integrated set of Systems that 
accomplish the Prometheus Program 
Objectives 
- 
Examples 
Project Engineering 
Science & Mission Design 
Mission Assurance 
Safety 
Launch System 
Deep Space System 
Science System 
Project 
An integrated set of modules that 
accomplish the Prometheus Project 
objectives. 
System 
Ground system 
Multi-Mission Operations Module 
Prometheus operations Module 
Science Module 
Mission Module 
Spacecratl Module 
A major product, service, or facility of 
the system. Module 
Reactor Module 
Heat Rejection Segment A major product, service, or facility of 
the module. 
An integrated set of assemblies, 
components, and parts which perfoms 
a cleanly and clearly separated function, 
involving similar technical skills, or a 
separate supplier. 
Segment Electric ~roplsion-segment 
Docking Adapter Segment 
Power Conditioning and Distribution Subsystem 
Telecommunications Subsystem 
Bus Structure Subsystem 
Command & Data Handling Subsystem 
Subsystem 
Battery 
Power Conditioning Unit 
Transponder 
Deployment Assembly 
Motor 
CPU 
An integrated set of components andlor 
subassemblies that comprise a defined 
part of a subsystem. 
An integrated set of components andlor 
parts that comprise a well-defined 
Assembly 
Subassembly 
bortion of an assembly. 
Comprised of multiple parts (a cleanly 
identified item). 
Memory 
InpuYOutput Devices 
Structural beam 
Bolt 
Resistor 
Diode 
Component 
Part 
The lowest level of separately 
identifiable items. 
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0 installed to ensure that the reactor remains sub-critical prior to and during launch. A pressure vessel 
surrounds the reactor core and contains the cooling heiiumlxenon gas mkure. ~ e / ~ e  gas is 
circulated through the reactor vessel and reactor coolant segment by the compressor located in the 
Energy Conversion Subsystem. The Reactor Segment consists of four subsystems: 
1. Reactor Core Subsystem - Consists of the reactor core, cladding and internal structural 
supports. 
2. Reactivity Control Subsystem - Consists of the fixed and movable reflectors, the associated 
alignment and support structures, shafts, and positioning motors. 
3. Reactor Vessel Subsystem - Consists of the reactor vessel and support that attaches it to the 
shield. 
4. Reactor Safety Subsystem - Consists of the safety rod(s) and associated removal 
mechanism(s) and mechanical features to preclude motion of movable reflectors prior to 
reactor operation. 
Primary Functions: 
1. Generate thermal energy from fissioning of nuclear fuel. 
2. Transfer thermal energy to the reactor coolant. 
3. Contain HeMe gas. 
4. Support the core. 
5. Contain fission gases. 
6. Control core reactivity. @ 7. Provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent inadvertent criticality. 
1.3.1.2 Reactor Radiation Shield Segment 
Shielding requirements are based on the radiation tolerance of the electrical components, sensors, 
and other materials in the Reactor Module and in the remainder of the spacecraft. These sensitive 
components are subjected to radiation damage from both the space environment and the reactor. 
The space environment sources of radiation include charged particles (electrons, protons, heavy ions, 
and secondary particles, such as spallation neutrons) and gamma radiation. In general, the shielding 
associated with environmental sources surrounds the sensitive components and consists of aluminum 
plate shielding with a thickness of 300 mils or more. This space radiation shielding is not part of the 
reactor radiation shield but is an interface that will be considered in the shield design. 
The reactor radiation shield segment shields spaceship components from radiation emitted by the 
reactor, such as direct neutron and gamma radiation, neutron capture, activation of coolant or 
structure, fission product release to the coolant, electrons leaving the reactorlreflector surface, etc. 
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A permanent magnet, rotary alternator converts the mechanical energy of the Brayton engine into 
electrical energy. The alternator is located within the gas pressure boundary and requires electrical 
feeds through the pressure boundary. These feed-throughs must be sealed to prevent leakage. 
Primary Functions: 
1. Remove heat from nuclear fission in the reactor core and transfer this heat to the Brayton 
Units. 
2. Utilize heat from the reactor to generate electric power. 
3. Circulate reactor coolant during initial reactor startup. 
4. Contain the reactor coolant gas. 
Secondary Functions 
1. Provide cooling to the Energy Conversion Subsystem components. 
In order to ensure long life of the turbo-machinery, a coolant purification and or filtering subsystem 
may be required. This would most likely make use of sharp piping bends and mechanical filters to 
centrifugally separate small potentially damaging particles out of the gas stream. Should a filtering 
subsystem be needed, care should be taken to minimize any pressure drops associated with it. 
1.3.1.4 Plant Structure and Environmental Protection 
The Plant Structure and Environmental Protection Segment provides structural support, 
micrometeoroid protection, and thermal management for the Space Nuclear Power Plant 
arrangement. It consists of three subsystems: 
Structural Support Subsystem - Supplies structural load paths necessary to maintain physical 
support and alignment of equipment and to accommodate all anticipated static, dynamic and 
thermally-induced loads. The system includes the primary support structure that provides 
overall support and connection.of the Reactor Module to the Spacecraft Module, including the 
module portions of the separable interfaces. The system also includes the secondary support 
structure that provides structural connections among Reactor Module components and the 
primary support structure. 
Micrometeoroid Protection Subsystem - Consists of material barriers around critical elements 
to protect the Reactor Module against impact damage, erosion and chemical contamination 
from micrometeoroids. This protection comes, in part, from existing structural elements and 
thermal control elements supplemented by other materials to provide the degree of protection 
desired. 
Thermal Management Subsystem - Provides the heat rejection, thermal isolation, and 
supplemental heating needed to keep the different Reactor Module elements within 
temperature limits. The thermal management subsystem would include insulating materials 
(insulation, multi-layer blankets, spacers), surface thermo-optical materials (paints, coatings, 
treatments, etc), conductive and isolating materials, and probably more active elements such 
as heaters, temperature sensors and heat pipes. 
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Primary Functions: 
1. Provide structural alignment and support of the reactor, shield, piping and energy conversion 
components. 
2. Provide structural attachment of the Reactor Module to the Spacecraft Module. 
3. Provide structural mounting features to accommodate launch loads, flight loads, thermally- 
induced relative displacements, and deployment loads on Space Nuclear Power Plant 
equipment. 
4, Provide support for the Micrometeorite Protection and Thermal Management Subystems. 
5. Protect the Reactor Module components from micrometeoroid damage. 
6.  Provide thermal isolation or coupling between components to meet performance requirements. 
7. Provide localized heat rejection from Reactor Module components. 
Secondary Functions: 
1. Provide a means for cable management and routing. 
2. Assure that Reactor Module temperatures are within the required values prior to reactor 
startup. 
1.3.1.5 Reactor Instrumentation and Control Segment 
The Reactor I&C segment contains the sensors and control circuits needed to continuously monitor 
the state of the Reactor Module and control its functions throughout the mission. The sensors are 
placed in key locations in the Reactor Module at the forward end of the spaceship and are connected 
to signal processing circuits via spaceship cabling assemblies which extend the length of the boom. 
The Reactor I&C signal processing circuits, reactor controllers, and other hardware are located in the 
shielded Bus Compartment at the aft end of the spaceship where the sensitive electronics are 
protected from the space environment. 
Primary Functions: 
1. Monitor important reactor parameters. These include reactor coolant temperature, pressure, 
and flow; reactor power (neutron flux); position of the reflectors and safety rod(s); and position 
of the isolation valves (if used). 
2. Monitor Brayton unit parameters. These signals would be obtained from data links with the 
PCAD subsystem and would include Brayton unit speed and output power. 
3. Control the positioning of the movable reflectors. The reflectors are part of the reactivity 
control subsystem and are used to control reactor temperature and power by adding or 
subtracting reactivity. 
4. Control the positioning of the reactor coolant isolation valves. These isolation valves prevent 
coolant flow through idle loop(s) in the configurations which use spare Brayton units. 
5. Control Reactor Module heaters (if used). 
6. Coordinate with the PCAD subsystem to control the speed of the Brayton units. 
7. Communicate with the spaceship Command and Data Handling subsystem to send and 
receive reactor data and commands to and from Ground Control. 
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These functions will be performed autonomously through pre-programmed algorithms in the reactor 
controller software. Such autonomous operation is required because of the absence of continuous, 
real-time communication with the spaceship. 
1.3.1.6 Aerothermal Protection Segment (APS) 
Description 
The APS, also known as the Aeroshell, is a physical structure that surrounds the reactor vessel 
and reflector and provides an aerodynamic envelope in the event of an accident that causes the 
reactor module to reenter the Earth's atmosphere. It is in place during launch and may be 
jettisoned prior to reactor criticality. 
Primary Functions 
1. Protect the reactor core from aerothermal heating during reentry into the Earth's atmosphere. 
2. Keep the reactor essentially intact during an impact with the Earth to support recovery of the 
fuel. 
1.3.2 Reactor Module Interfaces 
The following is a list of other spaceship segments and subsystems with which the Reactor Module 
would interface: 
1. Heat Rejection Segment - Removes heat from the energy conversion subsystem and radiates 
the heat to space. It also includes the Boom Assembly, which interfaces to the Reactor 
Module and controls the relative position of the Reactor Module and Bus Segment. This 
segment is described in Section 9. 
2. Bus Segment - Receives electric power from the energy conversion subsystem and 
distributes it throughout the spacecraft. Provides the primary structural support for the space 
vehicle. It also contains the spacecraft control and communications subsystems. 
a. Power Conditioning and Distribution (PCAD) Subsystem - Conditions and distributes 
power to the spacecraft bus segment. To apply a controllable electrical load to the 
turbo-alternator, the PCAD subsystem utilizes independent (one per Brayton Channel) 
shunt regulators. It also includes the startup power from the solar array and power 
during launch from the battery. 
b. Figure 1-6 shows a notional schematic of the PCAD subsystem. It consists of four 
independent busses and equipment to support conditioning and distribution of power 
throughout the Spaceship. 
c. Command and Data Handling (C&DH) Subsystem - Provides two way communication 
between the spaceship and Ground Control. 
d. Bus Cabling Subsystem - Electrical cabling that allows electricity to be transferred from 
point to point. 
e. Environmental Monitoring Subsystem - Monitors the radiation environment and the 
health of the spacecraft. 
f. Structures and Mechanisms Subsystem - Provides the primary support interface for 
the reactor module. 
3. Data Management Subsystem - Part of the Ground System that manages the data to the 
ground system operations stations. 
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A single Brayton system offers the simplest design, the least required component 
development, and the simplest plant operation. The single Brayton system also has the lowest 
mass and the highest thermal efficiency. The extra capability could not be quantified until 
plant arrangements and parameter optimization studies were completed. Plant parameters 
that would be part of an optimization include coolant molecular weight, turbine speed, coolant 
temperatures at various heat exchangers, system pressure, and compressor pressure ratio. 
(Note that the current two Brayton system heat balance shows a higher efficiency. However, 
no conclusion should be drawn because the heat balances are based on current non- 
optimized configurations. The single Brayton system with no valves, fewer pipe fittings, etc., 
will have a lower pressure drop and higher system efficiency.) The single Brayton concept 
should be considered along with other system architectures despite NASA's single point failure 
tolerance criteria. An additional momentum compensation system would be required for any 
spacecraft architecture, including the single Brayton system, that does not have counter- 
rotating turbines. 
To meet the single failure tolerance criteria, multiple Brayton units would be required, resulting 
in a mass penalty and overall thermal efficiency decrement relative to a single Brayton system. 
It is noted that the approach to use multiple components is based on the Level 2 Prometheus 
Requirement to meet the NASA Single Point Failure Policy. NASA experience indicates the 
prudence of having redundant components, even if they have demonstrated reliability, to 
ensure that manufacturing defects, human error, or an unexpected event does not lead to a 
mission ending failure. This is also consistent with NRPCT practice. For those components 
where redundancy is considered impractical, exceptions to the single point failure avoidance 
requirement is provided. For the currently envisioned Prometheus spacecraft, the reactor, the 
reactor coolant loop, the boom, and the xenon propellant tank all require such exceptions. 
Some critical elements of a single Brayton system could have redundancy built in (e.g., 
alternators). Others, like turbine bearings, cannot have redundancy built in. Exceptions could 
be provided for a single Brayton system, but the desirability of operating high speed equipment 
over an extended lifetime must be considered. 
The determination of which system layout is most reliable depends on the reliability of the 
constituent components. A two Brayton system, in which both Braytons are normally running 
but each could, upon failure of one Brayton, supply full power to the spaceship (2-2-2s) would 
probably be the most reliable system. This system would have a mass of -2,000 kg greater 
a than the one Brayton system, although a 2-1-1s was not fully evaluated and may save several 
hundred kilograms of mass. Assuming Brayton components could be developed with 
acceptably high reliability (approximately 97% or greater for the Brayton assembly), the most 
reliable system would be the single Brayton system with one recuperator and one gas cooler 
(1-1-1). However, for systems with Brayton assembly reliability less than 97%, a second 
redundant Brayton results in a higher overall system reliability, offsetting the impact of 
additional components and increased complexity. System architectures with three or more 
Braytons (See Figure 1-4) had lower overall reliability. This reliability was reduced because of 
additional welds, valves, and surface area vulnerable to leaks to space andlor micrometeoroid 
impact. Because this system is significantly different than any other in Gxistence, the decision 
on plant redundancy will have to be made without specific data on component reliability, and 
the envisioned test program will not be sufficient to establish a true statistical basis. 
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The mass difference between the one Brayton (1-1-1) and two Brayton systems (2-2-2s) is 
-2,000 kg based on these non-optimized results, which would be significant to the overall 
spaceship mass, although a 2-1 -1s was not fully evaluated and may save several hundred 
kilograms of mass. The compilation of component masses for the SNPP was done recently, 
and actions to minimize mass had not yet been undertaken. As discussed in Section 4, these 
actions would have included optimization of the system arrangement and heat balance; trades 
on the reactor shield, mission module shield, and boom length; selection of the most 
appropriate reactor configuration; selection of materials and specification of their design 
bases; trimming of the reactor shadow shield configuration based on established spaceship 
configuration; etc. 
Plant Operation and Plant Dvnamics 
Reactor plant dynamic models were made using three different modeling tools (Simulink, 
RELAP5-3D, and TRACE). Model results show that a multiple closed Brayton unit system is 
feasible, with no apparent system instabilities. However, parallel operation of multiple 
Braytons in a closed loop has never been done before and substantial testing would be 
needed to further demonstrate feasibility and validate the models. 
Utilization of two distinct power levels may allow for the reduction of system temperature 
and/or reactor power for significant portions of the mission, extending spacecraft life. Two 
distinct power levels were envisioned for the JIM0 mission: high power - thrusters operational, 
-185 kWe load; low power - thrusters secured, lower voltagellower frequency electrical power. 
Low power would include periods when science data is being collected and may require 
compensation for the angular momentum induced by the Brayton system on the spaceship. 
The simplest way to implement multiple operating modes would be to maintain speed and only 
reduce temperature (by reducing reactor power). However, this is most efficiently 
accomplished by a combination of speed control and temperature (power) reduction. Use of 
onioff control of Braytans and use of gas inventory control required increased system 
complexity and would not significantly improve performance. Reactor material performance 
may be affected by lowering of reactor temperatures and must also be considered. 
Reduced reliability results by adding spare Braytons in arrangements where 2 Braytons are 
already operating (3-3-3 and 4-4-4) 
Design Space 
Cycle analysis shows that achieving a system performance within the originally envisioned 
design space is challenging. Limiting the heat rejection area to 450 m2, while limiting 
maximum heat rejection heat pipe temperature to 500 K and the reactor coolant outlet 
temperature to 1 150 K can only be achieved in plant configurations where one Brayton 
normally provides the total electrical output given the preliminary piping system arrangements 
and non-optimized plant conditions that have been developed thus far. Allowing some 
increase in converter loop piping diameter, radiator area, heat pipe temperature, or allowing 
less margin for reactor temperature uncertainty would be required for plant configurations 
where two or more Brayton units normally provide the total electrical output. 
A key driver to overall plant efficiency is the arrangement of the converter loop piping system 
and the resulting impact on piping system pressure drop. For plants with multiple converter 
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loops, flow splits in the reactor inlet and outlet headers and inclusion of valves become 
significant additions to the overall piping system pressure drop. Large diameter pipe, few 
valves, low pressure drops through components, simple pipe runs, and large gentle bend radii 
are required to minimize loop pressure drop. However, these considerations will need to be 
balanced against the need to make the plant sufficiently flexible to accommodate thermal 
transients and the need to make it fit within the available volume. 
Allowances for off-design parameters (e.g., temperatures and pressures) need to be allocated 
early in the conceptual phase of the project to account for component degradation over service 
life, transient performance, casualty recovery, instrument error, operating strategy, and 
associated operating bands. 
Material Selection 
Use of refractory metal alloys for pressure boundary components were considered, but these 
alloys required substantial testing and development to mitigate inherent risks. Leading 
concerns included irradiation embrittlement, interstitial ernbrittlement from the absorption of 
working gas impurities and the integrity of dissimilar metal joints. Adequate protection from 
carbon and oxygen contamination would have required vacuum facilities exceeding those 
necessary for a nickel-base alloy pressure boundary. Similar complications would exist for 
extensibility to Lunar or Mars surface applications. Irradiation embrittlement would have made 
thermal cycling of a ground test unit difficult. 
Nickel-base superalloys were considered as leading candidate materials for the reactor vessel, 
loop piping, turbine, and heat exchangers. A large property, component manufacturing and 
performance database exists for Ni-base superalloys with the majority of the data obtained for 
air-breathing turbine engine applications. However, significant testing and development was 
required for the Prometheus design. Specific concerns were thermal creep, irradiation 
embrittlernent for the pressure vessel, chemical interactions with the working gas and working 
gas impurities and the integrity of dissimilar metal joints. 
Demonstration of dissimilar metal joining feasibility, including cast to wrought nickel-base 
superalloys, wrought nickel-base superalloy to titanium alloys, wrought nickel-base superalloy 
to various refractory metal alloys, and possibly, stainless steel to titanium alloys will be 
required prior to the selection and specification of materials for all major system components. 
If dissimilar metal joints are required, development of a sound joint for the material pairs would 
be required. 
A thorough understanding of environmental degradation issues relevant to the application of 
all candidate material types in a common system, including the implications of the heat 
rejection system materials, must be obtained prior to selection and specification of materials 
for all major system components. Issues included potential degradation from the space 
vacuum, fission products, impurities in the working gas and the transport of impurities from 
one material to another in the common gas loop. 
Refractory metal and nickel-base alloys are not readily available in wrought forms such as 
seamless pipe and tubing. This may be critical to meeting schedule. 
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To support the development and deployment of an SNPP, extensive material, component, and 
system testing had been planned. This testing would need to be a coordinated effort leading 
up to nuclear testing of a ground based prototype and non-nuclear testing integrated with the 
spaceship leading up to launch. The report for the Ground Test Reactor Facility (GTRF) for 
testing the prototype was transmitted by Reference 1-13. It should be noted that no final 
decision on the need for a GTRF or where it should be sited had been made; preliminary 
engineering work had started to support the NEPA process, establish scope, and meet the 
schedule. At the time of termination of NRPCT participation in Project Prometheus, the 
functional requirements for the facility were preliminary and had not yet been reviewed against 
federal requirements, peer reviewed, or approved by Naval Reactors. 
Components 
The designs for major plant components (recuperator, gas cooler, Brayton turboalternator, 
valves, bearings, and piping) are within the bounds of current technology assuming non- 
refractory materials are used. Designing these components to be leak tight for the long life of 
the deep space missions remains a large development item. 
The largest turbine component design uncertainties are the scale-up of the turboalternator 
assembly for a single 200 kWe Brayton system and the ability of the turbine to operate for an 
extended lifetime in the service environment. Further rotor dynamic evaluations, bearing 
development and alternator cooling studies and testing would be needed. 
Reactor Module thermal management must be designed to reject sufficient heat from the hot 
components while maintaining other components at acceptable temperatures. This challenge 
is significantly complicated by the need to provide micrometeoroid protection and is somewhat 
complicated by the need to provide sufficient heat before start-up to maintain temperatures 
above low extremes. Identification and testing of materials, coatings, finishes, etc., will be 
needed to identify options that will satisfy requirements after prolonged exposure to radiation 
and temperature. Thermal management must be integrated with the power plant design and 
should be considered early in conceptual design. 
The interface of the heat transfer segment to the Reactor Module requires significant 
integration to resolve key tradeoffs for reducing mass, spacecraft size, and project risk. Key 
integration items include the heat transport loop coolant and ducting materials that interface 
with the gas cooler, start-up and normal operational strategy, radiator mass versus 
temperature capability, heat load capability, and size. Lifetime degradation in the radiator 
performance, due to changes in effective emissivity and isolated heat pipe failures will lead to 
a slow increase in radiator temperature. Continued research is required to understand high 
temperature water heat pipe performance (500 K) and life capability needed for this application 
operating at relatively high power throughput and evaporator surface heat flux (10 w/cm2). 
A reador operating in space may generate a significant electrical charge buildup on' the 
spaceship. Actions will need to be taken to characterize, test and mitigate this effect to ensure 
spaceship operations aren't affected. 
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2 Plant Parameter List 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the pre-conceptual plant parameter and instrumentation and control (I&C) parameter 
lists was to provide a common set of design parameters used by the Naval Reactors Prime Contractor 
Team (NRPCT) for preconceptual evaluation of Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) concepts. 
2.2 Overview - Prometheus Pre-Conceptual Plant Parameter List 
The Prometheus Preconceptual Plant Parameter List, Table 2-1, contains a listing of basic 
parameters and a corresponding range of values, designated "Range/Options", to be considered in 
integrated plant trade studies and other preconceptual design efforts. Parameters are grouped by the 
component to which they pertain. The range of values identified for each parameter is considered to 
envelope the parameter's design space for full power operation. Additional information related to the 
parameters, reference documents, and bases of values is provided in Table 2-2. 
The preliminary plant parameter list includes a column of values, designated "A set of common 
parameters", which, when taken together, satisfy a system heat balance. It should not be inferred that 
the values given in this column were identified as optimal values for any particular plant configuration. 
These values are provided only to illustrate the interrelationship of the parameters. 
Values in the "Reduced Electrical Power Range/Optionsl1 column represent ranges of values to 
evaluate reduced power operations. One JIM0 level 2 requirement, from JPL Document 982-001 15, 
"Revision 2, Prometheus Project Multi-mission Project Derived Requirements", dated July 15, 2005, is 
the project shall use a nuclear reactor whose thermal power output is adjustable to ailow long-term 
operation at any reactor level down to the minimum of full power output required to support the 
minimum required electrical power. A reduced power mode may be used when electrical demand is 
reduced for long periods of time. The period of reduced electric demand may allow reactor power 
and/or temperature to be reduced, which allows fuel and clad temperature reduction (increased creep 
life) and burn up reduction (increased core life). The reduced power options are further discussed in 
Section 8, "Operational Strategy". 
All design values were notional and a range of values were being evaluated. These values were 
based on preliminary functional requirements and objectives provided by NASA-JPL. For all of the 
key driving requirements, future trade studies would have been performed to obtain reactor and 
reactor plant requirements and constraints. 
2.3 Overview - Instrumentation and Control Parameter List 
The Prometheus Preconceptual I&C Parameter List Table 2-3 presents the plant parameters being 
considered for operation of the space nuclear power plant (SNPP). These parameters would be 
measured by sensing elements of the I&C system and used in the monitoring, control, and calibration 
processes associated with the continuous operation of the plant. The tabulation evaluates each of the 
plant parameters selected for measurement and, based upon the best sensing technologies identified 
in 0-SE(SPS)IC-008, NRPCT Closeout of Prometheus Sensor Development Work for NR Information, 
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dated December 21, 2005, identifies the fundamental requirements for these measurements. These 
criteria were developed to support the design and development of the SNPP and its components. 
Reactor plant operations demand sufficient sensors and instrumentation to provide for the control and 
monitoring of the reactor for all the modes of plant operation. These modes include: 
rn Startup 
rn Constant power operation (steady state power operation) 
Power transitions 
Casualty Operations 
Maintenance and Testing Operations 
Shutdown 
These operations must successfully function under nominal as well as off-nominal conditions. To 
provide for all these conceivable situations a sufficiently diverse set of reactor plant instrumentation is 
required to ensure the control actions taken by the instrumentation and control (I&C) system are 
consistent with the actual state of the plant. 
For the space reactor plant in particular, the requirements and conditions are exceptionally severe 
and demanding, namely, the harsh temperature and radiation environment, -15 year lifetime, and 
high accuracy. A minimum sensor suite consisting of a diverse set of sensor capabilities and failure 
modes is desirable at this stage of the program since it is not clear that sensors will be found for all 
the desired locations and functions. Moreover, a reactor plant final design has not yet been 
determined, including the number of turbo-alternators (1, 2, 3,or 41, reactor coolant makeup system, 
the method of reactor control (slider or drum), and the methods of plant control (Brayton speed, 
voltage, current, load). At the pre-conceptual phase the controls for the reactor plant could be based 
one or more of the following parameters: 
Reactor power, temperature, pressure, flux, and I or control element position 
Brayton speed, electrical load, coolant flow, alternator and 1 or parasitic load radiator power, 
voltage, current 
Heat rejection temperature, flow rate, or pressure 
Pressure or coolant inventory 
All of these considerations suggest that at the pre-conceptual phase of the space reactor design effort 
a diverse set of reactor primary sensors be pursued to ensure that the parameters necessary for all 
the operations of the final plant are ultimately provided. The fundamental set of parameters 
considered necessary for reactor plant operation and monitoring are listed in Table 2-3. For each 
plant parameter, its nominal value and the characteristics of the sensor necessary to measure it are 
identified. The pre-conceptual nominal value is the parameter value identified in the four loop non- 
optimized Brayton system of Section 6. The sensor qualities represent the most capable technology 
for the measurement based on the sensor studies of B-SE(SPS)IC-008, NRPCT Closeout of 
Prometheus Sensor Development Work for NR Information, dated December 21, 2005. For example, 
the reactor outlet temperature measurement assumes the use of sapphire Fiber Bragg Grating (FBG) 
thermometry; the reactor coolant flow assumes an ultrasonic time-of-transit flowmeter. For these 
sensors, the typical accuracy, resolution, and time response of the technology are used to 
characterize the quality of the parameter measurement. The operational range considers all the 
various plant operations for which the sensor may be applied and identifies the range of values 
associated with these operations accordingly. The accuracy of a sensor measurement represents the 
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ability of the sensor output to match the absolute value of the actual parameter. The resolution 
represents the finest increment that the sensing system can differentiate. Both of these metrics are 
based on the range of parameter measurement unless otherwise indicated. The response time of the 
sensing system represents the time it requires to respond to a step change in the parameter and 
accurately represent its final value. The related reference information and justifications for the various 
criteria of the I&C parameters are provided in Table 2-4. 
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Table 2-1 : Prom 
Section Parameter 
I Mission Duration 
I. Reactor 
I Core Enerav 
1 Nominal Core Thermal Power 
I Reactor Inlet Tem~erature 
1 Reactor Outlet Tem~erature 
- - 1 Number of Reactor Inlet Noules 
I Number of Reactor Outlet Noules 
Reactor Nozzle-to-Nozzle Pressure Drop 
(d PIP) 
Gas Molecular Weight 
II. Shield 
Ill. Braytons 
Pioe Outer Diameter 
Number of Shield Penetrations for Piping 
Number of Shield Penetrations for CDM 
Pavload Rx Neutron (DDD) 
Rx Gamma (TID) 
Behind Shield Rx + S ~ a c e  Neutron (DDD) 
Rx + Space Gamma (TID) 
Number of Braytons 
I 
I Bravton Shaft Speed 
Power delivered from alternator 
I I Compressor Outlet Pressure 
theus Pre-Conceptual Plant Para 
Rangeloptions 
10-20 years 
10-20 Full Power Years 
0.5-1.5 MWt 
81 0-935 K (998-1 160°F) 
1050-1200 K (1430-1700°F l 
2045 glmol 
(He mole fraction = 0.874 - 0.560) 
TBD 
. . 
6-1 8 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
4 (2 op at 100% capacity, 2 spare) 
3 (2 op at 100% capacity, 1 spare) 
3 (3 op at 66% capacity) 
2 (2 op at 50% capacity) 
2 (1 op at 100% capacity, 1 spare) 
. . 
1 (1 op at 100% capacity) 
30000-75000 rpm 
97.0 -1 10 kWe per ~raGon for 3 & 4 
loop systems 
195-220 kWe per Brayton for 1 & 2 
loop systems 
1380-4000 kPa (200-580psi) 
neters 
A Set of Common Reduced Electric 
Parameters RangelOptions 
15 vears 
31.5 glmol 
(He mole fraction = 0.784) 3 
I L 
5E 1 0 nlcm2 
25 kRad Si Damage 
TBD 
0.5 GRad Si Damage I 
I I 
4 (2 op at 100% capacity, I 1 
2 spare) 
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- - - -  
97.0 kWe per Brayton 
193.9 kWe Total 
45-220 kWe 1 
I IV. Valves 
Recu erator C-- 
1 V!. Gas Cooler 
VII. Radiator I= 
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Parameter I Rangeloptions 1 A Set of Common 1 Reduced Electric Power 
Com~ressor lnlet Tem~erature 
Compressor Pressure Ratio 
350-450 K (1 70-350°F) 
I - I - - 1 
Parameters 
390 K (242°F) 
2.0 
Converter Loop Pipe Outer Diameter 
Alternator Loop Pipe Outer Diameter 
1 at Compressor Inlet 
1 at Compressor Outlet 
1 at Low Pressure Recuperator 
Outlet 1 Alternator Bleed Flow Outlet 
RangelOptions 
I I I 
10-1 6 cm (3.9-6.3 in) 
TBD 
Isolation Valves 
10 cm (3.9 in) 
5 cm (2 in) 
1 at Turbine Outlet I f at Compressor Outlet I 
Check Valves 
Number of Recuperators 
High Pressure side of Recuperator dPlP 
Low Pressure side of Recuperator dP/P 
Recu~erator effectiveness 
\ I 1 
1 at Compressor Inlet 
1 at Compressor Outlet 
1 at Alternator Bteed Flow Outlet 
I 
1 at Compressor Outlet 
1 4  
0.5-1.5% 
1 .O-3.0% 
0.86-0.94 
Number of Gas Coolers 1 4  
Gas Side of Gas Cooler dPlP 
Pressure Drop in HRS Side of Gas Cooler 
Gas Cooler effectiveness 
4 
0.8% 
1.5% 
0.92 
4 1 
Heat Rejection System Fluid 
Two-sided Radiator Area with 14.5% Margin 
0.5-1.5% 
0.90-0.96 
Inlet Coolant Temperature 
Emissivitv 
lumber of loops I 1 -4 I 4 
I .O% 
25 kPa (3.6 psi) 
0.94 
Water, NaK 
400-650 mL(4300 - 7000ftL) 
~, 
4RS Operating Pressure 
Dressure Drop in LOOD 
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Water 
450 mL (4840 f f )  
485-530 K (41 3-494-F) 
0.75-0.95 
505K (449°F) 
0.9 - - - - -  
5-1 1 MPa (725 - 1595 psi) 
100-400 kPa (15-58 mil 
- ~ - 
7.8 MPa (1 130 psi) 
365 kPa (53 psi) 
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1 able 2-2: Parameter Justification and References 
Section 1 Parameter I Justification and References 
I - ~ . - -  -..-- I Mission Duration Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) mission duration is 12 years. The multi-mission duration is 
I. Reactor 
I Project ~ulti-mission Project Derived Requirements", dated July 15; 2005. 
1 Nominal Core Thermal Power 1 The Pre-Conceptual Base Case value does not include uncertainties associated with plant 
20 years,-and applies to subsequent missions. To meetthese NASA requirements, the 
reactor should be designed to support an initial operating life of 12-15 years, with subsequent 
missions of increasing duration, up to 20 years. Based on JPL document 982-001 16, revision 
2, Prometheus Project JlMO Project Derived Requirements, dated July 15, 2005 and JPL 
document 982-001 15, revision 2, Prometheus Project Multi-mission Project Derived 
Requirements, dated July 15, 2005. 
~- - - ~  
I operating band: Based on 4 Brayton case SNPP Heat Balance Section 6. 
I Reactor Inlet Temperature 1 Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and consistent with Reactor Pre-conce~tual Desicin 
Core Energy 
I ) (SPP-67410-0013lB-SE(RE)-0003, dated January 27, 2006). 1 Number of Reactor Inlet Nozzles I Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and consistent with Reactor Preconceptual Design 
15 full power years is a simplifying assumption used for initial concept comparisons. It 
approximates to 10 years total thrust (full power) time and 10 years reduced power (-50% 
power) for a 20 year mission. Based on JPL Document 982-001 15. 'Revision 2. Prometheus 
Reactor Outlet Temperature 
( Report (SPP-67410-0013lB-SE(RE)-0003, dated January 27,2006). 
] Number of Reactor Outlet Nozzles 1 Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and consistent with Reactor Preconceptual Design 
- 
Report (SPP-67410-0013lB-SE(RE)-0003, dated January 27,2006). 
Consistent with industry practice for current materials used in turbine assembly. Based on 
SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and consistent with Reactor Preconceptual Design Report 
I Report (SPP-67410-0013/B-SE(RE)-0003, dated January 27,2006). - 
] Reactor Nozzle-to-Nozzle Pressure Drop (dPIP) ( Indicates fraction of inlet pressures. Based on an evaluation envelope to include many 
. . 1 reactor pressure boundah designs from the SNPP Heat Balance section 6. 
Gas Molecular Weight 1 Gas being assumed as coolant is a mixture of Helium Xenon. Considered a benign, single- 
I phase coolant to achieve high efficient energy conversion with a low activation energy. Molecular weiaht based on ~ a s t  JIM0 trade studies. Based on heat balance Section 6. I 
1 - I II. Shield I I 
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Pipe Outer Diameter 
Number of Shield Penetrations for piping 
Based on preliminary radiation study to decrease radiation streaming through the shield by 
turning or spiraling the pipe through the edge of a shield initially assumed to be 55 cm thick. 
Space Reactor Shield Design Summary (SPP-67210-0011). 
Does not include control drive mechanism penetration or instrumentation wiring. Assumed 
one hot leg pipe and one cold leg pipe, for limiting shield penetration and radiation streaming. 
Space Reactor Shield Design Summary (SPP-67210-0011). 
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Section 
I Environmental Requirements Document, dated July 6, 2005. 
- 
Rx Gamma (TID) I Total Ionizing Dose (TID) based on JPL document 982-00029, Prometheus Project 
Payload Rx Neutron (DDD) 
Parameter 
Number of Shield Penetrations for CDM 
Report (SPP-67210-001 I). - - 
Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) based on JPL document 982-00029, Prometheus project 
- 
Justification and References 
Does not include piping penetration or instrumentation wiring. Reactor studies have used 12 - 
as a base case for reactivity controls with sensitivities resulting in more reactivity controllers to 
decrease the space envelope of the reactor. Reactor Pre-conceptual Design Report (SPP- 
6741 0-001 3/B-SE(REI-0003, dated January 27, 2006), Shielding Pre-conceptual Design 
Behind Shield Rx + Space Neutron (DDD) 
~nvironmental Requirements Document, dated July 6, 2005. 
- 
Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) based on the limiting radiation dose to materials just 
Ill. Braytons 
I 
I Com~ressor Outlet Pressure 
Brayton Shaft Speed 
Power delivered from alternator 
engineering, and science loads. 6ased on [(I 30 kW thrusters output10.72 Electric Propulsion 
efficiency) + 5 kWe (Vehicle operation)]/ 0.95 PMAD efficiency = 195 -200 kWe and on JPL 
document 982-001 15, revision 2, Prometheus Project Multi-mission Project Derived 
Requirements, dated July 15. 2005. 
- 
Oriainally set based on coolant selection and system optimization from past JIM0 trade 
Rx + Space Gamma (TID) 
Number of Braytons 
and system Architecture section 3. 
- 
Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and Brayton Turboalternator Section 9.1. 
- 
Alternator output required to meet spaceship electrical power needs, including propulsion, 
I stuiies. -~ased  on SNPP Heat Balance section 6 and Brayton Turboalternator Section 9.1. 
I Com~ressor Inlet Tem~erature 1 Decreasina com~ressor inlet temperature increases cycle efficiencies. Based on SNPP ~ e a c  
behind the shield. - 
Total Ionizing Dose (TID) based on the limiting radiation dose to materials just behind the 
shield by current standards; the most limiting dose was due to cabling and wiring. - 
- 
Four converters were originally selected as a comparison basis when other concepts were 
being evaluated with a range of 1 to 4 converters. Based on SNPP Heat Batance Section 6 
Compressor Pressure Ratio 
Converter Loop Pipe Outer Diameter 
Alternator Loop Pipe Outer Diameter 
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Balance ~Gction'6 and Brayton ~"rboalternator ~ect idn 9.1. 
- 
Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and Brayton Turboalternator Section 9.1. 
- 
Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and Piping Section 9.4. 
- 
Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and Piping Section 9.4. 
- 
IV. Valves 
V. Recuperator 
Isolation Valves 
Check Valves 
Number of Recuperators 
- 
Based on minimizing pressure drops and temperatures; Heat Balance Section 6. 
- 
Based on minimizing pressure drops and temperatures; Heat Balance Section 6. 
- 
- 
Four converters were originally selected as a comparison basis when other concepts were 
- 
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1 I ( High Pressure side of Recuperator dPlP I Indicates fraction of inlet pressures. Based on heat balance in section 6 and Recuperator 
Section 
1 Section 9.2 ] Low Pressure side of Recuperator dP1P 1 Indicates fraction of inlet pressures. Based on heat balance in section 6 and Recu~erator 
Parameter 
being evaluated. Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and System Architecture Section 3. 
Justification and References 
VI. Gas Cooler 
1 3. 1 Gas Side of Gas Cooler dPlP 1 Indicated fraction of inlet pressure. Based on heat balance in section 6 and Gas Cooler 
Number of Gas Coolers 
Recuperator effectiveness 
Four converters were originally selected as a comparison basis when other concepts were 
being evaluated. Based on SNPP Heat Balance Section 6 and System Architecture Section 
I agent. 
1 Heat Rejection System Fluid ) Based on SPP-67310-0009 and NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Subcontractor- 
Section 9.2. 
Based on heat balance in section 6 and Recuperator Section 9.2. 
VII. Radiator 
I provided Reactor Module Segment Design Description Report, SDRL SE-002-001. 
( Two-sided Radiator Area with 14.5% Margin ( This is an objective not a requirement. Further trades would be required for radiator area and 
temperature.- Current heat balances (section 6) show radiator are& up to 626 rn2 for a 
200kWe power system. Based on NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Subcontractor- 
Pressure Drop in HRS Side of Gas Cooler 
Gas Cooler effectiveness 
1 1 provided '~eacto; Module Segment Design Description Report, SDRL SE-002-001. 1 Inlet Coolant Temperature I This is an objective not a requirement. Further trades would be required for radiator area and 
section 9.3. 
Based on heat balance in section 6 and Gas Cooler section 9.3. 
Based on heat balance in section 6 and Gas Cooler section 9.3. 
Northrop Grumman Space Technology (NGST) was the Heat Rejection System (HRS) design 
temperature.- Based on  eat Balance Section 6, Heat Rejection system Section 9.6, and 
NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Subcontractor-provided Reactor Module Segment I Design Description ~ e ~ o r t ,  SDRL SE-002-001. 
I Emissivity 1 Based on NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Subcontractor-provided Reactor Module 
I 1 provided Reactor Module Segment Design Description Report, SDRL SE-002-001. 
1 Number of Pumps per Loop 1 Based on HRS Section 9.6 and NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Subcontractor- 
HRS Operating Pressure 
Pressure Drop in Loop 
Number of Loops 
I . . I provided Reactor Module Segment Design ~esc r i~ t i oh  Report, SDRL SE-002-001. I 
Segment Design Description ~eport,  SDRL SE-002-001. 
Assumes HRS coolant is water. Based on SPP67310-0009. 
Based on Heat Balance Section 6 and NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Sub- 
contractor-provided Reactor Module Segment Design Description Report, SDRL SE-002-001. 
Based on HRS Section 9.6 and NGST Prometheus Spacecraft Module and Subcontractor- 
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Start Inverter 
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Pump Speed (Multispeed) 
Water Flow 
Inlet Temperature 
Outlet Temperature 
TBD 
600 cm3/s 
505 K 
379 K 
TBD 
10-1 000 C ~ V S  
250-570 K 
250- 430 K 
N A 
K20 cm3/s 
k3.0 K 
Q.0 K 
N A 
1 0 cm3/s 
1.5 K 
1.0 K 
N A 
1 sec 
10 sec 
10 sec 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 2-16 
Table 24: Promethe~ 
Section 
I. Reactor 
Pre-Conce~tual Instrumentation 
Parameter 
Outlet Temperature 
Inlet Temperature 
W~de Range 
Flux Based Power 
and Control Parameters References and Justifications 
Justification and References - 
The reactor outlet temperature 11 50 K is the nominal value for the four loop non-optimized Brayton 
system of Section 6. The range 250-1280 K assumes the plant maintains ternperaiure not below 250 K, 
a * I0 K control band for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of M.5% and a 10% 
uncertainty for transient performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy *5K is *0.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, high 
temperature FBG sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The resolution of f K is a factor 5 times finer than the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is continuous; the 
associated signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision sensor including its thermal 
and instrumentation response. - 
The reactor inlet temperature 911 K is the nominal value for the four loop non-optimized Brayton system 
of Section 6. The range 250-1000 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 250 K , a i l O  
K control band for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy *0.5% and 10% uncertainty for 
transient performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy k4K is i0.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, high 
temperature FBG sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The resolution of 1 K is a factor 4 times finer than the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is continuous; the 
associated signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision sensor including its thermal 
and instrumentation response. - 
The single wide range nudear detector has been pursued for the SNPP to minimize the number and types of 
detectors. It would cover a range of power from lxfo8 % to 2x1 0' %, -1 ldecades, to monitor reactor operations. 
from initial startup to full power. Fission counter technology is capable of this wide range performance assuming it 
is located near the reactor fore of the shield and in the radiation shield nearest the reactor. 
The nuclear instrumentation for the wide range detector must be a logarithmic instrument. For this reason its 
accuracy of i 1% is defined on a percent of point basis. Accuracy and resolution reflect the typical capabilities of ;3 
high precision, digital nuclear instrument. 
The nuclear detector and its associated instrumentation is generally characterized by a rapid response 
time of the order of 1 second or less over most of the anticipated range. 
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Parameter 
Outlet Pressure 
Outlet Volumetric Flow 
Outlet Temperature 
Justification and References 
The nominal compressor outlet pressure 2000kPa value for the four loop non-ootimized Bravton system of 
Section 6 is assumed. 
The range of the pressure detector 0-2200 assumes a detector technology capable of sensing 0 kPa and a 
maximum value approximately 110% of the nominal value allowing for uncertainty and transient plant 
performance. 
The accuracy of H 5  kPa is based on a typical commercial pressure detector capability of 2% of the operating 
range. Assumes a 2% accuracy over operation range. 
The resolution of 9 kPa is 5 times finer than the absolute accuracy. 
The 1 second time response typifies a high precision pressure sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The nominal volumetric Row of 0.1 5 m3/sec (corresponding to a mass flow of 3.08 kglsec) for the four loop non- 
optimized Brayton system of Section 6 is assumed. 
The range 0.01-1 m3/sec has been selected to cover a sufficiently wide range of operation to provide for plant 
startup at reduced flows, full power operation, and casualty performance. 
The accuracy of k0.0025 m3/sec typifies the accuracy of 0.25% of point found in gas industry ultrasonic flow 
metering equipment. 
The time constant of 1 second typifies high precision pressure sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The nominal compressor outlet temperature 538 K for the four loop non-optimized Brayton system of 
Section 6 is assumed. 
The range 250-600 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 250 K, a *I0 K control band 
for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of iO.5%, and a 70% uncertainty for transient 
performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy G! K is *0.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, 
high temperature FBG or RTD sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The resolution of I K is a fador 2 times finer than the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is continuous; the 
associated signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision temperature sensor including 
its thermal and instrumentation response. 
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Section 
Ill. Recuperator 
IV. Gas Cooler 
Parameter 
lnlet Temperature 
lnlet Temperature 
lnlet Temperature 
- -- - - - -- - - - 
Justification and ~efereices - 
The nominal compressor inlet temperature 390 K for the four loop non-optimized Brayton system of 
Section 6 is assumed. 
The range 250-460 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 250 K, a * I0  K control band 
for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of *0.5%, and a 10% uncertainty for transient 
performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy i1 K is k0.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, 
high temperature FBG or RTD sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The resolution of 1 K equals the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is continuous; the associated 
signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision temperature sensor including 
its thermal and instrumentation response. 
- 
The nominal recuperator inlet temperature 943 K for the four loop non-optimized Brayton system of 
Section 6 is assumed. 
The range 250-1040 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 250 K, a *I0 K control band 
for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of i0.5%, and a 10% uncertainty for transient 
performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy *5 K is a.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, 
high temperature FBG or RTD sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The resolution of I K is a factor of 5 times finer than the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is 
continuous; the associated signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to 
achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision temperature sensor including 
its thermal and instrumentation response. 
- 
The nominal gas cooler inlet temperature 559 K for the four loop non-optimized Brayton system of 
Section 6 is assumed. 
The range 250-630 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 250 K, a 41 0 K control band 
for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of k0.5%, and a 10% uncertainty for transient 
performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy k2 K is *0.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, 
high temperature FBG or RTD sensor with digital instrumentation. 
- 
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Parameter 
Bleed Temperature 
Continuous Position 
Justification and References 
The resolution of 1 K is a factor of 2 times finer than the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is 
continuous; the associated signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to 
achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision temperature sensor including 
its thermal and instrumentation response. 
The nominal alternator bleed temperature 456 K for a non-optimized single loop Brayton architecture 
and heat balance is assumed. 
The range 250-510 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 250 K, a *I0 K control band 
for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of m.5%, and a 10% uncertainty for transient 
performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. 
The accuracy *I .2 K is M.5% of the baseline operating range. Accuracy value typifies high precision, 
high temperature FBG or RTD sensor with digital instrumentation. 
The resolution of 1 K is a factor 1.2 times finer than the absolute accuracy. The sensor signal is 
continuous; the associated signal processing circuitry must be capable of resolving it sufficiently to 
achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 10 seconds typifies the response of a high precision temperature sensor including 
its thermal and instrumentation response. 
Each reactivity control slider will have a position sensing device that measures its actual realtime 
absolute location. The slider for the SNPP reactors is characterized by a linear movement over a range 
from 0 to 45 cm. 
Based on the slider range and its step size of 0.1 cm, an accuracy of a .05  cm equal to 0.1% of range 
has been chosen. This accuracy is typical of position indication technologies such as LVDT and 
ultrasonic devices used for this application. 
A resolution of 0.005 cm has been chosen, 10 times finer than the absolute accuracy to ensure any 
movement of the slider is identified. For continuous signal position detector technologies like LVDT and 
ultrasonic devices, the associated signal processing circuitry must be capabb of resdving the signal 
sufficiently to achieve the resolution. 
The time constant of 1 second typifies the response of a high precision position sensor including its 
sensor and instrumentation response. 
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Section Parameter 
Discrete Position 1 
Discrete Position 2 
Discrete Position 3 
Continuous Position 
Discrete Position 1 
Discrete Position 2 
Justification and References - 
One discrete position sensor is considered rewired for monitorina the slider in its stowed position prior 
to launch and'operation of the SNPP reactor. it is a fixed positionsensor that confirms theslider in'the 
fully withdrawn position. Photo, proximity, and microswitch technologies are typically applied as discrete 
position sensors. An accuracy of M.05 cm of point and resolution of 0.005 crn of point for the sensor 
equal to that of continuous position sensor is readily achievable. A response time of 0.001 seconds is 
common for these discrete position technologies. 
- 
One discrete position sensor is considered required for monitoring the slider at the boundary of the 
active core region if this position is different from its stowed location. As initial critical operaions 
commence, this sensor may be used as an interlock or confirmation of the continuous position. Photo, 
proximity, and microswitch technologies are typically applied as discrete position sensors. An accuracy 
of k0.05 cm of point and resolution of 0.005 cm of point for the sensor equal to that of continuous 
position sensor is readily achievable. A response time of 0.001 seconds is common for these discrete 
position technologies.. - 
One discrete position sensor is considered required for monitoring the slider near its expected critical 
position. This sensor may be used as an interfock or confirmationof the continuous position. Photo, 
proximity, and microswitch technologies are typically applied as discrete position sensors. An accuracy 
of k0.05 crn of point and resolution of 0.005 cm of point for the sensor equal to that of continuous 
position sensor is readily achievable. A response time of 0.001 seconds is common for these discrete 
position technologies. - 
Each reactivity control drum will have a position sensing device that measures its actual realtime 
absolute location. The drum for the SNPP reactors is characterized by a rotary movement over a range 
from 0 to 360 degrees. 
An accuracy and resolution of k0.1 degrees equal to 0.03% of range has been selected for this 
continuous position sensor. These values are typical of the rotary position sensor technologies such as 
resolver devices. 
The time constant of 1 second typifies the response of a high precision position sensor including its 
sensor and instrumentation response. - 
One discrete position sensor is considered required for monitoring the drum in its stowed position prior 
to launch and operation of the SNPP reactor. It is a fixed position sensor that confirms the drum in the 
fully withdrawn position. Photo, proximity, and microswitcl~ technologies are typically applied as discrete 
position sensors. An accuracy of &.ldegree of point and resolution of 0.1 degree of point for the sensor 
equal to that of continuous position sensor is readily achievable. A response time of 0.001 seconds is 
common for these discrete position technologies. 
- 
One discrete position sensor is considered required for monitoring the drum at the boundary of the 
active core region. It is a fixed position sensor that confirms the drum in this position. Photo, proximity, 
and microswitch technologies are typically applied as discrete position sensors. An accuracy of 
k0.ldegree of point and a resolution of 0.3 degree of point for the sensor equal to that of continuous 
position sensor is readily achievable: A response time of 0.001 seconds is common for these discrete 
bosition technologies. . 
Drum Position 
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Section 7 
Safety Rod 
VII. Valves I== 
Parameter 
Discrete Position 3 
Discrete Position I 
Discrete Position 2 
Sensor 1 
Sensor 2 
Justification and References 
One discrete position sensor is considered required for monitoring the drum near its expected critical 
position. it is a fixed position sensor that confirms the drum in thisposition. Photo, proximity, and 
rnicroswitch technologies are typically applied as discrete position sensors. An accuracy of Hlldegree 
of point and a resolution of 0.1 degree of point for the sensor equal to that of continuous position sensor 
is readily achievable. A respanse time of 0.001 seconds is common for these discrete position 
technologies. 
One discrete fixed position sensor is considered required for monitoring the safety rod in its fully 
inserted position prior to launch and operation of the SNPP reactor. Photo, proximity, and microswitcb 
technologies are typically applied as discrete position sensors. An accuracy of M.05 cm of point and 
resolution of 0.005 cm of point for the sensor equal to that of continuous position sensor is readily 
achievable. A response time of 0.001 seconds is common for these discrete position technologies. 
One discrete fixed position sensor is considered required for monitoring the safety rod in its fully 
withdrawn position after launch and prior to initial critical operations of the SNPP reactor. Photo, 
proximity, and microswitch technologies are typically applied as discrete position sensors. An accuracy 
of k0.05 cm of point and resolution of 0.005 crn of point for the sensor equal to that of continuous 
position sensor is readily achievable. A response time of 0.001 seconds is common for these discrete 
poslion technologies. 
In multiple-loop SNPP architectures with 2 or more Brayton machines, valves are used to dired coolant 
flow appropriately. Sensing of valve position is necessary for monitoring and control of these valves. 
For each valve a discrete fixed position sensor is required to be active (asserted) when the valve is in its 
OPEN position. Otherwise it is inactive (deasserted). Photo, proximity, and microswitch technologies are 
typically applied as discrete position sensors. Accuracy and resolution values for the sensor of 0.1% of 
point and 0.01% of point and a response of 0.001 seconds are typical of these technologies 
In multiple-loop SNPP architectures with 2 or more Brayton machines, valves are used to direct coolant 
flow appropriately. Sensing of valve position is necessary for monitoring and control of these valves. 
For each valve a discrete fixed position sensor is required to be active (asserted) when the valve is in its 
SHUT position. Otherwise it is inactive (deasserted). Photo, proximity, and rnicroswitch technologies are 
typically applied as discrete position sensors. Accuracy and resolution values for the sensor of 0.1% of 
point and 0.01% of point and a response of 0.001 seconds are typical of these technologies. 
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Section 
VIII. PCAD 
Alternator 
Parameter 
Voltage 
Current 
Frequency 
(Brayton Speed) 
Power [Single Alternator] 
Total Power r w o  Alternators] 
Justification and References 
The line-to-line 3 phase altemating voltage output of each Brayton machine altemator is to be measured 
for monitoring and control of the altemator, the machine, and the power plant. A nominal iine-to-line 
voltage of 450 volts at 2250 Hz is assumed at full power operation. To accommodate startup and steady 
state operations, the sensor would have a wide range capability of 0 - 500 volts with an accuracy of 
a . 5  volts (0.1% FS), a resolution of 0.1 volts (0.01% FS), and a time constant of 1 second including 
sensor and instrumentation. These criteria represent typical capabilities of commercial sinusoidal 
- .  
voltage meters. 
The 3 phase alternating current output of each Brayton machine alternator is to be measured for 
monitoring and control of the alternator, the machine, and the power plant. A nominal phase current of 
128 A at 2250 Hz is assumed at full power operation. To accommodate startup and steady state 
operations, the sensor would have a wide range capability of O - 150 A with an accuracy of *.I5 A, a 
resolution of 0.03 A, and a time constant of 1 second including sensor and instrumentation. These 
criteria represent typical capabilities of commercial sinusoidal current meters. 
The frequency of each Brayton machine alternator is to be measured for monitoring and control of the 
alternator, the machine, and the power plant. In this usage, the frequency of the alternator may be used 
as a measure of the speed of the Brayton machine and the coolant flow through the plant. A nominal 
frequency of 2250 Hz is assumed at full power operation. To accommodate startup, transitions in power 
level. steady state. and transient operations, the sensor would have a wide range capability of 450-2475 
Hz corresponding to 9k to SOkRPM. Representing the typical capabilities of commercial metering 
equipment for sinusoidal frequency measurement, an accuracy of iO.225 Hz (#.Ol%FS, fi.5 RPM), a 
resolution of 0.1 Hz (0.005%FS, 2.0 RPM), and a I second response time including sensor and 
instrumentation have been selected. 
The power output of each Brayton machine alternator is to be measured for monitoring and control of 
the alternator, the machine, and the power plant. A nominal power of 97.0 kWe is assumed at full power 
operation based on a nonaptimized four loop Brayton machine rated for 100 kWe operation. To 
accommodate startup, transitions in power level, steady state, and transient operations, the sensor 
would have a wide range capability of 0-1 10 kWe providing 10% margin to the nominal value. RMS 
evaluations of the altemator current and voltage uncertainties of #.2% are assumed to obtain a M.2 
kWe accuracy. The resolution of 0.03 assumes voltage and current measurement resolutions of 0.2%. 
A 1 second response time including sensor and instrumentation typifies commercial electrical metering 
equipment. 
The total power output from both 100 kWe Brayton machines is to be measured for monitoring and 
control of the power plant. A norninal power of 193.9 kWe is based on the non-optimized four loop 
Brayton system of Section 6. To accommodate startup, transitions in power level, steady state, and 
transient operations, the sensor would have a wide range capability of 0-220 kWe providing 10% margin 
to the norninal value. RMS evaluations of the alternator current and voltage uncertainties of M.2% are 
assumed to obtain a f l . 4  kWe accuracy. The resolution of 0.06 kWe assumes voltage and current 
measurement resolutions of 0.2%. A 1 second response time including sensor and instrumentation 
typifies commercial electrical metering equipment. 
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Section r 
Start Inverter 
I Parasitic Load 
Radiator 
IX. Radiator 
Parameter 
Voltage 
Current 
Frequency 
(Brayton Speed) 
Power 
Voltage 
Current 
Power 
Pump Speed (multispeed) 
Justification and References 
The start inverter supplies 3 phase electrical power to the Brayton alternator to motor the machine 
during its startup. A nominal line-to-line voltage of 135 volts is assumed based on the anticipated speed 
of the machine for startup. A nominal range 0-1 50 volts provides 10% margin. An accuracy of iO.15 
volts (a.1 %FS), a resolution of 0.01 volts (0.01 % FS), and a response of 1 second are typical values 
associated with commercial voltage metering equipment. 
The start inverter supplies 3 phase electrical power to the Brayton altemator to motor the machine 
during its startup. A nominal phase current of 13 A is assumed based on the anticipated speed of the 
machine for startup. A nominal range 0-15 A provides 10% margin. An accuracy of *0.015 A (&O.l%FS), 
a resolution of 0.003 A (0.02% FS). and a response of 1 second are typical values associated with 
commercial current metering equipment. 
The start inverter s u ~ ~ l i e s  3 phase electrical Dower to the Bravton alternator to motor the machine 
during its startup.   he nominal frequency of 675 Hz correspo&s to the machine speed of 13500 RPM, 
the assumed motoring speed for machine startup. The range of 125-750 Hz provides 10% margin. The 
accuracy of k0.07 Hz (*O.Ol%FS, I .5 RPM), resolution of 0.03 Hz (0.005% FS, 0.75 RPM), and a 
response of 1 second are typical values associated with commercial frequency measurement equipment 
The start inverter supplies 3 phase electrical power to the Brayton alternator to motor the machine 
during its startup. The nominal power of 2.7 kWe corresponding to the machine speed of 13500 RPM is 
assumed. A meter range of 0-5 kWe reflects the large potential variation in this value during startup. The 
accuracy of H.01 kWe assumes an RMS evaluation of voltage and current accuracies of 0.2%FS. The 
resolution of 0.001 kWe assumes an RMS evaluation of the voltage and current resolutions of 0.02%FS. 
These accuracies and resolution, and the 1 second response typify voltage and current metering 
equipment and the resulting power measure. 
The PLR absorbs the output of the Brayton alternator up to its maximum output plus a few additional 
percent to accommodate speed regulation at full power conditions. Therefore, nominal line-to-line 3 
phase alternating voltage output of each Brayton machine alternator is 450 volts at 2250 Hz. The 
voltage metering equipment for the PLR would be the same as the Brayton alternator voltage metering 
equipment and have the same accuracies, resolution, and response time. 
The PLR absorbs the output of the Brayton alternator up to its maximum output plus a few additional 
percent to accommodate speed regulation at full power conditions. The nominal phase current of each 
PLR under full load conditions of 135 A has been selected. The current metering equipment for the PLR 
would be the same as the Braytan altemator current metering equipment and have the same 
accuracies, resolution, and response time. 
The PLR absorbs the output of the Brayton alternator up to its maximum output plus a few additional 
percent to accommodate speed regulation at full power conditions. Therefore the PLR nominal value of 
103 kWe has been selected for operation at full power conditions. The power metering equipment for 
the PLR would be the same as the Brayton alternator power metering equipment and have the same 
accuracies, resolution, and response time. 
The method of pump speed measurement had not been determined. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
6-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 2-24 
Section 7 Parameter 
Water Flow 
inlet Temperature 
Outlet Temperature 
Justification and References - 
The nominal water mass flow through the heat rejection is 0.70 kglsec corresponding to a volumetric 
flow rate of approximately 600 crn31sec based on the four loop non-optimized Brayton system. 
Flowmeters are generally capable of measurement ratios of 1 300 providing a design range of 10-1 000 
for the HRS flow measure, Flowmeters typically have 2% (320 cm31sec) accuracies, 1% (1 0 cm3fsec) 
resolutions, and responses times of 1 second including instrumentation. 
The nominal heat rejection system inlet temperature of 505 K is based on the four loop non-optimized 
Brayton system of Section 6. The range 250-570 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 
250 K, a i f 0  K control band for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of kf % and a 10% 
uncertainty for transient performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. The 
accuracy of *3 K (1% of range) and the resolution of 1.5 K (0.5% of range) and the 10 second response 
typify the characteristics of quality commercial temperature sensors and instmrnentation. 
The nominal heat rejection system outlet temperature of 379 K is based on the four loop non-optimized 
Brayton system of Section 6. The range 250430 K assumes the plant maintains temperature not below 
250 K, a * I0 K control band for reactor operation at full power, the stated accuracy of i 1 %  and a 10% 
uncertainty for transient performance due to casualty or maneuvering. The number is rounded. The 
accuracy of G.0 K (1% of range) and the resolution of 1.0 K (0.5% of range) and the 10 second 
response typify the characteristics of quality commercial temperature sensors and instrumentation. 
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3 System Architecture 
3.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of the following discussion is to highlight observations and conclusions relative to 
selection of a basic architecture for the direct gas cooled nuclear reactor with Brayton energy 
conversion concept selected for the Prometheus application (Reference 3-1). The Reactor Coolant 
Segment would incorporate one or more parallel Brayton energy conversion toops with various 
degrees of cross-connectivity (cross-strapping) between converter loop components. The 
nomenclature "system architecture" is intended to describe the basic plant configuration (i.e. the 
number of Brayton units and extent of cross-strapping between converter loops) and does not relate 
to the physical arrangement of the components that comprise the Reactor Coolant Segment. Since 
the functional requirements for the Reactor Module were not finalized, the system architecture was 
not selected. This section compares the attributes of several basic plant architecture schemes 
considered by the NRPCT to be viable candidates. 
A few key observations regarding system architecture are: 
A single Brayton system offers the simplest design, the least required component 
development, and the simplest plant operation. The single Brayton system also has the 
lowest mass, lowest radiator area, and highest thermal efficiency. The singIe Brayton 
concept should be considered along with other system architectures, recognizing the potential 
for departure from the desire to maintain single point failure tolerance. 
To meet the single failure tolerance criteria; multiple Brayton units would be required, 
resulting in a mass penalty and overall thermal efficiency decrement relative to a single 
Brayton system. It is noted that the approach to use multiple components is based on the 
Level 2 Prometheus Requirement to meet the NASA Single Point Failure Policy. NASA 
experience indicates the prudence of having redundant components, even if they have 
demonstrated reliability, to ensure that manufacturing defects, human error, or an unexpected 
event does not lead to a mission ending failure. This is also consistent with NRPCT practice. 
For those components where redundancy is considered impractical, exceptions to the single 
point failure avoidance requirement is provided. 
In systems with more than one installed Brayton unit, it may be preferred to normally run all of 
the installed Brayton units even though full power output could be achieved with only one or 
two Brayton units in operation. This mode of operation may be desirable if the probability of 
failure of a Brayton unit during startup is sufficiently high. However, operating each loop at 
less than its full power capability, i.e. away from its full-power design point, leads to a 
reduction in overall system efficiency that must be compensated for by an increase in reactor 
power and an increase in radiator area and associated mass penalties. However, the 
benefits of this concept will be impacted by the need for an electric power system that would 
enable operation of the ion propulsion power units at multiple Brayton speeds. Such an 
electrical system may be significantly more complex than those that are designed for a single 
Brayton speed during spaceship thrusting periods. 
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Several factors were planned to be considered as part of the system architecture decision pending 
finalization of mission requirements: 
Compatibility with mission requirements and Reactor Module functional requirements 
System mass comparisons and the ability to trade mass and reliability for key components 
Heat balance comparisons (resulting operating and design parameters; margin to material and 
component design limits) 
System and component reliability, redundancy, and complexity comparisons; ability to 
accommodate any unforeseen casualties or alternate operating modes 
Component availability and technology development challenges (e.g. high temperature, large 
diameter, long life gas valves) 
Capability of the Brayton components to provide the required power output and efficiency 
during all required modes of operation 
Compatibility with preferred operational strategies and the feasibility of part-load operation 
The influence the number of operating Braytons has on other spaceship systems (e.g. heat 
rejection segment, electric power distribution, angular momentum) 
Ability to arrange the necessary hardware in the system behind the shield cone with 
appropriate allowance for thermal growth while minimizing hydraulic losses 
Compatibility of the system configuration with a number of potential future missions including 
longer duration missions and surface exploration missions 
While the NRPCT evatuated reactor plant concepts for gas cooied reactors, liquid metal cooled 
reactors, and heat pipe cooled reactors for the reactor concept selection in early 2005 (Reference 3- 
I), Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and Noflhrop Grumman Space Technology (NGST) developed a 
preliminary spaceship arrangement, called the Prometheus Baseline 1 (PB1). The PBI reactor plant 
concept was a liquid metal reactor with four parallel Brayton energy conversion loops. Redundant 
Brayton loops were assumed for several reasons: 
Simultaneous operation of two Brayton units provides continuity of power after failure of one 
Brayton unit, allowing for startup of a standby unit without reliance on energy storage systems 
Each Brayton unit would need to provide power for only a portion of the mission duration 
allowing shorter design life components 
Operating Braytons in counter-rotating pairs cancels angular momentum to ensure spaceship 
orientation (pointing) stability during science orbits 
Tolerance of single point failures is a NASA design requirement and provides protection 
against unforeseen issues 
The approach to use multiple components is based on the Level 2 Prometheus Requirement to meet 
the NASA Single Point Failure Policy. NASA experience indicates the prudence of having redundant 
components, even if they have demonstrated reliability, to ensure that manufacturing defects, human 
error, or an unexpected event does not lead to a mission ending failure. This is also consistent with 
NRPCT practice. For those components where redundancy is considered impractical, exceptions to 
the single point failure avoidance requirement is provided. For the currently envisioned Prometheus 
spacecraft, the reactor, the reactor coolant loop, the boom, and the xenon propellant tank all require 
such exceptions. 
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The excess work from the turbine is converted to electricity by the alternator to power the ion 
propulsion system and on-board instrumentation. Electrical power in excess of demand is 
shed using a Parasitic Load Radiator (PLR). 
A number of different plant architectures have been envisioned. Leading candidates include: 
Operate one turboalternator without spares. Use alternate means for momentum 
compensation (if required). 
Operate one turboalternator with one or more spares. A second unit would be placed in 
service in the event of a failure of the primary unit by means of an energy storage device; 
e.g, battery, flywheel, etc. Use alternate means for momentum compensation (if required). 
Operate two counter-rotating turboalternators without spares. In the event of failure of one 
of the operating units, -50% of the full power output could be achieved. 
Operate two counter-rotating turboalternators without spares. These units would both 
normally operate at -50% of their design capability. Thus, in the event of failure of one of 
the operating units, the remaining unit would be able to produce the full power output. Use 
alternative means for momentum compensation iflwhen required. 
Operate three turboalternators with potentially one counter-rotating turbine without spares. 
The three units would normally operate at -66% of their design capability. Thus, in the 
event of failure of one of the operating units, the two remaining units would be able to 
produce the full power output. Use alternative means for momentum compensation if 
required. 
Operate with two co-rotating turboalternators for most of the mission life, i.e. periods when 
momentum compensation is not required, with one installed spare. The spare unit would 
rotate in the opposite direction and be placed in service upon failure of one of the other 
units or when the spaceship requires momentum compensation, e.g, science orbit. 
Operate two counter-rotating turboalternators and have a spare pair of counter-rotating 
turboalternators. Each turboalternator would normally operate at its design capability, 
providing -50% of the total electrical output. Each turboalternator unit would be paired 
with a spare unit that shares a common recuperator and gas cooler through cross- 
strapping of converter loop piping and required valving. 
Operate with two counter-rotating turboalternators and a spare pair of counter-rotating 
turboalternators. Each turboalternator would normally operate at its design capability, 
providing -50% of the total electrical output. Each turboalternator would have a dedicated 
recuperator and gas cooler. This is essentially the same as the architecture described in G 
with the addition of two recuperators and two gas coolers and fewer valves. This is the 
base case used in the JPUNGST derived PBI study. 
Additional detail pertaining to the architectures listed above is provided in Sections 3.3 through 3.10. 
Other architectures, not detailed here, were also considered that combined loop heat exchangers into 
a common structure while maintaining independent internal flowpaths and heat transfer surfaces as a 
means of minimizing mass and possibly improving reliability. Section 5 of this report includes pictorial 
representations of several of the system architecture options described herein. 
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3.3 Single Operating Brayton Unit (1-1-1 ~rrangement') 
3.3.1 System Design 
One 200 kWe Brayton unit, with dual alternator stator windings 
One recuperator sized to service one 200 kWe Brayton unit 
One gas cooler sized to reject heat from one 200 kWe Brayton energy conversion loop (may 
be multiple independent flow paths housed within a common pressure boundary; see Section 
3.1 6.2 for a discussion of the gas cooler interface with the HRS) 
NO valves 
Brayton Turboalternator Capability 
The feasibility of this plant configuration, and other configurations where a single Brayton unit is 
required to provide the full plant output (Sections 3.4 and 3.6), is predicated upon the ability of a 
Brayton unit to produce 200 kWe while maintaining other plant parameters at acceptable values. 
Based on fundamental scaling laws incorporated in the SRPS-opt code developed by the NASA 
Glenn Research Center (GRC) and supported by GRC calculations of Brayton performance maps, 
operation of a 200 kWe Brayton is possible and would allow for higher system efficiency, higher 
operating pressure, and higher helium content in the gas. Each of these effectively reduces demand 
on the reactor by reducing required power level and permitting more efficient heat transfer. Additional 
information pertaining to the scalability of Brayton turbomachinery and associated operational 
considerations is provided in Section 9.1. 
Operation of a single Brayton unit at full plant power could ailow for a reduction in plant operating 
temperature while still achieving the required power output. Figure 3-3 compares the system 
efficiency for two units producing 100 kWe each to one unit producing 200 kWe as a function of 
reactor outlet temperature for the same operating conditions. 
The designation of I -1- j  or B-R-G where B is the number of Brayton units, R is the number of recuperators 
sized to support the operation of one Brayton unit at 100% of its rated power and G is the number of gas coolers 
sized to support the operation of one Brayton unit at 100% of its rated power. It does not indicate the number of 
individual recuperators or gas cooler assemblies as more than one unit may be housed within a common 
pressure boundary to achieve design objectives; e.g. minimize mass, improve reliability, facilitate system 
arrangement. For example a 2-2-2 for a 200 kWe system with both Braytons running (no spares) would 
incorporate two 100 kWe Brayton units with two recuperators and two gas coolers, each sized to support a 100 
kWe Brayton unit. The gas cooler and/or recuperator may be physically one unit with multiple flow paths or 
independent flow paths or multiple units. See Section 3.1 1 for additional discussion. 
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3.3.3 Normal Operation 
Brayton unit is in service at all times 
During Propulsion mode: [ I  1501 K, [45000] rpm (temperature used to control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduced temperature, reduced speed (temperature andlor speed 
used to control Brayton cycle) 
3.3.4 Abnormal Operation 
r On loss of the operating Brayton unit, compressor or alternator - End of Mission. 
- I . 
Simplest system design and operation I Mission is lost if Brayton unit fails 
Table 3-1: System Pros and Cons; Single Operating Brayton Unit (I -1-1 Arrangement) 
Pros 
Lowest system mass 
Cons 
Valves are not required 
May be less able to accommodate any unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than other 
svstem architectures 
For spacecraft applications, momentum 
compensation system may be required 
Four gas cooler heat exchangers in a common 
pressure boundary - simplified piping 
Minimizes the potential for gas leakage from the 
system 
Highest thermal efficiency (potentially lowest 
reactor outlet temperature) 
Lowest required radiator area 
Straightfoward Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
200 kWe Brayton unit may be greater than that 
required for a 100 kWe Brayton unit 
If the energy conversion system fails in deep 
space, there may not be power to communicate 
the reason for failure 
Dual alternator stator windings are required to 
simplify electrical system 
Easiest arrangement within a space envelope 
interface 
No component redundancy (except alternator 
Stator windin 
' Bracketed values are estimated values which will be finalized as the design progresses. A single Bayton unit 
has the highest cycle efficiency. This efficiency can be traded for other design parameters such as lower 
operating temperatures, larger design margins and/or radiator area. 
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3.4 Single Operating Brayton Unit with Spare Brayton Unit (2-1-1 Arrangement) 
3.4.1 System Design 
Two 200 kWe Brayton units, potentially with dual alternator stator windings 
a One recuperator sized to service one 200 kWe Brayton 
0ne'gas cooler sized to cool one 200 kWe Brayton (may be multiple independent flow paths 
housed within a common pressure boundary) 
Each Brayton has a set of turbine outlet valves, to isolate a Brayton unit and a check valve in 
each alternator cooling line 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, etc.) required to start standby Brayton unit 
Means for momentum compensation may be required 
An isolation valve would be located at each turbine outlet to shutdown an over-speeding unit and to 
limit flow through a non-operating Brayton unit. This valve would be normally shut for a standby 
Brayton unit. 
A check valve or isolation valve would be placed at the compressor outlet to prevent reverse flow 
through the compressor in a non-operating Brayton. The reverse flow would be driven by the 
differential pressure across the operating compressor. Reverse flow through the non-operating 
compressor could cause the Brayton to spin backwards and damage its bearings. If an isolation valve 
were employed, it would have to be normally shut for the standby Brayton. 
A check or isotationlshutoff valve may be required at the alternator outlet to prevent reverse flow 
through the alternator. This flow would be driven by gas cooler differential pressure. 
Commissioning 
Motor of one 200 kWe Brayton using solar electric power to provide coolant flow to the reactor 
Startup the reactor 
Bring the Brayton to self-sustaining power level 
Raise power as needed 
Normal Operation 
One Brayton unit is in service at all times 
During Propulsion mode: [I 1501 K, I450001 rpm (temperature used to control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduced temperature, reduced speed (temperature andlor speed 
used to control Brayton cycle) 
Abnormal Operation 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a complete toss of coolant 
flow. Thus, reactor power must be expeditiously lowered to ensure core thermal limits are not 
exceeded. 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit (turbine, compressor or alternator) - utilize electrical 
power storage device to start the standby Brayton unit and restart the reactor 
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Table 3-2: System Pros and Cons; Single Operating Brayton Unit with a Standby Brayton Unit (2-1-1 
Arrangement) 
Pros Cons 
Can tolerate a single Brayton unit failure High temperature gas valves are required and 
must function to start standby Brayton unit 
Recuperator and gas cooler configurations may 
reduce system mass and reduce potential for gas 
leakage from system 
For Spacecraft applications, momentum 
system may be required 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a 
single Brayton system 
The most limiting components from a gas 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
200 kWe Brayton unit may be greater than that 
required for a 100 kWe Brayton unit 
leakage perspedive Oubing and jointsin heat 
exchangers) are not redundant (number 
minimized) - minimizing the potential for gas 
3.5 Dual Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 50% of Rated System Power 
(2-2-2 Arrangement) 
On a loss of Brayton unit, all flow through 
the reactor is lost 
leakage from the system 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
recuperator) are not redundant, minimizing the 
mass penalty for redundancy 
3.5.1 System Design 
Most severe reactor transients upon loss of a 
Brayton unit - reactor and plant must be able to 
handle this transient 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, 
etc.) required to start standby Brayton unit and 
the reactor 
Two 100 kWe Brayton units, counter-rotational designs 
Two recuperators each sized to service one 100 kWe Brayton unit operating in parallel 
Two gas coolers sized to cool two 100 kWe Braytons (may be multiple independent flow paths 
housed within a common pressure boundary) 
An isolation valve at the compressor outlet could be used in this arrangement to shut down an over- 
speeding Brayton. 
The 2-2-2 system is schematically depicted in Figure 3-5. This schematic also applies to other 2-2-2 
system options, including the option discussed in Section 3.6. The valves shown are consistent with 
the base arrangement stated in the Plant Parameter List (Section 2). The 'NO' associated with the 
isolation valve at each compressor outlet indicates that the valves are normally open when the system 
is operating. The bracketed INS' indicates the position of the isolation valve if the associated Brayton 
is no longer operating and is isolated. 
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3.5.3 Normal Operation 
Two Brayton units in service at all times operating at 100% of rated power 
During Propulsion mode: [1150] K, [45000] rpm (temperature used to control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduced temperature, reduced speed (temperature andlor speed 
used to control Brayton cycle) 
3.5.4 Abnormal Operation 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit, insufficient electrical power to support the mission - may 
provide a minimum power to allow for communications and potential Brayton restart 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay heat removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed. 
Table 3-3: System Pros and Cons; Dual Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 50% of Rated 
System Power (2-2-2 Arrangement) 
Pros Cons 
On a loss of Brayton unit, coolant flow through Mission is lost if one Brayton fails (cannot achieve 
the reactor is maintained 
- 
full power) 
No component redundancy, minimizing Brayton 
loop mass High temperature gas valves may be required 
For spacecraft applications, separate momentum 
compensation system is not required 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
100 kWe Brayton unit may be less than that 
required for a 200 kWe Brayton unit 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, 
etc.) is not required to restart a shutdown Brayton 
unit 
Paired gas coolers simplifies the HRS interface 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a I 
- 
single Brayton system 
The most limiting components from a gas 
leakage perspective (tubing and joints in heat 
exchangers) are not redundant (number 
minimized) - minimizing the potential for gas 
leakage from the system 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
recuperator) are not redundant, minimizing the 
mass penalty for redundancy 
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3.6 Dual Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 100% and 50% of Rated 
System Power (2-2-2s Arrangement) 
System architectures in which the PCAD system is designed to operate at full rated power at multiple 
frequencies are designated with an "s", e.g. 2-2-2s. Additional detail regarding this mode of operation 
is provided in Section 3.1 1. 
3.6.1 System Design 
Two 200 kWe Brayton units, counter-rotational designs, designed to operate at two system 
state points: 50% rated system power and 100% rated system power 
a Two recuperators each sized to service a 200 kWe Brayton (may be multiple independent flow 
paths housed within a common pressure boundary) 
Two gas coolers sized to service a 200 kWe Brayton unit (may be multiple independent flow 
paths housed within a common pressure boundary) 
Each Brayton has a set of valves at the compressor outlet to allow for isolation of a failed 
Brayton unit 
An isolation valve or a combination of an isolation valve and a check valve at the compressor outlet 
could be used in this arrangement to shut down an over-speeding Brayton or to isolate an out of 
commission loop, minimizing backflow. The check valve would be used to prevent back flow through 
the standby Brayton. The isolation valve would be used to stop an over-speeding Brayton. 
The 2-2-2s system is schematically depicted in Figure 3-5. 
Commissioning 
Motor one 200 kWe Brayton using solar electric power to provide coolant flow to the reactor 
Startup the reactor 
Bring the first Brayton to self-sustaining power level 
Startup of the second 200 kWe Brayton using electric power from the operating Brayton 
Raise power as needed 
Normal Operation 
Two Brayton units in service at all times operating at 50% of rated power, isolation valves 
open 
During Propulsion mode: [Reserved] K, [Reserved] rpm (temperature and speed used to 
control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduce temperature further (temperature used to change operating 
state points) 
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3.6.4 Abnormal Operation 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit, electrical loads are transferred to the remaining Brayton 
unit by adjusting reactor outlet temperature and Brayton speed as discussed in Section 3.1 I. 
The compressor outlet isolation valves are shut in the loop with the damaged Brayton unit 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed. 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, electrical power would continue to be available from the 
operating Brayton unit; therefore, an alternate power supply woutd not be needed. 
Table 34:  System Pros and Cons; Dual Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 100% and 
50% of Rated System PC 
Pros 
Valves are not required to function to maintain 
the operating components in-service 
Mission not impacted by loss of a single Brayton 
unit 
On a loss of Brayton unit, coolant flow through 
the reactor is maintained 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, 
etc.) is not required to restart a shutdown Brayton 
unit 
Paired alternators simplifies electrical distribution 
system 
Paired gas coolers simplifies the HRS interface 
- 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a 
single Brayton system 
ler (2-2-2s Arrangement) . 
Cons 
Valves are required to function to isolate a 
damaged Brayton unit 
Two system state points results in cycle 
inefficiency at a minimum of one operating point, 
resulting in a mass penalty and a tighter design 
For spacecraft applications, separate momentum 
compensation system may be required if a 
Brayton unit fails 
Mass impact on the electrical distribution system 
to accommodate two frequencies br ray ton in it 
speed) 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
200 kWe Brayton unit may be greater than that 
required for 100 kWe ~ r a ~ t o n  unit 
The most limiting components from a gas leakage 
perspective (tubing and joints in heat exchangers) 
are redundant - increasing the potential for gas 
leakage from the system 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
recuperator) are redundant, increasing the mass 
penalty for redundancy 
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3.7 Three Operating Brayton Units, Each 
System Power (3-3-3s Arrangement) 
Unit Capable of 33% and 50% a ~f Rated 
System architectures in which the PCAD system is designed to operate at full rated power at multiple 
frequencies are designated with an "s", e.g. 3-3-3s. Additionat detail regarding this mode of operation 
is provided in Section 3.1 1. 
3.7.1 System Design 
Three 100 kWe Brayton units, two of three co-rotational, designed to operate at two system 
state points: 33.3% rated system power and 50% rated system power 
Recuperators sized to support the operation of two 100 kWe Brayton units or three 66.7 kWe 
Brayton units operating in parallel (may be multiple independent flow paths housed within a 
common pressure boundary or may be three independent recuperators each sized to service a 
100 kWe Brayton) 
Gas coolers sized to support the operation of two 100 kWe Brayton units or three 66.7 kWe 
Brayton units operating in parallel (may be multiple independent flow paths housed within a 
common pressure boundary or may be three independent gas coolers each sized to service a 
100 kWe Brayton) 
0 Each Brayton has a set of compressor outlet valves to allow for isolation of the failed Brayton 
An isolation valve at the compressor outlet could be used in this arrangement to shut down an over- 
speeding Brayton. 
No schematic is provided for the 3-3-3s system. The only major differences in the 3-3-3s system 
compared to the 2-2-2 or 4-44 systems occur in the connection of the primary system to the heat 
rejection segment. Section 9 provides discussion of the heat rejection segment design. The heat 
rejection segment design and operation have not been evaluated for the dual operating mode 3-3-3s 
system. 
Motor one Brayton unit using solar electric power to provide coolant flow to the reactor 
Startup the reactor 
Bring the first Brayton to self-sustaining power level 
Startup of the second Brayton unit using electric power from the operating Brayton 
Startup of the third Brayton unit using electric power from the operating Brayton 
Raise power as needed 
Normal Operation 
Three Brayton units in service at all times operating at 33.3% of rated power, isolation valves 
open 
During Propulsion mode: [Reserved] K, [Reserved] rpm (temperature and speed used to 
control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduce temperature further (temperature used to change operating 
state points) 
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Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, electrical power would continue to be available from the 
operating Brayton unit; therefore, an alternate power supply would not be needed. 
Abnormal Operation 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit, electrical loads are transferred to the two remaining 
Brayton units by adjusting reactor outlet temperature and Brayton speed as discussed in 
Section 3. I 1. 
The compressor outlet isolation valves are shut in the loop with the damaged Brayton unit 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed. 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, electrical power would continue to be available from the 
operating Brayton unit; therefore, an alternate power supply would not be needed. 
Table 3-5: System Pros and Cons; Three Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 33% and 
50% of Rated System Power (3-3-3s Arrangement) 
Pros 
Valves are not required to function to maintain the 
operating components in-service 
Mission not impacted by a single Brayton unit 
failure 
I 
On a loss of Brayton unit, coolant flow through the 
reactor is maintained 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
100 kWe Brayton unit may be less than that 
required for a 200 kWe Brayton unit 
Cons 
High temperature gas valves are required to 
function to isolate a damaged Brayton unit 
Two system state points results in cycle 
inefficiency at a minimum of one operating point, 
resulting in a mass penalty and a tighter design 
space 
For spacecraft apptications, separate momentum 
compensation system may be required 
Mass impact on the electrical distribution system 
to accommodate two frequencies (Brayton unit 
speed) 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
recuperator) are not redundant, minimizing the 
mass penalty for redundancy 
The most limiting components from a gas leakage 
system 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a 
single Brayton system 
Interface with electrical system complicated by 
system with three operating converter loops 
perspective (tubing and joints in heat exchangers) 
are not redundant (number minimized) - 
minimizing the potential for gas leakage from the 
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3.8 Dual Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 50% of Rated System Power 
with Spare Brayton Unit (3-2-2 Arrangement) 
3.8.1 System Design 
Three 100 kWe Brayton units, two of three cu-rotational 
Two recuperators each sized to service a I00 kWe Brayton units (may be multiple 
independent flow paths housed within a common pressure boundary) 
Two gas coolers each sized to cool a 100 kWe Brayton (may be multiple independent flow 
paths housed within a common pressure boundary) 
The operating Brayton units share a common recuperator and set of gas coolers with the 
standby Brayton unit 
Four isolation valves per heat exchanger allow for isolation of the standby (failed) Brayton 
Each Brayton has a set of compressor outlet valves 
An isolation valve or a combination of an isolation valve and a check valve at the compressor outlet 
could be used in this arrangement to shut down an over-speeding Brayton or to isolate an out of 
commission loop, minimizing backflow. The check valve would be used to prevent back flow through 
the standby Brayton. The isolation valve would be used to stop an over-speeding Brayton. 
Figure 3-6 shows one conceptual layout for a 3-2-2 system. A key point of this concept is that the 
third Brayton can replace either one of the other Braytons and use the corresponding recuperator and 
gas cooler. Therefore, the third Brayton requires two isolation valves in the turbine outlet, the 
compressor inlet, and the alternator cooling outlet in order to direct gas flow to the appropriate 
components. The normally operating Brayton units have in addition to the isolation valve and the 
check valve in the compressor outlet (the base valve arrangement per Section 4) another isolation 
valve located in the turbine outlet to prevent flow from bypassing the standby Brayton when the 
standby is in use. 
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Commissioning 
Motor one 100 kWe Brayton using solar electric power to provide coolant flow to the reactor 
Startup the reactor 
Bring the first Brayton to self-sustaining power level 
Startup of the second 100 kWe Brayton using electric power from the operating Brayton 
Raise power as needed 
Normal Operation 
Two Brayton units in service at all times operating at 100% of rated power, isolation valves 
open 
During Propulsion mode: [I 1501 K, [45000] rpm (temperature used to control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduced temperature, reduced speed (temperature and/or speed 
used to control Brayton cycle) 
Abnormal operation 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit, the remaining operating Brayton unit would supply the 
power needed to start the standby Brayton unit. 
The recuperator and gas cooler isolation valves are shut for the damaged Brayton, 
compressor or alternator and the isolation valves connecting this recuperator and gas cooler to 
the standby Brayton are opened. 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed. 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, electrical power would continue to be available from the 
operating Brayton unit; therefore, an alternate power supply would not be needed. 
Table 3-6: System Pros and Cons; Dual Operating Brayton Units, Each Unit Capable of 50% of Rated 
System Power with Spare Brayton Unit (3-2-2 Arrangement) 
. . 
recuperator) are not redundant, minimizing the I compensation system may be required if a 1 
Pros 
On a loss of Brayton unit, coolant flow through 
the reactor is maintained 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
Cons 1 
High temperature gas valves are required to 
function to isolate a damaged Brayton unit 
For spacecraft applications, separate momentum 
mass penalty for redundancy 
Mission not impacted by a single Brayton unit 
PRE-DECISIONA L - For planning and discussion purposes only 
hayton unit fails 
Additional valves are required to allow sharing of 
failure 
The most limiting components from a gas 
leakage perspective (tubing and joints in heat 
exchangers) are not redundant (number 
minimized) - minimizing the potential for gas 
leakage from the system 
components between converter loops 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
0-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 3-25 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
100 kWe Brayton unit may be less than that 
required for a200 kWe ~ iay ton  unit 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, 
etc.) is not required to restart a shutdown Brayton ( 
unit 
Paired alternators simplifies electrical distribution 
system 
Paired gas coolers simplifies the HRS interface 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a 
single Brayton system 
3.9 Dual Operating Brayton Units, with Two Spare Brayton Units (4-2-2 Arrangement) 
3.9.1 System Design 
Four 100 kWe Brayton units, two counter-rotational sets 
Two recuperators each sized to service one 100 kWe Brayton (may be multiple independent 
flow paths housed within a common pressure boundary). 
Two gas coolers each sized to cool one 100 kWe Brayton (may be multiple independent flow 
paths housed within a common pressure boundary). 
Two Braytons share a common recuperator and gas cooler 
Two of four of the Braytons are running at any given time (opposite rotations) 
Four isolation valves per recuperator allow for isolation of the failed Brayton 
Each Brayton unit has a set of compressor outlet valves. 
An isolation valve or a combination of an isolation valve and a check valve at the compressor outlet 
could be used in this arrangement to shut down an over-speeding Brayton or to isolate an out of 
commission loop, minimizing backflow. The check valve would be used to prevent back flow through 
the standby Brayton. The isolation valve would be used to stop an over-speeding Brayton. 
Commissioning 
Motor one 100 kWe Brayton using solar electric power to provide cooling flow to the reactor 
Startup the reactor 
Bring the first Brayton to self-sustaining power level 
Startup of the second 100 kWe Brayton using electric power from operating Brayton 
Raise power as needed 
Normal Operation 
Two Brayton units in service at all times, isolation valves open 
During Propulsion mode: 11 1501 K, [45000] rpm (temperature used to control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduced temperature, reduced speed (temperature andlor speed 
used to control Brayton cycle) 
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3.9.4 Abnormal Operation 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit, compressor or alternator, high voltage loads are shed 
r The recuperator and gas cooler isolation valves are shut far the damaged Brayton, 
compressor or alternator 
The recuperator and gas cooler isolation valves are opened for the standby Brayton unit 
An emergency startup system is used to motor and startup the standby Brayton 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed. 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, electrical power would continue to be available from the 
operating Brayton unit; therefore, an alternate power supply would not be needed. 
Table 3-7: System Pros and Cons; Dual Operating Brayton Units, with Two Spare Brayton Units 
(4-2-2 Arrangement) 
pros 1 Cons 
Valves are not required to function to maintain the ] 
operating compo~ents in-service (i.e. if the valves 
failed to operate, system reliability is similar to a 
single Brayton) 
Redundant turbomachinery 
Mission not impacted by the loss of a single 
Brayton unit in each loop. 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
recuperator) are not redundant, minimizing the 
mass penalty for redundancy 
The most limiting components from a gas leakage 
perspective (tubing and joints in heat exchangers) 
are not redundant (number minimized) - 
minimizing the potential for gas leakage from the 
system 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a 
Valves are required to function to startup a spare 
Brayton and to isofate a damaged Brayton 
single Brayton system 
Valves could be used to isolate the standbylfailed 
components 
Commissioning power requirements to,startup a I 
100 kWe Brayton unit may be less than that 1 I 
required for 200 kWe 6ayton unit 
On a loss of Brayton unit, coolant flow is 
maintained through the reactor 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, 
etc.) is not required to restart a shutdown Brayton I I 
unit 
Paired alternators simplifies electrical distribution 
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3.10 Dual Operating Brayton Units, with Two Spare Brayton Units (4-4-4 Arrangement) 
3.10.1 System Design 
Four I00 kWe Brayton units, two counter-rotational sets 
r Four recuperators each sized to service one 100 kWe Brayton unit (may be multiple 
independent flow, paths housed within a common pressure boundary) 
Four gas coolers each sized to cool one 100 kWe Brayton unit (may be multiple independent 
flow paths housed within a common pressure boundary) 
Each Brayton unit has a recuperator and set of gas coolers 
Two of four of the Braytons are running at any given time (opposite rotations) 
Each Brayton unit has a set of compressor outlet valves 
An isolation valve or a combination of an isolation valve and a check valve at the compressor outlet 
could be used in this arrangement to shut down an over-speeding Brayton or to isolate an out of 
commission loop, minimizing backflow. The check valve would be used to prevent back flow through 
the standby Brayton. The isolation valve would be used to stop an over-speeding Brayton. 
The 44-4 system is schematicatly depicted in Figure 3-7. The valves shown are consistent with the 
base arrangement stated in the Plant Parameter List (Section 2). Each Brayton loop is cooled by an 
independent HRS loop. 
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Figure 3-7: Dual Operating Brayton Units, with Two standby Brayton Units 
3.10.2 Commissioning 
r Motor one 100 kWe Brayton using solar electric power to provide coolant flow to the reactor 
Startup the reactor 
Bring the first Brayton to self-sustaining power level 
Startup of the second 100 kWe Brayton using electric power from operating Brayton 
Raise power as needed 
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3.10.3 Normal Operation 
Two Brayton units in service at all times 
During Propulsion mode: 11 1501 K, [45000] rpm (temperature used to control Brayton cycle) 
Coast and Science mode: reduced temperature, reduced speed (temperature and/or speed 
used to control Brayton cycle) 
3.10.4 Abnormal Operation 
On loss of an operating Brayton unit, compressor or alternator, high voltage loads are shed 
a The compressor outlet isolation valves are shut in the loop with the damaged Brayton unit 
The compressor outlet isolation valves are opened for the standby Brayton unit 
An emergency startup system is used to motor and startup the standby Brayton 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, the reactor plant experiences a reduction in coolant flow. 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) capability is maintained; therefore a separate DHR system is not 
needed. 
Upon loss of a single Brayton unit, electrical power would continue to be available from the 
operating Brayton unit; therefore, an alternate power supply would not be needed. 
Table 3-8: System Pros and Cons; Dual Operating Brayton Units, with Two Spare Brayton Units (4-4- 
4 Arrange 
Pros 
- - - -  
Valves are not required to function to maintain the 
operating components in-service (i.e, if the valves 
failed to operate, system reliability is similar to a 
single Brayton) 
All rotating equipment has a redundant/backup 
component 
May be more able to accommodate unforeseen 
casualties or alternate operating modes than a 
single Brayton system 
Mission not impacted by the loss of a single 
Bravton unit 
Commissioning power requirements to startup a 
100 kWe Brayton unit may be less than that 
required for 200 kWe b ray ton unit 
On a loss of Brayton unit, coolant flow is 
maintained through the reactor 
Electrical power storage device (battery, flywheel, 1 etc.) is not required torestart a shutdown Brayton 
?merit) 
Cons 
@ 
Valves are required to function to startup a spare 
Brayton and to isolate a damaged Brayton 
unit 
Paired alternators simplifies electrical distribution 
system 
Paired gas coolers simplifies the HRS interface 
The most massive components (gas cooler and 
recuperator) are redundant, resulting in a mass 
- 
penalty for redundancy 
The most limiting components from a gas 
leakage perspe&e (tubing and jointsin heat 
exchangers) are redundant - increasing the 
potential for gas leakage from the system 
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3.1 I Dual Brayton Operating State Points for Full Power Operation 
System architectures in which the PCAD system is designed to operate at full rated power at multiple 
frequencies are designated with an "s", i.e. 2-2-2s and 3-3-3s systems. This capability permits a 
mode of operation where all turboalternators are normally operating at less than their rated capacity 
but jointly produce the full rated system power by reducing turbine inlet temperature and rotational 
speed. In the event of failure of one turboalternator, fult rated system power is restored by increasing 
the turbine inlet temperature and rotational speed of the remaining unit(s) such that each 
turboalternator operates at its rated capacity. This mode of operation is desirable to mitigate 
concerns associated with material performance at elevated temperature. Analysis shows that 
operating the turboalternators at a reduced turbine inlet temperature and reduced rotational speed 
allows for significant plant sizing advantages (higher thermodynamic efficiency) over operating by only 
reducing turbine inlet temperature at a constant speed (see Figure 3-8). 
Figure 3-8 presents a map of alternator load capability (solid lines) ranging from 25 to 200 kWe, 
reactor inlet temperature (dashed lines) with ranges from 740 to 970 K, and cycle efficiency (contour 
color map) with ranges from 0.08 to 0.259 for a 2-2-2s system architecture. The proposed reactor 
vessel material for Prometheus is a Ni-based superalloy, which is cooled by the reactor inlet flow. A 
design temperature of -900K is the near the lirnit.for acceptable creep allowance. Ptant operation is 
envisioned to control the turbine inlet temperature, by reactor reflector motion, and Brayton speed to 
not exceed the blue line (constant reactor inlet temperature) on Figure 3-8. 
Table 3-9 shows operating points that yield the highest cycle efficiencies for 2-2-2s and 3-3-3s plant 
architectures. Note that for a 2-2-2s plant architecture, a reduction of 18.5% in rotational speed, 
45,000 to 36,668, and a reduction of reactor outlet temperature from 11 50 to 1091 K is required to 
operate steady state at 50% alternator load capacity. Due to the cycle efficiency penalty of operating 
additional engines at lower speed, and lower turbine inlet temperature, the reactor and heat rejection 
system need to be sized larger to support full power operation. Additional detail regarding this mode 
of operation is provided in Reference 3-2. 
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~ 3.12 Number of Heat Exchangers 
It may be desirable to house individual recuperators or gas cooler heat exchangers within a common 
pressure boundary to achieve certain design objectives; e.g, minimize mass, improve reliability, 
facilitate system arrangement. The potential for gas leakage increases with the pressure boundary 
surface area and the number of pressure boundary joints (welds). Therefore, pressure boundary area 
and number of pressure boundary joints should be minimized. Housing heat exchangers within a 
common pressure boundary, or sharing sides between two heat exchangers, would effectively 
minimize system pressure boundary surface area while retaining separation of converter loop flow 
paths. 
Sharing heat exchangers between converter loops, where converter loop flow paths could combine, is 
another means of potentially achieving the design objectives listed above. However, plant 
configurations that utilize cross-strapped heat exchangers would require additional valves to properly 
isolate idle converter loops. The mass reductions obtained by eliminating redundant heat exchangers 
may be offset by the mass these additional valves and the resulting increased system pressure drop. 
Similarly, system reliability could be improved or degraded with the elimination of redundant heat 
exchangers associated additional valves. 
I 3.13 Valve Operations 
For any system with spare turboafternators, check valves or isolation valves would be required to 
minimize reverse flow through the idle loop(s). While these valves do not see high operating 
temperature (300-500 K), they do need to operate reliably after long periods in a fixed position. While 
gas valves can and have been used in previous space applications, gas valves of the size considered 
here (10-1 2 cm diameter) are considered to be developmental. Not all valve faults would result in 
mission ending failures. For example, if a check valve in an idle loop failed to function properly, 
reverse flow would be initiated in that loop. This would result in a reduction in reactor flow and could 
potentially damage turbomachinery bearings in the affected loop, rendering it inoperable. However, 
use of the remaining loops would still be possible. See Section 9.5 for additional discussion. 
Configurations that incorporate shared heat exchangers require isolation valves in hotter portions of 
the loop. In order to share a recuperator and gas cooler, multiple valves are required to successfully 
switch from an operating Brayton unit to a spare unit. The number of valves is further increased in 
this case given the bearing and alternator cooling arrangement that draws cold gas from the 
compressor inlet. Some of these valves must operate at the turbine exit conditions (-900 K). 
I 3.14 Number of Alternator Stator Windings or Alternators 
In addition to the number of Braytons units, the number of alternator windings or alternators must also 
be considered. The addition of redundant alternators or stator windings within a Brayton unit provides 
a higher degree of fault tolerance at the expense of additional mass, volume, and rotor-dynamic 
complexity. Plant configurations where one Brayton unit is normally providing the full plant output (1- 
1-1 and 2-1-1) require dual alternators or dual stator windings to maintain single point failure tolerance 
of some electrical system faults. Furthermore, electrical systems are subject to a large number of 
temporary faults which may make dual alternators or dual stator windings necessary for a sufficiently 
reliable system. A complete explanation of alternator failure modes is provided in Section 9.1.8. 
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The mass penalty associated with redundant alternators is -1 0 kg for a 100 kWe alternator and -20 
kg for a 200 kWe alternator. The additional mass for a second set of stator windings is less than the 
mass of an additional alternator. Most of the failure modes that are made suwivable with redundant 
alternators are made survivable when dual stator windings are utilized. The increased mass and 
changes in rotor geometry that would result from the use of dual alternators would require additional 
study and analysis of the Brayton rotor dynamics. 
3.15 Alternate Means for Momentum Compensation - Use of Reaction Wheels 
In the PB1 spaceship configuration, every effort was made to reduce the need to compensate for 
momentum developed by the rotating turbomachinery. For example, counter-rotating units are 
preferred and the orientation of the Brayton units is such that the axis of rotation is perpendicular to 
the long axis of the spaceship. Any spaceship architecture that does not incorporate counter-rotating 
turbines may require some other means of momentum compensation to counteract Brayton unit 
momentum and to compensate for torque developed during Brayton speed changes. The initial mass 
estimate for an appropriately sized reaction wheel is -25 kg. This mass penalty is considered small 
relative to the increase in mass and system complexity associated with the addition of a counter- 
rotating Brayton unit. Momentum compensation wheels are a standard spacecraft technology and 
have been designed and used by the space industry. The PBI spaceship configuration incorporates 
reaction wheels in the mission module for spaceship orientation control. Due to their location, these 
reaction wheels may not be able to adequately compensate for angular momentum vectors developed 
by operation of turbomachinery at the opposite end of the boom during periods when spaceship 
orientation control is particularly critical. An additional spaceship study is required to probe the validity @ of this concern. 
3.16 Impact on Interface Systems 
3.16.1 PCAD Subsystem 
Spacecraft electrical power systems have traditionally employed multiple distribution buses for fault 
tolerance. This allows for continued operation of spacecraft functions with one or more failures in the 
electrical buses, the switches connecting loads to the buses, or the load circuits themselves. The 
same was true for the Prometheus spaceship. The PB 1 PCAD architecture called for a separate 
electrical bus for each Brayton unit, with each load capable of receiving power from any electrical 
source. The same approach must also be used in considering PCAD arrangements for the system 
architectures described above, including the 1-1-1 configuration with dual alternator windings (i.e. a 
separate bus for each alternator winding). 
The largest impact on the PCAD subsystem posed by the system architectures described above is the 
desire to operate the spaceship electrical buses at multiple frequencies and voltages (the result of 
operating the Brayton units at multiple speeds). Typicatly, power electronic circuits are designed for a 
specified input voltage and frequency in order to provide optimum performance and power quality. 
Some latitude in their input may be allowable, but an input variation of greater than 10-1 5% in voltage 
and frequency may require additional hardware (e.g. special transformers, larger filter circuits and 
rectifiers). The mass impact of the additional hardware would be most significant in the configurations 
where multiple Brayton speeds are used during thrusting phases of the mission, as the largest amount 
of power is consumed by the power processing units (PPUs). The HRS pump power supplies, some 
of the science loads, and the power downconverter for the spaceship computers are also powered 
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from the Brayton units' electrical buses and would likewise be affected, but the mass impact of 
alternate circuit designs with these loads would be less because of the small percentage of power 
they consume. 
If the desired speed variation is large, or if more than two operating speeds are required, a DC 
electrical system with rectifiers connected to the Brayton outputs should be considered. A DC 
electrical system would make all of the spaceship loads immune to the changing Brayton speeds, but 
the added rectifier circuits would make it heavier than a comparable AC plant. 
3.16.2 Heat Rejection Segment 
A block diagram schematic of the interface of the converter loops with the HRS for a system 
architecture using four Brayton energy conversion loops that are each capable of generating 50% 
electrical power (4-4-4) is given in Section 9.6. The ability to integrate two HRS fluid loops to each 
radiator panel is desirable for any system architecture. This redundancy is considered a key design 
element as it allows for full power operation in the event of failure of one HRS loop or energy 
conversion loop. The interface of converter gas loops to the heat rejection segment loops for several 
other plant architectures is described in Section 9.3. The 3-3-3s system architecture presents a 
challenge with regards to achieving the desired redundancy and fault tolerance features in a way that 
does not result in the potential for an unbalanced flow condition between the three converter loops. 
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4 Mass Estimates and Basis 
4.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this section is to summarize the component mass estimates presented in the other 
sections of this report and to develop system mass estimates for the Space Nuclear Power Plant 
(SNPP) pre-conceptual design cases. The masses presented herein are best estimates and do not 
include margins or uncertainty allowances. 
4.2 Background 
Mass is a significant concern in spacecraft design due to the capability of the available launch vehicle 
and the propulsionltrajectory solutions. In Reference 4-1, mass was used as a discriminator in 
concept selection. Mass allocations must be assigned early in the design process and carefully 
tracked throughout the project. The NRPCT has been developing the methodology for estimating the 
mass of reactor module components. Mass estimates for the Reactor, Reactor Radiation Shield, Plant 
and Structural segments have been developed and, while still in the early stages, have been 
documented in this report so that future refinement of the reactor module concept will have a basis for 
better mass estimates. While the Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) and the Power Control and 
Distribution (PCAD) subsystem were not part of the NRPCT portion of the spacecraft, the masses 
associated with them must be included in the overall SNPP mass to get a complete and accurate 
representation of how the power plant mass changes for different system architectures. 
4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The SNPP mass depends on the specific reactor design, materials of construction and the number of 
energy conversion components chosen. The number of components and how they are operated affect 
the efficiency of the conversion process and thus the thermal ratings (and therefore the masses) of 
the Reactor and the Heat Rejection Segments. The Reactor Segment mass is also affected by the 
material of construction and core geometry. Because the details of the reactor design have not been 
selected, a range of SNPP masses is possible. Bounding estimates of the reactor module mass were 
calculated based on the 1-1-1 and 4-4-4 energy conversion equipment system architectures 
described in Sections 3.3 and 3.10 respectively. All mass estimates provided herein assume the use 
of a fast spectrum, unmoderated, MoRe reactor core using U02 as a fuel. Since no specific reactor 
geometry or material has been selected, an average reactor and shield mass was calculated based 
on information in Reference 4-5. The mass variation associated with reactor core geometry and 
material options is discussed in detail in Reference 4-5. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the mass estimating that was done. They are: 
The 1-1-1, 2-1-1 and 2-2-2 system architectures are within the JPUNGST Reactor Module 
mass estimates for the Prometheus Baseline 1 (PBI) concept (see Section 4.6). 
Thermal power rating has the single largest influence on SNPP mass. For example, if the 
system efficiency is 20%, a 10 kWe reduction would result in a 50 kWt reduction in thermal 
power and associated reductions in reactor mass, reactor radiation shield mass, and HRS 
mass. A rough order of magnitude mass reduction of 350 kg would result. 
All mass estimates could potentially be reduced by: 
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Optimizing the physical arrangement to minimize pressure drops and piping lengths. 
This would lower reactor thermal power by raising cycle efficiency. 
Optimizing the operating parameters using the sensitivity studies that are documented 
in Section 6. 
Coupling the plant with one of the lighter reactor geometrylmaterial concepts. 
Optimizing the trade of HRS radiator area versus reactor thermairating. 
Trimming the reactor radiation shadow shield for a more specific spaceship 
configuration (eliminate shielding in zones having no equipment). 
Optimize the spaceship shield mass trade among reactor shielding, mission module 
shielding and boom length. 
Using lightweight materials such as carbon-carbon composife, and titanium alloys in 
heat exchangers vice the nickel-base superalloys that were assumed 
Coupling the recuperator with the gas cooler within the same housing and no 
connecting piping. 
Use aluminum cabling in the PCAD subsystem instead of heavier copper cabling. 
Relaxation of the radiation hardening requirements for the spacecraft electronics to 
reduce shield mass. 
For the range of parameters analyzed herein, an increase in launch vehicle capability 
that would allow an increased radiator area may allow operating the HRS at a lower 
temperature and may result in a reduced mass. 
The 1-1-1 SNPP mass is the lowest and substantially lower (-2000 kg) than a fully redundant 
system (2-2-2s). 
The mass savings that would be gained by sharing a recuperator, in some cases, would be 
essentially offset by the mass of the added piping and valves that would be required for cross 
st rapping. 
The mass of the reactor and reactor radiation shield combination is very sensitive to the 
overall dimensions of each reactor concept (diameter, length), the configuration of the fixed 
reflectors and control devices (drums vs. sliders) and the proximity of the core to the shield. 
4.4 Overall SNPP Mass 
The estimated overall SNPP masses for various system architectures, which include the estimated 
Heat Rejection Segment and PCAD subsystem masses, are shown in Figure 4-1. The reactor thermal 
power estimate for each system architecture is shown above the applicable bar. The system 
architectures marked by the letter 's' are dual speed cases (i.e. 2-2-2s would be two, 200 kWe 
Braytons operating at reduced temperature and speed together at 100 kWe each to produce a total of 
200 kWe). The changes in Brayton loading would be accomplished by a means of both speed and 
temperature control. Additional detail regarding this mode of operation is provided in Section 3.11. 
The mass of the 2-2-2s case was estimated using Reference 4-7 estimates for thermal power. 
Specific reactor mass calculations were done for the 1-1 -1 and 44-4 system architectures. The 
remaining reactor mass estimates are interpolations (based on thermal power) using these two 
calculated reactor masses. Summaries of the bases for the estimates are provided in Section 4.5. 
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and 4-9, respectively. The reactor masses quoted for both designs were obtained from the Monte 
Carlo nuclear models for the specific design concepts. These nuclear models include the active radial 
reflector and its canning, as well as the reactor vessel (represented as a right circular cylinder). Within 
the core, the fuel, liner, clad, block, barrel, vessel thimble and axial Be0 reflector pellets are included. 
Components that were not modeled include the control drive mechanisms, pressure vessel support 
skirt, and slider guide rails or drum drive axles. It has been identified that these additional components 
could increase the reactor mass calculated from the nuclear model by 40%, which has already been 
added to the masses as displayed in this section. A more complete description of reactor mass 
calculations is provided in Reference 4-6. Each energy conversion architecture described above 
results in a slightly different reactor thermal power rating. Reference 4-5 evaluated the impact on the 
reactor mass with the use of various core materials and core geometries. Of these design variations, 
the U02 fuel/molybdenum coated liner on a Mo47.5Re cladding refractory alloy annular flow block and 
open lattice designs were used to obtain a representative reactor mass. Since the reactor concept 
masses varied, an average reactor mass was calculated for these two cases and used herein for the 
comparison of different plant architectures. See Reference 4-5, for a more detailed explanation of how 
reactor masses vary for the different designs and material cases. 
4.5.1.2 Movable Reflector Control Drive Mechanism 
The Movable Reflector Control Drive Mechanism (CDM) System mass estimate of 221 kg was based 
on twelve CDMs each having a mass of approximately 18.4 kg. The preliminary mass estimate was 
based on a slider design and includes the following components: 
Position transducer 
Ball screw 
Ball nut 
Driveline 
Cover 
Flanges 
Motor 
Brake 
The mass of the CDM system as well as the control material is included in the nuclear reactor mass 
estimate. Cabling to the twelve CDM motors was included in the Reactor I&C Segment. Reference 
4-5 contains details of the CDM. 
4.5.2 Reactor Radiation Shield Segment 
The best-estimate value for Reactor Shielding mass was obtained using the Quick Mass Analysis for 
Reactor Shields Program (QMARS v2.0) developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and modified 
for NRPCT application and normalized to agree with Reference 4-3 mass estimates. Shield mass and 
dimensions are sized to limit the neutron fluence at the payload to no more than 5 x 10" n/cm2 and 
the gamma dose at the payload to no more than 2.5 x lo4  rads. Other areas of the propulsion plant 
forward of the payload will experience doses greater than this. Each reactor case of Reference 4-5 
has a unique shield mass. This mass depends on parameters specific to the reactor design and the 
material composition of the shield. The parameters for the specific reactor designs of Section 4.5.1 .I 
were used to size a beryHiurnlB,C shield and estimate its mass. 
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The resulting QMARS output for the 1-1-3 and 4-44 architectures is shown below: 
Parameter I 1-1-1 Value 1 4-44 Value I 
( Shield Mass (kg) 1 1502 1 1672 1 
The above shield masses were used as a basis for estimating shields for system architectures other 
than 1-1-1 and 4 - 4 4  This estimation was a simple linear interpolation based on reactor thermal 
power. Reference 4 4  discusses the shield in more detail and how its mass depends on the materials 
of construction. 
4.5.3 Reactor Coolant Segment 
Details of the Reactor Coolant Segment component masses are given in the respective sections of 
this report. These individual masses were used in calculating a combined mass of each energy 
conversion architecture outlined in Section 6. 
Table 4-2 shows how the masses for the components were combined to obtain the resultant total 
mass. The thermal rating for each component was calculated using a heat balance with the following 
common parameters: 
Reactor Outlet Temperature = 11 50 K 
Compressor Outlet Pressure = 2.0 MPa 
Compressor Pressure Ratio = 2.0 
He-Xe Coolant Molecular Weight = 31.5 glmol 
Electrical Power Rating = 185 kWe 
Maximum Radiator Water Temperature = 505 K 
Assumed one isolation valve and one check valve on the compressor outlet (except for the 1- 
1-1 case which requires no valves) 
For each of the possible piant configurations, it was determined that, for mass estimating purposes, 
the individual energy conversion component thermal ratings could be approximated by one of four 
heat balances. Section 6 discusses the heat balances in more detail. Table 4-1 gives a summary of 
which heat balance and arrangement was used for each mass estimate. 
Table 4-1: Svstem Architecture Mass Summaw - - - 
Architecture HeatBal 
I-A-1 Figure 6-1 780 kWt Figure 5-26 1 None 
2-1-1 Figure 6-1 780 kWt Figure 5-33 1 None 
2-2-2 Figure 6-3 930kWt Figures-23 [None - 
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/ Architecture 1 Heat ~alance' 
Reference 4-7 
Reference 4-7 
3-2-2 
I 
4-4-4 ] Figure 6-4 
 h he 4-Brayton heat balance used 
Figure 6-3 
4-2-2 
Thermal 
Power 
970 kWt 
I ,040 kWt 
Figure 6-4 
I r  the 
Arrangement 
Figure 5-23 
Figure 5 24 
Figure 5-21 
mass estimate was sli! 
Page 4-1 0- 
,a 
Comments I 
Heat balance used for energy 
conversion components, Rx, shield 
and HRS from reference 
Heat balance used for energy 
conversion components, Rx, shield 
and HRS from reference 
Piping mass was estimated using the 
2-2-2-architecture 
- 
Piping mass was estimated using the 
2-1 -1 architecture 
None 
itly modified (compressor inlet 
temperature) from Figure 6-4 so that full electric power could be generated. 
It should be noted that the heat balances used for each system architecture had not been optimized. 
In particular, the 4-4-4 arrangement was found to need larger piping diameters to reduce reactor 
coolant pressure drops in the reactor coolant loop piping. This arrangement had not been optimized to 
incorporate the increased piping diameters, due to project termination. Hence, it is recognized that the 
4-4-4 heat balance and associated mass presented herein is higher than expected and could be 
better optimized following revision of the 4-4-4 arrangement and determination of associated new 
piping pressure drops. Section 6 presents a partially optimized 4-4-4 heat balance. A preliminary 
mass assessment of this heat balance shows that the mass of the 4-4-4 arrangement could be 
reduced by as much as 1,500 kg. 
The mass estimating techniques for the turbine are discussed in Section 9.1 -2, the gas cooler in 
Section 9.3.5 and the recuperator in Section 9.2.2.6. Where arrangements were developed, the piping 
mass was calculated by taking the piping lengths and diameters directly from the associated 
arrangement (see Section 9.4.5) and using the following information to calculate piping masses. 
Piping material: lnconel 617 with density of 8360 kg/rn3 
Insulation material: lnconel 617 hollow spheres with density of 710 kg/m3 
Pipe wall thickness: per Section 9.4.3 
Since all cases did not have a specific arrangements developed, the piping masses for the 3-2-2 and 
4-2-2 were estimated using the other arrangements as a guide. 
A description of the valve requirements and the vendor base that was being considered is given in 
Section 9.5. A rough estimate of valve masses was obtained using the Section 9.5 information and 
the following assumptions: 
- Industry Check Valve masses based on information available for Enertech Noule Check 
Valves. These masses were estimated shipping weights for flanged carbon steel or AlSl 
316 or AISl 321 stainless steel valves. 
- It was assumed that with the elimination of the flanges (space valves will be butt welded) 
and with design enhancements that a 50% reduction in check valve mass could be 
achieved for the space check valve applications. 
- Industry Isolation Valve masses based on information available for VALTEK Shear Stream 
ball valves with butt weld connections and a pneumaticlspring operator. 
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- It was assumed that with design enhancements for the valve and operator that a 50% 
reduction in isolation valve mass could be achieved for the space isolation valve 
applications. 
The resulting estimates for valve masses are: 
Isolation valve: 18 kglvalve 
5 cm Check valve: 4.5 kglvalve 
10 cm Check valve: 17.5 kglvalve 
Table 4-2 shows the results of combining the masses in the 'Total' column. Each set of rows 
corresponds to one of the system architectures described in Section 6. Each component has a 
column that shows the rating of that component, the number required for the specific architecture, 
how much one component weighs and the total mass of that specific component. 
Component 
Mass of single Brayton 
Total mass of all 
Braytons I/- 
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Table 4-2 Reactor Coolant Segment Mass Calculation 
2-2-2 
see Section 
3.5 
2-2-2 
see Section 
Valves' 
Okg 
4 * 4  
116kg 
Q = I00 kW 
2 1 81 kg 
162 kg 
3-3-3 
see Section 
Gas Coolers 
Q = 559 kWt 
1 I 4 1 1 k g  
41 1 kg 
Q = 559 kWt 
1 I 411 kg 
41 1 kg 
Total 
1126kg 
1528kg 
Recuperators 
Q = 1074 kWt 
1 1 299 kg 
299 kg 
Q=1074 kWt 
1 I 299 kg 
299 kg 
Architecture 
1-1 -1 
see Section 
3.3 
2-1 -1 
see Section 
3.4 
Q = 200 kWe 
2 1 93 kg 
Piping 
.. .. 
323kg 
516kg 
Braytons 
Q = 200 kWe 
1 1 93 kg 
93 kg 
Q = 200 kWe 
2 1 93 kg 
186 kg 
Q = 681 kW 
2 I 193 kg 
386 kg 
Q = 100 kWe 
3 I 81 kg 
Q = 349 kWt 
2 I 262 kg 3-2-2 
see Section 
4-2-2 
see Section 
Architecture I Braytons I Recuperators I Gas Coolers 
Valves list the estimated number of isolation valves + check valves 
Q = 349 kW 
2 I 262 kg 
524 kg 
Q=1064 kWt 
2 1 296 kg 
3.9 
4-4-4 
see Section 
3.1 0 
2666 kg 
1 Total 
Q = 554 kWt 
2 I 205 kg 
Q = 681 kWt 
3 I 193kg 
1 I 
Q =  100 kW 
4 1 81 kg 
4.5.4 Heat Rejection Segment 
Q = 349 kWt 
3 I 175kg 
Q = 100 kWe 
3 1 81 kg 
324 kg 
Q = 100 kW 
4 1 81 kg 
324 kg 
The Heat Rejection Segment was not an NRPCT cognizant segment. The mass estimates were done 
using the heat balances of Section 6 as an input to a NASA Glenn mass estimating tool (SRPS Opt) 
and the following assumptions: 
- Working fluid is water 
- Maximum inlet temperature of 505K 
- Materials consist of titanium pressure boundary and carbon-carbon facesheet panel 
fins 
- Four transport loops each with two pumps and accumulator 
- Titanium heat pipes with water working fluid 
Q 681 kWt 
2 I 193kg 
Q = 761 kW 
2 1 214 kg 
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2 I 284 kg 
428 kg 
Q = 761 kW 
4 1 214kg 
856 kg 
568 kg 
Q = 397 kW 
4 1 142kg 
568 kg 
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- Includes micrometeoroid shield, survival heaters, clamps, insulation for the transport 
loops 
- No deployment system or panel support structure mass has been included 
Additional detail of the geometry of the radiator panels and heat exchanger connection to the 
transport loops are shown in Section 9.6. 
4.5.5 Reactor I&C Segment 
The current best-estimate value for Reactor Instrumentation and Control segment, 321 kg, is based on 
projected Reactor Module 18C needs for the JIM0 mission. 
The following assumptions for the Reactor I&C system were made to provide a basis for this mass 
estimate: 
The reactor system design is assumed to be as documented in Reference 4-A. It is assumed 
that 12 sliders are utilized for reactivity control, and one safety rod is withdrawn at plant startup 
and not used. It is also assumed that there are between one and four loops with one Brayton 
Generator per loop (and two valves per loop, unless there is only one loop). The reactor 
system design is extensible to control drums if required. 
There are four independent control channels and independent sensors are used for each 
channel (e.g. there are four independent sensors measuring the same parameter -one , 
connects to each channel) with the following exceptions: continuous slider position indication 
(one sensor per slider), discrete slider position, discrete valve and safety rod position, and 
fission product level (one sensor overall not used for control but only for information- 
gathering). 
Assuming 12-slot card racks are used; this architecture can be implemented using six card 
racks, 10 unique card types, and 45 total cards (41 if analog circuitry is combined onto another 
card). 
The alternator is designed to produce 440 volt AC electrical power to operate the spacecraft 
systems and provide propulsion power. 
All Reactor I&C circuits will be located at the aft end of the spacecraft inside the same shielded 
compartment as the Power Conditioning and Distribution (PCAD) controller and etectronics, 
and the Command & Data Handling (C8DH) subsystem. 
All reactor functions will be controlled directly by the Reactor I&C segment, and not by other 
spacecraft subsystems. 
A direct communication link with the spacecraft PCAD controller will be provided. 
The Reactor Controllers control the reactor and maintain continuity of electrical power to the 
spacecraft based on sensor inputs. The reactor sensors include, but are not limited to, hot leg 
temperature, cold leg temperature, pressure, flow, neutron flux, fission products, continuous control 
device assembly position, and discrete valve and control device assembly positions. Details of the 
mass for circuit cards, sensors and cabling are contained in Reference 4-2 and are summarized 
below. 
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- 
I&C System Mass 
Circuit Cards & Card Racks (with 
Total mass 
4-44 (kg) 
A nO 
Analog Interface cards) 
A similar analysis was done for the single Brayton system that resulted in a mass of 305 kg 
I UU 
Cabling 
Total 
4.5.6 Plant Structure and Environmental Protection Segment 
190 
321 
The design of the Reactor Module structure has not progressed to the point of having a mass 
estimate based on a specific design. Based on discussions with NASA JPL, it was estimated that 12% 
of the reactor module mass would be the supporting structure. This includes the shielding structure 
and the primary support structure but does not include HRS structure or spacecraft boom. 
Sensors and Actuators 
The Thermal Management and Micrometeoroid Protection Subsystem masses are not yet known and 
are not included in the overall Reactor Module mass. Reference 4-1 0 estimates the Thermal 
Management Subsystem mass at 75 kg. 
25 
4.5.7 Aerothermal Protection Segment 
No mass estimates were done on the Aerothermal Protection Segment (or Aeroshell). Thus, mass of 
this segment has not been included in the overall Reactor Module mass. It is anticipated that the 
aeroshell would be separated from the Reactor Module prior to reactor startup. Therefore, its mass is 
important for launch vehicle capacity, but not for interplanetary trajectory calculations. Reference 4-10 
estimates the aeroshell mass at 143 kg. 
4.5.8 Power Conditioning and Distribution (PCAD) 
The PCAD Subsystem is not an NRPCT cognizant subsystem. Thus, a complete mass evaluation of 
PCAD mass has not been performed by the NRPCT. However, PCAD mass depends heavily on the 
number of energy conversion units and how they are controlled, so some evaluation of this subsystem 
has been performed. 
PCAD mass is dominated by the cabiing from the alternators to the spacecraft bus. Table 4-3 shows 
estimates of the PCAD cabling for the various system architectures. In each case, the cabling mass 
was calculated assuming a 3% electrical loss. Conductors are copper and the mass excludes 
insulation. Use of aluminum conductors is estimated to reduce these conductor masses to 
approximately 41 % of the mass shown in Table 4-3. 
For the 1-1-1 case, two full rated cables have been included, assuming that the alternator has two 
independent stator windings. This configuration is required to maintain single fault tolerance in the 
PCAD subsystem. 
For the 2-2-2s and 3-3-3s cases, 50 kg additional mass has been added for tap-changing 
transformers in the PPUs. These additional components may be needed to maintain constant PPU 
operating voltage at the partial speed conditions of these two cases. 
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Mass Percent 
Component Difference (kg) Increase Comments 
Increase in piping diameter, wall thickness 
Piping 630 360% and inclusion of internal insulation; detailed 
arrangements used to determine lengths 
! Valves I 140 I 100X ( No valves included in concept selection 
Primary Support Structure 
The structure mass increase resulted from the following differences: 
- Minimal mass of structural support was included in the Concept Selection 
process 
- The current concept estimated that 12% of the total reactor module mass would 
be from the structure 
- The spacecraft boom was not included in either estimate 
Reactor Shield Mass 
The reactor shield mass increase resulted from the following differences: 
- Reactor size changes due to power increase 
- Power level increase effect on shielding effectiveness 
- Normalization of the QMARS mass estimating tool to NRPCT design goals 
More information on the changes in the reactor shield that resulted in the mass increase can 
be found in Reference 4 4 .  
Heat Rejection Segment 
The heat rejection segment mass increase resulted from the following differences: 
- Increased thermal load due to power increase (mass increase) 
- Change of working fluid from NaK to water (mass decrease) 
PCAD and I&C 
. A minor increase in the Reactor I&C segment was seen. The PCAD mass decreased slightly 
(52 kg) because the NRPCT estimate only includes conductors. 
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4.6 Mass Comparison with JPL Final Report 
Reference 4-1 0 discussed the mass summary for the entire spaceship. In the Reference 4-1 0 
summary, details of the reactor module were given. These masses are shown in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4: Reactor Module Mass Estimate from JPL Final Report 
f 1 JPL Final Report 1 
Notes 
I Reactor Segment I 2,823 I I 
I Reactor 18C Segment I 373 I 
Reactor Radiation 
Shield Segment 807 
Reactor Coolant 
Segment 
I PCAD Segment / 958 I I 
Unknown materials of 
construction 
Heat Rejection 
Segment 
I ,954 
2,019 
Total: 1 -9,850 
4-4-4 system architecture 
Structure 
I I I 
'includes an 80% uncertainty allowance and a 250 kg design growth allowance I 
Comparing these JPL masses with the NRPCT estimates shows that the NRPCT 1-1-1, 2-2-2 and 3- 
2-2 plant configurations all fall below the JPL estimate. The 1-1-1 NRPCT estimate has a margin of 
2,050 kg to the JPL mass. The NRPCT 4-4-4 plant configuration comes in 1,400 kg over the JPL 
estimate. This is shown graphically in Figure 4-4. 
940 
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5 Arrangements 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions: 
Several arrangements and associated trade studies were evaluated by the NRPCT based on 
estimates available for each component and the overall spaceship envelope. Spaceship constraints, 
which led to reactor module envelope targets, and individual component constraints, and system 
pressure drop were the primary influences for the arrangement models. It was anticipated that 
accommodation of thermal expansion and thermal management objectives would have heavily 
influenced future efforts. Although no specific arrangements were selected, the process of developing 
alternate arrangements was informative. 
Numerous design considerations affected the size, orientation, and positioning of the components and 
subsequent assemblies. Design information and constraints were gathered by area of expertise from 
NRPCT members, from vendors, and from primary members of the Prometheus Project, (i.e., JPL and 
NGST). Some of the considerations are collected in Section 5.3. 
The overall process is described in Section 5.4, followed by a discussion of trade studies and a view 
of future actions that would have been pursued. 
Key conclusions are 
Adhering to the space envelope design constraint coupled with other design constraints, such 
as minimizing pressure drop, would be a challenge for configuration options having more 
primary components than a system with one Brayton, one recuperator, and one gas cooler. 
It would be difficult to configure more than two Brayton loops within the baseline design 
envelope (See Figure 5-3) without compromising system pressure drop or other performance 
characteristics. Changes in the baseline design envelope, which is driven by the shield 
shadow size and by packaging constraints within the fairing, would need to be considered in 
parallel with arrangement development efforts. 
Control of system angular momentum, in order to avoid interference with the science mission, 
could be a significant driver for arrangement of the Reactor Coolant Segment. Orientation of 
the Brayton units so that the momentum axis is orthogonal to the orbit plane limits the design 
space. Angular momentum of the primary coolant would also need to be considered. 
Placement of a momentum offload system (e.g., reaction wheel assembly), if necessary, 
should be considered part of early design trades. 
Advantages were identified for both functional and modular grouping of the components. 
Thermal management, piping, or structural concerns may be simplified by grouping 
components according to function (e.g., all coolers together). Modular placement, in which 
complete loops (Brayton, cooler, recuperator) are assembled and tested prior to installation 
may offer advantages such as more complete testing prior to installation and greater ease of 
installation. The reactor radiation shielding value of the component arrangements also will 
need to be considered. 
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arrangements with varying numbers of components and various configurations to capture constraint 
and decision drivers during and after each arrangement study. 
Six arrangement layouts (1-1-1, 2-1-1, 2-2-2, 3-3-2, 3-3-3, 4-44) were generated. The layouts vary by 
the number of main components referenced by "x-y-zn nomenclature. The designation of 1-1 -1 or B- 
R-G is B is the number of Brayion units, R is the number of recuperators each sized to support the 
operation of one Brayton unit at its rated power and G is the number of gas coolers each sjzed to 
support the operation of one Brayton unit at its rated power. It does not indicate the number of 
individual recuperators or gas coolers. For example a 2-2-2 for a 200 kWe system with both Braytons 
running (no spares) would be two 100 kWe Brayton units with two recuperators and gas coolers, each 
sized to support a 100 kWe Brayton unit. Additional reactor module components that were modeled 
include reactor and associated components, piping, valves, heat rejection system components, such 
as pumps and accumulators, shielding, and the primary support structure. 
A significant highlight in the arrangement modeling effort was a quantitative comparison of the 1-1 -1, 
2-2-2, 3-3-3, and 4-44 systems based on a list of metrics. The metrics encompassed the primary 
drivers for the system, including pressure drop, manufacturability, simplicity, and redundancy, among 
others. The quantitative comparison provided additional information to support the selection of the 
number of Braytons for Prometheus. 
In addition, concepts with varying degrees of component redundancy, such as the 2-1-1 and the 3-3-2 
with a shared gas cooler, were considered to evaluate reliability, extensibility, and other arrangement 
dependent metrics such as pressure drop. The 2-1-1 arrangement studies intentionally neglected 
mission specific space envelope constraints for a deep space mission to the Jupiter Icy Moons in 
order to explore pros and cons to arrangement options outside of our prior design space. Mission 
specific constraints, such as the space envelope or Brayton orientation, were lifted to assess all 
pntential component geometric arrangements for clear solutions to arrangements issues or to obtain 
advantages for the system. Though mission specific constraints were lifted, individual component 
constraints were still incorporated into the possible layout. Constraint removal did not yield clear 
advantages over the other systems upon first review, but further trade studies would be needed to 
more fully explore the alternatives. The 3-3-2 with a shared gas cooler study maintained spaceship 
and individual component constraints. Both studies demonstrate the ability to arrange alternate 
concepts and understand advantages and disadvantages of these systems. 
All revisions of the arrangement models afforded the NRPCT technical insight into the relationship ' 
between components, piping effects on pressure drop, component orientation, thermal concerns, 
manufacturability issues, and effects of mission on reactor and plant layout. Several other subsystems 
were to be incorporated, such as the Primary Support Structure, micrometeoroid protection, and 
aeroshell, which would lead to additional iterations and trade studies. 
5.3 Design Considerations 
One of the important outcomes of the arrangement efforts was the identification of design 
considerations. These considerations promoted the natural evolution of the arrangements process 
and are discussed throughout the descriptions of the individual arrangements. Table 5-1 lists some 
of the significant design considerations identified, with an accompanying explanation of the 
consideration or the impact as appropriate. Some of the items listed are also constraints, but are 
grouped together with considerations for simplicity. 
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Table 5-1. List of Design Considerations for Arrangement Models 
1 Desian Consideration T 
Configuration Considerations 
Reactor Module Envelope Dimensions are based on the 
spaceship stowed configuration within a five meter fairing 
and the requirement to remain within the cone angle of 
the shield. 1 
Support structure components forward of the shield must 1 
be minimized to avoid interference with core reactivity, 
e.g. neutronics. 
The shield and its supporting structure must not interfere 
with aero shell performance. 
space ship is orbiting with no thrust. 
Piping Considerations 
To minimize pressure drop, piping must be modified in 
length, diameter, number of bends, and general routing. 
Increasing the ratio of pipe bend radius to pipe diameter 
will decrease pressure drop through the system. 
(See Sectior; 9 Czmponznt Desc:ipticns) 
To avoid large velocity gradients at the compressor inlet, 
a de-swir~erarran~ement or 2 to 4 diameters in length of 
straight piping is currently required before the 
compressor. Velocity and pressure gradient avoidance is 
less critical for the turbine, because flow enters a vortex. 
(See Section 9 Component Descriptions) 
For reliability, surface area of pressure boundaries 
should be minimized. This is to include the recuperator 
and gas cooler. Arrangement and orientation may help 
protect the system against external impacts, such as 
from micrometeoroids. (See Section 7 Reliability) 
Thermal coupling between hot leg piping and plant 
components must be accounted for when evaluating 
thermal expansion issues, structural issues, and ( operational performance issues (see Section 10). 
Explanation I Impact 
These considerations were captured in the 
envelope defined by NGST and described in 
Figure 5-3. 
This was not yet a factor in the efforts to date. 
It would have become a constraint for design 
of the launch supports and other structures. 
This guideline was preliminary, and did not 
havean effect on efforts to date. It was 
anticipated that special consideration would be 
needed to assure that the shield and its 
supports would have to separate cleanly from 
the aeroshell. in order to maximize the 
beneficial effects of the aeroshell. 
This requirement reflects the need for pointing 
stability during the science operations. 
Counter-rotating braytons or other forms of 
momentum compensation may be necessary 
to offset Brayton or gas flow momentum. 
This is a trade which must be performed in 
order to meet the competing requirements of 
packaging, minimum pressure drop, and 
acceptable thermal expansion stresses. 
Compressor inlet is much more sensitive to 
straight piping than turbine inlet piping. Flow 
characteristics in the inlet to the compressor 
affect surge and efficiency. 
As arrangement efforts progressed, one 
consideration for placement of components 
would have been shielding of the more 
vulnerable components by more robust 
elements and orientation of components so 
that the more vulnerable surfaces face away 
from higher particle flux directions. 
This constraint reflects the thermal 
management internal to the reactor module 
See Section 10. 
CDM Related Considerations 
The control drive mechanisms for the sliders for the 1 . - 
reactor require clearance behind the shield nearly equal 
to their length due to the translational motion with 
respect to the reactor necessary for operation. 
This forces the Energy Conversion elements to 
be placed further away from the shield to keep 
clear of the sliders. Use of drums would 
reduce the offset form the shield. 
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Shield Related Considerations: 
Piping arrangements must consider streaming through 
the reactor shadow shield. Routing the piping through 
the shield with a 90 to 180 degree spiral provides good 
neutron attenuation and was a leading candidate (see 
Reference 5- 1 ). 
Where possible, consideration should be given to 
placement of components in a manner which provides 
extra shielding for local components (e.g., alternator) or 
for the space vehicle bus 
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Explanation ! Impact 
How piping routes through the shield and then 
around the CDM's is a significant driver in the 
piping configuration. ~ h i g  would need to be 
addressed early in future work. 
For example, aligning the axis of the Brayton 
with the axis at the space ship and placing the 
turbine and compressor closer to the shield 
than the alternator may provide added 
shielding for the alternator. Also, ptacement of 
equipment of substantial mass closest to the 
back side of the shield with respect to the rest 
of the plant components provides additional 
gamma shielding for p h t  components. 
5.4 Model Development 
A valuable part of the arrangement studies effort was the development and evolution of the different 
configuration models. The evolution of the arrangement models described herein details the logic trail 
based on the best estimates available at the time each model was created. Insight into the process 
and where future efforts might lead can be gained by understanding the different evolutions and the 
overall approach to updates and evaluation of the different arrangements. 
With each model description, component best estimates are revised and, in some cases, completely 
altered from previous revision descriptions. Since the arrangement process evolved using best 
estimates and resulted in several revisions, there is not yet a single preferred arrangement. The 
component dimensions used in the models are based on operational conditions of the system and its 
components to achieve rated power level and minimize pressure drop. 
5.4.1 3-3-3 System Architecture - Revision 1 
The NRPCT evaluated options for an initial base case arrangement. The options ranged from a one to 
a four Brayton system, all sized to produce 200 kWe with the norma\ly operating components in- 
service, which were all completely redundant systems with exception to the 1-1-1 system. A 
completely redundant system is redundant from a component perspective such that there are no 
shared components for the energy conversion loops. These systems require the additional complexity 
of valves and potentially cross strapping. In order to capture some of the challenge of packaging 
many components and in keeping with the goal to pursue a redundant system, the team selected a 
completely redundant three Brayton system to serve as the first iteration of a multi-Brayton system 
arranged in the pre-determined space envelope. The 3-3-3 system Revision 1 is shown in Figure 5-4. 
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requirements and design objectives. These issues include structural, thermal, and operational effects 
on arrangements, component size and orientation, and additional arrangements with various levels of 
component redundancy. The following paragraphs describe some of the anticipated challenges. 
Structural considerations, thermal management, and operational effects would all affect arrangements 
of components. With the incorporation of structural systems, such as an aeroshell and the Primary 
Support Structure as well as auxiliary components, such as micrometeoroid protection, the locations 
and orientations of all components would be affected. Aspects such as flexibility within the design 
space, accessibility for equipment support points, and physical geometry of all system components, 
would impose layout challenges. Thermal concerns would affect ptacement and orientation of 
components for heat rejection, and thermal isolation would be required to provide moderate 
temperature zones and avoid excessive heating of plant and structure components. Additional 
features would be required to accommodate thermal movement of components relative to each other 
as temperature changed. Finally, operational effects would affect arrangements, because pipe routing 
and valve locations are directly coupled with pressure drop, which, in turn, affects system efficiency. 
Additional information would be required to further investigate these concerns and their effects on the 
system. 
As with the layout of components, the component sizes depend on many factors. The power 
requirements, number of operating components, pressure drop through the system, and heat balance 
requirements all affect the dimensions of components by varying the heat transfer area, inlet and 
outlet ducts, and structural support area. It is also necessary to refine metrics, such as pressure drop, 
to include component specific values as they become available. Not only are the component 
dimensions dependent on these metrics, but they are dependent on each other. For example, 
operational component pressure losses and the pipe diameter and routing affects pressure drop, 
which affects system efficiency. System efficiency, then, affects the size of the reactor, which also 
determines the size of the shield and the need for shield caps. Thus, all components, especially the 
reactor, shield, and primary PCS components would require re-evaluation to both continuously update 
the individual dimensions and promote the individual design optimizations as well. 
Design optimization and re-evaluation is also dependent on mission requirements. The mission 
dictates module functional requirements and influences design constraints for the arrangement and 
individual components. Various configurations would have been investigated for feasibility for manned 
or unmanned missions, different destinations for varying lengths of time, and for missions where 
levels of maintenance were available. 
Lastly, based on the various levels of component redundancy and cross strapping, additional 
iterations could be performed to assess arrangements with different numbers of components. These 
systems would be arranged such that the PCS loops would share different components. The 3-3-2 
system and the various iterations of the 2-1-1 system are examples of these types of systems. 
5.9 References 
5- 1: KAPL letter SPP-67210-0011, "Space Reactor Shield Design Summary, for Information", to be 
issued 
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6 Heat Balances - Design and Off-Design System Performance, 
Parameter Sensitivity Studies 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This section describes the results of system heat balance studies and parameter sensitivity studies 
that were performed for the Prometheus Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP). These evaluations 
were performed to establish the range of plant operating parameters needed to satisfy the 
requirements described in Section 1. The results of these studies are used to establish SNPP 
component sizing and operating conditions, enable comparison of candidate system architectures, 
and initiate trade studies. A few key observations regarding these preliminary heat balances and 
parameter sensitivity studies are: 
A key driver for the overall plant efficiency is the relative complexity of the piping system and 
the resulting impact on piping system pressure drop. Without optimization, both the single 
Brayton and two Brayton system arrangements are able to produce -185 kWe while meeting 
the 450 m2 heat rejection segment radiator area objective. 
Relatively minor improvements in assumed heat pipe capability (heat flux vs, operating 
temperature and service life) and Brayton turbomachinery performance (turbine and 
compressor efficiency) were found to provide significant system benefits. Conversely, 
relatively small reductions in turbine and compressor efficiencies were shown to significantly 
degrade overall system performance. Thus, Brayton turbomachinery should continue to be a 
key area of development. 
Design heat balance sensitivity studies suggest that fundamental design concerns (material 
performance at elevated operating temperatures, manageable mass and radiator area) may 
be alleviated with a modest reduction in the spaceship electrical requirement. Conversely, 
spaceship electric requirements greater than the 185 kWe assumed in these studies would 
make satisfying all design constraints progressively more difficult and would require increased 
reactor thermal output and increased heat rejection segment radiator area. 
Additional effort must be directed toward identification of material temperature limits, 
operating strategy, temperature band, instrumentation accuracy, and plant transient response 
prior to establishing an operating temperature band that will ensure design limits are not 
exceeded. 
For the four Brayton system, increasing pipe diameter and decreasing compressor inlet 
temperature were found to have larger impacts on system performance for small changes 
than the other parameters studied. 
6.2 Heat Balance Model 
Heat balance studies were performed using a spreadsheet model created by the NRPCT to calculate 
operating conditions for the direct gas Brayton system. The model uses the plant arrangements 
described in Section 5 which have one reactor providing heat to one, two, three, or four parallel 
Brayton conversion loops. Each energy conversion loop incorporates one Brayton turboalternator, 
one recuperator, one gas cooler, and associated piping. One converter loop is normally operating for @ the one and two loop cases and two loops are normally operating for the three and four loop cases. 
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The model has the ability to determine both design state points and off-design operating points for a 
fixed sized system. The design portion of the model determines the state points for a system 
designed to produce a net 185 kWe to be supplied to the spaceship. The off-design portion of the 
model uses fixed sized components, as determined in the design portion of the model, to predict off- 
design operating conditions for the system. A more detailed description of the model can be found in 
Reference 6-1. 
6.3 Preliminary Design Heat Balances and Parameter Sensitivity Studies 
The key driver for the heat balance is to produce the 185 kWe required by the spaceship. In order to 
achieve this output from the Power Conditioning and Distribution (PCAD) system, -200 kWe must be 
output from the operating converter loop(s). The total electrical output of a converter is the turbine 
power minus the compressor power, shaft mounted fan power, bearing losses, windage losses, and 
alternator efficiency losses. 
Plant parameters can be varied to optimize the system to achieve desired objectives. Key design 
objectives include: 
Maximize converter loop and overall system efficiency 
Minimize mass 
Maximize reliability 
Minimize required heat rejection segment radiator area; a limit of -450 m2 had been assumed 
for concept downselection trade studies documented in Reference 6-7 
Minimize reactor fuel load 
Maximize operational flexibility 
Minimize operating temperatures of reactor vessel and reactor outlet piping to mitigate 
concerns associated with material performance at elevated temperature 
Maximize extensibility to missions with other power requirements and/or operating 
environments 
While many of these objectives are complementary, variation of parameters can sometimes result in 
competing effects. For example, a set of plant parameters that may tend to maximize efficiency, 
minimize mass, minimize fuef load, and minimize radiator area may lack sufficient operational 
flexibility, degrade system reliability, result in unsatisfactory material performance, or preclude 
operation in other environments. Ultimately, a set of parameters must be identified which 
satisfactorily balances all the design objectives. 
Converter and system efficiencies may be increased by increasing the turbine inlet temperature 
andlor decreasing the compressor inlet temperature, Increasing turbine inlet temperature increases 
turbine power by creating a larger temperature drop across the turbine. Decreasing compressor inlet 
temperature decreases the compressor and fan power requirements by creating a smaller 
temperature rise across the compressor and fan. Decreasing compressor inlet temperature also 
effectively increases system efficiency and decreases the heat rejection segment temperature. These 
competing factors combine to create an optimal value for compressor inlet temperature for which 
required radiator area is minimized and heat rejection segment operating temperature is maximized 
but within operationai limits. 
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Piping and component pressure drops also impact the converter and system efficiencies. The turbine 
pressure ratio is set by the pressure rise across the compressor minus the pressure losses in the 
components and piping. The larger the pressure drop within the system, the smaller the turbine 
pressure ratio. Decreasing the turbine pressure ratio decreases the turbine temperature ratio and 
therefore the turbine temperature drop. This decreases the amount of useful work extracted from the 
fluid and results in a less efficient system. 
The following assumptions apply to the design heat balances and sensitivity studies described in 
Section 6.3: 
-1 85 kWe total to bus and electric plant loads 
Piping system arrangements as described in Section 5 which incorporate internally insulated 
reactor outlet piping as described in Reference 6-2 
o Reactor Outlet Piping 
12.4 cm ID flow diameter (internally insulated)/?6.0 cm OD 
o Reactor Inlet Piping 
15.2 cm ID flow diametedl6.0 em OD 
o Converter Loop Piping 
15.2 cm ID flow diameterll6.0 cm OD -for single and two Brayton arrangements 
(Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) 
o Converter Loop Piping 
9.4 cm ID flow diameter11 0.0 cm OD - for three and four Brayton arrangements 
(Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4) ' 
o Piping wall thickness as calculated by methods described in Attachment B of 
Reference 6-2 
o Hydraulically smooth piping 
1 150K reactor outlet temperature ' 
390K compressor inlet temperature ' 
2.00 MPa compressor outlet pressure 
2.00 compressor pressure ratio ' 
500K maximum radiator heat pipe operating temperature ' 
37.5 glgmol HeXe mixture reactor coolant/working fluid [78.4% He (atomic)] 
2.9% of the reactor thermal output is lost to the environment 
a Brayton turbine efficiency (see Section 9.1.3) 
o 90.0% -for single and two Brayton arrangements (Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) 
o 88.4% -for three and four Brayton arrangements (Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4) ' 
Brayton compressor efficiency (see Section 9.1.4) 
o 84.7% -for single and two Brayton arrangements (Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) 
o 84.0% -for three and four Brayton arrangements (Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4) ' 
Brayton turbomachinery operating at constant speed of 45,000 RPM 
Except when evaluating the sensitivity of these parameters in Section 6.3.6 
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Pressure drop across components are assumed to be independent of flow parameters; e.g. 
temperature, pressure, flowrate 
o 50 kPa reactor 
o 15 kPa low pressure side of recuperator 
o 15 kPa high pressure side of recuperator 
o 20 kPa gas cooler (gas side) - for single and two Brayton arrangements (Sections 
6.3.1 and 6.3.2) 
o 10 kPa gas cooler (gas side) - for three and four Brayton arrangements (Sections 6. 
and 6.3.4) 
20% margin applied to calculated piping system pressure drop values 
92% effective recuperator 
94% effective gas cooler 
30% efficient heat rejection segment pumps 
95% alternator electromagnetic efficiency 
99% efficient cabling from converter to PCAD system 
97% efficient Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) electronics 
99% efficient cabling from PCAD system to loads 
500 W PMAD controller load 
200K radiator sink temperature 
14.5% margin applied to calculated required heat rejection area 
The heat balances given in Sections 6.3.1,6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 6.3.4 are preliminary and are provided 
only for baseline comparisons. To enable comparison of the one, two, three, and four Brayton 
systems, the heat balances assume the same set of input parameters. The assumed operating 
parameters do not represent the optimal set of operating conditions for any particular configuration. 
Each of the heat balances incorporate piping system pressure losses based on the preliminary 
arrangements described in Section 5 of this report which have not been optimized for pressure drop, 
mass, or thermal management concerns. 
Without optimization, both the single Brayton and two Brayton system arrangements are able to 
produce -1 85 kWe while meeting the 450 m2 heat rejection segment radiator area objective. The two 
Brayton system also meets the single fault tolerance requirement. Further optimization of operating 
parameters and arrangements of piping and components is required. Trade studies with the 
spaceship must be performed to optimize reactor module and spaceship design in areas such as heat 
rejection radiator area and boom length. 
System heat balances determine component heat loads and operating conditions and, thus, provide 
the basis of system mass estimates. Section 4.5.3 describes the heat balances and piping 
arrangements that were assumed for mass estimating purposes. 
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As discussed in Section 3.6, an alternative two Brayton system architecture was evaluated where 
both turboalternators would normally operate at less than their rated capacity but jointly produce the 
full rated system power by reducing turbine inlet temperature and rotational speed. In the event of 
failure of one turboalternator, full rated system power is restored by increasing the turbine inlet 
temperature and rotational speed of the remaining unit such that each turboalternator operates at its 
rated capacity. This mode of operation is desirable to mitigate concerns associated with material 
performance at elevated temperature and is expected to perform comparably to the system described 
in Figure 6-2. 
The two Brayton system architecture discussed in Section 3.5 includes two Brayton units each rated 
for approximately I00 kWe. Since both Brayton units would be operated in parallel to produce the 
required electrical output, the heat balance would be similar to that generated for the three Brayton 
arrangement (Figure 6-3). 
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As discussed in Section 3.7, an alternative three Brayton system architecture was evaluated where all 
three turboalternators would normally operate at less than their rated capacity but jointly produce the 
full rated system power by reducing turbine inlet temperature and rotational speed. In the event of 
failure of one turboalternator, full rated system power is restored by increasing the turbine inlet 
temperature and rotational speed of the remaining units such that each turboalternator operates at its 
rated capacity. This mode of operation is desirable to mitigate concerns associated with material 
performance at elevated temperature and is expected to perform comparably to the system described 
in Figure 6-3. 
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6.3.5 System Comparison 
A summary of key outputs from the design heat balances for the non-optimized one, two, three, and 
four Brayton plant configurations (Figure 6-1 through Figure 6-4) is provided in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: Comparison of Non-optimized Design Heat Balances 
Reactor Electrical Thermal Basic Plant 
Required Reactor Inlet System 
Configuration Power 
Radiator Temperature Efficiency Area 
[kWe] I [kWt] [m2] wl [%I 
Single Brayton 
Section 6.3.1 185 783 453 896 23.6 
Two Brayton 
Section 6.3.2 185 779 449 895 23.8 
Three Brayton 
Section 6.3.3 185 932 566 906 19.9 
Four Brayton 
Section 6.3.4 182 1002 62 1 91 1 I 8.2 
While it is assumed that the turbine and compressor efficiencies are slightly higher for the single 
Brayton and two Brayton systems, the key driver for the degradation in overall plant efficiency for the 
three and four Brayton systems is the relative complexity of the piping systems and the resulting 
impact on piping system pressure drop. For plants with multiple converter loops, flow splits in the 
reactor inlet and outlet headers and inclusion of valves become significant additions to the overall 
piping system pressure drop. Piping system complexity generally increases as more components are 
arranged into the prescribed space envelope. Notwithstanding these factors, it is noted that the two 
Brayton system is slightly more efficient than the single Brayton system. This is an artifact of the 
preliminary, non-optimized piping system arrangements used in the these heat balances where the 
single Brayton arrangement has slightly greater piping system pressure drop than the two Brayton 
system despite having no converter loop flow splits and no valves. The performance trends exhibited 
in Table 6-1 clearly demonstrate the need for continued piping system optimization to reduce piping 
system pressure drops. 
As discussed in Section 6.3.4, the four Brayton system is able to produce only -98% of the required 
185 kWe given the assumed piping arrangement and system parameters. Parameter sensitivity 
studies (Section 6.3.6) indicate that the four Brayton system remains a viable plant configuration as 
very minor changes to the baseline assumptions utilized here result in a plant output of 185 kWe. 
6.3.6 Parameter Sensitivity Studies 
A number of sensitivity studies were performed to determine the effect of parameter variations on the 
plant's overall heat balance and other parameters of interest. Of particular interest was the effed of 
parameter variation on required reactor thermal output, required radiator area, and reactor inlet 
temperature. The overall mass of the SNPP is minimized when reactor thermal output and required 
radiator area are near minimum values as the mass of the reactor, the reactor radiation shield, and 
the heat rejection segment dominate the overall SNPP mass. Minimizing the required thermal output 
of the reactor has many benefits as the mass of the fuel load, reactor structure, and reactor radiation 
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For each of the reactor concepts represented in Figure 6-5, reactor mass decreases as the 
concentration of He increases toward the lowest molecular weight mixture that was evaluated, 20.0 
glgmol. It is noted that reactor mass at a molecular weight of 31.5 gtgmol, the composition assumed 
here, is within 10% of the reactor mass evaluated at 20.0 glgmol for each case. Heat exchanger and 
reactor mass and performance optimize toward lower molecular weight (better heat transfer) white 
turbomachinery performance optimizes toward higher molecular weight (higher specific speed). 
Integrated plant trade studies must be performed to identify the optimal composition of HeXe that 
balances turbomachinery performance with heat transfer capability for the direct gas system. 
The plant parameter sensitivity studies described in this section demonstrate that significant 
improvements in system performance can be realized with advances in a few key technology areas. 
Relatively minor improvements in heat pipe capability (heat flux vs. operating temperature and service 
life) and Brayton turbomachinery performance (turbine and compressor efficiency) were found to 
provide significant system benefits. Piping system and component pressure losses were also found 
to have a significant impact on overall plant efficiency. 
6.3.6.1 Converter Loop Piping Diameter Sensitivity - Design Case 
Table 6-2 describes the piping sizes assumed in the four Brayton system arrangement (Figure 5-19) 
used as a baseline for these sensitivity studies. 
Table 6-2: Reference Pipe Sizing for Four Brayton Arrangement 
e Outer Diameter Inner Diameter Wall Thickness [cm] [cm] [cm] 
I \ 
Reactor Outlet 12.4 
Piping 16.0 (assumes 1.39 cm thick 0.4 internal insulation and liner) 
I Reactor Inlet Piping 1 16.0 I 15.2 I 0.4 I 
- - I 
Converter Loop 
Piping 10.0 9.4 0.3 
Alternator Cooling 
Pi~ina 5.0 4.6 0.2 
Flow losses in converter loop piping were found to have a significant impact on the overall plant 
efficiency, particularly in the low pressure portions of the loops. The sensitivity of converter loop 
piping diameter to overall plant performance was examined for a range of converter loop piping sizes 
from 10.0 to 16.0 cm outer diameter. The wall thickness for the converter loop piping was assumed 
constant over the range of sizes evaluated. 
It should not be inferred that piping arrangements were developed for four Brayton systems with 
converter loop piping greater than 10 cm OD. The piping lengths and bend locations used in the 
baseline four Brayton arrangement (Figure 5-19) are assumed in this sensitivity study. Converter loop 
piping diameter and bend radii were simply increased without regard for space envelope constraints 
or resultant changes to piping length and bend locations. The results of the converter loop piping 
diameter sensitivity study are shown in Figure 6-6. a 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 



Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 6-22 
6.3.6.4 Compressor Outlet Pressure Sensitivity - Design Case 
The sensitivity of compressor outlet pressure to overall plant performance was examined for a 
pressure range of 1.38 MPa to 4.00 MPa. Outer diameter of the reactor outlet piping, reactor inlet 
piping, converter loop piping, and alternator cooling piping were assumed to be constant as shown in 
Table 6-2. Thickness of insulation and liner in the reactor outlet piping was also assumed to be 
constant at 1.39 cm. Piping wall thickness is assumed to vary with compressor outlet pressure as 
shown in Table 6-3. 
Table 6-3: Assumed Pipe Sizes for Compressor Outlet Pressure Sensitivity Study 
1 I 
Compressor Outlet Pressure [MPa] 
< 2.00 1 2.03 1 2.50 1 3.00 1 3.50 / 4.00 
It should be noted that the inside diameter decreases with increasing pressure since outer diameter 
was held constant. This approach maintains consistency of the piping system arrangement but 
results in increased hydraulic resistance. Turbine and compressor isentropic efficiency were 
assumed to decrease with increasing pressure as shown in Table 6-4. 
Reactor Outlet Piping Wall Thickness [cm] 
Reactor Inlet Piping Wall Thickness [cm] 
Converter Loop Piping Wall Thickness [cm] 
Alternator Cooling Piping Wall Thickness [cm] 
The results of the compressor outlet pressure sensitivity study are shown in Figure 6-9. 
0.40 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
Table 6 4 :  Assumed Turbomachinery Efficiencies 
for Compressor Outlet Pressure Sensitivity Study 
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heat pipe temperature must be balanced against increased gas cooler mass and a potential increase 
in the probability of failure of the gas cooler pressure boundary. Also, heat pipe evaporator heat flux 
limits as a function of operating temperature and service life must be further evaluated and validated 
through test programs. 
6.3.6.8 Conclusions - Design Heat Balances 
A key driver for the overall plant efficiency is the relative complexity of the piping system and the 
resulting impact on piping system pressure drop. For plants with multiple converter loops, flow splits 
in the reactor inlet and outlet headers and inclusion of valves become significant additions to the 
overall piping system pressure drop. Piping system complexity generally increases as more 
components are arranged into the prescribed space envelope. The performance trends exhibited in 
Table 6-1 clearly demonstrate the need for continued piping system optimization to reduce piping 
system pressure drops. 
For the four Brayton system, increasing pipe diameter and decreasing compressor inlet temperature 
were found to have larger impacts on system performance for small changes than the other 
parameters studied. Also, reactor thermal rating, required radiator area, and reactor inlet temperature 
decrease significantly as turbine and compressor efficiencies increase. Thus, Brayton 
turbomachinery should continue to be a key area of development, Test programs should be 
implemented to verify actual performance of flight-unit hardware. 
Design heat balance sensitivity studies suggest that fundamental design concerns (material 
performance at elevated operating temperatures, manageable mass and radiator area) may be 
alleviated with a modest reduction in the spaceship electrical requirement. Conversely, spaceship 
electric requirements greater than the 185 kWe assumed in these studies would make satisfying all 
design constraints progressively more difficult. 
While the baseline four Brayton system (Figure 6-4) makes at most 182 kWe of the required 185 kWe 
with the assumed piping arrangement and system parameters (Section 6.3), the preceding design 
heat balance sensitivity studies show this system can be significantly improved with minor adjustment 
to a few assumed parameters. Efficiency of this system, significantly benefits from increased 
compressor outlet pressure, increased compressor pressure ratio, and decreased compressor inlet 
temperature. The increased system efficiency, combined with an increased heat rejection water 
temperature, results in a significant reduction in required radiator area. A first iteration on the four 
Brayton system heat balance, assuming the piping arrangement described Figure 5-1 9 and Table 6-2 
and a reactor outlet temperature of 11 50K, is provided in Figure 6-13. Note that the one, two, and 
three Brayton systems would optimize at parameters other than those shown in Figure 6-13 for the 
four Brayton system. This is primarily due to differences in assumed turbine and compressor 
efficiencies and the relative impact of hydraulic resistance on the overall heat balance. 
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6.4.6 Conclusions - Off-Design Heat Balances 
Off-design studies indicate that system performance is highly sensitive to Brayton turbine and 
compressor efficiency. The system can sustain only a 1.3% degradation in turbine and compressor 
efficiency, when taken simultaneously, and still be able to produce the required 185 kWe at beginning- 
of-life. This result supports the conclusion obtained from the design sensitivity studies; i.e. Brayton 
turbomachinery should continue to be a key area of development. Test programs should be 
implemented to verify satisfactory turbine and compressor performance over component life. 
System performance was shown to degrade significantly as effective sink temperature increases 
above the assumed design value (Figure 6-20). This sensitivity study illustrates the need to ensure 
that radiator panels do not have a view to an effective sink temperature greater than design value 
when full electrical power is required. Effective sink temperatures less than the design value were 
shown to negligibly improve plant performance. 
Off-design studies show that the plant can sustain a loss of 10% of the original gas inventory and still 
be able to produce the required 185 kWe (Figure 6-18). This preliminary conclusion confirms 
assumptions used in previous analyses related to Brayton system gas leakage which were based on 
acceptable system leak rate of std CC/S giving a 10% reduction in system pressure over 15 years 
(Whitepaper 8, Enclosure 7 to Attachment D of Reference 6-7). 
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7 Reliability 
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Reliability values calculated in this study are based on individual component reliabilities estimated 
from limited research and engineering judgment; therefore conclusions made herein are based on the 
performance of each system studied relative to the other systems. No conclusions have been made, 
nor should be made, based on the absolute reliability values contained in this report. Comparison 
between system configurations can be made by understanding the impacts of different system 
architectures using estimates of relative component reliabilities. 
This reliability study mainly focused on comparisons of potential system architectures of the energy 
conversion system (see Section 3). Variations in other systems, such as the heat rejection system or 
the electrical control system were not included in this study. A specific decision concerning the 
number of energy conversion loops was not made due to project termination. However, these studies 
reveal that a one or two Brayton system would probably be recommended over a three or four 
Brayton system because they would be more reliable. 
The most reliable systems have fewer components and less surface area (fewer opportunities 
to fail). For Brayton assemblies with high assumed reliabilities (approximately 97% or higher), 
the single Brayton system with one recuperator and one gas cooler (1-1-1) is the most reliable 
(See Figure 7-1). The fully redundant two Brayton (2-2-2s and 2-2-2 one operating, one 
standby) systems provide a reliability benefit assuming Brayton assembly reliabilities below 
97%. These system architectures only require one Brayton unit to produce rated system 
power. The reliabilities of these two Brayton systems are also less sensitive to changes in 
assumed Brayton reliability. Future studies would need to determine whether the benefits of 
adding a second Brayton loop compensate for additional mass (shown in Figure 7-2). 
As shown in Figure 7-1, the 1 of 2 (2-2-2) Brayton system architecture will always be more 
reliable than either a 2 of 3 (3-3-3) or a 2 of 4 (4-4-4) Brayton configuration. The results are 
based on system architecture and are independent of component reliabilities. Three and four 
Brayton systems have a significant increase in the number of certain components, along with 
an increase in surface area for redundant components, which negatively impact the reliability 
of the overall system. The three and four Brayton systems require two Brayton units to be 
' operable to produce rated system power. 
Components most affecting system reliability differ based on system architecture. For the 
system configurations studied, the four components having the largest reliability impact were 
the gas cooler, heat rejection system loops, electrical penetrations, and the 
turbine/compressor (part of the Brayton assembly). Bearings also have a strong impact on the 
reliability of a single Brayton system, while the considerable number of welds significantly 
impacts multiple Brayton system reliabilities. 
To achieve an overall system reliability of 95% for a one Brayton system, each individual 
component needs to have a minimum reliability of roughly 0.994 (If the average reliability of 
multiple components is 0.994, a system reliability of 95% can be obtained.); due to the 
increased number of components, the average reliability for multiple Brayton system 
components would need to be higher to achieve 95% reliability. To achieve system reliability 
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7.2 Terminology 
The following definitions are used in this report: 
Reliability: The probability of performing a required function in the desired manner under all 
relevant conditions and on the occasions or during the time intervals when it is required so to 
perform (Reference 7- 2). 
Redundancy: The ability to survive one or more equipment faults and continue with its 
intended operational function (Reference 7- 2). 
Redundancy, active: Redundancy wherein all redundant items are operating simultaneously 
(Reference 7- 3). 
Redundancy, standby: Redundancy wherein the alternative means of performing the 
function is not operating until it is activated upon failure of the primary means of performing 
the function (Reference 7- 3). 
Robustness: Ability of a system to successfully operate under more extreme conditions than 
those for which it was designed (Reference 7- 2). 
Series Components: Two (or more) components independent of one another where the 
failure of either (any) component will fail the system. 
Parallel Components: Also known as redundant components. 
Total component reliability: the combination of reliabilities of the parts that form a 
component 
Brayton unit: composed of turbine/compressor, alternator, housing, bearings, windings, 
rotor, shaft 
Brayton assembly: For the purposes of this study, this is defined as the Brayton unit plus 
recuperator internal area 
Brayton loop: all components in primary system from reactor outlet to reactor inlet 
System architecture: composed of Brayton loops. 
Parallel System: Term used to indicate a system architecture in which 100% power is 
supplied by all Brayton units operating at a reduced capacity, but in the event of failure(s), full 
power can be supplied by fewer Braytons. 
7.3 Listing of Systems Evaluated 
7.3.1 Assumptions 
1. Multiple loop systems contain two valves per loop--one check valve and one isolation valve 
both in the compressor outlet. 
2. Backup power (battery) is available for starting the standby Brayton when the operating 
Brayton is not available in the 2-2-2 (1 operating, 1 standby) system architecture. However, 
the backup power source is not included in the current reliability studies. 
.3. Brayton engines can be designed to have different operating power levels. Section 8 and 
Reference 7- 8 evaluate the feasibility of this assumption. 
7.3.2 List of Systems Evaluated 
The general system architecture evaluated includes piping, valves, turbine/compressor, alternator, 
and heat exchangers. Smaller piping and instrumentation such as alternator bleed flow piping and 
sensors were not included. The reactor was not included in the study (reliability set to 100%) because 
not enough information is available at this time to assign a reliability number or to show if the reactor 
reliability would change with different system architectures. Instrumentation and control (control of 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 





Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 7-14 
7.4 Component Reliability Values and Basis 
7.4.1 Background 
Reliability values used in this study are shown in Table 7-1. Little reliability data is available for the components (many of which have not been 
designed yet) that will make up the SNPP. Component reliabilities were estimated based on NRPCT experience. Limited commercial data was 
used to confirm these approximations (as noted below). The values of some of the components were based on perceived reliability relative to other 
components. For example, the recuperator was perceived to have higher reliability than the gas cooler due to differences in functional 
requirements. Therefore, since a specific reliability value was given for the gas cooler, and a specific reliability value was not given for the 
recuperator, the constituents of the recuperator were assigned reliability values to ensure that the overall reliability value of the recuperator was 
higher than the gas cooler reliability for this study. The reliability of some of the components is based on either surface area or length of the critical 
dimension that is a pressure boundary. The general expression relating reliability to surface area or length takes the form ( - l - l * l ~ - j ) ~  , where "j" is a 
value given to achieve an estimated component reliability for a single Brayton system and then incremented as stated for multiple brayton systems. 
"k" is the surface area or the dimension (length) of the component vulnerable to the specified failure mode. Section 9 provides a detailed 
description of the component functional requirements, concept designs, failure modes, and review of available historical component benchmarks. 
7.4.2 Component Reliability Values 
Table 7-1 Component Input Reliability Values and Component Failure Mode 
System Component I Reliability I Basis and Remarks 
I I configurations. I Piping length of 2436 cm for one Brayton 
Reactor and Core 
Piping Area 
per loop 
1 .O 
i 
Benchmark 
Not enough information is available at this 
time to assign a reliability number for the 
reactor or to show how the reactor 
reliability changes with different system 
(1 -1 '1 09.485 h ~ ~ W ? 4 3 6 )  4 
None 
loop from arrangement studies. pipe ' 
radius of 8 cm from arrangements. Piping 
area is incremented by 50% for each 
None 
per unit 
Leak to space 
Leak to space, Control 
RoMechanism failure, 
Stops producing heat 
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( System Component 
Recuperator External / Area 
Gas Cooler Area r 
Similar Material Welds t--- 
Welds 
refractory joints 
1 Turbo Alternator 
(1-1'10"~~ 
(k=recuperator external 
area) 
(1 0JlW09S (Nil 44x10~) 
"> 
(N=recuperator intemal 
area) 
1 
(current reliability models 
assume no such joints) 
0.996 
Basis and Remarks 
Recuperator area derived from code 
(recuperator design team); Section 9. 
External area for recuperator is 14000 cm2 
& 18000 un2 for 100 kWe and 200 kWe 
recuperators, respectively 
Internal area is 150000 cm2 for a 100 kWe 
Brayton and 245000 cm2 for a 200 kWe 
Brayton from recuperator design team; 
Section 9. Values adjusted to ensure 
higher reliability than for gas cooler. 
Estimate given based on a function of time 
(1 5 years). HRS architecture is assumed 
to be the same for any Brayton system 
configuration. Therefore, the gas cooler 
area will be the same for all systems. 
Information from Hamilton Sundstrand (see 
Reference 7- 10 and Section 9) 
Joints at every pipe meeting and 
component interface. Value chosen to be 
higher than the reliability for dissimilar 
material welds. 
Joints between gas cooler and gas piping; 
Two per gas loop. 
Research 
Research (Hamilton Sundstrand) 
Benchmark 
Approximately 97% - 99% 
total for intemal and 
extemal areas combined- 
Commercial data from 
Hamilton Sundstrand and 
Garrett for similar type 
heat exchangers (Section 
9) 
Approximately 97% - 99% 
total for internal and 
external areas combined- 
Commerciaf data from 
Hamilton Sundstrand and 
Garrett for similar type 
heat exchangers (Section 
9) 
Vendor data for similar 
heat exchangers (same as 
above) 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Commercial data 
page'?-I 5. 
Failure Mode 
Leak to space 
Internal leak (fails) 
Leak to space. 
Both internal leaks and 
external leaks to space 
cause failure; however, the 
probability of leakage is 
likely different for intemal 
versus extemal. This 
difference is not quantified in 
this study. 
Leak to space 
Leak to space 
CrackReak to space 
Leak to space 
Mechanical failure 
Reliability 
per unit 
or area 
99.63% 
100 kWe 
99.53% 
200 kWe 
99.99% 
100 kWe 
99.98% 
200 kWe 
98.1 3% 
99.96% 
99.90% 
NIA 
99.60% 
97.00% 
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System ComponGt 
flIC) 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing (3) 
Stator 
Isolation 
Alternator 
Winding 
(electrical 
bus) 
Total 
electrical 
penetration 
circumference 
alves 
Check Valves 
Heat Rejection System 
Loop 
Heat Rejection System 
Pump 
Electrical Control 
System 
Reliability Basis and Remarks 
Research (Garrett) 
(1 -0.00ON8)' '~' (r= 
radius of penetration in 
cm) 
0.998 
0.999 
Educated Decision (Garrett, Hamilton 
Sundstrand) 
A single Brayton system Brayton assembly 
has two alternator windings running in 
parallel. Multiple brayton system Brayton 
assembiies have one alternator winding 
per Brayton. 
The radius in cm is 1 for a 100 kWe 
Brayton and 2 for a 200 kWe Brayton. 
Based on estimated Brayton conductor 
size. Based on power rating of Brayton. 
Originally based on research, but value 
Research (Section 9, Garrett, Hamillon 
Sundstrand) 
Educated Decision 
1 was adjusted relative to other components. 
0.9gL I Educated Decision 
(two failure modes) 
0.998 
0.996 (parallel systems) 
0.99 
(one failure mode) 
Educated Decision 
Educated Decision 
Educated Decision 
Value chosen based on relative reliability 
compared to other components. 
Benchmark 
Commercial data 
Failure Mode Reliability 
per unit 
or area 
99.00% 
(Reference 7- 12) 
None 
I I 
Commercial data- I Seize 1 99.10% 
None 
Reference 7- 12 I I 
Research-- Hamilton I Loss of IoadlCable short 1 99.40% 
Mechanical faiiure 
Sundstrand I I 
99.80% 
Mechanical failure 
None 
99.90% 
Leak to space 
years (Reference 7- 11) ) required) I 
0.999-0.9999 per demand I Mechanical (unable to 1 99% 
0.998 per demand to 
operate for a solenoid 
valve or 0.987 for 
solenoid to fail over 15 
to shut or open, I change position when 
res~ectivelv. Commercial reauired) I 
Eledrical (incorrect signal to 
change valve position) 
Mechanical (unable to 
change position when 
I I 
None I Electrical and mechanical 1 99.0% 
98.01% 
data-Refe'rence 7- I I 
None 
I (not separated for this study) 1 
None I Loss of load control 1 99.8% 
None of the component reliabilities based on area reflect differences due to variations in system efficiency with system configuration. For example, 
although the three and four Brayton system recuperators are nominally the same size (100 kWe), differences in overall system efficiency would 
require the recuperators for the four Brayton system to have a larger heat transfer area, according to the system heat balances of Section 6. 
Leak to space 
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System efficiency differences between the three and four Brayton systems results in approximately a 28% higher thermal rating for the four Brayton 
system recuperator, causing a lower reliability for the four Brayton system recuperator then the three Brayton system recuperator. 
Although this reliability study does not relate reliability to the surface area of the gas cooler, the four Brayton system gas cooler would also require 
more heat transfer area compared to the three Brayton system gas cooler due to differences in system efficiency between the three and four 
Brayton systems. From Section 6 heat balances, the difference in system efficiency causes the four Brayton system gas cooler to require 
approximately a 25% higher thermal rating than the three Brayton system gas cooler. However, as noted in Section 6 Conclusions, optimization of 
the heat balances may lead to reduced differences in efficiency among the systems evaluated. 
7.5 Reliability and Sensitivity Studies Results 
7.5.1 Reliability Study Results 
Two separate values for the turbine/compressor (TIC) component were given in Table 7-1. Reliability results for both component reliability values 
are presented in Table 7-2 and Table 7-3. The columns for "parallel" systems indicate systems where every Brayton is operating below rated 
capacity such that they could supply full power if a Brayton is lost. In the following tables, "CRPn refers to counter-rotating pairs, which indicates 
that each operating Brayton must rotate in the opposite direction from the other operating Brayton (usually to minimize angular momentum effects 
on a spacecraft). Originally, the reliability study included the variation in which any Brayton could operate with any other Brayton regardless of 
rotation direction; however, due to the connection between the Brayton loops and the HRS (discussed in Section 7.7.2.1), both of these variations 
are mathematically the same with respect to calculating reliability. 
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Table 7-3 Reliability Results for TurbinelCornpressar Reliability of 99% 
I 
System Component Area Number of Component , Bnyton 1 of 2 TIC at 0.99 Components Reliability Braytons 
100 kWe BraytonsNalveslHRS 
I 1-200 kWe Brayton IHRS I I I 1 0.9723 r 0.9895 
2-200 kWe BraytonsNalveslHRS 
Recuperator Ext 100 kWe 14000 cm2 0.9963 
Recuperator Ext 200 kWe 18000 cm2 0.9953 0.9953 0.9906 
Piping Area 122446.7 cmZ 0.9996 0.9996 0.9994 
Similar Welds (1 loop) 12 0.9996 0.9952 
Similar Welds 12 l o o ~ ~ l  40 0.9841 
. , I I I I I . . I Similar Welds 13 loons) 63 1 I 
I Similar Welds (4 loons) 1 1 86 1 1 I 
[ Dissimilar Welds (1 loop) I 1 2 1 0.9990 1 0.9980 1 
Dissimilar Welds (2 loops) 4 0.9960 
Dissimilar Welds (3 loops) 6 
Dissimilar Welds (4 loops) 8 
Penetrations 100 kWe Radius - 1 cm 0.9970 
Penetration 200 kWe Radius - 2 cm 0.9940 0.9940 0.9881 
Cooler Area Leak 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 
Electrical Control System 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980 
Reliability of System 0.9353 0.9291 
Reliability in Percent 93.53% 92.91% 
- - 
20f3 
Braytons 
0.9847 
2o f3  
parallel 
0.9859 
parallel 20f4  I 
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From the previous tables it can be seen that the results for the different system configurations are 
very close in reliability. 
Because the reliability of a Brayton assembly as a whole is lower than any of the other given 
components, the reliabilities of the system architectures were analyzed based on increases in Brayton 
assembly (turbinelcompressor, alternator, housing, bearings, windings, rotor, shaft, and recuperator 
internal surfaces) reliability. Figure 7-3 illustrates the overall system reliability trend for each of four 
system architectures based on Brayton assembly reliability. Assuming that both a 100 kWe and 200 
kWe Brayton assembly have the same reliability, it can be seen in Figure 7-3 that for a Brayton 
assembly reliability of 0.95, the two Brayton system is more reliable than the other systems. There is 
a crossover point where the single Brayton system becomes more favorable, given component 
reliabilities provided in Table 7-1, than any of the multiple Brayton systems. For Brayton assembly 
reliability below a certain crossover point, the single Brayton system is less reliable than the three 
Brayton system. In Figure 7-3, system reliability of 95% was only achieved for the one Brayton 
system when the Brayton assembly reliability reached nearly 100%. This indicates that the Brayton 
assembly reliability is critical in determining whether the system reliability could achieve 95%. 
Because the same trend exists for both standby systems and systems with all Braytons running below 
rated capacity, the following figure contains the one Brayton system and only the standby systems for 
multipte Brayton configurations. 
Given an increase in Brayton assembly reliability, the configuration of multiple Brayton systems does 
not produce as much of an increase in system reliability as for the single Brayton system. With 
increased redundancy in Braytons units, there is an increase in the number of redundant components 
in a series configuration. As the number of components operating in series increases the reliability of 
the system decreases. Therefore, the increase in Brayton redundancy is negated by the increase in 
units of components along with an increase in surface area. 
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Table 7-4 Breakdown of Brayton Assembly Reliability 
I I TIC Reliability at 0.97 I TIC Reliability at 0.99 I 
Brayton Component Area I Component ( 100 kWe I 200 kWe I 100 kWe ( 200 kWe Reliabilitv . . - . . - - - . . - 
Turbine Compressor 0.97 or 0.99 0.9700 0.9700 0.9900 0.9900 
Alternator Rotor 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980 
Shaft 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990 0 ,9990 0.9990 
Bearing (3) 0.9970 0.9910 0.9910 0.9910 0.9910 
TCA Housing 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960 
Alt Windings 1 Brayton system 
(two in parallel) 0.9940 0.9999 0.9999 
Alt Windings >1 Brayton system 0.9940 0.9940 0.9940 0.9940 0.9940 
Recuperator Internal 100 kWe 150000 cm2 0.9999 0.9999 
Recuperator Internal 200 kWe 245000 crn2 0.9998 0.99984 
Brayton Reliability 1 Brayton 0.9544 I 0.9741 
I Bravton Reliability .l Brayton I I 1 0.9488 1 0.9487 0.9683 1 0.9683 1 
Due to the small differences between system reliabilities, a particular conclusion of system 
configuration based on reliability numbers is not meaningful. However, the sensitivity studies provide 
insight into components that need to have an increase in reliability to increase overall system 
reliability, 
7.5.2 Sensitivity Studies Results 
This section summarizes system reliability sensitivity studies based on varying the assumed reliability 
for a given component. Failure rates (I .O minus the reliability value) were used as the sensitivity 
range for component reliabilities to test effects of component reliability changes on system reliability. 
Table 7-9 provides the ranges for the sensitivity study based on failure rates of one unit of each 
component. Each of the components in the analyzed systems proved to be a significant factor. 
Based on these results, components with the greatest impact on system reliability were identified. As 
component reliabilities either increased or decreased the components that affected the system the 
most changed. A listing of the five components that affected overall system reliabilities the most, 
given a decrease in component reliability (increase in failure rate), are given in Table 7-5. A listing of 
components that had the most significant impact on system reliabilities, given an increase in 
component reliabilities (decrease in failure rate) are given in Table 7-6. The ranking of the 
significance of the components is given followed by the percent increase or decrease in system 
reliability in parentheses. Complete component significance ratings for each system can be found in 
Section 7.1 1. 
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addition of piping, valves, and other equipment beyond the two Brayton system reduces the overall 
system reliability. 
7.6 Future Actions 
Had the Prometheus project continued, the following actions would have been pursued concerning 
system reliability studies: 
1. Work with the cognizant NASA Centers and aerospace contractors to select the most 
appropriate Reactor Module architecture, balancing the need to maximize reliability with the 
need to minimize mass. 
Research space industry use of fault tree analysis and probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) 
and evaluate their use for SNPP design. 
o Research how the NR Program has used fault tree analysis and apply as 
appropriate 
o Develop a fault tree for each system (See Section 7.8) 
Fault trees graphically represent a system and its functions and show 
relationships between component events and system level events. Fault trees 
created by NRPCT would be integrated with NASA overall system fault trees. 
3. Integrate NRPCT reliability studies (including fault trees) with future project partners' reliability 
evaluations. 
4. Add intetfacing systems to the reliability evaluation, such as heat rejection system and 
electrical control systems (instrumentation and control and power conditioning and 
distribution), and evaluate potential system architectures of the interfacing systems. 
5. Research options to increase reliability or to reduce consequences of failure, including 
engineered features. 
6. Perform Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
This analysis is performed to identify all system design failure modes to minimize catastrophic 
and critical failures. This tool ranks failures according to the potential impact on the overall 
system. For the analysis to be most effective, it must occur early in the design process so 
that problem areas in the design may be identified. Depending on the amount of component 
failure rate information available, either a qualitative or quantitative FMECA would be 
performed. Various resources such as Reference 7- 3 describe the FMECA process. 
Refine and validate component reliability values and failure modes through testing of 
components and research of component failures, including understanding transient and age 
effects, etc. 
a. Assumptions of operating failures would need to be verified for both valves and the 
HRS. Given any modifications to these assumptions, system reliability models would 
need to be updated and applied to the analysis. Changes in assumptions for the 
valves or particularly the HRS based on system configuration could substantially alter 
conclusions made herein. 
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b. Develop baseline reliability levels for comparison (using NNPP components) 
This task would research reliability values for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
(NNPP) components to benchmark and understand the magnitude of reliability for the 
SNPP components. 
c. Identify component testing required to support improvements in reliability 
d. Study effects of steady state conditions, including temperature effects due to plant 
arrangement. 
e. Study transient and casualty effects on reliability 
f. Research and estimate reliabilities of components utilizing commercial and Naval 
experience 
Potential resources include Naval component databases, Reactor Safety organization 
knowledge, and the following commercial or government nuclear and non-nuclear 
component failure databases and reliability resources: 
Reliability Databases 
Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Plant Components - VGB PowerTech Germany (ZEDB 
centralized Reliability and Events Database) 
- - -- - 
Japanese data base from CRlEPl 
NRC database CCFDB (Common-cause failures data base) 
RADS (Reliability and Availability Data System - NRC) 
British and French Gas Cooled Power reactors Databases 
Data Source: Equipment Covered: 
I 
MIL-HDBK-217F - Reliability Prediction of 
Electronic Equipment Electronic components 
EPRD - Electronic Parts Reliability Data (RAC) Electronic components 
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I I 
NPRD-95 Non-electronic Parts Reliability Data Mechanical and electro-mechanical 
components 
I NONOP-1 Nonoperating Reliability Data (RAC) 
SR-332 Reliability Prediction for Electronic 
Equipment (Telcordia Technologies) 
Mechanical and electro-mechanical 
components 
FMD-97 Failure ModeIMechanism Distributions 
WAC) 
Electronic components 
Efectronic, electrical, mechanical and 
electro-mechanical components 
EiReDA - European Industry Reliability Data Mainly components in nuclear power plants 
IOREDA - Offshore Reliability Data Topside and subsea equipment for offshore oil and gas production 
MechRel - Handbook of Reliability Prediction for 
Mechanical Equipment 
Mechanical equipment - military 
applications 
T-Book (Reliability Data of Components in Nordic 
Nuclear Power Plants (ISBN 91-631-0426-1) Components in nuclear power plants 
Reliability Data for Control and Safety Systems - 
PDS Data Handbook 
1 G ~ a s t e r  (ExproSoft) 
Sensors, detectors, & control logic 
Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook (exida) 
1 components in oil wells 
Safety equipment (sensors, logic units, 
actuators) 
SubseaMaster (ExproSoft) 1- Components in subsea oiligas production systems 
PERD - Process Equipment Reliability Data ( ( AicnE) Process equipment 
GIDEP (Government-Industry Data Exchange 
Program) 
- 
CCPS Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability 
Data, AIChE, 1989 
Electronic, electrical, mechanical, 
pneumatic equipment 
Process equipment 
PERD - Process Equipment Reliability Data Process equipment 
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Data for Nudear Power Generating Stations 
I 1 FASIT (FeI og avbrudd i traftsysteme) Failure in the electro-power supply system (in Norwegian) 
7.7 Methodology of Reliability Studies 
Objectives 
To support pre-conceptual design of a space nuclear power plant system: Perform reliability 
studies to identify relative system configuration reliabilities and reliability drivers for number of 
Brayton units and other components. 
.* Identify design features and actions to mitigate failures. 
ldentify components that have a significant effect on system reliability. 
Assumptions 
Mission parameters and requirements are as stated in Section 2, Preconceptual Plant 
Parameter Report 
Turbomachinery may be designed to operate at two separate operating points. 
Methodology 
7.7.1 Identify system architectures to be evaluated 
Refer to Section 7.3.2 for a list of system architectures. In general, the system architectures included 
the reactor, piping, varying numbers of turbomachinery components (including the alternator and heat 
exchangers), and any required valves. Smaller piping and instrumentation, such as alternator bleed 
flow piping and temperature sensors, were not included. The heat rejection system (HRS) was 
included to investigate how the HRS design can affect the reliability of the energy conversion system. 
The electrical control system (PCAD control of Brayton units) was incorporated in the reliability studies 
as represented by a single reliability value because minimal information was available on system 
designs and reliability of electrical components. Future reliability studies would include more detail for 
the electrical control system. 
7.7.2 Identify failure modes for each component 
Component failure modes would be collected and the information would be used to develop fault trees 
and identify potential component failure issues relative to overall system reliability. Ultimately, a 
failure rate (the probability a given failure of a component will occur within a given period of time) is 
determined from component reliabilities and used in calculating overall system reliability. 
A few simple failure modes were initially identified for the components included in the reliability 
studies. Failure mode information is included in Table 7-1 in Section 7.4. 
7.7.2.1 Effect of Heat Rejection System Failures on Brayton Primary System 
The way the HRS connects to the primary system through the gas cooler affects how failures in the 
HRS impact the primary system. Detailed descriptions of HRS system and gas cooler configurations 
are included in Section 9.3. Figure 7-8 through Figure 7-12 are from Section 9.3. 
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exist when two components are operating or one component is operating and one is in standby and 
mission success is dependent on only one component operating. For a single Brayton assembly in a 
one Brayton system only one alternator winding needs to operate for mission success. The 
mathematical computation of components in parallel given the component reliabilities in the previous 
example is: 
System Reliability = (1-(1-R,,)(l -Rd)) 
0.9985 = (1-(I -0.95)(1-0.97)) 
Thus, components in parallel can provide a higher probability of success for a given mission. 
Complexity of systems arise when a specific combination of components do not function entirely in 
series or parallel, or a specified number of components needs to operate for mission success (r of N 
components). For component configurations where 'r' of 'N' components needs to operate the 
component reliability can.be quantified using the Binomial model. An example of needing 'r' of 'N' 
components is seen in the structure of the HRS for a single Brayton system where one of two HRLs 
associated with a given radiator needs to operate for mission success. The binomial model is as 
follows: 
R, = 0.998 
N = number of components 
r = number of components (success/failure) 
p = reliability of one component (either reliability 
of failure or success) 
For a system with three components, the reliability of no components operating, one component, iwo 
components, or three components operating should sum to 1. This is illustrated as follows where the 
reliability of a component is 0.95: 
(3 0.95*(1- 0.95)'3-0' = 0.0125% probability of none succeeding 
0) 0.95'(1- 0.95)'~-" = 0.7125% probability of one succeeding 
(:)0.95'(1- 0.95)"-" = 13.5375% probability of two succeeding 
(:)0.95'(1- 0.95)"-" = 85.7375% probability of three succeeding 
Total Probability = 0.01% + 0.71 % + 13.54 % + 85.74%= 100% 
To determine the reliability for two of three components operating for mission success (at least two; 
lower bound), the probabilities of two and three components operating are needed. The probabilities 
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of two and three components operating are summed to give the reliability of a system configuration 
where two out of three components are needed to operate for mission success. In the example 
above the reliability of at least two components operating is 99.28%. 
A failure set is used when a configuration of components does not operate in parallel, series, or have 
a redundant set of components where a specified number have to operate for mission success, as is 
the case with the isolation valves mechanical and electrical failure modes. A failure set is a 
combination of all possible combinations of components failing. For example, given that '1' 
represents a success and '0' represents a failure, the following shows a failure set for a system 
containing three components: 
1 Com~onent I 1 Comoonent 2 i Com~onent 3 1 
To calculate the reliability of a given system or combination of components based on a failure set, 
combinations of successes and failures that allow a system to still operate need to be determined. 
For the three given components, if component 1 is needed to work and either component 2 or 
component 3 is needed to operate, the first three combinations of successes and failures would end in 
mission success. Given Component 1 has a reliability of 0.97, Component 2 has a reliability of 0.96 
and Component 3 has a reliability of 0.99, a model can be formulated by putting in the reliability of 
each component for a '1' and (7- component reliability) for '0'. 
System I Status I Component1 I Component2 I Component3 / 
1 Success I R, = 0.97 1 R,= 0.96 1 R q =  0.99 1 
Success R ,  = 0.97 R2 ~0.96 (I- R3) = (1-0.99) 
Success R1 = 0.97 (1 - R2) = (1-0.96) R3 = 0.99 
Failure R1= 0.97 (7- ) = (1096) (1- R1) = (1-0.99) 
Failure (1- R1) = (1-0.97) R2 =O.96 Rg = 0.99 
Failure (1- R,) = (1-0.97) R2=0.96 (1- R3) = (1 -0.99) 
Failure (1- R,) = (1-0.97) (1- Rz) = (1-0.96) R3 = 0.99 
Failure (7-  R,) = (1-0.97) ( 7 -  R2) = (q-0.96) (1 - RQ) = (1 -0.99) 
For each combination that ends in a success multiply the reliability of the components whether it is a 
success or a failure and sum up the products of all combinations ending in a success. 
For success combination 1 the mathematical model is: R1*R2*R3 
For success combination 2 the mathematical model is: R1* R2*(l-R3) 
For success combination 3 the mathematical model is: R1*(l- R2)*d3 
@ Combining the models into one model you have: 
~e l iab i l i t~  of System Success = (R1)x(R2)x(R3) + (RI)x(R2) + (R1)x(R3) - (2x((Rl)x (R2)x(R3)). 
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Check valves, isolation valves and HRS loops for multiple Brayton systems did not function in either 
parallel or series with the Braytons themselves. Because of this complexity, a failure set was created 
for each system and mathematical models were formulated. In determining success combinations, 
assumptions were made regarding valves and HRS loops. Assumptions for valves were fhe same 
regardless of system configuration. Assumptions for the HRS were determined on a per-system 
basis. 
Valve assumptions are based on an operational system with all valves in their correct positions for 
system operation. 
Assumptions associated with valves: 
1. There is one check valve and one isolation valve for each Brayton loop. 
2. A check valve is controlled based on pressure and stays in its correct position until the 
compressor which it is adjacent to starts (or stops, if already running). 
3. A valve failure is when the valve does not perform its intended function (all failures will occur at 
the same point in time, creating non-time dependent results: time dependency is with standby 
Braytons only.). 
4. For a running Brayton, if the isolation valve has an electrical failure and is unable to close 
because of a mechanical failure, the Brayton remains running (i.e., the isolation valve is sent a 
message to close but is unable to.). 
5. Once a valve fails it does not recover. 
Assumptions for Braytons in parallel: 
1. If one Brayton fails and the remaining survives, either the check valve (1) or the isolation valve 
(1) has to close for the system to survive (the system will not operate with a non-secured dead 
Brayton). 
2. For a loop to remain operational, the isolation valve has to remain open, and the Brayton has 
to be working. 
3. For an isolation valve to fail on an operational Brayton, the mechanical portion of the valve has 
to be operational and the electrical portion has to fail. 
4. The electrical failure of the isolation valve is the electrical control commanding the valve to 
move to the opposite of the position required to maintain the system operating. 
5. Failure of the check valve is when the disc is welded in place at the time that system changes 
require the check valve disc to move. 
Assumptions for Braytons in standby: 
1. If the standby Brayton(s) has at least one shut valve, the system survives. 
2. Limitation of the study is recognized because there is a case where the isolation valve on a 
standby Brayton unit opens and remains open until the time where it is required to open to 
bring the standby loop into operation. This case is not considered in this study because time 
dependency is not included in the study; i.e., all failures occur at the same time. 
3. Valves associated with a standby Brayton are in their original positions when called upon from 
an operating Brayton failing. 
Braytons, check valves and isolation valves are analyzed separately to determine the Brayton 
condition based on a combination of failures from a failure set. The conditions of a running Brayton 
are 1) Running, 2) Secured (whether by failure or not), and 3) non-operational and non-secured. 
Conditions for a standby Brayton are 1) able to start and operate, 2) secured. For the operational 
Brayton the condition of "running" includes when the isolation valve fails electrically and mechanically 
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(valve assumption #4). This condition is not applicable for a standby Brayton. lmpact of the isolation 
valve on system reliability is minimal. The increase in overall system reliability from the double failure 
mode of the isolation valve is presented in Table 7-8. The double failure mode is seen most 
commonly in systems where multiple Braytons are running at reduced capacity. However, the double 
failure of the isolation valve does not impact system reliability by even a 1 % increase. 
Assumptions for the HRS are broken down for each system configuration. Each system has a two 
radiator configuration with four heat rejection loops (HRL). Two HRLs are associated with each 
radiator. The failure modes for the HRS are discussed in Section 7.7.2.1. 
Table 7-8 Impact of Isolation Valve Double Failure Mode on System Reliability 
Using component reliability values shown in Table 7-1, the reliability calculation for a single Brayton 
given a turbineicompressor (TIC) reliability of 0.97 is 
System 
Architecture 
200 kWe Brayton =(TIC: 0.97) * (Alternator Rotor: 0.998) * (Shaft: 0.999) * (Bearings: 0.997~) * 
(TurbinelCompressor/Alternator (TCA) Housing: 0.996) * (Alternator 
Windings: (1 -(I -0.994)A2)) *(Recuperator Internal Area: 0.9998) 
Reliability of a 200 kWe Brayton = 0.95439 or 95.44% 
Operational 
Configuration 
System = (Recuperator External Area: 0.9952) * (Piping Area: 0.9996) * 
(Similar Material Welds: 0.9952) * (Dissimilar Material Welds: 0.998) * 
(Electrical Penetrations: 0.994) * (Cooler Area: 0.981 3) * 
(Electrical control system: 0.998) * (Brayton: 0.9544) 
Reliability of a Single 200 kWe Brayton System = 91.64% 
Possible Failure 
Combinations 
Analysis for the multiple Brayton systems was built upon the foundations set by the given 
assumptions. Mathematical models for conditions of the Brayton and valves were determined and 
used to develop models including the HRS that calculate the reliability of success for a given system 
configuration. The mathematical models for reliability values for the combination of Brayton 
assembly(ies), valves and HRS can be found in Section 7.10. Results are discussed in Section 7.5. 
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7.7.4 Perform sensitivity study far each system based on individual component 
reliabilities 
Since absolute reliability values are not credible at this stage of the design, the reliability study 
focuses on determining the relative reliability of various systems and the impact individual 
components have on overall system reliability. Sensitivity studies allow design teams to determine 
which components need to be further developed to increase system reliability and which components 
a given system is robust to, allowing for developers to focus on components needing improvement. 
A Designed Computer Experiment (DCE) was developed to perform sensitivity studies on the given 
system configurations. Sensitivity studies help, identify which factors contribute significantly to system 
reliability and to which factors a system is robust. A system is said to be robust to a given component 
if the reliability of the system does not change significantly with changes in component reliability. 
The DCE changes component reliabilities based on a given range to identify how the system changes 
with increases or decreases in component reliabilities. The range for the sensitivity studies was 
based on the failure rate for each component. Failure rates were used instead of a common range 
(e.g., 95%-99% reliability for each component) to prevent components that would not have an impact 
on system reliabilities from being identified as such (e.g., a similar material weld would not in 
practicality have a failure rate of 5%). The values used in the sensitivity studies are given in Table 7-9 
Table 7-9 Component Reliability Sensitivity Ranges 
Component 
1 Dissimilar Weld 
1 Similar Weld 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
8earina 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control Sys Parallel 
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Area 
Shaft 
TIC 
TCA Housing 
0.9900 
0.9813 
0.9960 
Reliability 
0.9990 
0.9996 
0.9940 
0.9980 
0.9970 
0.9990 
0.9700 
0.9960 
0.01 00 
0.0187 
0.0040 
Rate 
Failure 
0.001 0 
0.0004 
0.0060 
0.0020 
0.0030 
(0.9800, I .OO) 
(0.9626, 1.00) 
(0.9920, 1.OO) 
0.0010 
0.0300 
0.0040 
Sensitivity 
Range 
(0.9980, 1.OO) 
(0.9992, 1.OO) 
(0.9880, 1.OO) 
(0.9960, 1.OO) 
(0.9940. 1 .OOl 
(0.9980, 1.OO) 
(0.9400,1.00) 
(0.9920, 1 .OO) 
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The DCE was performed in MATlAB and was analyzed using JMP software. Because of the non- 
linear response, two DCEs were performed; one for decreases in component reliability and one for 
increases in component reliability. This provided the exact percentage increases in system reliability 
based on an increase or decrease in failure rate. 
7.8 System Fault Trees 
7.8.1 Background 
Fault frees are typically used to identify how component failures can cause system level failures. 
The fault tree shown in this section is generic. Future fault trees would have more detail for each 
component and have probabilities of either success or failure for each box. The top tier box would 
have an overall probability of success or failure for the whole fault tree. 
JPL requested NRPCT to provide input on reactor plant faults for the Prometheus fault tree to support 
presentations for the Project Mission and Systems Review (PMSR). NRPCT generated a fault tree 
organized by start up operations and post-start up operations, but the final form of NRPCT input to 
JPL included markups of existing JPL fault trees instead of providing the newly created fault tree. 
Future work would have included fault trees for different system layouts and included more detailed 
events. 
7.8.2 Example Fault Tree 
The following fault tree was originally developed to support the Project Mission and Systems Review 
(PMSR), which is a milestone for each NASA project. 
Startup failures were not included in the initial reliability study because the startup procedure was not 
complete and it was assumed that pre-startup testing would minimize startup failures. External 
environment effects due to micrometeoroids and orbital debris are implied in the leak to space failure 
mode and probabilities assumed for pressure boundaries. Reactor failures were included in the fault. 
tree, but the specific failure modes and probabilities were not included. 
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Start Up Fault Tree 
FautQ Sensor 
Signal Causes 
Commands 
I System E ~ Q ; ~ ~ ~ ~  (ECS) Fails to 
Failure to Send 
Prevents Startup 
Faulty Contml 
Lcqic Causes 
lnmrrect 
Commands 
I 
Causes I & C to 
Not Operate 
Failure Prevents 
Startup 
/Compressor 
Assembiy Fails 
Prevents Start- 
Failure wihn 
PCAD System 
Causer ECS 
Gas Coder 
Farlure Prevents 
I 
Prevents Start- [ u" 
Failure in HRS 
Prevents Start- 1 
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7.9 Documentation of software (BlockSimFTl, 
7.9.1 Description of software 
XFMEA) 
BlockSimFTl and XFMEA are modules written and distributed by ReliaSoft Corporation to assist in 
reliability analysis. BlockSimFTl uses Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) and fault trees to calculate 
the reliability of a given system. From a user defined RBD or fault tree, BlockSimFTI will calculate the 
reliability of the system. An automated Monte Carlo simulation is included in the software and can be 
run using either fault trees or RBDs. Portions of fault trees or RBDs can be re-used to create different 
systems within the software module. A fault tree can be automatically changed into an RBD based on 
the logic structure created by the user. However, an RBD can not be transformed into a Fault tree. 
The structure is different for an RBD and a fault tree and can not be converted from an RBD to a fault 
tree. The RBD is a condensed version of a fault tree and thus eliminates some of the logic gates in a 
fault tree. 
XFMEA (FMEA stands for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) is used to outline potential areas of 
system failure. XFMEA creates a file containing all sub-systems and keeps track of all combination of 
identified series of events leading to a defined result (usually mission failure). This is similar to event 
trees used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). 
7.9.2 Justification for use of software 
Based on the original number of 45 systems for analysis, an automated approach was desired to 
handle the complexity of the valves and the HRS. Reliability software packages were critiqued and 
BlockSimGFTI was identified as the best software package for the cost. XFMEA was intended to be 
used once systems had been developed to determine possible failures within a sub-system or 
component that would alter mission success. XFMEA would allow for easy access to all possible 
failures in one file and be able to identify which failures occurred on a more frequent basis. 
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7.11 Tables of Detailed Sensitivity Study Results By System Architecture 
Table 7-10 One Brayton System Detailed Sensitivity Study Results I One Brayton System ( Failure 1 % change in System I % chanse in System 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
1 Dissimilar Weld 
! Similar Weld 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRSLoop 
HRSPump 
Isolation Valve Electric 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Penetration 200 KW 
Piping Area 
Recuperator External Area 200 kW 
Recuperator Internal Area 200 KW 
Shaft 
TIC 
TCA Housing 
Rate 
0.0010 
0.0004 
0.0060 
0.0020 
0.0030 
0.0100 
0.0187 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.01 00 
0.0100 
0.0100 
0.0060 
0.0004 
0.0047 
0.0002 
0.0010 
0.0300 
0.0040 
~eliabil%y dueto an increase 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.1916 % 
0.4597 % 
0.0034 % 
0.1917 % 
0.8630 % 
NIA 
1.8073 % 
0.1917 % 
0.1730 % 
0.0006 % 
NIA 
NIA 
0.5753 O/O 
0.0383 % 
0.4533 % 
0.0156 % 
0.0958 % 
2.9161 % 
0.3838 % 
~ e l i a b i l h  dueto a decrease 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.1753 % 
0.4203 % 
0.0095 % 
0.1756 % 
0.7912 % 
NIA 
1.6838 % 
0.1 756 % 
0.4761 % 
0.0045 % 
NIA 
NIA 
0.5261 % 
0.0350 % 
0.4159 % 
0.0142 % 
0.0877 % 
2.7492 % 
0.3522 % 
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Table 7-11 Two Brayton System (I Running, I Standby) Detailed Sensitivity Study Results 
Table 7-12 Two Brayton System (2 Running) Detailed Sensitivity Study Results 
I Two Brayton System (2 Running) I Failure % change in System ] % change in System 
Piping Area 
Recuperator External Area 200 kW 
Recuperator Internal Area 200 KW 
Shaft 
TIC 
Two Brayton System (1 Running I 
standby) 
I Dissimilar Weld 
I Similar Weld 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRStoop 
HRSPump 
Isolation Valve Electric 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Penetration 200 KW 
% change in System 
Reliability due to an increase 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.3869 % 
1.5470 % 
0.0666 % 
0.0222 % 
0.0998 % 
0.0534 % 
1.8247 % 
0.1935 % 
0.6833 % 
0.0022 % 
0.0576 % 
0.0531 % 
1.1616 % 
Failure 
Rate 
0.001 0 
0.0004 
0.0060 
0.0020 
0.0030 
0.01 00 
0.01 87 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.0100 
0.0100 
0.0100 
0.0060 
0.0004 
0.0047 
0.0002 
0.0010 
0.0300 
1 Dissimilar Weld 
I Similar Weld 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRSLoop 
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% change in System 
Reliability due to a decrease 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.3553 % 
1.41 99 % 
0.1605 % 
0.0532 % 
0.2396 % 
0.1294 % 
1.7065 % 
0.1779 % 
1.6715 % 
0.0159 % 
0.1382 % 
0.1273 % 
1.0663 % 
' H R S P U ~ ~  
Isolation Valve Electric 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Penetration 200 KW 
Piping Area 
Recuperator External Area 200 kW 
Recuperator Internal Area 200 KW 
Shaft 
0.0580 % 
0.4577 % 
0.0018 % 
0.01 11 % 
a TCA Housing 
Rate 
0.0010 
0.0004 
0.0060 
0.0020 
0.0030 
0.01 00 
0.01 87 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.0532 % 
0.4215 % 
0.0043 % 
0.0265 % 
0.0100 
0.01 00 
0.01 00 
0.0060 
0.0004 
0.0047 
0.0002 
0.001 0 
0.3382 % 1 0.8336 % 
0.0040 
~el iabi l i ty due to an increase 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.3879 % 
1.5512 % 
0.0349 % 
0.01 16 % 
0.0523 % 
0.0002 % 
1.8297 % 
0.1941 % 
0.1800 % 
TIC 1 0.0300 
TCA Housing 1 0.0040 
0.0443 % 1 0.1067% 
~ e l i a b i l h  due to a decrease 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.3622 % 
1.4475 % 
0.0920 % 
0.0305 % 
0.1374 % 
0.0019 % 
1.7396 % 
0.1814 % 
0.5271 % 
0.0006 % 
0.0580 % 
0.0000 % 
1.1647 % 
0.0582 % 
0.4589 % 
0.0009 % 
0.0058 % 
0.0050 % 
0.1516 % 
0.0005 % 
1.0870 % 
0.0542 % 
0.4297 % 
0.0025 % 
0.0152 % 
0.1 780 % 
0.0233 % 
0.4786 % 
0.0612 % 
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- - - - I the failure rate I the failure rate 
1 Oissimilar Weld 1 0.0010 1 0.5766 % 1 0.5168 % 
Table 7-13 Three Brayton System (2 Running, 1 Standby) Detailed Sensitivity Study Results 
I . . - - - 
1 Similar Weld 1 0.0004 1 2.4208 % I 2.1686 % 1 
Three Brayton System (2 Running 
1 standby) 
Failure 
Rate 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRSLoop 
HRSPump 
Isolation Valve Electric 
% change in System 
Reliability due to an increase 
in component reliability by 
~ - - 
0.0060 
0.0020 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Penetrations 100 KW 
I I ~ - ... - -  - 
TCA Housing 1 0.0040 1 0.0971 % 1 0.2203 % 1 
% change in System 
Reliability due to a decrease 
in component reliability by 
-~ - 
0.1459 % 
0.0485 % 
0.4950 O/O 
0.1796 % 
1.6548 % 
0.1725 % 
1.7223 % 
0.0164 % 
0.3717 % 
0.0030 
0.01 00 
0.01 87 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.0100 
0.01 00 
0.01 00 
0.0030 
0.0688 % 
0.3179 % 
0.0054 % 
0.0548 % 
1 7238 % 
Piping Area 
Recuperator External Area 100 kW 
Recuperator Internal Area 100 KW 
Shaft 
TIC 
0.3315 % 
0.1098 % 
I 
0.21 86 % 
0.0784 % 
1.8131 % 
0.1923 % 
0.7437 % 
0.0024 % 
0.1645 % 
Table 7-14 Three Brayton System (3 Running) Detailed Sensitivity Study Results 
I -. . . - / Alt Windings 0.0060 1 0.1412 % 1 0.3238 % 
0.0775 % 
0.8656 % 
0.0004 
0.0037 
0.0001 
0.001 0 
0.0300 
Three Brayton System (3 Running) 
1 Disimiiar Weld 
1 Similar Weld 
0.1739 % 
0.7755 % 
0.0768 % 
0.3537 % 
0.0024 % 
0.0242 % 
0.7438 % 
- 
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Failure 
Rate 
0.0010 
0.0004 
- 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRSLoop 
HRSPump 
Isolation Valve Electric 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Penetrations 100 KW 
Piping Area 
Recuperator External Area I00  kW 
Recuperator Internal Area 100 KW 
Shaft 
TIC 
TCA Housing 
% change in System 
Reliability due to an increase 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.5768 % 
2.4217 % 
0.0020 
0.0030 
0.0100 
0.0187 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.0100 
0.01 00 
0.0100 
0.0030 
0.0004 
0.0037 
0.0001 
0.0010 
0.0300 
0.0040 
% change in System 
Reliability due to a decrease 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.51 84 % 
2.1754 '10 
0.0469 % 
0.2115 % 
0.0003 % 
1.8137 % 
0.1924 % 
0.7198 % 
0.0023 % 
0.2346 % 
- 0.00096 % 
0.8659 % 
0.0769 '10 
0.3538 % 
0.0023 % 
0.0235 % 
0.7200 % 
0.0940 % 
- -- 
0.1073 % 
0.4835 % 
0.0023 % 
1.6600 % 
0.1731 % 
1.6827 % 
0.0160 % 
0.5343 % 
0.0059 % 
0.7779 % 
0.0690 % 
0.3189 % 
0.0053 % 
0.0536 % 
1.6840 % 
0.2152 % 
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Table 7-15 Four Brayton System (2 Running, 
L 
Piping Area 1 0.0004 
Recuperator External Area 100 kW 1 0.0037 
Table 7-16 Four Brayton System (4 Running) Detailed Sensitivity Study Results 
. .  . 1 Penetrations 100 KW I 1 0.0030 1 1.1438 % I 1.0011 % 1 
Four Brayton System (2 running 2 
stand by) 
I Disimilar Weld 
I Similar Weld 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRSLoop 
HRSPurnp 
Isolation Valve Electric 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Penetrations 100 KW 
2 Standby) Detailed Sensitivity Study Results 
0.0951 % 
0.3503 % 
0.0032 % 
0.0317 % 
0.9732 % 
0.1269 % 
Recuperator Internal Area I00  kW 
Shaft 
TIC 
TCA Housing 
Alt Windings 
Alternator Rotor 
Bearing 
Check Valve 
Cooler Area Leak 
Electrical Control System 
HRSLoop 
HRSPump 
Isolation Valve Electric 
Isolation Valve Mechanical 
Failure 
Rate 
0.001 0 
0.0004 
0.0060 
0.0020 
0.0030 
0.0100 
0.0187 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.01 00 
0.01 00 
0.01 00 
0.0030 
% change in System 
Reliability due to an increase 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.7613 % 
3.2725 % 
0.1906 % 
0.0634 % 
0.2857 % 
0.1505 % 
1.7956 % 
0.1904 % 
0.9731 % 
0.0032 % 
0.1670 % 
0.1 497 % 
1.1430 % 
0.0001 
0.0010 
0.0300 
0.0040 
% change in System 
Reliability due to a decrease 
in  component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.6672 % 
2.8662 % 
Four Brayton System (4 running) 
I Disimilar Weld 
1 Similar Weld 
% change in System 
Reliability due to a decrease 
in  component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.6633 % 
2.8495 % 
0.4070 % 
0.1348 % 
0.6078 % 
0.32 19 % 
1 S929 % 
0.1661 % 
2.1160 % 
0.0202 % 
0.3560 % 
0.3165 % 
0.9953 % 
0.0827 % 
0.3060 % 
0.0067 % 
0.0673 % 
2.1 169 % 
0.2705 % 
0.0060 
0.0020 
0.0030 
0.0100 
0.01 87 
0.0020 
0.0300 
0.0100 
0.0100 
0.0100 
Piping Area 
Recuperator External Area I00  kW 
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a 
Failure 
Rate 
0.001 0 
0.0004 
Recuperator Internal Area 100 KW 
Shaft 
TIC 
TCA Housing 
% change in System 
Reliability due to an increase 
in component reliability by 
the failure rate 
0.7619 % 
3.2748 % 
0.1817 % 
0.0604 % 
0.2723 % 
0.0004 % 
1 .7968 % 
0.1906 % 
0.9280 % 
0.0030 % 
0.3021 % 
- 0.0012 % 
- - 
0.0004 
0.0037 
1 
0.3944 % 
0.1307 % 
0.5890 % 
0.0030 % 
1.6022 % 
0.1672 % 
2.0501 % 
0.0195 % 
0.6508 % 
0.0070 % 
0.0001 
0.0010 
0.0300 
0.0040 
0.0952 % 
0.3505 % 
0.0832 % 
0.3078 % 
0.0030 % 
0.0302 % 
0.9283 % 
0.1210 % 
0.0065 % 
2.0518 0 652 % 
0.2621 % 
e 
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8 Operational Strategy 
This section develops an operational strategy for the Direct Gas Brayton space nuclear power plant. 
General methods of plant operation and control that will allow it to most effectively meet its mission 
requirements within the constraints of the space application are identified. The most significant 
conclusions regarding operational strategy include: 
Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) electric power output could be controlled on reactor 
outlet temperature and Brayton speed. Mass inventory control (system pressure) was not 
pursued based on increased complexity and the additional risks to spaceship performance 
introduced by such a system (e.g., inadvertent coolant addition, additional leak paths). 
SNPP operations during startup, initial criticality evolutions, and during abnormal conditions 
require integrated operations of the reactor, the energy conversion system, and the power 
distribution system using other controls from those applied at constant power. 
A reduced reactor power and temperature mode may be used when electric power demand is 
reduced for long periods of time, i.e., coasting during interplanetary transfer and during 
science orbits. This mode would result in fuel and plant temperature reductions, fuel burn up 
reductions, lower turbo-compressor speed and could maximize plant lifetime. 
An autonomous control system for the plant (including the reactor) would be required. Some 
events require action to occur in less time than a signal could be sent to and from the 
spacecraft, or during communication blackout periods (of several weeks). 
Instrumentation uncertainty, the.coarseness of reactor and Brayton speed control actions, 
other control band allowances, allowances 'for transients, casualties and age effects all impact 
the efficiency of the thermal cycle and therefore the sizing of all components. These 
uncertainties have a significant impact on the SNPP design and the necessary margin to 
accommodate these uncertainties. Developing an autonomous control scheme that 
minimizes operating bands and error will be necessary to minimize system mass. 
8.1 Summary 
The development of an operational control scheme for the SNPP was at an early stage when project 
cancellation occurred. The choice of methods for reactor control, energy conversion system control, 
and power distribution system control, and the integration of their operation by the instrumentation 
and control (I&C) system to meet all the operational requirements and conditions of the plant have 
significant effects on complexity, size, and robustness of the plant design. This section considers 
these effects and develops operational strategies to best accommodate them. 
This operational strategy also provides an assessment of the various options and issues associated 
with reactor operations for the flight unit and includes some discussion of the differences that would 
be required for the Ground Test Reactor (GTR). 
The operational strategies discussed herein are developed from a power plant perspective. Sections 
8.2 and 8.3 discuss operating assumptions and reactor and plant control. A number of control options 
have been assessed. Section 8.5 discusses the impact of different plant configurations (system 
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architecture) on plant operations. Sections 8.6 and 8.7 assess normal operations and potential 
system casualties and the instrumentation and controls needed to identify and recover from these 
potential events. These evaluations were used to identify instrumentation needs and operational 
methods. A complementary discussion, focused on the reactor is in Reference 8- I, Section 5.1. 
8.2 Operating Assumptions 
1. The reactor and plant are required to produce -200 kWe during portions of the mission when 
full power is required (i.e., thrusting). 
2. After commissioning (Reactor Module and spaceship startup), a reactor shutdown would 
result in a loss of the spaceship (due to planned ejection of the solar panels following startup). 
3. Reactivity will normally be added using one method at a time (e.g., HRS flow would not be 
increased while inserting reflectors, although reflector position may be changed to 
accommodate a change in HRS flow or to minimize the subsequent transient). 
4. A low power operating mode may be used to maximize the service life of the Reactor Module. 
5. A range of operating parameters (e.g., pressure and temperature) will need to be established 
early in the design, taking into consideration measurement uncertainty, minimum slider 
movement, minimum Brayton speed increment, operating bands, slider (or drum) sensitivity, 
component performance decrement over life, overall cycle thermal efficiency, and transients 
during normal operations and recoverable casualties. 
8.3 Plant and Reactor Controls 
The operating state of the SNPP is defined by a specific set of parameters (e.g., pressure, 
temperatures, flow rates, electrical power, reactor power, etc.). This operating state may be changed 
by adjusting one of the four following plant control parameters: 
1. Reactor Outlet Temperature (Reactivity) 
Reactor outlet temperature is controlled by adding or removing reactivity via the reactivity control 
devices (sliders or drums) to increase or decrease reactor power. Changes in alternator output, 
Brayton speed (and therefore primary gas flow rate) and HRS performance (flow, heat transfer 
efficiency) also impact this parameter. 
2. Brayton Unit Shaft S'peed (Electrical Load) 
Brayton unit shaft speed is controlled by adding or removing electrical load(s) to the alternator 
using the Parasitic Load Radiator (PLR). Primary system gas flow is directly coupled to Brayton 
shaft speed. 
3. Heat Rejection System (HRS) Flow Rate (HRS Pump Speed) 
Heat Rejection System flow rate is changed by changing the HRS pump speed therefore 
changing the cooling water flow through the gas cooler and the radiators. Changes in HRS 
performance (flow, heat transfer efficiency) impact primary system Brayton unit compressor inlet 
gas temperature. 
4. Primary Coolant Pressure (Mass inventory) 
Primary coolant pressure could be controlled by adjusting the coolant gas inventory or via bypass 
flow schemes around the compressor. 
These are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure (1) to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 8-9 
Reactor coolant temperature, nuclear power, and alternator electric power output at constant Brayton 
machine speed, are parameters commonly considered for control of reactor operation. Regardless of 
which parameter(s) is chosen for steady-state reactor control, the same physical principles apply. 
Inserting reflectors (or rotating drums to increase reactivity) adds reactivity, which increases reactor 
power. Increased reactor power increases fuel temperature and reactor coolant outlet temperature 
(That), which in turn increases the power delivered to the Brayton unit and the HRS. The Brayton 
machine is held to a constant speed by the Parasitic Load Radiator which absorbs the additional 
output electrical power and moves to a more efficient operating point governed by its improved 
thermodynamic performance at the higher temperature. The parameters are all interrelated allowing 
some flexibility as to which ones are monitored and which are controlled. 
One advantage of having several control parameters for reactivity control available is that the system 
can cross-check its results or respond to potential sensor failures. If electric power is the control 
parameter, for example, and the signals for electric power are lost, then the reactivity controller could 
switch to Tht for reactor control. 
Although some of the preceding control parameters have a strong influence over a single monitored 
parameter, manipulation of any one of the control parameters would influence monitored parameters 
throughout the system. Due to the interdependent nature of the system parameters, it may be 
necessary to control the plant based on certain parameters or combination of parameters (a derived 
control signal, potentially allowing for anticipatory control), while allowing others to vary within 
predetermined bands. 
8.3.1 Reactor Outlet Temperature (Reactivity) Control 
Summary 
Reactor outlet temperature (ThoJ is directly affected by core reactivity. Positive or negative reactivity 
is added through movement of the reactivity control devices (sliders or drums). In general, adding 
positive reactivity will increase reactor outlet temperature; adding negative reactivity will decrease 
reactor outlet temperature. Reactivity changes needed for plant transient response and to account for 
the normal burnup of fuel will be controlled by the Reactor Instrumentation and Control (WC) 
segment. This controller will be required to operate autonomously for periods in the mission when 
communication with Earth is not possible (up to 50 days), ,and for periods in the mission when 
communication with Earth has a long delay or is not possible. It is envisioned that ground control 
intervention from an SNPP perspective will be limited to commissioning, periodic monitoring, 
performance enhancements (software uploads), and long term corrective actions to recover from 
unforeseen casualties or equipment degradation. 
Present Control Drive Mechanism (CDM) concepts use stepper motors which will provide discrete 
positioning steps of the reflector segments (sliders) or drums. Presently each step motion is assumed 
to be one millimeter, although this would need to be optimized after a complete control scheme, 
including all aspects of the overall plant is developed. Moving one reflector segment a millimeter 
changes reactor temperature by about 2 K based on currently assumed reflector segment worths and 
temperature coefficients. Additional detail is contained in Section 5 of Reference 8- 1. 
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The general reactor startup sequence is discussed in Section 8.6.1. After pre-critical checks and 
establishing reactor flow by motoring a Brayton unit using solar power, the reflectors are inserted (or 
drums positioned) to a position estimated to be 2% from critical conditions. The critical position will be 
known from previous ground testing of the actual flight unit but uncertainties exist due to temperature 
changes and other unexpected changes due to effects of shipping or launch loads. 
From the 2% from critical position, the approach to criticality is made by inserting reactivity at a slower 
rate and monitoring the reactor's neutron level. Such a procedure most likely would consist of a series 
of steps initiated from ground control and autonomously executed by the reactor controller because 
there is no guarantee of continuous communications with the spaceship. Once criticality has been 
reached, a brief check of reactor conditions will be performed by ground control. 
The next phase of the reactor startup is to bring reactor power low into the power range 
(approximately 1 % power) and use reactor power to perform a plant heat-up at a specified rate, 
(notionally 0.5 Klmin). Achieving this heat up rate should require roughly moving one reflector 
segment I mm about every 3 to 5 minutes. As the plant temperature increases, the amount of 
electrical power required to motor the Brayton unit will decrease as the turbo-compressor starts to 
extract power from the primary coolant. The Brayton unit will require an electric load controller for 
motoring at a fixed speed as plant temperature increases. When plant temperature is high enough, 
the Brayton unit produces sufficient electric power to become self-sustaining. The speed controller 
must be able to adapt to this change of state. Electric power produced by the Brayton unit continues 
to increase as the plant heat-up continues. When sufficient power is being produced a second 
Brayton unit can be motored and brought on line. 
8.3.2 Brayton Unit Shaft Speed (Electrical Load) Control 
Summary 
In this concept, a variable load is imposed on the Brayton unit by the PLR which can be adjusted if 
electrical demand changes to maintain constant Brayton unit loading and shaft speed. The PLR 
always maintains load on the Brayton above the required spaceship electrical demand. If the electrical 
demand on the SNPP increases, the PLR decreases its load the same amount to maintain a constant 
load on the Brayton unit and thus maintain constant speed. If the electrical demand on the SNPP 
decreases, the PLR increases its load the same amount, again maintaining a constant toad on the 
Brayton unit and thus a constant speed. This has the advantage of allowing the plant to operate at 
maximum efficiency. 
Brayton Unif Speed Control 
Brayton unit shaft speed is fundamentally controlled by the balance of work produced by the turbine 
minus the work required by the compressor, electrical work removed, and losses. The Brayton unit 
will only operate at a constant speed when the sum of these terms is zero. That is: 
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At the quasi-stable point no action is needed to correct an increase in speed because the negative 
torque will slow the Brayton unit back to the quasi-stable operating point. However, if the speed 
decreases, the total electrical load must be reduced below the net Brayton unit work at the reduced 
speed. This is done by decreasing the electrical work removed by the PLR. The net Brayton unit 
work will now be positive, resulting in a positive torque on the Brayton unit shaft and increasing 
Brayton unit speed. The PLR load must be increased again as the Brayton unit approaches the 
quasi-stable point. In a similar manner the PLR can be used to operate the Brayton unit at the 
unstable point. Because the PLR is an electrical system and can respond much faster than the 
mechanical Brayton unit system, it is possible to operate at the quasi-stable and unstable points. 
To operate at the unstable point, a Brayton unit speed increase is countered by an increase in PLR 
loading, putting a negative torque on the shaft and slowing it back to the desired speed. A decrease 
in speed is countered by a reduction in PLR loading, putting a positive torque on the shaft and 
increasing speed back to the desired speed. It is desirable to operate the Brayton unit at a speed 
near the quasi-stable operating point to maximize efficiency. 
8.3.3 Heat Rejection System (HRS) Flow Rate Control 
Summary 
The Brayton unit compressor inlet temperature (CIT) is affected by varying the HRS flow rate (pump 
speed). Changes in the compressor inlet temperature influence reactor power and thus reactor outlet 
temperature and Brayton unit electric power output. This change in reactor power is caused by the 
change in reactor inlet temperature (Tcold) coming from the compressor and the resultant change in 
reactivity due to the reactivity temperature coefficient. It is desirable to operate at the lowest 
compressor inlet temperature for maximum plant efficiency. Control of the'plant based on HRS flow 
rate thus prevents the system from operating at maximum efficiency. As such, this control scheme is 
not envisioned for use for normal operation. 
System Operation 
The HRS mass flow rate would be controlled by changing HRS pump speed. Changes in the HRS 
mass flow rate influence the CIT and radiator coolant temperatures. Figure 8-4 demonstrates the 
sensitivity of reactor power, electrical power, reactor outlet temperature, and compressor inlet 
temperature to changes in HRS flow rate. 
Decreasing CIT increases system efficiency, making it desirable to operate at the lowest CIT 
attainable. This will be achieved when the gas cooler is operating near the design point, as shown in 
Figure 8-4. Operating at a different HRS mass flow rate increases CIT, which decreases system 
efficiency. Decreasing HRS mass flow rate reduces the heat transfer between the gas and the HRS 
fluid in the gas cooler, increasing CIT. Increasing HRS mass flow rate also increases CIT for the fixed 
size system. Increasing the HRS mass flow rate will transiently increase the heat transfer in the gas 
cooler; however, because the HRS fluid system spends less time in the radiator and because the 
radiator is near its limit, the increased heat is not able to be rejected and the HRS fluid returns to the 
gas cooler hotter, increasing ClT. Control of the HRS mass flow rate may also be needed to keep the 
HRS from freezing or overheating, limiting its ability to fluctuate and control CIT 
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associated with a given parameter (i.e., the difference between the "indicated" and actual values) and 
is determined by physical effects such as material degradation of the sensing element and by the 
sensor's signal conditioning circuitry. The reactor sliders and the load changes of the PLR are 
characterized by discrete fixed movements or changes in resistance. The control band is the amount 
of deviation allowed in the indicated control parameter before an action is taken to change it. The size 
of the control band is determined predominately by the uncertainty in the control parameter and the 
minimum change in that parameter in response to the discrete control actions (e.g., the minimum 
reactor temperature change in response to a slider step, or the minimum change in Brayton unit 
electrical load (and hence operating speed) in response to the minimum PLR resistance change). 
The size of the control band will increase as either of these factors increase in size. 
The incentive to minimize the size of the control band is to maximize plant operating efficiency and 
minimize the potential impact on component ratings, required core power, and overall plant mass. 
The upper limit of the control band for temperature is fixed at the maximum allowable (actual) plant 
temperature (because of material limitations). Therefore with a fixed maximum temperature, a larger 
control band implies a lower minimum control band temperature. The minimum control band 
temperature is associated with a lower operating efficiency, which in turn increases the sizing of the 
plant. The reduced efficiency drives the size of each component larger, from the reactor through the 
Brayton unit system to the heat rejection panels. Because of these issues, there is a strong incentive 
to minimize the size of the control band through small sensor and control errors and through small 
discrete actuator actions. The benefits of a small control band in reduced reactor power and 
component sizes and ratings, are potentially limited by the more frequent shims of the slider 
mechanisms which could lead to excessive mechanical wear, or result in increased complexity of the 
PLR. These drivers would have to be balanced to determine an appropriately sized control band. 
8.5 Plant Configuration Options 
This section describes the operation of different plant configuration options. It is assumed that all 
configurations are required to produce approximately 200 kWe. Heat balances for the various 
configurations can be found in Section 6 and detailed arrangements can be found in Section 5. 
The system architecture is described by three numbers separated by dashes. For example, the 
designation 1-1-1 uses a convention of B-R-GI where B is the number of Brayton units, R is the 
number of recuperators sized to support the operation of one Brayton unit at 100% of its rated power, 
and G is the number of gas coolers sized to support the operation of one Brayton unit at 100% of its 
rated power. It does not indicate the number of individual recuperators or gas cooler assemblies as 
more than one unit may be housed within a common pressure boundary to achieve design objectives; 
e.g,, minimize mass, improve reliability, facilitate system arrangement. For example a 2-2-2 for a 200 
kWe system with both Brayton units running (no spares) would incorporate two 100 kWe Brayton units 
with two recuperators and two gas coolers, each sized to support a 100 kWe Brayton unit. The gas 
cooler and/or recuperator may be physically one unit with multiple flow paths or independent flow 
paths or multiple units. 
Also noted in each system architecture discussion is the number of frequencies at which the Power 
Conditioning & Distribution (PCAD) system is designed to operate (systems architectures designed to 
operate at full rated power at multiple (two) frequency and temperature points are designated with an 
"sn, e.g., 2-2-2s). This operation at a second state point is discussed in detail in Section 3.12. The 
conceptual PCAD design accepted a single frequency and converted it to the required bus voltages 
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and frequencies. Increasing the number of acceptable frequencies increases the PCAD system 
complexity and mass, see Section 4. 
8.5.1 The 1-1 -1 System Architecture 
The 1-1-1 system architecture has one Brayton unit running at full capacity to produce the required 
200 kWe. This configuration does not require any valves, nor does it carry any spare Brayton units, 
recuperators, or gas coolers, making it the simplest configuration. Refer to Figure 8-5. Failure of any 
major component in the Reactor Module would be mission ending. The PCAD system is simplest 
because the AC bus operates on only a single voltage during full power operation. This concept may 
require addition of an angular momentum compensation device (flywheel) to ensure adequate 
spaceship control during science orbits. 
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ejected after initial startup, a long term energy storage system would be required to start the spare 
Brayton unit if the operating Brayton unit fails. The PCAD system would be simpler because the AC 
bus operates on only a single voltage and frequency during full power operation as opposed to 
configurations such as the 2-2-2s that involve Braytons operating at multiple speeds, resulting in 
multiple electrical bus voltages and frequencies. 
8.5.2.2 Two 100 kWe Brayton Units Operating at 100% Capacity (2-2-2) 
This 2-2-2 configuration has two Brayton units, each rated at 100 kWe, running at full capacity to 
produce the required electrical power. This configuration requires valves. Failure of a Brayton unit 
would be mission-impacting, since full power could no longer be generated. Although this 
configuration does not provide redundancy for full power operation in the event of a failure, it would 
allow the option of securing a Brayton for troubleshooting or to react to an unusual circumstance. 
Also, even if one Brayton were lost, the spaceship would continue to be operational indefinitely and a 
reduced scope mission may be an option. Reasons for choosing this option are: (1) if the 
development of Brayton unit machinery of the 200kWe size proves to be undeliverable (which is 
unlikely - see section 9.1) or (2) there is a significant advantage to the spaceship having angular 
momentum compensation provided by counter-rotating Brayton units as oppdsed to a flywheel 
system, and/or the Reactor Module mass allowance allows this as an acceptable alternative that has 
some level of redundancy. The PCAD system is only required to accept a single voltage during full 
power operation. 
8.5.2.3 Two 200 kWe Brayton Units Operating at 50% Capacity (2-2-2s) 
This 2-2-2s system architecture has two Brayton units, each rated at 200 kWe, normally running at 
half capacity (100 kWe) through reduced temperature and speed to produce the required spaceship 
power. This configuration requires valves. In the event an operating Brayton unit fails, the remaining 
operating Brayton unit is brought up to full capacity to supply the spaceship power demand. 
Operating State Points for the 2-2-2s configuration are shown in Section 3.1 1. 
This configuration provides additional operational flexibility and relatively high reliability with an overall 
mass that is only about 2000 kg greater than for a single Brayton unit (1-1-1) option. However, it 
requires a PCAD system that is capable of supplying the spaceship with full power at two frequency 
and voltage points. This adds some mass to the power conditioning circuits. System efficiency will be 
reduced because the turbomachinery can only be optimized for one of the two sets of parameters 
(speed and temperature) or optimized for some midpoint, increasing the required radiator area and 
reactor power rating. The difference in overall system mass is primarily driven by the mass of added 
mechanical components, the loss of system thermal efficiency operating at non-optimized parameters, 
and the mass penalty associated with system pressure drop due to the more complex arrangements. 
Additional information for this configuration is contained in Section 3.7 and 3.12. 
8.5.3 The 3-3-3 System Architecture 
Similar to the 2-2-2 system architecture, there are many options for the 3-3-3 configuration. Several 
of these options are discussed below that provide different levels of redundancy. 
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8.5.3.1 Two 100 kWe Operating Brayton Units with One 100 kWe Idle Spare (3-3-3) 
This 3-3-3 configuration has two Brayton units, each rated at 100 kWe, running at full capacity to 
produce the required electrical power, and a 100 kWe idle spare. This configuration requires valves. 
Failure of a Brayton unit requires starting the spare in order to produce full spaceship demand. The 
power to start the spare is supplied by the remaining operating Brayton unit. The PCAD system is 
simpler because the AC bus operates on only a single voltage and frequency during full power 
operation. 
8.5.3.2 Three 100 kWe Brayton Units Operating at 50% Capacity (3-3-3s) 
This 3-3-3s system architecture has three Brayton units, each rated at 100 kWe, running at two-thirds 
I capacity (67 kWe) through reduced temperature and speed to produce the required spaceship power. 
This configuration requires valves. In the event an operating Brayton unit fails, the remaining two 
operating Brayton units are brought up to full capacity to supply the spaceship power demand. 
This configuration provides additional operational flexibility and relatively high reliability with an overall 
mass that is only about 2000 kg greater than for a single Brayton unit (1-1-1) option. However, it 
requires a PCAD system that is capable of supplying the spaceship with full power at two sets of 
frequency and voltages. This adds some mass to the power conditioning circuits. System efficiency 
will be reduced because the turbomachinery can only be optimized for one of the two sets of 
parameters (speed and temperature) or optimized for some midpoint, increasing the required radiator 
area and reactor power rating. The difference in overall system mass is primarily driven by the mass 
of added mechanical components, the loss of system thermal efficiency operating at non-optimized 
parameters, and the mass penalty associated with system pressure drop due to the more complex 
arrangements. Additional information for this configuration is contained in Section 3.8 and 3.12. 
8.5.4 The 4-44 System Architecture 
Similar to 2-2-2 and 3-3-3 system architectures, there are many options for the 4-4-4 configuration. A 
typical configuration is shown in Figure 8-7. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure (1) to 
SPP-67210-0010 / 
0-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 8-21 
Figure 8-7: Typical 4 4 4  System Architecture 
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8.5.4.1 Two 100 kWe Operating Brayton Units with Two 100 kWe Spares (4-4-4) 
This 4-44 configuration has two Brayton units, each rated at 100 kWe, running at full capacity to 
produce the required electrical power with two idle spares. This configuration requires valves. Failure 
of a Brayton unit requires starting the spare in order to produce full spaceship electrical demand. The 
power to start the spare is supplied by the remaining operating Brayton unit. The PCAD system is 
only required to accept a single voltage during full power operation. 
8.6 Normal Operation and Control Strategies 
8.6.1 Reactor Startup and Power Production Sequence 
Table 8-1 provides the steps for the initial commissioning of the SNPP for the JIM0 spaceship. It 
includes the startup (approach to criticality) of the reactor, the startup of the Brayton unit(s), heatup of 
the SNPP, and the production of full electrical power for the spaceship. The conclusion of this 
sequence supports supplying electrical power and checkout of the remaining spacecraft systems and 
the eventual transition to the thrusting phase. 
This startup scenario is based on the mission plan utilizing transfer stages to boost the spacecraft out 
of earth orbit and into the interplanetary trajectory before full spacecraft deployment is achieved and 
the reactor startup is begun. The following is also assumed within the procedure: 
The PCAD architecture assumed (Figure 8-8) is the Northrop Grumman Space Technology 
arrangement at the time of Project Mission Systems Review (PMSR). A PCAD controller is 
assumed to control the tineup of the spacecraft electrical buses and to coordinate the 
operation of the Brayton unit Start Inverter and PLR. 
A reflector made up of twelve segments (sliders) is assumed for reactivity control. Each 
segment is controlled individually by a stepper motor. Only one segment is moved at a time. 
The assumed increment of movement is one millimeter per step. 
Physics testing will have been performed on the flight unit reactor prior to launch. This will 
provide confirmation of the core design and manufacture, and will support an accurate 
determination of the reactor's estimated critical position (ECP) for the plant startup in space. 
Valve operation is not addressed in this procedure. 
Mission Control will not be in direct control of each step of the startup sequence. Time delays 
in the communication path between Mission Control and the spacecraft preclude real time 
monitoring and control of plant functions. Also, continuous communication with the spacecrafi 
is not assured during the deployment and startup phases (Level 2 Requirements are 92%). It 
is therefore assumed that the controt architecture for the Reactor Module would be designed 
such that an entire series of steps or phase of the startup would be initiated by a command 
from Mission Control and controlled autonomously from the spacecraft. Mission Control would 
wait for satisfactory indications that the sequence steps had been completed before 
proceeding with the next phase of the sequence. How the steps in the following startup 
sequence would be accomplished within the respective spacecraft controllers (Reactor Module 
and PCAD) has not been determined. 
The assumed plant arrangement requires two Brayton at 45,000 rpm to produce full electrical 
power. 
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8.6.I.f Reactor Startup Procedure and Principles 
Table 8-1: Reactor Startup Procedure and Principles 
Procedure 
1.1 Initial Conditions 
1. The PCAD subsystem is operational. 
2. The solar arrays are sun pointing and 
are providing electrical power during 
the reactor startup. 
3. The telecom link to Mission Control is 
operational. 
4. The reactor module aeroshell has been 
jettisoned. 
Principles 
The PCAD subsystem provides the electrical 
power to operate the Command and Data 
Handling subsystem, the Reactor I&C 
segment, and to motor the Brayton unit to 
produce reactor coolant flow. 
The solar arrays (located on the docking 
adapter in the PB? arrangement) provide the 
primary source of electrical power for all 
functions on the spacecraft. The reactor 
startup requires an established flow of gas 
through the reactor to provide cooling when 
heat is produced. This gas flow is provided by 
motoring the first Brayton unit from the 
spacecraff electrical bus. Since the Brayton 
unit imposes the largest single load on the 
spacecraft electrical bus during the startup, the 
solar arrays must be pointed fo generate 
maximum electrical power. 
The telecom link provides a communication 
path for commands to activate the Reactor 
l&C segment and control phases of the reactor 
startup. Once reactor specific commands are 
received on the spacecraft, they are 
processed by the Command and Data 
Handling subsystem's flight computer and 
passed to the Reactor I&C segment. 
The aeroshell must be absent when the 
reactor is operational in order to allow 
adequate heat dissipation from the reactor and 
energy converters. It must be jettisoned prior 
to the startup of the reactor to preclude any 
undesired interference with the operational 
reactor. 
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5. Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) is 
deployed. 
a. HRS trace heaters are 
energized to preclude freezing 
in the piping to the radiators. 
b. HRS pumps are in a low flow 
mode to preclude freezing in 
the piping to the radiators. 
6. Reactor l&C segment is energized. 
7. The reactor is shutdown. 
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Principles 
The Heat Rejection Segment provides the 
heat sink necessary for operation of the 
Brayfon unit cycle. Full deployment of the 
radiator panels is required prior to reactor 
startup and the raising of the power system's 
temperature. Spacecraft operational planning 
assumes that trace heaters and a minimum 
("survivalJ~ flow will be utilized to prevent HRS 
fluids from freezing from launch until operation 
of the power system. 
Initial planning has assumed that the reactor 
I&C segment would be launched in a 
deenergized state to conserve battery power. 
The initial architecture of the reactor I&C 
segment does not provide for partial 
energization during launch to monitor limited 
reactor plant parameters. This is considered 
acceptable because the sliders would be 
launched in their least reactive position with no 
means to energize them, and shutdown safety 
rod@) with locking mechanisms would be in 
the reactor core to provide additional 
shutdown margin. 
Energization of the reactor I&C segment would 
be initiated from Mission Control. The 
command would be received by the spacecraft 
Command and Data Handling subsystem's 
flight computer and passed to the Reactor I&C 
segment's supervisor controller. Energization 
of the Reactor /&C segment could occur 
anytime alter deployment of the spacecraft 
solar arrays, but does not have to occur until 
the full deployment of the spacecraft is 
complete. 
Except for a single ground test to confirm 
criticality of the flight unit core, this reactor will 
not have been operated previously, and will 
never have been operated at power. The 
reactor will have been launched in a 
safe/shutdown condition and will not be taken 
critical until the spacecraft is on the 
interplanetary trajectory. 
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Procedure 
8. All sliders are in their least reactive 
position (launch condition). 
9. Reactor vessel, piping, and Brayton 
unit Turbo-Compressor Alternator are 
at a temperature of approximately 250- 
300 K. 
10. Reactor I&C segment pre-critical 
checks have been performed 
satisfactorily. 
11. Permission has been received from the 
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion to 
commence the startup of the JIM0 
reactor. 
f .2 Precautions 
1. From the start of slider motion until 
reactor power is greater than [1.0%] 
power, the following shall not occur: 
a. Brayton unit speed shall not be 
changed. 
b. Heat Rejection subsystem 
pump speed / lineup shall not 
be changed. 
Principles 
The safety position for launch of the reactor is 
with all sliders in their least reactive position, 
and the safety rod(s) fully inserted. All devices 
are deenergized until the systems power up 
prior to reactor startup. 
The preliminary plant design assumes a 
thermal management subsysfem which 
maintains the temperature of the plant 
components at 25G300 K from launch until 
startup of the power plant. 
Once energized, the reactor I&C circuits would 
perform self checks to verify proper operation. 
Additionally, checks would be performed to 
confirm correct operating constants and gain 
factors. Additional checks would be identified 
as the detailed circuit designs are completed. 
The purpose of these checks is to confirm that 
all of the reactor 1&C circuits survived launch, 
are propetiy aligned to support the reactor 
startup, and will perform their assigned 
functions during the subsequent reactor 
operation. Confirmation of satisfactory 
completion of the pre-critical checks would be 
required before Mission Control could initiate 
the react or startup. 
Slider motion (direct reactor reactivity control), 
Brayton unit speed (reactor coolant flow rate), 
and HRS flow ail represent independent 
methods of affecting reactivity and are 
controlled by separate control systems on the 
spacecraft. To avoid power swings and 
control oscillations caused by interactions from 
the respective controllers, only one factor 
affecting reactivity may be changed at a time. 
Communication behveen the respective 
controllers is imperative. 
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Procedure 
2. Following the reactor startup (reactor 
power greater than [I .0%]), no 
combination of slider motion, Brayton 
unit speed change, and HRS pump 
speed 1 lineup change shall occur 
simultaneously. 
2.1 Reactor Startup 
Perform operational checks on the 
reactor slider drive mechanisms. 
Withdraw the safety rod(s) to the full 
out position. 
Secure the thermal management 
heaters in the reactor module. 
Start Brayton unit #I. The initial 
frequency setpoint shall be [675 Hz 
(equivalent to a Brayton unit speed of 
13, SO0 rpm)]. 
Principles 
The primaryjustification for this concern is to 
preclude multiple, independent additions of 
reactivity to the reactor core at the same time. 
While modeling efforts may eventually 
demonstrate that this is not an issue, this 
precaution should remain until later in the 
design phase because the reactor3 sliders, 
the Brayton unit speed, and the HRS pump 
speed are controlled by different portions of 
the spacecraft. Effective coordination between 
the control functions on the various segments 
of the spacecraft needs to be established. 
Each slider is insetied one or two steps and 
then withdrawn to its least reactive position to 
confirm the inte.~rifv of the slider drive motor 
circuits and the operability of the slider 
mechanism. 
Each slider check is commanded from Mission 
Control and proper operation is verified before 
completion of the step. 
Once the slider drive mechanism checks have 
been completed, the safety rod(s) are 
withdrawn from the reactor. This allows 
normal reactivity control with the sliders. 
The thermal management heaters (estimated 
power demand: 7 -2 kWe) represent a 
competing electrical load for the power needed 
for the Brayton unit Start Inverter. This power 
is now required for the reactor startup phase. 
lnsulation and micrometeorite protection 
coverings will need to maintain residual heat 
until the reactor is producing thermal energy. 
The command is sent from Mission Control to 
the spacecrafi flight computer which then 
passes it to the PCAD controller. The PCAD 
controller energizes the Brayton unit Start 
Inverter (see Figure .I) to apply AC electrical 
power to rotate the Brayton unit, using its 
alternator as a motor. The Brayton unit Start 
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Procedure 
5. Commence slider insertion to the ECP- 
0.02 position ( 2% sub-critical). 
Principles 
Inverter converts DC electrical power (source) 
to variable frequency AC power. (This 
represents the largest single load on the DC 
distribution bus during the startup and drives 
the sizing of the solar array.) (See Figure 2). 
For the first phase of the reactor startup, the 
frequency of the Start Inverter would notionally 
be set to 675 Hz - corresponding to a Brayton 
unit speed of 13,500 rpm (30% of 45,000 rpm). 
(This speed would likely be in the range of 20- 
30%. Less than 20%, and the speed would be 
too close to the Brayton unit's low end critical 
rotor speeds, and additionally, the speed 
would be so low that the turbine wheel would 
not begin producing work at any attainable 
temperature from the reactor. Greater than 
30% speed, and the Start Inverter power 
demand would increase solar array sizing 
unnecessarily.) This speed is controlled by 
the Start Inverter, and is likely a frequency 
control on its output. Brayton unit speed and 
voltage will be ramped up to minimize the 
peak power demand on the electrical bus. At 
this point, the PLR is not providing load on the 
AC bus. 
These programmed sequences for the reactor 
startup will be initiated from Mission Control 
and will be executed autonomously by the 
Reactor I&C segment. Continuous downlinks 
from the spacecraff will provide status 
information to Mission Control on the progress 
of the startup. Mission Control would be able 
to stop the startup sequence at any point. ' 
The slider control program will insert one slider 
at a time, moving each slider in succession 
around the reactor vessel in order to keep the 
relative position of all sliders approximately 
equal. The slider motion interval for the first 
ohase of reactivity addition is assumed to be 
me slider step every second, or a total of 60 
mm of slider motion per minute. 
When the ECP-0.02 position is reached, slider 
motion will cease until the next command is 
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Procedure 
6. Commence slider insertion to reach 
criticality. 
2.2 Raise Plant Temperature to Set 
Brayton unit #l Power Positive 
Insert sliders to raise turbine inlet 
temperature. 
a. Control the interval of slider 
insertions to limit the rate of 
temperature increase to [0.5 
Urnin]. 
b. Continue to hold Start Inverter 
frequency setpoint at [675 Hz 
Principles 
received from Mission Control. . 
This slider control program will begin by 
insetting one slider at a time at an inten/al of 
one slider step every 70 sec. 
Stattup rate (as derived from the nuclear 
instrument outputs) will be continuously 
monitored. Startup rate in excess of 10.5 
DPM] will cause slider motion to be suspended 
until the startup rate has decreased to [O 
DPM]. Slider motion will cease completely 
when the startup rate remains positive. 
Mission Control will confirm the slider 
positions, power level, and coolant 
temperature when criticality is achieved. 
Adding reactivity to slowly heat the plant from 
a cold condition while motoring a Brayton unit 
to maintain a constant reactor coolant flow rate 
is potentially the most challenging part of the 
startup sequence. As the turbine inlet 
temperature slowly increases from reactor 
heat, the turbine will begin to produce work 
and the power drawn from the start inverter 
will decrease. 
The following method needs to be modeled 
and tested to determine the speed stability of 
the Brayton unit as its alternator phase 
currents approach zero, and also to assess 
the sensitivity of the reactor core to variations 
in Brayton unit speed (coolant flow rate) at this 
temperature. 
A heatup rate of LO.5 Klmin] is expected to 
require slider motion of approximately f slider 
step every 3-5 minutes. The heatup rate of 
10.5 Wmin] was conservatively chosen to allow 
for gradual thermal growth of the power 
system components. After final material 
selections and detailed design and analysis of 
the components, a more aggressive heatup 
rate may be permissible. 
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Procedure 
(Brayton unit speed: 13,500 
rpm)l. 
2. Secure slider motion when the 
turbine inlet temperature reaches 
[950 K]. 
a 3.1 Raise Plant Power 
1, Increase the HRS Loop 1 pump speed 
to [intermediate]. 
2. Increase the PLR speed setpoint to 
[35,000 rprn]. Limit the rate of change 
of the speed setpoint to approximately 
FBD rpmlmin]. 
Principles 
As the plant temperature increases, the 
Brayton unit will begin to produce. electrical 
energy and eventually become power positive 
(self-sustaining). As this happens, the PCAD 
controller will secure the start inverter and 
transition speed control of the Brayton unit to 
the PLR such that its speed remains constant. 
Increasing the plant temperature to a point 
above that where the Brayton unit becomes 
power positive places the power plant in a 
state where the Brayton unit can support small 
changes in plant loads without risk of stalling. 
The 1950 K] stopping point needs to be 
confirmed with modeling and prototype testing 
to ensure that sufficient power is available to 
support the plant load changes in the following 
steps. 
The HRS pump speed needs to be increased 
from the minimum flow value to support higher 
power plant operation. The setting of the HRS 
pump speeds needs to be verified with 
accurate models of the final plant design. 
The approach being used to transition from the 
Brayton unit power positive point to the full 
power state is to "stair-step" upwards in 
increments of temperature and then power. 
With temperature being raised in the step 
above, the Brayton unit speed (and load) can 
now be increased to the value consistent with 
the new temperature. The optimum rate of 
change of speed needs to be chosen based 
on thermal considerations for plant 
components and to limit the overshoot of 
speed and reactor power. It must also be 
verified based on an accurate model of the 
final plant design. Refer to Figure 4 for the 
typical family of curves relating temperature, 
electrical output power, and Brayton unit 
speed. 
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Procedure 
3. Increase the HRS Loop 1 pump speed 
to [fast]. 
4. Insert sliders to raise turbine intet 
temperature to [ I  ,000 K]. 
a. Control the interval of slider 
insertions to limit the rate of 
temperature increase to [0.5 K / 
min.] 
b. Continue to hold the Brayton 
unit speed setpoint at [35,000 
rpml. 
c. Secure slider motion when the 
turbine inlet temperature 
reaches [I ,000 K]. 
5. Increase the PLR speed setpoint to 
[40,000 rpm]. Limit the rate of change 
of the speed setpoint to approximately 
[TBD rpml min]. 
6. Insert sliders to raise turbine inlet 
temperature to 11,150 K]. 
Control the interval of slider 
insertions to limit the rate of 
temperature increase to [0.5 K 1 
min.] 
Continue to hold the speed 
setpoint at [40,000 rpm]. 
Secure slider motion when the 
turbine inlet temperature 
reaches [ l  ,150 Kj. 
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Principles 
The HRS pump speed needs to be increased 
to the full flow value to support Brayton unit full 
power operation. The setting of the HRS 
pump speeds needs to be verified with 
accurate models of the final plant design. 
7,000 K represents an intermediate 
temperature point which will support an 
increased Brayton unit speed. 
As above, the rate of change of Brayton unit 
speed needs to be determined to limit the 
overshoot of speed and reactor power and 
with considerations for the thermal limits of 
plant components. 
[f ,  f50 K] is the final operating temperature for 
the plant, and will support full speed operation 
of the Brayton unit. 
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Procedure 
7. increase the PLR speed setpoint to 
[45,000 rpm]. Limit the rate of change 
of the speed setpoint to approximately 
[TBD rpml rninJ. 
3.2 Perform the Intermediate Heat Balance 
Principles 
45,000 rpm is the design operating speed of 
the Brayton unit. At this speed, the frequency 
of the electrical output is the PCAD design 
value of 2250 Hz. 
The purpose of this step is to provide an in-situ 
calibration of the nuclear instruments 
monitoring reactor flux. The details will be 
developed as the plant design is finalized. 
An in-situ calibration is required as the 
correlation between actual reactor power and 
the flux measured by the nuclear instruments 
is affected by their location relative to the 
reactor and by structures and geometry of the 
sensor locations. 
It is anticipated that steady state plant 
conditions will be established and maintained. 
During this steady state period, measurements 
will be made of the pressures, temperatures, 
and flows in the primary coolant loop and the 
HRS loops. From these measurements and 
adjustments made to account for thermal 
losses to the space environment, a calculation 
may be made to determine the fotal energy 
(and therefore the power level) being 
produced by the reactor. This value will then 
be used to adjust the gain on the nuclear 
instruments. 
Performance of this calibration at this power 
point (-50%) provides an intermediate 
adjustment on the nuclear instrument gains, 
thereby improving the accuracy of the level 
and rate measurements during the remainder 
of the increase to full plant power. 
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4.1 Start Brayton unit #2 
Set the HRS Loop 2 pump speed to 
[intermediate]. 
Energize Brayton unit Start Inverter #2. 
Set the frequency setpoint to [675 Hz. 
Equivalent Brayton unit speed: 13,500 
rpml. 
As Brayton unit #2 speed increases, 
limit speed to [13,500 rpm] with the 
PLR. 
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Principles 
This approach starts the second Brayton unit 
when the plant has reached full operating 
temperature. It is acknowledged that this 
represents a temperature transient on plant 
components and the reactor, and that a more 
gentle approach may be to start Brayton unit 
#2 at a lower temperature and bring both units 
up to full speed together. 
However, should a plant configuration with 
spare Brayton units be developed, and a spare 
unit be called upon to replace a failed unit 
during the mission, a procedure similar to the 
following may be required to restore full power 
to the spacecraft. 
If the following approach is used, pre-heaters 
on colder components may be required. 
The HRS pump speed needs to be increased 
from the minimum flow value to support higher @ 
powerplant operation. The setting of the HRS 
pump speeds needs to be verified with 
accurate models of the final plant design. 
This will start Brayton unit #2 rotating. Power 
for the Start Inverter will come from the solar 
arrays (still connected in the initial startup) or 
from the High Voltage AC bus through the 
wide input down-converter to the 28 vdc bus. 
With the plant at normal operating 
temperature, Brayton unit #2 will rapidly 
increase in speed and begin to produce 
electrical energy to become power positive 
(self-sustaining). As this happens, the PCAD 
controller will secure the start inverter and 
transition speed control of the Brayton unit to 
the PLR such that its speed remains constant. 
The approach considered here is to limit the 
speed of Brayton unit #2 to a modest value 
and then control its ramp up rate by adjusting 
load. 
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Procedure 
4. Set the HRS Loop 2 pump speed to 
[fast]. 
5. Increase Brayton unit #2 speed from 
13,550 rpm to 45,000 rpm at a rate of 
[TBD rpml min]. 
5.1 Perform the Final Heat Balance 
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Principles 
The HRS pump speed needs to be increased 
from the intermediate flow value to support 
higher power plant operation. The setting of 
the HRS pump speeds needs to be verified 
with accurate models of the final plant design. 
The optimum rate of change of speed needs 
to be chosen based on thermal considerations 
for plant components and to limit the 
overshoot of speed and reactor power. It must 
also be verified based on an accurate model of 
the final plant design. 
The purpose of this step is to provide a final in- 
situ calibration of the nuclear instruments 
monitoring reactor flux at full power conditions. 
The details will be developed as the plant 
design is finalized. 
As discussed in step 3.2, this procedure is 
required to correlate the output of the nuclear 
instrument circuits with the actual flux 
produced by the reactor. This procedure must 
be repeated at full power to adjust this 
calibration to the full power operating 
conditions of the reactor and power plant. 
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would be to start Brayton unit # I ,  startup the reactor, heatup the plant to the point where Brayton unit 
#1 goes power positive (self-sustaining), and then use the solar array's "Brayton unit power budget" to 
start Brayton unit #2. This would occur at an intermediate temperature (800 - 900 K), and might 
lessen the thermal transient on the plant compared to starting Brayton unit #2 when the plant was at 
normal operating temperature. 
While it may be possible to shim reflectors and change Brayton unit speed simultaneously in theory, it 
would be difficult to execute this on the spacecraft. In the current spacecraft architecture, the two 
functions are controlled by separate controllers (Reactor I&C and PCAD) which would require 
continuous coordination and unnecessarily complicate the control algorithms. It is thus likely that 
these functions would be performed sequentially. Brayton unit speed would be held constant while 
shimming reflectors to raise temperature, then reflector position would be held constant while raising 
Brayton unit speed. This sequence would be repeated until normal Brayton unit operating speed and 
plant temperature was reached. 
8.6.3 Steady State Operation 
Once the reactor and Brayton unit startup is complete, the SNPP is in a configuration to support 
continuous, unlimited operation of the spaceship. This would place the reactor at 100% power and 
the Brayton units producing full power (185 kWe total). Until thrusting is commenced, the power 
demand for spaceship loads would be on the order of 10-20 kWe. The remainder of the electrical 
power being produced would be absorbed by the PLR sections on each electrical bus. As with the 
startup phase, the reactor controller would act to maintain reactor coolant temperature within its 
prescribed band. The PCAD controller (through the PLR) would act to maintain the Brayton unit 
speed (or voltage) within its prescribed band. When the thrusting phase is commenced, the 
necessary electrical power would be made available by reducing the power consumed by the PLR, 
thus maintaining the Brayton units at their desired operating point. If desired, this steady state 
operating lineup could continue for the duration of the mission with no significant actions by the 
respective controllers except the occasional reactivity addition (reflector shim) to the reactor to 
compensate for fuel burnup, or to respond to an anomaly in the plant. In the thrusting mode, full 
power would be required to provide thrust capability for the interplanetary transfer or for orbit 
maintenance at the mission's target. 
Certain phases'of the mission do not require full power capability for thrusting. During the 
interplanetary transfer, there are coast periods where the spaceship thrusters are secured and the 
actual power demand is reduced significantly. In addition, thrusting would not typically be required 
during periods of science observation. In both cases, the power demand would be reduced to 40 kWe 
or less. This affords the opportunity'to lower the operating point of the Brayton units (temperature and 
speed) and thereby reduce the necessary operating temperature of the reactor and extend its 
operational lifetime, as wet1 as reducing temperatures and stresses in the Reactor CoolantIEnergy 
Conversion components. These options are discussed in more detail below. 
Evaluations of the control methods for the reactor and Brayton units were not complete at the time of 
project cancellation. Some initial conclusions on control approaches and plant responses are 
provided in Section 12. 
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8.6.4 Reduced Power Operation 
The JIM0 Level 2 requirements (Reference 8- 3) state: 
PRD-18 - Reactor Throttle Capability 
The Project shall use a nuclear reactor whose thermal power output is adjustable to 
allow long-term operation at any reactor power level down to [30%] of full power output 
The 30% reactor power level is a tentative number that would be determined as the project 
progressed. Utilization of a low power operating mode may allow for the reduction of system 
temperature and/or reactor power for significant portions of the mission, maximizing Reactor Module 
lifetime. This low power mode may also represent a state in which to place the Reactor Module while 
recovering from a casualty transient. Two power levels were envisioned for power plant operations. A 
higher power level of approximately 185 kWe would have been utilized when propulsion was required, 
and a low power level (-40 kWe or less) would have been utilized when the spaceship was coasting 
(i.e., propulsion not required) and during periods of scientific data once the spaceship arrived on 
station. Increased plant and core life allow follow-on missions of longer duration than the first JIM0 
mission. JPL estimates that non-thrusting periods could range from 3 years for the JIM0 mission to 10 
years for the longest envisioned (20 year) Prometheus mission. 
Several methods using the plant controls listed in Section 8.3 were explored to achieve a distinct low 
power level. The methods of reducing power considered were: 
1. Reduce the number of operating Brayton units 
2. Reduce reactor outlet temperature 
3. Reduce Brayton unit speed 
4. Reduce reactor outlet temperature and Brayton unit speed 
Options 2, 3, and 4 were analyzed using a version of the Simulink model for a 132 kWe plant 
(Reference 8- 4) with a NaK secondary loop (an earlier conceptual design iteration). This model does 
not take into account the degradation of heat pipe performance with reduction in HRS temperatures. 
Below -340°K the heat pipe heat transfer begins to decrease and below -310°K the heat pipes cease 
to transfer heat. Cases where these temperature limitations are exceeded would have decreased 
efficiencies relative to the efficiencies reported by the Simulink model. 
8.6.4.1 Reduce the Number of Operating Brayton units 
If the plant utilizes multiple Brayton units, one or more Brayton unit(@ could be shut down to reduce 
reactor power. Plant and core temperatures would remain fairly constant, with reactor flow reduced 
by the amount attributable to the secured Brayton unit. The percentage of reactor power reduction 
will nearly follow the percentage of flow reduction. System efficiency will stay near design efficiency, 
and may increase slightly due to reduced pressure drop in common flow paths. This method could be 
used in conjunction with temperature reduction to increase creep life. 
A disadvantage of this method is that shutting down an operating Brayton unit makes the system less 
tolerant of an operating Brayton unit failing. In a plant where only two Brayton units normally operate, 
shutting one down for a reduced power mode requires an energy storage device to restart the 
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8.6.5.2 Ground Test Reactor Shutdown 
The Ground Test Reactor would have to be designed with normal shutdown, emergency shutdown, 
and restart capabilities. These would be required for normal test and maintenance evolutions, as well 
as for reactor protection from potential casualties and engineered safeguards for a potential reactor 
accident condition. 
Normal shutdown of the GTR could be accomplished by withdrawing the moveable reflectors and/or 
inserting the safety rod(s). The GTR will likely also need a rapid shutdown function for reactor 
emergencies. The form of this shutdown function has not yet been determined and requires 
consideration of such aspects as public safety requirements, single-failure criteria and the desire for 
the reactor module to be as prototypical as possible to the flight unit. 
Shutdown would cause a reduction in the turbine inlet temperature of the Brayton unit energy 
converters. This would reduce their power output, and require that power be supplied from the test 
facility to motor their alternators for decay heat removal (similar to the beginning of the reactor startup 
sequence). The Brayton units could be continuously motored to provide decay heat removal, or a 
separate circulator could be added to the prototype support facility to provide the function and allow 
the Brayton units to be secured. The prototype support facility would also need to provide a 
continuous source of power to the 28 Vdc bus for uninterrupted power to the reactor controllers to, 
completely withdraw the sliders and allow for continuous reactor monitoring after the shutdown. 
8.7 Abnormal Operations and Casualties 
This section qualitatively identifies indications the plant might use to identify abnormal or casualty 
events along with the desired plant response. Instrumentation that may be necessary for control or 
monitoring of plant parameters during these events is also identified. 
8.7.1 Inadvertent Valve Closure 
It is extremely unlikely for a solenoid operated valve to inadvertently close. The most likely cause 
would be failure of the solenoid coil or the control circuitry. However, the valve could be designed so 
that it would fail as is. Other actions to minimize failure could also be taken, such as redundancy in 
the control circuitry. Although there is an extremely low probability of inadvertent valve closure, 
closure of a valve in an operating loop potentially would have serious plant ramifications. If valve 
closure causes loss of a Brayton unit, electrical loads may be lost if the subject valve cannot be re- 
opened, or another Brayton unit started. 
Indications and plant response will vary depending on whether the affected valve is associated with a 
Brayton unit turbine/compressor, or alternator cooling line (for multiple Brayton unit configurations). 
Closure of an inlet or outlet valve to a Brayton unit turbine or compressor causes loss of loop flow and 
consequent loss of the Brayton unit. Closure of a valve in the alternator cooling line will cause 
overheating of the alternator and potential loss of delivered electrical power. Evaluations have been 
performed for a two loop plant with one loop operating and the other is an installed spare, and for a 
three loop plant with two operating and one spare loops. 
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8.7.1 .l.l Initial Indications 
For a two loop plant with one operating Brayton unit, the following initial indications are expected to 
signify closure of a turbine or compressor isolation valve. Subsequent indications that might occur if 
this event were to continue are not listed. 
Valve position indication for the affected valve indicates shut or does not indicate open 
Loop flow rate reduction or complete loss of flow 
Brayton unit speed decreasing due to loop mass flow rate below the capability of the Brayton 
unit speed controtler 
Alternator output reduction due to reduced Brayton unit speed 
Primary temperature increasing due to reduced coolant mass flow rate though the core 
Inadvertent closure of a Brayton unit turbine or compressor isolation valve is less severe for a 
three loop plant with two operating Brayton units than for a two loop plant with only one 
operating Brayton unit. With two Brayton units initially operating, loss of one Brayton unit 
does not cause a potentially mission ending complete loss of electrical power. The following 
initial indications are expected for this scenario. 
Vatve position indication indicates shut or does not indicate open 
r Primary flow rate reduction to 50% flow 
Brayton unit speed decreasing in affected loop due to loop mass flow rate below the capability 
of the Brayton unit speed controller 
Alternator output reduction due to reduced Brayton unit speed; combined output 50% of rated 
Primary temperature increasing due to reduced coolant mass flow rate though the core 
8.7.1 .I .2 Desired Plant Response 
An attempt should be made to re-open the valve as soon as it no longer indicates fully open. If the 
affected valve can be successfully re-opened prior to loss of the Brayton unit, no further immediate 
actions may be required. If the valve cannot be re-opened, then the following plant response would 
be desired regardless of whether one or two Brayton units were initially operating. 
Reduce plant electrical loads to those within the capacity of the remaining Brayton unit(s) 
Open the isolation valve associated with the idle (spare) Brayton unit 
Motor spare Brayton unit, observing heat-up rate limitations 
Transition spare Brayton unit to self-sustaining, switch to PLR voltage control 
Secure the affected Brayton unit 
8.7.1.1.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
The following instrumentation is desired to support implementation of the preceding strategy. 
0 Valve position or loop flow indication 
Alternator output voltage and current or Brayton unit shaft speed 
r Coolant temperature leaving the core (entering the Brayton unit) 
Electrical bus voltage indication . 
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8.7.f .2 Alternator Cooling Isolation Valve 
Inadvertent closure of a Brayton unit alternator cooling isolation valve is serious because of the 
potential loss of electrical output due to alternator overheating and damage. However, this transient is 
less severe than loss of a Brayton unit turbine or compressor isolation valve as more time is available 
to take action. This transient does not affect Brayton unit turbine or compressor performance, but 
causes overheating of the associated alternator and eventual alternator damage if the overheating is 
not corrected. 
8.7.1 2.1 Initial indications 
The following initial conditions are expected regardless of whether a two loop plant with one operating 
Brayton unit or a three loop plant with two operating Brayton units is chosen. 
Valve position indication indicates shut or does not indicate open 
Alternator stator temperature increasing 
8.7.1.2.2 Desired plant response 
An attempt should be made to re-open the alternator cooling line isolation valve as soon as it no 
longer indicates fully open. If the affected valve can be successfully opened prior to alternator 
damage, no further immediate actions will be required. If the valve cannot be opened, then the 
alternator will likely fail, causing a loss of electrical power from that unit. An idle (spare) Brayton unit, 
if available, will need to be started and electrical loads shifted to maintain electrical power continuity to 
the Plant. The following plant response would thus be desired if the subject valve cannot be opened 
regardless of whether one or two Brayton units were initially operating. 
Open the isolation valve associated with the idle (spare) Brayton unit 
Motor spare Brayton unit, observing heat-up rate limitations 
Transition spare Brayton unit to self-sustaining, pick up electrical load 
Secure the affected Brayton unit 
8.7.1.2.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
The following instrumentation is desired to support implementation of the preceding strategy. 
Valve position indication 
Alternator stator temperature 
Loop flow indication 
Alternator output voltage and current 
Brayton unit shaft speed 
Coolant temperature leaving the core (entering the Brayton unit) to verify proper loop flow rate 
8.7.2 Loss of Brayton unit Speed Control 
A controller is required to maintain Brayton unit shaft speed constant as load varies. Constant 
Brayton unit speed is desirable to maintain maximum Plant efficiency. Without a speed controller, a 
reduction in load could cause a significant increase in Brayton unit speed, possibly to the point of 
overspeed and damage. Similarly. an increase in load could cause a significant reduction in Brayton 
unit speed, possibly to below self-sustaining. Loss of Brayton unit speed control must be identified 
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and responded to promptly to prevent potentially catastrophic equipment damage or loss of electric 
power. 
8.7.2.1 lndications 
Brayton unit speed outside of the established normal band and moving away from normal 
limits 
Brayton unit speed rate of change exceeding established normal limit 
8.7.2.2 Desired Plant Response 
It is necessary to secure the Brayton as soon as practicable to preclude loss of the Brayton unit, 
reduction in core cooling, and loss of associated electrical power. A spare Brayton unit, if available, 
should be started and electrical loads transferred accordingly. The following steps are thus required. 
Open the isolation valve associated with the idle (spare) Brayton unit 
Motor spare Brayton unit, observing heat-up rate limitations 
Transition spare Brayton unit to self-sustaining, switch to PLR voltage control 
Secure the affected Brayton unit 
8.7.2.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
The following instrumentation is desired to support implementation of the preceding strategy. 
Brayton unit shaft speed 
Valve position indication 
Loop flow indication 
Alternator output voltage and current 
Coolant temperature leaving the core (entering the Brayton unit) to verify proper loop flow rate 
8.7.3 Mechanical Loss of Brayton unit 
There are potentially serious plant ramifications associated with a loss of a Brayton unit. There are a 
number of ways in which a Brayton unit fail, such as inadvertent valve closure, overspeed due to loss 
of load, electrical failure, gas leakage, etc. This section focuses only on Brayton unit failure due to 
mechanical causes. 
Brayton unit failure results in loss of alternator electrical output, reduced loop flow and reduction in 
core cooling. Initial lndications may vary depending on the specific cause of Brayton unit failure. For 
a single Brayton unit plant, this event is mission ending. For multiple Brayton unit plants, this event 
still represents a significant plant transient. To maintain continuity of electrical power to Plant loads, 
the loads must be rapidly transferred to another operating Brayton unit or loads shed until plant 
capacity is restored (either by starting an idle Brayton unit or raising the capacity of the operating 
Brayton unit). For plant configurations such as the 3-3-3 or 4-4-4 that have spare Brayton units, the 
spare Brayton unit is started and electrically loaded. For plant configurations such as the 2-2-2s that 
have alternate state points, increase the speed and temperature of the operating Brayton unit until the 
higher power operating state point is obtained, and then supply plant electrical loads. 
Evaluations have been performed assuming a two loop plant with one loop operating and the other is 
an installed spare, and a three loop plant with two operating and one spare loop. Indication trends are 
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generally the same regardless of the number of Brayton units running. However, the casualty is more 
severe if fewer Brayton units are initially operating because a greater percentage of total loop flow is 
lost. 
8.7.3.1 BearingMIheel Rub 
8.7.3.1 .I Indications 
Rapid Brayton unit shaft speed reduction with associated loss of loop flow rate 
Loss of Brayton unit alternator output 
System pressure decrease due to loss of Brayton unit compressor 
Primary temperature increasing due to reduced coolant mass flow rate though the core 
Autonomous control action (if the autonomous reactor control system provides action for a 
complete loss of flow) 
8.7.3.1.2 Desired Plant Response 
Reduce reactor power by inserting negative reactivity (if necessary) 
Secure affected Brayton unit by closing any valves required in failed Brayton unit loop 
Open the isolation valve associated with the idle (spare) Brayton unit 
Motor spare Brayton unit, observing heat-up rate limitations 
Transition spare Brayton unit to self-sustaining, pick up electrical load 
Increase reactor power by inserting positive reactivity (as required) 
8.7.3.1.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
The following instrumentation is desired to support implementation of the preceding strategy. 
a Brayton unit speed 
Loop flow indication 
a Alternator output voltage and current 
Coolant temperature leaving the core (entering the Brayton unit) to verify proper loop flow rate 
Reactor power 
Valve position indication 
8.7.3.2 Brayton Unit Shaft Shear 
Shaft shear represents a total and immediate failure of the Brayton unit regardless of whether the 
shear occurs between the turbine and compressor wheels, or between the compressor and the 
alternator. Figure 8-12 shows an example of a conceptual design of a Brayton unit turboalternator 
(Hamilton Sundstrand concept design, Reference 8- 2). 
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If a leak were to occur, it is more likely to occur in components with high thermal stress that can lead 
to cracking, such as the recuperator or gas cooler. Leaks are also more likely to develop at locations 
with seals, such as valves, and at areas of discontinuity, such as weld joints, especially bimetallic 
weld joints. The probability that a leak wilt develop can thus be greatly minimized by utilization of 
welded caps on valves, seamless piping, minimizing the number of pipe joints and bi-metallic joints, 
and a carefully developed, and thoroughly implemented inspection program. 
Currently there are no valves designed for gas service at the operating temperatures of a space 
reactor that will have zero seat leakage over any significant length of time. White it may be possible 
to reduce the leakage rate in a multi-Brayton unit plant by shutting an isolation valve, it is currently not 
be possible to completely arrest a leak if it should develop. In general, any small leak that develops 
will initially reduce plant efficiency, and over time will become mission ending. A gas reservoir could 
be used to prolong plant life in case of a leak. However, the reservoir would add mass and volume to 
the plant along with additional complexity. 
8.7.4.1 Indications 
The following initial conditions are expected regardless of whether a two loop plant with one operating 
Brayton unit or a three loop plant with two operating Brayton units is chosen. 
Primary pressure decreasing due to loss of gas mass 
Primary plant temperature increasing due to less mass of gas available to cool the core 
PLR load on the Brayton unit decreasing 
As primary plant temperature drops and less gas inventory exists in the system, the Brayton unit will 
not be able to keep up with the applied electrical load, and so the tendency will be for it to slow down. 
The PLR load on the Brayton unit is thus expected to be decreasing to maintain Brayton unit speed. 
At some point however, there will be no more PLR load on the Brayton unit to reduce, and at that 
point, Brayton unit speed and voltage will decrease. The Brayton unit speed and voltage decrease 
will continue until the power converters drop out that feed the 28 Vdc bus and the reactor controllers, 
resulting in loss of electrical power. 
8.7.4.2 Desired Plant Response 
Currently, the NRPCT does not believe it is practical to implement a leak isolation procedure for a gas 
cooled space nuclear reactor. 
The following strategy closes isolation valves in an attempt to reduce the gas leakage rate, extending 
plant life. A spare Brayton unit would be started if available, and electrical loads would be shifted to it 
for continuity of electrical power. If a gas makeup system was provided, it would be utilized to restore 
gas mass and pressure within the Plant. However, the ability to successfully execute such a strategy 
requires three assumptions: 
Small leak rate 
Ability to quickly identify the leak 
Ability to quickly isolate the leak 
It becomes increasingly difficult to identify a leak as its leak rate decreases. Thus, this strategy also 
a requires instrumentation of sufficient sensitivity and response time. 
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For a two loop plant with one operating Brayton unit, the following would be the desired plant . 
response. 
Reduce reactor power to prevent exceeding thermal limits due to reduced coolant flow 
Open the isolation valve associated with the idle (spare) Brayton unit 
Start the idle Brayton unit in the spare loop 
Shift electrical loads to the second Brayton unit 
Restore normal reactor thermal power level 
Isolate the first Brayton unit loop by closing the Brayton unit turbine inlet and compressor 
outlet isolation valves 
r Observe pressure changes in the isolated loop for indications of a gas leak 
For a three loop plant with two operating Brayton units, the following would be the desired plant 
response. 
Reduce reactor power to preclude thermal limits from being exceeded due to reduced coolant 
flow 
0 Open the isolation valve associated with the idle (spare) Brayton unit 
Start the idle Brayton unit in the spare loop using the power supply provided for that purpose 
Shift electrical loads to the started Brayton unit 
Sequentially isolate loops while monitoring parameters until the affected loop is identified and 
isolated (these parameters need to be distinguished from normal changes in system pressure 
due to temperature changes) 
Restore normal reactor thermal power level 
8.7.4.3 Required Plant instrumentation 
The following instrumentation will be required to implement the preceding strategies. 
r Loop pressure instruments 
Reactor power indication 
Valve position indication 
Alternator output voltage and current 
Coolant temperature leaving the core (entering the Brayton unit) to verify proper loop flow rate 
8.7.5 Stuck Open Valve in Idle Loop (Partial Loss of Flow) 
8.7.5.1 Indications 
Reverse flow in idle loop caused by pressure drop across the reactor 
Decrease in reactor coolant flow since some is reverse flowing through the idle loop 
Rise in TCO, CIT, and other temperatures if the idle loop is cold 
Increase in temperature rise across reactor due to reduced reactor coolant flow 
Operating compressor outlet pressure decreasing due to lower overall system resistance 
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8.7.5.2 Desired Plant Response 
Attempt to shut the stuck open isolation valve. If this is not possible, shut an alternate valve 
to preclude reverse flow through the idle loop. 
The preceding should be performed rapidly to minimize potential Brayton unit damage from 
backflow, and to prevent exceeding reactor core thermal h i t s  
8.7.5.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
Loop flow sensors 
Loop temperature sensors (TCO, CIT, others) 
Reactor inlet and outlet temperature sensors 
Loop pressure sensors (compressor outlet) 
8.7.6 Partially Shut Valve in Operating Loop 
8.7.6.1 Indications 
Large pressure drop in affected loop due to flow restriction 
Reduced load on PLR or Brayton unit speed decrease due to flow restriction 
Reduced alternator output 
Unbalanced loop flow rates due to equalization of pressure drops in each loop 
Higher steady state pressure drop in both loops 
Mismatched temperature change across loop components due to unbalanced loop flow rates 
affecting heat exchanger performance 
8.7.6.2 Desired Plant Response 
Attempt to open the partially shut valve 
If the valve can't be fully opened, start a sp 
power. 
lare Brayton unit if available and supply electrical 
The preceding should be performed rapidly to avoid exceeding reactor core thermal limits 
8.7.6.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
Multiple pressure sensor locations per loop 
PLR load reporting 
Alternator power output sensors 
Loop flow sensors 
Loop temperature sensors 
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8.7.7 Loss of HRS Radiator Area 
8.7.7.1 lndications 
Higher water temperatures in the gas cooler due to less heat rejection in the radiator 
Increased CIT due to hotter water temperature at the outlet of the gas cooler 
lncreased alternator temperature due to hotter water temperature at the outlet of the gas 
cooler 
8.7.7.2 Desired Plant Response 
lncrease Tho, consistent with temperature limits to make up for loss of radiator area.. 
Do not exceed TwId and/or Tho, limits 
Do not exceed alternator or bearing temperature limits 
8.7.7.3 Required Plant lnstrumentation 
CIT sensor 
HRS loop temperature sensors 
Alternator temperature sensors 
8.7.8 toss of Flow in a HRS Loop 
8.7.8.4 Indications 
Loss of flow indication in HRS loop 
lncrease in CIT and other loop temperatures due to loss of gas cooler heat transfer 
lncrease in gas cooler water temperatures 
8.7.8.2 Desired Plant Response 
Do not exceed temperature limits 
Ability to continue using Brayton unit, if pump failure (carry a spare pump) 
Ability start a spare Brayton unit and continue mission (if leak) 
8.7.8.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
HRS loop flow meters 
Loop temperature sensors 
HRS loop temperature sensors 
8.7.9 Inadvertent Slider Motion 
8.7.9.1 Indications 
lncrease or decrease in reactor power (if within the range of detectors). 
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Increase or decrease in startup rate (unless detectors are saturated). 
Change in slider segment position indication. 
Change in coolant temperature (if above the POAH). 
Change in plant pressure (if above the POAH). This effect may be detectable only if all 
Brayton units are idle; i.e., during reactor startup. 
Change in PLR loading. This effect is due to the change in plant efficiency as the control 
system restores a steady operating state at a higher or lower turbine inlet temperature. 
Change in voltage or current to slider segment contro!lers or motors. 
8.7.9.2 Desired Plant Response 
The reactor control system senses the accident from one or more of the above indications 
and takes action to stop or reverse reflector motion as needed. 
8.7.9.3 Required Plant Instrumentation 
Reactor power indication 
Slider segment position indication 
Loop pressure instruments 
Loop coolant temperature 
Alternator output voltage and current 
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9 Component Descriptions 
This enclosure summarizes the main primary plant components of the direct gas Brayton 
system envisioned for Prometheus excluding the reactor and shield and also describes the heat 
rejection system. A simplified diagram of the direct gas Brayton system is provided in Figure 
9-1. As illustrated in the figure, the working gas (potentially HeXe) is heated in the reactor. The 
gas then enters the turbine and expands extracting work from the gas. The gas then enters the 
low pressure side of the recuperator. In this component, heat from the high temperature gas 
exiting the turbine is exchanged with the lower temperature gas exiting the compressor. The 
exiting gas from the low pressure side of the recuperator passes through the gas cooler. As the 
gas passes through the gas cooler it is cooled by exchanging heat with the working fluid of the 
heat rejection system which radiates this waste heat to space. The exiting gas from the gas 
cooler then enters the compressor and the helium xenon is compressed. The gas exiting the 
compressor then enters the high pressure side of the recuperator where it is heated by 
exchanging heat with the high temperature gas exiting the turbine. The gas exiting the high 
pressure side of the recuperator then enters the core where it is heated prior to entering the gas 
turbine. 
The components addressed in this enclosure have been studied to a conceptual level by 
NRPCT. The component sections specifically addressed include: 
Section 9.1 Brayton Turboalternator 
Section 9.2 Recuperator 
Section 9.3 Gas Cooler 
Section 9.4 Piping 
Section 9.5 Valves 
Section 9.6 Heat Rejection System 
Section 9.7 Hot Leg Piping Thermal Stress Analysis 
The following component sections provide a description of the component requirements, 
materials selection, technology maturity, failure modes, and development planlneeds. Table 9-1 
provides a summary of the main future development needs identified by NRPCT for each of the 
component areas. 
Based on the conceptual development of Brayton cycle components during the Prometheus 
project, NRPCT concludes that the envisioned energy conversion components have a strong 
industrial base, and limited technology development to allow the delivery of highly efficient, 
reliable deep space hardware. The established plan for component development had testing of 
a near prototypic energy conversion system occurring in -3 yrs. from concept selection. 
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9.1 Brayton Turboalternator 
I I Summary and Conclusions 
The Brayton turboalternator component has been studied to a conceptual level to establish the 
technology design space, determine supplier capabilities, establish key system interfaces 
impacting the design, failure modes, and future development steps to enhance performance and 
increase reliability. 
The Brayton turboalternator component requires some development, though the base 
technologies exist and have demonstrated reliable service life in aircraft and distributed power 
generation applications. There are four critically important future developments that would need 
to be completed prior to, or in parallel with, the design and test of a prototypic Prometheus 
Brayton turboalternator. These four development efforts include: 
Turbine scroll, turbine wheel, and turbine stator creep life- The turbine inlet stagnation 
temperature of 1 150K has been an established parameter from heat balance development 
to allow for sufficient thermodynamic efficiency performance. Thermal management (blade 
conduction, "aerodynamic cooling") of the turbine wheel is needed to obtain the analyzed 
maximum turbine metal temperature of -1030K for an inlet stagnation temperature of 
1150K. The turbine scroll and stator blades are proposed to operate at near stagnation 
temperature though have lower stresses and higher allowable total creep strain. Cast Ni- 
based superalloys have advanced over the past thirty years and are currently envisioned to 
be suitable. Other material options include ceramic turbines and stator blades (SIN), and 
refractory turbine scrolls or internally insulated scrolls. 
Com~ressor efficiencv ~erformance and arranqement to the power unit - The currently 
envisioned compressor design isentropic efficiency is 84-85%. This efficiency greatly affects 
the power system efficiency and should be a focus for detailed design and potentially sub 
component independent testing prior to integration into a power unit. The location of the 
compressor on the turboalternator shaft can greatly affect the inlet diameter and fluid 
conditions depending whether the machine is designed as an overhung "single" disk or 
designed by separating the compressor from the turbine on either end of the shaft. Thermal 
management, rotor dynamic stability, and compressor performance would all need to be 
evaluated prior to making this fundamental design decision. 
HeIiumlXenon gas bearinn performance -The current data (load capacity, stiffness, 
damping, and power loss) being used in the analysis of the rotor dynamic stability, 
component thermal management, and power conversion efficiency is based on data 
obtained for air. Some models have been developed to scale this data to the high pressure 
HeIXe fluid, though these models differ dramatically. Future testing using high pressure 
bearing test rigs needs to be completed prior to development of a reference bearingkhaft 
design. 
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Alternator electrical winding and maanets temperaturelirradiation tolerance - The 
Prometheus Brayton alternator would have needed to operate at an ambient fluid 
temperature near the thermal limit of many of typical winding insulation materials. Many of 
the more conventional materials temperature capabilities may have not been sufficient and 
the higher temperature electrical insulation materials have unknown irradiation tolerances. 
Increased irradiation dose from fission product release or buildup of corrosion/erosion 
products is a driving concern for the closed loop alternator windings. An alternative is to add 
a supplemental cooler for the alternator cooling bleed flow or an independent cooling loop, 
both of which add complexity and mass to the system. 
Other development issues included a cast to wrought Ni-base superalloy pressure boundary 
joint, an electrical pressure boundary penetration seat, and corrosion due to interactions 
between the alternator and bearing coating materials with other materials in the closed gas loop. 
9.1.2 Introduction 
The Brayton Turboalternator, also referred to as a Brayton rotating unit (BRU) or Brayton unit, is 
a component containing many complex, highly integrated sub-components. The major sub- 
components include the turbine assembly (turbine wheel, scroll, diffuser), the compressor 
assembly (compressor wheel, volute, diffuser), the bearing assembly (journal and thrust 
bearings, shaft, 8 thrust disk), and the alternator assembly (alternator rotor, stator windings, 
electrical feedthrough, and alternator pressure boundary housing). The main function of the 
turboalternator is to convert thermal-hydraulic energy to mechanical shaft energy, and then to 
electrical energy. This energy conversion process is obtained by expanding a high temperature 
gas through a turbine, extracting energy from the fluid and transferring this energy to 
mechanical energy of shaft rotation. This shaft energy is used to drive both the alternator and 
the compressor. The alternator is a permanent magnet generator (PMG) which uses Lorentz 
forces to induce current from the rotating permanent magnets located on the components 
rotating shaft. A significant amount of energy from the turbine (-Z3) is used to drive the 
compressor that raises the fluid pressure prior to being heated by the recuperator and the 
reactor. During startup the alternator also operates as a starter motor until the energy 
conversion systems temperature ratio is high enough to allow for self sustaining rotation. Figure 
9-2 shows an example of a conceptual design of a Brayton turboalternator (Hamilton 
Sundstrand concept design, Reference 9- 1) completed as part of the JIM0 spacecraft concept 
study. 
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Table 9-2: Notional Brayton Turboalternator Specifications 
Alternator Power 
Alternator Frequency 
Alternator Voltage 
Poles 
Alternator efficiency 
Rotational Speed 
1 -  -- I Gamma Radiation ' 5 
1 Turboalternator 
196.6 kWe 
2250 Hz 
440 VAC rms L-L 
6 
Coolant 
Lifetime 
Neutron Radiation 
I -00 Mrad 
2 Turboalternators 
97.7 kWe 
2250 Hz 
440 VAC rms L-L 
R 
-
95% 
45,000 RPM 
HeXe with molecular weight of 31.5 grnlrnol 
20 years (10 years for JIMO) 
3 x  10 l4 n/cm 
-
95% 
45,000 RPM 
Compressor Outlet Pressure 
Compressor Pressure Ratio 
Compressor Inlet 
Temperature 
Compressor efficiency 
Bearings I Gas Foil Bearings 
2 MPa 
2.0 
390K 
Turbine Pressure Ratio 
Turbine Outlet Pressure 
Turbine Inlet Temperature 
Turbine efficiency 
Space radiation will also provide up to 1 Grad of gamma radiation near Europa. 
2 MPa 
2.0 
390 K 
84.7% 
Past space BRU development programs (1 960's - 70's) have been completed to understand 
the closed Brayton cycle and component performance for space nuclear & non-nuclear 
applications. These programs were led by NASA Glenn and were successful in achieving the 
component technical specifications. No closed Brayton power cycle has been operated in 
space, though a significant amount of turbomachinery has been operated for cooling spacecraft 
hardware. 
84.0% 
1.83 
1.051 
1 150K 
90.0% 
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Differences in the Prometheus BRU over previous space designs include an increase in power 
capability, lifetime, and compressor and alternator temperatures. However, since these 
development programs, a significant amount of additional development has occurred in aircraft 
industry on Brayton technology. A more comprehensive historical view of the space BRU 
engines and aircraft applications of small Brayton hardware can be found by researching the 
following development programs and applications below: 
Brayton Rotating Unit (BRU) (References 9- 3, 9- 4, 9- 5) - Space designed closed 
cycle turbine, compressor, alternator (10.5 kWe) with gas foil bearings 
Mini-Brayton Rotating Unit (Mini-BRU) (Reference 9- 6) - Space designed closed 
cycle turbine, compressor, alternator (ZkWe) with gas foil bearings 
Integrated Power Unit (IPU) (Reference 9- 8) - Development program for an open 
cycle advanced APU (200kWe) with magnetic bearings. 
Capstone Microturbine (Reference 9- 7) - Open cycle turbine, compressor, alternator 
(30-200 kWe) with gas foil bearings for high efficiency distributed power generation. 
Auxiliary Power Units (APU) (Reference 9- 2 )  - Open cycle turbine, compressor, 
alternator (up to -40kWe) 
Air Cycle Machines (ACM) - Open cycle turbine, compressor, starter motor which use 
gas foil bearings 
Two Brayton vendors were involved in the Prometheus spacecraft project proposals, teamed 
with bidding aerospace contractors. These vendors were Hamilton Sundstrand in Rockford IL 
and Honeywell (formerly Allied Signal, AiResearch, Garett) in Tempe AZ. These two suppliers 
teamed with other leading vendors in the fields of gas foil bearings and turbomachinery design 
to generate closed cycle conceptual designs for use with a tiquid metal reactor. Honeywell had 
also been the lead subcontractor for the NASA-built space BRU and mini-BRU engines. 
Hamilton Sundstrand competed and won a NASA Glenn contract during the Prometheus project 
to build a 100 kWe high speed alternator named the Alternator Test Unit (ATU). Both vendors 
had competed and won different phases of the recent IPU Air Force development program 
(1994-2004). Requirements for the IPU machine were similar to the Prometheus project in 
power, speed, and turbine temperature, though different to the Prometheus requirements in 
shock loads, compressor inlet temperature and pressure, working fluid (air vs. HeXe), and 
lifetime. Reference 9- 8 describes the recent IPU progress made by Hamilton Sundstrand. 
Plans were developed for involving the vendor base to establish a conceptual design for use 
with a direct gas reactor (Reference 9- 9), along with the phased approach to build the first 
generation development hardware, termed the Thermal Test Model ( lTM) (Reference 9- lo), 
also further described in Section 13. 
Performance, mass and efficiency estimates for the Brayton turboalternator have been made 
based on historical data, and recently developed conceptual designs (Figure 9-3). The 
turboalternator component is not envisioned to be a very significant source of mass within the 
space nuclear power plant, though the components efficiency affects the system mass 
substantially. The current mass estimate model for system tradeoff studies is a simple model 
that provides mass as a function of component electrical power output and compressor 
pressure ratio (see equation below). Component mass increases with increasing compressor 
pressure ratio due to the higher power needed by the turbine and compressor compared to the 
alternator at higher pressure ratios. This component mass relationship was developed by d 
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The turboalternator has many characteristics that determine the operational efficiency of the 
Brayton power cycle. lrreversibilities in the component which affect the system efficiency include 
the turbine and compressor isentropic efficiency, bearing power losses, windage losses, EM & 
I2R alternator losses, thermal management power losses (pump), and ambient heat loss to 
space. These losses will be described in more detail in the sub-component sections below. 
Reference 9- 11 describes the significance of these parasitic losses to the overall power system 
efficiency. 
Sensitivities to the main Brayton cycle design power operating parameters including compressor 
inlet pressure, compressor pressure ratio, compressor inlet temperature, turbine inlet 
temperature, recuperator and gas cooter effectiveness, and total AP of loop are discussed in 
Section 5.0. The following design constraints have been used to guide the current design state 
points: 
Turbine inlet stagnation temperature S 11 50K, based on historical hardware ranges & 
concern for turbine wheel I scroll creep 
Compressor inlet temperature 5 400K, based on a need for adequate HRS average 
temperature, and alternator and bearing material temperature limits 
Compressor pressure ratio 4 4 
Turbine/Compressor Specific Speed 0.3 4% 0.8 (defined in Section 9.1.3) 
Turbine Tip Speed 5 400m/s, based on maximum centrifugal stress of the superalloy 
rotor 
9.1.3 Turbine Assembly 
The turbine assembly consists of a pressure boundary housing and turbine. The housing 
consists of many sections that are either formed together or welded. These sections are shown 
on Figure 9-4, and their function is described in Table 9-3. 
Figure 9-4: Inward Flow Radial Turbine Schematic 
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Section 
Inlet duct 
I 1 motion to have good flow distribution into the stator I 
Function 
Circular duct to be joined to the hot leg pipe and allows 
Scroll 
flow to enter the scroll 
Radial housing that accelerates the flow into a centrifugal 
Nozzle blades 
The turbine, as shown conceptually in Figure 9-4, is a single stage 90' inward flow radial (IFR) 
turbine. This turbine configuration has been applied to this application due to the extensive 
experience of using the 90' IFR in many other small power, high speed applications with high 
efficiency. New methods of fabrication enable the blades of small axial-flow turbines to be cast 
integrally with the rotor so that both types of turbines can operate at about the same blade tip 
speed. Reference 9- 12 has compared the relative merits of axial and radial gas turbines at @ some length. Based on proven hardware in this power range, the IFF! is the base case. 
blades 
These blades increase the gas velocity and establish the 
angle at which the flow impinges on the turbine rotor inlet 
to establish the optimum velocity triangle. These are the 
Shroud 
Diffuser 
Turbine Wheel 
The interaction between the fluid and the machine is primarily fluid-dynamic lift with some drag 
forces also present. Lift and drag forces are normally defined with reference to airfoils. Airfoils 
very similar to airplane wings are used in axial-flow compressors and turbines. However, the 
IFR radial turbine employs shaped channels rather than airfoils. Lift and drag forces must then 
be defined with reference to the normal and tangential directions of the channel walls. The IFR 
turbine rotor blades extend from a radially inward inlet to an axial outlet. The exit part of the 
blades is curved to remove most (if not all of) the absolute tangential component of velocity, 
maximizing the achievable power extracted from the fluid. This curved section of blading is 
known as the exducer. The 90' IFR turbine is also known as a centripetal turbine, and is very 
similar in appearance to the centrifugal compressor, but with the flow direction and blade motion 
reversed. 
Radial flow gas-turbines use radial inward flow because the increase in the volume flow is 
relatively small and can easily be accommodated in the flow path near the axis, and because 
there are advantages in locating the interaction of the nozzle exit flow in a region of high and 
constant'rotor-blade velocity. 
stationary blades also referred to as the turbine stator 
Provides tight clearance to the rotor prohibiting leakage 
Diffuses the kinetic energy into recovered pressure 
Power producing rotating turbomachine, converting 
hydraulic power to shaft power 
9.1 -3.1 Turbine Efficiency 
i 
The turbine assembly has many losses that combine to produce significant frictional work 
through frictional torques exerted by the casing. These include the fluid scrubbing on the back 
of the disk and on the back of the rotating shroud, if used, stator blade fluid frictional losses, and 
rotor blade frictional losses. Other losses include leakage from clearances between the rotor 
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and shroud, and the loss of recovering the exit kinetic energy of the fluid back to near the 
stagnation enthalpy for duct flow. An axial diffuser is used on the turbine exhaust to recover a 
fraction of this exit kinetic energy. Reference 9- 12 describes an analytical approach for 
establishing the appropriate geometry for IF R turbines. This report discusses the effects of 
optimizing geometry (nozzle exit flow angle,a2 , rotor diameter ratio D21D3avg, and rotor blade 
entry height to exit diameter ratio b2/D3avg) to maximize efficiency. Figure 9-5 and Figure 9-6 
from Reference 9- 13 show how the relative geometry and efficiency vary for this non- 
dimensional turbine specific speed. Turbine specific speed, as, (see equation below) is a 
function of the volumetric flow, rotational speed, and the isentropic total-to-total enthalpy drop 
( ~ h ~ ~ = 1 / 2 * c ~ ~ ) .  Specific speed is a dimensionless parameter. 
I 3 3 1 
Where: N - Rotational speed 
QB - Volumetric Flow (turbine exhaust) 
Ahos - lsentropic total-to-total enthalpy drop 
DP - Diameter of turbine wheel 
UP - Blade tip speed = x*N*D2 
c, - Spouting fluid velocity (noule outlet) 
Figure 9-5: IFR Turbine Geometry Variation versus Specific Speed (G) for Maximum 
Static Efficiency (Reference 9- 93) 
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Sgtdfic sotad, a, (ad) 
Figure 9-6: Representative IFR Turbine Distribution of Losses versus Specific Speed for 
Maximum Total-to-Tobl Efficiency (Reference 9- 13) 
The Hamilton Sundstrand conceptual design of Figure 9-2 was designed to a specific speed of 
0.56 which is consistent to the peak of Figure 9-6. Many of the current NRPCT heat balances 
have selected to trade some of the turbomachinery efficiency to allow for better heat 
transporthransfer coolants to be used in the power system to reduce duct, reactor, recuperator, 
8 gas cooler volume and mass. Either increasing design pressure or reducing molecular weight 
(more Helium) lowers the specific speed. The ability to increase design rotational speed would 
be studied further to evaluate whether the turbomachinery efficiency can be increased while 
obtaining an acceptable mechanical design with acceptable damping for dynamic stability. The 
current NRPCT heat balances have turbine specific speeds in the range from 0.4 to 0.6. Figure 
9-6 is a representative total-to-iota1 efficiency curve. Based on new optimization methods since 
the late 601s, increases to these achievable turbine efficiencies have been obtained. The 
current estimates used by the NRPCT for plant design trade studies is shown on Figure 9-7. 
The shaded area on Figure 9-7 represents where various design point heat balance sensitivity 
studies have been focused. 
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joining methods are not recommended due to extensive reheat and solidification cracking and 
other weld defects. Concerns for these pressure boundary joints include cracking and 
thermally induced stresses due to different coefficients of thermal expansion between the cast 
and wrought materials. There is precedence in industry for developing cast-to-wrought Ni-base 
superalloy joints by hot-isostatic-pressing (HIPing), coextrusion, inertia (friction) welding, or. 
brazing, but further investigation is needed due to the limited amount of information available. 
Additional joining development was scheduled to occur in FY06 with NASA Glenn to select the 
most appropriate joining procedure. For detailed information on cast to wrought Ni-base 
superalloy joining, please refer to References 9- 17 and 9- 18. 
The temperature capability of MAR-M-247LC or IN 792(5A) materials operating for 20 years is 
limited by either thermal creep or creep fatigue, depending on the number and severity of 
transient cycles. Figure 9-8 shows the current MAR-M-247 creep test data in air from 
Reference 9- 16. Depending on the structural requirements of the application of this material 
(allowable growth), the useful lifetime of the material, or the allowable stress will vary. Very 
limited rupture data exists, but what is available has shown creep strains of >3% before rupture. 
The data below shows the potential capability for this material to operate for 20 years (1 75,000 
hours) at 1090 K with a stress of 100 MPa (15 ksi) while reaching a creep strain of 2%. The 
basis for allowable creep strains for each component is not well established at this point, though 
2% creep strain may be acceptabte for the turbine housing. A detailed structural analysis of this 
turbine housing has not been performed, though a 15 ksi allowable stress should be acceptable 
design strength for this pressure boundary. Raising the temperature up to 11 50K would reduce 
the allowable stress or life. Extrapolations of these curves show that increasing the temperature 
to 11 60 K would reduce the operating lifetime at 100 MPa by an order of magnitude, down to 2 
years from 20. Careful consideration needs to be taken to determine the change in location of 
the stator blades in relation to the turbine due to creep deformation. 
This cast superaltoy turbine scroll is currently envisioned to be insulated externally over the 
majority of the area, placing this material at maximum operating gas temperature through life. 
More complex arrangements for thermally managing the pressure boundary either by internally 
insulating or other means has been considered, though the manufacturing complexity and 
reliability of this construction has not been researched. Figure 9-9 shows a schematic of the hot 
leg to turbine housing joint. This joint would allow for a wrought alloy to maintain a steady state 
temperature of -900 K with no significant thermal stress present due to the transition of the cast 
alloy being internally and externally insulated. 
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As the gas enters a radial inflow turbine, the fluid is accelerated to a velocity higher than the 
turbine tip speed termed the spouting velocity. This acceleration transfers enthalpy of the fluid 
to kinetic energy. The combination of these Wo energies is called the stagnation enthalpy. 
HeIiumlXenon mixtures behave close to a perfect gas, allowing the equation below to be valid to 
relate how the total temperature of the gas varies from its static temperature when the gas has a 
high kinetic energy. 
r/ 2 
Where: Cp - Fluid Heat Capacity 
To - Stagnation Temperature 
T - Static Temperature 
V,, - Fluid velocity entering turbine 
This high spouting velocity decreases the static temperature of the gas as it enters the turbine. 
An example of this is for a turbine wheel rotating at a tip speed of 400 m/s. The spouting 
velocity at the design point for IFR turbines typically ranges between 30-40% higher than the 
turbine wheel tip speed. This places the gas at a velocity of 520 m/s or 0.36 M for a HeIXe fluid 
with a molecular weight of 31.5 gmlmole. At this speed, the 11 50 K stagnation temperature of 
the Heme would correspond to 950 K static temperature. The turbine blade surface temperature 
would operate at stagnation co.nditions (no slip), though would have convective heat flow from 
the blade to the fluid lowering the blade surface temperature. This phenomenon has 
been termed "aerodynamic cooling" which helps reduce needed material capabilities. Hamilton 
Sundstrand's estimate for the maximum temperature of the turbine blade in Figure 9-2 
conceptual design was 1031 K for an 1150 K gas inlet stagnation temperature. 
Another method that reduces turbine material temperature includes coating the turbine with an 
oxide that has a low thermal conductivity, allowing for reduced heat flow through the turbine 
wheel reducing the temperature of the wheel itself by conducting this reduced heat flow to the 
compressor more effectively. Thermal barrier coatings (TBCs) have long been used in the 
aerospace industry to lower the temperature seen by the turbine wheel in jet engines. State-of- 
the-art TBCs are comprised of -8-10 mil thick, yttria-stabilized zirconia (Zr02-8 wt.%Y203) (YSZ) 
deposited by electron-beam physical vapor deposition. This deposition technique results in a 
columnar grain microstructure (carpetlike) with a low thermal conductivity (-2 ~m- 'K- ' ) .  Dense 
YSZ would quickly spall off from a Ni-base base superalloy because of the differences in 
thermal coefficient of expansion, but the columnar microstructure allows the YSZ to expand 
without cracking. After tong times at elevated temperatures the columnar grains will sinter 
together and the coating will lose its elastic compliance and eventually fail due to spallation. 
TBCs are generally re-applied after 20-30,000 hrs of operation. After this period of time, the 
coating has very little resistance to thermal cycling. Spallation of the coating within the Brayton 
gas could lead to particle erosion effects elsewhere in the loop. TBC's should be evaluated as a 
means to reduce turbine metal as long as their use does not introduce other material 
interactions or compatibility issues. Previous operating experience with the BRU closed-cycle 
machines (Reference 9- 20) suggests that coatings were not needed. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 / 
0-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 9-29 
For Prometheus, the turbine wheel stress and temperature values are not exact until a detailed 
turbine design is available. Therefore, a definitive view of the creep stresses and allowable 
temperatures is not possible at this phase in the conceptuat design. However, these estimates 
point to a need for careful thermal management of the turbine blade and possibly the need for 
an alternative blade material if MAR-M-247LC or IN 792(5A) is not adequate. NASA Glenn has 
identified silicon nitride (Si3N4) as a possible alternative but no specific developmental plans are 
in place at this point since MAR-M-247LC is believed to be the best candidate. Turbine wheel 
creep is believed to be a key potential component life limiting failure mode, discussed in Section 
9.1.8. 
9.1.4 Compressor Assembly 
The compressor assembly consists of a pressure boundary housing and compressor wheel. 
The housing consists of many sections that are either formed together or welded. These 
sections are shown on Figure 9-1 1, and their function is described in Table 9-4. 
Figure 9-11 : Centrifugal Compressor Schematic 
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Section 
Inlet duct - 
Function 
Circular duct to be joined to the compressor shroud 
allowing the flow to enter the inlet with an appropriate 
Inducer 
. . I hydraulic power by increasing gas 
Shroud ) Provides tight clearance to the rotor prohibiting leakage 
Diffuser ] Diffuses the kinetic energy into recovered pressure at the 
. .  . 
ve~ocit~distribution and swirl. 
Section of the impeller that draws the flow smoothly and 
Compressor Wheel (Impeller) 
efficiently or without disruptions into the main stage 
Rotating turbomachine that transfers shaft power to 
The compressor assembly, as shown conceptually in Figure 94 ,  is a single stage centrifugal 
gas compressor designed for maximum efficiency, low mass, with a moderate pressure ratio 
ranging between (1.8 to 2.4). The sensitivity of performance (efficiency) for this application is 
highly sensitive, as shown in Section 6, to meeting required electrical power for a given heat 
rejection size. Compressor efficiency of the preliminary design heat balances range between 84 
to 85%, and are envisioned to be achieved with limited turbomachinery development. This 
development would have followed the three step process as described in Reference 9- 22. The 
third level of the process uses comprehensive models, and utilizing them systematically to 
develop new optimum configurations based on the basic ftow phenomena for each section of 
the compressor stage. 
Collector Scroll 
Key areas' of study to maximize the performance of a compressor design includes the entrance 
and inducer design, the angle of the blades inclined backwards to the direction of rotation, 
number of blades and height, and the shape and configuration of the diffuser. The term specific 
speed (non-dimensional) as discussed in the turbine assembly section above is also used in 
compressor design to help characterize the overall geometry (blade height to diameter). 
Clearance from the shroud to the impeller blades has an effect on efficiency and is more 
important for a low specific speed design (~0.5) due to the increasing clearance to blade height 
fraction. 
outlet of the stage. 
Radial housing that is connected to the diffuser that 
collects the fluid to near static conditions and transfers 
this flow to the compressor outlet duct 
9.1 A.1 Compressor Efficiency ~ 
Hamilton Sundstrand had worked with Concepts NREC to develop a compressor conceptual 
design. This design had a 55" backswept blade angle, Ns = 0.68, blade tip speed of 368 mls, 
CPR=1.85, Tin=400K, Pin=0.69MPaC q=84.5%, and a low solidity airfoil diffuser plus volute and 
conical diffuser. The current heat balances from Section 6 includes a slightly higher pressure 
ratio, higher inlet pressure, lower inlet temperature, which all lower the impeller specific speed 
for a constant rotational speed and coolant MW. The mass flow per unit electrical power of the 
system was higher for the current heat balances than the Hamilton Sundstrand concept due to 0 
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integrity of the pressure boundary. The feedthrough is comprised primarily of an outer shell 
which is bonded to the alternator housing, an electrical conductor, and an insulator which is 
bonded or otherwise sealed to both the outer shell and the conductor. The electrical conductor 
connects internally to a stator coil, and externally to the power system cabling. The bonds 
between the outer housing and the pressure vessel, the outer housing and the insulator, and the 
insulator and the conductor must all be hermetic. Careful attention must be paid to the selection 
of the feedthrough device, as it is the sole through-penetration in the Brayton energy converter 
and represents a potential source of leakage. The feedthrough must remain hermetic through 
the entire life of the SNPP. The NRPCT evaluation of potential electrical feedthrough options is 
contained in Reference 9- 26. 
9.1 -5.2 High Speed Alternator Design Challenges 
The high operating speed of the Brayton unit allows a reduction in overall mass compared to 
larger, slower electrical generators, but also brings several challenges with respect to the 
alternator design. First, rotor dynamics and balance become more difficult at higher speeds 
where the light rotor contains significant rotational energy and where more vibration modes are 
excited. (Critical vibration modes can also piace limits on the operating envelope of the Brayton 
unit such as the minimum allowable motoring speed assumed in the reactor startup sequence 
described in Section 8. The low end critical rotor modes required a higher motoring speed than 
might be needed for the reactor coolant demand and therefore drove the sizing of the spaceship 
solar arrays.) The higher rotational speeds also place more stress on the permanent magnet 
structure on the rotor. as centrifugal forces tend to close the gap between the rotor and the 
stator assemblies. The size of this gap is critical and must reach a balance between a srnatl 
gap to increase the magnetic flux density and a larger gap to allow expansion of the permanent 
magnet structure due to thermal effects and centrifugal force at the highest operating speed. 
The higher operating speed also produces a higher frequency electrical output. While a higher 
frequency alternator requires less iron in the stator laminations (less penetration of the magnetic 
flux) and therefore less mass, the higher frequency magnetic field produces more losses in the 
stator laminations which result in additional heating of the stator. Thermal management thus 
becomes more important. 
9.1 -5.3 Dual Alternator Design Option 
One three phase alternator per Brayton unit has been the base case Prometheus concept 
design considered thus far. However, an independent dual winding system has recently been 
considered and could be used in the Brayton design to enable electrical system redundancy 
without adding mechanical complexity to the rest of the system. There are several ways to 
implement a double winding. These concepts are preliminary and require further evaluation. 
One method is to employ a double alternator with two sets of magnets and two stator 
assemblies. This approach provides redundancy in the magnets, complete electrical isolation of 
the windings, and is the most fault tolerant approach. However, this approach results in 
lengthening of the machine and carries the largest mass penalty. Also, providing redundant 
magnets yields little reliability gain, as the most plausible magnet failure mode is degradation 
from excessive temperature and would affect both sets of magnets equally. 
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Another approach is to provide a double winding with a single magnet assembly and stator 
structure. Utilizing a single magnet structure maintains the length of the alternator and 
minimizes the mass impact. The methods considered include: 
A sectored winding in which alternate poles are electrically connected to form two 
independent 3 phase circuits. This is potentially the best method as the slot count can be 
retained and the winding reactances will be nearly equal. Additionally, the windings can 
be loaded arbitrarily without adversely affecting the magnetic field in the alternator and 
causing undesirable vibrations. 
An interleaved winding in which conductors are placed in adjacent slots. This approach 
requires doubling the number of slots in the stator and may not be achievable due to the 
small stator diameter of the proposed machine. 
A six phase winding in which two independent 3 phase sets are used for the two circuits. 
Again, this approach requires doubling of the slot number and may not be achievable. 
r A double layer winding in which the two sets of coils are stacked in the slots and 
separated by an insulator. This technique requires Roebelled conductors to achieve 
balance of reactances for the two windings. Since this stator winding is more 
complicated than the sectored approach, this method is probably less preferable. 
It should be noted that any of these methods require approximately a doubling of the conductor 
mass in the alternator. If the length of the machine is held constant then slot depth must be 
nearly doubled, and will increase the diameter of the stator. Back iron thickness of the 
laminations would not be affected. A final selection of winding type would require a series of 
optimization studies for the alternator. During normal operation with both windings running at 
100 kWe, temperatures within lhe stator will be quite low as the windings would be designed for 
continuous 200 kWe service. 
Use of a second winding provides partial protection against single point failures of the alternator 
windings. However, some winding failures are catastrophic and will not be mitigated by a 
second winding. For example, a phase to phase short in a winding is likely to result in severe 
over-temperature, melting of the copper conductors, and possible ejection of the winding into 
the air gap and complete failure of the alternator. 
9.1.6 Bearing Assembly 
Due to the closed-loop environment, foil bearings are the proposed method of supporting the 
rotating shaft due to their ability to use the process gas as a lubricant, while exhibiting long life 
and high reliability under extreme temperatures. Gas foil bearings are self-acting, compliant 
surface hydrodynamic bearings. A diagram of the main parts of these bearings is shown in 
Figure 9-14 below. Traditional oil lubricated bearings are not practical in closed loop systems 
because oil can enter the process flow causing downstream coking problems, and also would 
contaminate refractory metal alloys if selected as reactor materials. The use of magnetic 
bearings was considered, however it was determined that the technology was more complex 
and potentially less reliable for long deep space mission duration. 
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accommodate for changes in the spaceship loads, thus maintaining a constant Brayton unit 
speed that is independent of spaceship operating requirements. 
The control architecture being planned for the Prometheus spaceship had the reflector position 
(and temperature control) being provided by the Reactor Controller, and Brayton unit speed 
being controlled by the PCAD controller. Coordination between these two controllers was 
expected in order to achieve integrated control of the SNPP. 
9.1.7.2 Rotordynamic Stability 
The turboalternator rotor design couples all of the subassemblies together into an integrated 
unit. An iterative design process occurs to meet both the allowable bearing performance 
parameters (load capacity, damping, stiffness) along with meeting the rotors structural design. 
The current shaft design uses a large diameter hollow shaft that provides high rigidity with low 
mass. This allows the shaft to operate at the design operating speed (-45,000 RPM) with 
sufficient margin below the first bending critical speed (67,000 RPM). The large diameter 
allows for high shaft surface velocity, which improves the load capacity of gas foil bearings. 
Preliminary analyses were performed by KAPL and NASA Glenn on the Hamilton Sundstrand 
conceptual design using a broad set of analysis methods. These methods include DyRoBeS 
(NASA Glenn), RotorLab (KAPL), and ABAQUS (KAPL) computer simulation programs. All 
simulations were used to predict the rigid and bending critical speeds and mode shapes. These @ comparisons showed that all three methods with slightly different modeling techniques predicted 
similar mode shapes and speeds for the proposed rotor as further described in Reference 9- 32. 
Assumptions that were neglected in these analyses, though are considered important second 
order effects, include the side load forces from the alternator magnetic field and the thrust 
bearing loads. 
When performing damped rotor simulations with unbalanced forces, there were differences in 
the magnitude and location of the largest displacement of the shaft. The NASA Glenn 
DyRoBeS analysis had shown the largest displacement of 0.8 mils at design speed at the 
turbine wheel. This displacement is an acceptable magnitude. The KAPL RotorLab analysis 
predicted smaller maximum displacements, between 0.8 and 0.3 mils, depending on how the 
model was constructed. 
A stability analysis was performed by NASA-GRC and KAPL. Rotor stability is determined by 
calculating the log decrement of forward whirling undamped modes. A negative log decrement 
suggests vibration amplitudes that tend to increase in time. Forward whirling undamped modes 
can be self-exciting, leading to instability if they have a negative log decrement. NASA-GRC 
calculated the threshold speed of stability, the rotor speed at which the log decrement of any 
forward whirling damped mode becomes negative, for varying bearing damping. The KAPL 
RotorLab results agree with the NASA-GRC conclusions, that the rotor system is stable for 
bearing damping above 10 Ib-ink This level of damping is believed to be attainable for gas foil 
bearings. 
These rotor design analyses assume the known bearing properties with atmospheric air as the 
working fluid at atmospheric pressure. A primary focus is needed to understand how these 
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bearings and rotor designs would be modified from changes in the fluid operating pressure, 
temperature, and composition. Some early results show that increasing pressure allows for 
higher bearing load capacity, or a lower power loss for a constant load capacity, when gas 
pressure is increased and when using alternate gases (He, Ar). The bearing stiffness and 
damping are less well known bearing parameters, and are very important to the shaft design. 
Future work is needed to confirm that the gas bearings can be designed with the appropriate 
damping and stiffness with high pressure HeIXe fluid and that more refined second order forces 
are considered in follow on scoping analyses. 
9.1.8 Failure Modes 
In general, Prometheus is no more demanding than the current Brayton Turboalternator units in 
terms of tip speeds and turbine inlet temperatures and it is much less demanding in terms of 
startlstop cycles. The key difference is that with the exception of BRUIMini-BRU and Hubble 
cryo-cooler, they are open cycle machines and have regular maintenance performed so direct 
comparison is difficult. 
Gas bearing history is very positive and provides high reliability in Capstone and air cycle 
machines. Mean time between failure has exceeded 100,000 hours in some Boeing machines. 
Similarly, the robustness of gas foil bearings for the Hubble Space Telescope cryocooler 
designed and manufactured by CREARE has shown exceptional performance for long periods 
(14 years on life testing and 3 years to-date in space). While at low operating temperature and 
much smaller, these cryo-coolers operate at over 100,000 rpm. 
A Garett (now Honeywell) study estimated failure rates for space Brayton systems. The 
estimated failure rates for relevant components of a Prometheus mission are shown in Table 
9-5. Based upon their values, a reliability rate of -99.6% for a 3 year mission and -97% for a 20 
year mission are inferred. While these values are only rough estimates based upon open cycle 
experience not directly related to the Prometheus designimission, it indicates that high reliability 
rates are believed achievable, even for longer life missions. 
Hamilton Sundstrand study of Brayton failure'probability resulted in similar reliability numbers as 
the Garrett study (-97% for a 20 year mission); however, their results used a lox factor on 
some of the reliability numbers to account for what are considered favorable conditions for our 
program versus land based units. This may be true but it is hard to substantiate such a factor at 
this point due to the lack of hard data from space based units. 
Table 9-5: Reliability Study from Garrett Fluid Systems (Reference 9- 27) 
er hour 
3 x 10- 
Turbine I x 10‘ 
6 x 10- 6 x  10 
Alternator 5 x 10- 5 x  10 
I Component 
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Thermal management of the turbine to keep highly stressed areas at low temperature is very 
important. Large conduction area to the shaft or compressor is needed to allow for good 
thermal management. 
Turbine creep is considered one of more likely life limiting failure modes and should be 
continually studied through the conceptual design process. 
Turbine Scroll Creep 
In the base case design, the turbine scroll is the maximum operating temperature pressure 
boundary in the entire reactor power system. Creep failure of the turbine scroll could end in a 
breech of the pressure boundary, or lead to significant deformation in the turbine stator to 
degrade or fail turbine performancetoperation. Risk mitigation of this failure mode includes 
designing the turbine scroll with a refractory metal alloy, which was researched as part of the 
Mini BRU program (Reference 9- 6), or internally insulating the pressure boundary as is planned 
for the base case hot leg pipe design. A scroll based on a refractory metal alloy was not 
seriously considered due to concerns over a bimetallic pressure joint. This is also why a Ni- 
base superalloy pressure vessel was advocated over one made from a refractory metal alloy. 
Section 9.1.3 discusses details as to the structural materials capabilities for the cast Ni-base 
superalloy materials (Figure 9-8) currently being envisioned. From this figure, the turbine scroll 
may be as limiting as the turbine due to the material operating at a high temperature (1 150 K 
max vs. -1031 K max). 
Pressure boundary breech 
If catastrophic failure can lead to breach of the pressure boundary and loss of coolant, there are 
methods to capture the turbine wheel and prevent such failure. However, mass penalty and 
possibility of debris from a "blade catcher" may make such options unattractive. Most likely the 
design will need to be of high enough reliability to reasonably prevent catastrophic failure 
without a blade catcher device. Options also exist relative to bearing design to cause the unit to 
shutdown and self-weld to bearing prior to contact with shroud to prevent catastrophic failure. 
Recent communications from NASA Glenn and earlier discussions with vendors have indicated 
that passive failure modes where a unit shuts down but does not cause catastrophic failure to 
the loop or other components has been demonstrated to occur in operation, and is a 
requirement for APU on aircraft (Reference 9- 33). 
Erosion from debris 
Issue of debris in a closed loop is also a concern due to possible long term erosion effects if not 
removed from the main flow. Short term tolerance of debris has been shown to be acceptable 
and it is part of the design basis for aircraft units that must be reasonably tolerant of dust and 
sand ingestion during takeoff and landing. Debris can be from failure of a unit or 
corrosion/erosion (see section (c) of Attachment D of Enclosure 7 of Reference 9- 23)). While 
some Brayton failures could release debris into loop, the amount and size of debris is not clearly 
known and the tendency for this material to remain in the flow (vs. settling out in low flow 
regions) is not characterized. NASA Glenn is reviewing this issue in more detail but experience 
with gas foil bearings has shown the damage and debris tend to be contained in the bearing 
cavity due to the rapid deceleration experienced following failure and the tortuous path that must 
be taken to exit the bearing cavity. Erosion from particulate matter smaller than 20 V r n  in 
diameter has been shown to not be an issue but this is very dependent upon the flow and 
material. Large debris from the Brayton (> 1 mm) would be trapped by recuperator but small 
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debris (< 1 mm and > 20 pm) could cause long term erosion if not removed. Separators or filters 
may have been needed with further test and analysis of erosion. 
Compressor Failure 
The compressor within this closed cycle is envisioned to have a much lower failure rate than an 
open cycle due to the nature of not being the first component in the path of ingested debris. 
The compressor is a highly stressed material, though operates at low temperature. Thermal 
creep is not considered a failure mode at this low temperature (<550 K). Compressor stability 
through transients is known to cause imbalanced blade loading, causing the compressor to 
potentially rub the shroud. Erosion wear from potential high velocity particulate flow on the 
diffuser vanes could also reduce compressor performance. 
9.1.8.2 Alternator Failure Modes 
Electrical Feedthrouqh Failure (nas leakage, s in~ le  point failure) 
Gas leakage through the feedthrough was identified to occur from four principal modes. The 
first is baseline molecular diffusion. This was not determined to be a feedthrough specific failure 
mode. The second is through-sealant leakage from induced microcracks in the sealant 
material. The third is an imperfect bond between the sealant and conductor. The fourth is an 
imperfect bond between the sealant material and the body or outer housing of the feedthrough. 
The mechanisms by which these failure modes can occur are detailed below. 
Alternator material failure from irradiation 
The two primary failure modes expected from irradiation are insulation system failure which 
would lead to a short, as described below, or magnet heating from irradiation. 
Open circuit on Alternator 
The event of a three phase open circuit at the feedthrough, cable or inside the alternator 
windings would result in the loss of load on the alternator. Since the Brayton TCA shaft speed 
is based on the torque balance between the alternator, turbine and compressor, the loss of load 
would lead to an acceleration of the rotor shaft until some mechanical failure occurred, or a new 
stable operating speed was reached. For a single phase open circuit on the alternator a similar 
acceleration to the point of stability or mechanical destruction would occur, but the rate of 
acceleration would be much slower. 
It should be noted that a double wound stator prevents a single failure from removing load from 
an operating Brayton and causing turbine runaway. 
Electrical faults on Alternator 
There are many different faults that can occur in a stator winding: 
Turn to turn faults are most common and result from an insulation breakdown between 
adjacent conductors. They can occur in the end turns or within the slots. A turn to turn 
fault results in a localized hot spot which can later develop into a ground fault or phase 
to phase fault. 
Phase to ground faults occur when both coil insulation and the slot liner have been 
compromised. For the spacecraft (which has an ungrounded power system) a single 
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phase to ground fault will not necessarily fail the stator. However if multiple ground faults 
develop then large circulating currents resulting in total stator failure are possible. 
Phase to phase faults can arise in the slots or the end turns and result in potentially 
large short circuit currents and stator failure. 
Conductive contaminants can fail a stator since the insulation system is not perfectly 
sealed. Conduction through small holes in the insulation occurs and burns small "tracks" 
on the insulation surface. 
Many of these faults could be detected at an incipient stage through the use of a ground 
detector, and the affected Brayton unit (or winding if a dual alternator approach is used) 
removed from service. This approach may prevent further degradation of the winding, but in 
some cases may not be sufficient. Early detection of insulation system grounds is important for 
this approach to be successful. Other advanced methods of detecting stator defects are 
possible as well and could either be implemented on the spacecraft or on the ground using 
telemetry data. 
Rotor Can Rupture 
Rotor can rupture is one means of mechanical destruction of the Brayton shaft which can occur 
in the over speed condition. In this scenario the hoop stress on the rotor can by the mass of the 
spinning magnets and the magnetic forces pulling the magnets to the stator, rupture the rotor 
can allowing the magnets to travel across the small (-50 mm) gap to the stator surface. Once 
on the stator, the magnets exert a normal force of about 10 kN which is expected to cause the 
shaft to stop. The kinetic energy from the shaft is then transferred to the housing through the 
alternator. Further analysis will need to be done to determine if the torque that is placed on the 
housing by this fault is sufficient to cause pipe leakage. 
Loss of Alternator Thermal Mananement 
Loss of alternator coolant resulting from a blockage in the alternator and bearing coolant 
channel or damage to the shaft fan, leads to over heating of the alternator components and 
bearings. Thermal management analyses of a proposed Turboatternator can be found in 
References 9- 24 and 9- 25. 
Magnet overheating 
As the alternator magnets heat, the field produced in the gap will decrease, and consequently 
the EMF on the stator will decrease. The EMF on the stator is proportional to the field strength 
and the shaft speed. If the control on the PLR is set up for constant voltage then the alternator 
will accelerate until the new EMF matches the design EMF. If the control on the PLR is setup 
for current control, the alternator may maintain a steady speed if there is enough reserve PLR 
capacity available or accelerate to a new steady state speed. A temporary demagnetization 
would be fine, but a permanent demagnetizing to a large extent would lead to loss of capability 
on the alternator and ultimately mission failure. 
Winding overheating 
The heating of the winding insulation will lead to the outgassing of the organic materiats which 
make up the insulation. Since the coolant in the alternator is in thermodynamic contact with all 
the other components in the primary loop, it is important that the alternator does not outgas any 
material which can lead to material damage of other components. For example, Nb- and Ta- 
base alloys cannot be exposed to sources of carbon and oxygen as they suffer from rapid 
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interstitial embrittlement. This rapid loss of ductility can occur at contamination levels of around 
a few hundred wppm of C and 0. There is currently a preliminary mass transport model 
completed that would have advanced to quantify an acceptable outgassing rate of these 
constituents for various reactor materials. 
Material Transport to Alternator Materials 
Fission product release, which is not yet fully characterized, can also lead to beta radiation from 
the decay of fission products in the coolant. The fission products also will tend to plate on 
surfaces which match the materials temperature limits. Since the alternator coolant flow path is 
near the low temperature for the system, a difficult flow path, and has a large magnetic field 
there is a high probability of the alternator acting as a getter for fission products. 
9.1.8.3 Bearing Failure Modes 
The requirement for the bearing system to support the rotating machinery for a mission length 
on the order of 20 years makes the gas foil bearings a possible area of concern. Additionally, 
many of the spacecraft concepts envisioned multiple or back-up Brayton units in order to 
increase the overall system reliability. These concepts therefore require that a failure of one of 
the Brayton units would not compromise the other units or the rest of the spacecraft and allow 
the mission to continue, perhaps at some lower capability. This places an additional 
requirement on the bearings that if failure does occur, it is contained in the bearing assembly. 
The primary failure modes identified were particle ingestion, poor thermal management, high 
cycle faitigue, overloading, and excessive wear. 
Particle Ingestion 
Particle ingestion failure is of minimal concern for the envisioned spacecraft because it is a 
closed loop system, as discussed above in the section on debris from erosion. However, there 
is some concern that particles emerging from within the loop could potentially damage the gas 
foil bearings. In fact the gas foil bearings themselves produce submicron particulate due to 
rubbing that occurs during start-up and shutdown. It is believed, however, that gas foil bearings 
are tolerant of particles less than 25 micron in size and greater than 100 microns (Reference 9- 
34). This is due to the fact that the larger particles are to big to enter the bearings and the 
smaller particles simply flow through them. If a large particle were to block the cooling flow path 
for the bearing cavity, it could result in thermal management problems. Over-heating of the 
bearings could lead to creep problems or if heating was excessive, to melting of the gas foils 
themselves. 
Reverse flow of idle units 
If idle units are present in system for redundancy, then the current foil thrust bearing design 
does not allow for reverse rotation of the unit without damage to the bearing. Reverse rotation 
would need to be prevented by either use of check valves or electrically locking the rotor. Both 
options would be acceptable, and the key unknown is the amount of backflow needed to cause 
reverse rotation. This would dictate how leak resistant the valves would have to be and whether 
electronic tocking would be required in addition to or in place of valves. 
Launch loads 
Overloading of the bearings could be a concern during the launch of the spacecraft. This 
damage would occur due to excessive displacements from launch vibrations causing plastic 
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deformation of the foil structure. This damage would perhaps go unnoticed until operation of the 
Brayton units began, and problems would arise during startup. This scenario may necessitate 
that a temporary support structure is designed to prevent turboalternator shaft deflections during 
launch. This support structure would then be removed prior to initial start-up of the Brayton unit. 
Wear 
The majority of wear in current gas foil bearing applications occurs during start-ups and 
shutdowns, when the shaft is rotating at too low of a speed for a gas film to develop therefore 
causing the shaft to be in direct contact with the bearing surface. Since the envisioned mission 
profiles contained relatively few start-up and shut-down cycles, this type of wear was not 
considered to be a major concern. However, during normal operation, there is some small 
amount of contact between the shaft and bearing surface during transients. Over a long period 
of time, this could cause concern for failure. Fortunately, testing has shown that gas foil 
bearings exhibit what can be called a soft failure mode. This means that failure of the bearings 
would not trigger a catastrophic event within the Brayton unit. 
Over-Loading 
The most common failure mode in a gas foil bearing is a breakdown of the compliant support 
structure either by over-loading the bearing or running at too high a temperature. This 
breakdown causes the bearing to no longer be able to support the shaft and the rotor will quickly 
stop spinning. However it has been shown in that this quick stopping does not cause the 
Brayton unit to come apart and compromise the rest of the spacecraft (Reference 9- 34). 
Foil Attachement Failure 
The foil layer and compliant support is attached to the structure by a spot welded attachment 
joint. High cycle fatigue (HCF) has been shown to cause failure of this joint. More advanced 
assembly methods may be required to reduce the likelihood of this failure. 
Despite the potential failure modes discussed above, reliable gas foil bearing experience has 
been demonstrated in the aircraft and power generation industry. Table 9-7 shows the 
commercial experience for various metrics, and compares them to the projected Prornetheus 
concept. Although the Prometheus spacecraft would be unique in that no maintenance would 
be possible, it is evident from the table that the planned design fits within the operational 
experience of current state-of-the-art gas foil bearings. 
Table 9-7: Gas foil bearing commercial experience relative to Prometheus concept 
I Gas foil bearing experience Capstone Hamilton Honeywell I Prometheus 1 
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total operating hours (all units) 
hours on high time unit 
startfstops on high cycle unit 
units produced I in service 
max temperature 
surface speed 
Microturbines 
6 million 
44,000 
14,000 
2,600 
727 K 
480 - 600 ft/sec 
Sundstrand 
Air Cycle Machines 
40 million 
50,000 
18,000 
4,600 
560 K 
500 Wsec 
Air Cycle Machines 
concept 
300 million 
80,000 
20,000 
25,000 
572 K 
500 Wsec 
175,000 
<< 100 
- 
450 K 
519 Wsec 
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9.1.9 Future Development Needs 
9.1.9.1 Turbomachinery Development 
The turbine assembly structural design needs further development in evaluating: 
The turbine wheel, turbine scroll, and turbine stator blades allowable creep deformation (Oh 
creep strain), 
More comprehensive set of creep property data for the proposed materials in a prototypic 
He/Xe environment, 
Further development of creep mitigation techniques (scroll internal insulation, and advanced 
materials). 
The current shaft conceptual design of an overhung "singIe disk" layout with a large shaft 
diameter has a difficult entrance of the flow to the compressor making the stability and efficiency 
of this machine less than ideal. Future study should focus on the requirements of the 
compressor inlet flow area and hub diameter needed to understand if the overhung "single disk" 
layout is an acceptable layout with a single rigid shaft for the needed high performance 
compressor stage. Other shaft layout options should be explored including the capstone 
microturbines flexible shaft coupling from the compressor to the alternator, and the more 
traditional shaft layout with the turbine and compressor on either end of the shaft. More detailed 
analysis of the rotor dynamic stability of these various shaft layouts, the hydrodynamic 
performance of the compressor, and the thermal management of the machine would be needed 
before one option is carried forward. 
9.1.9.2 Alternator Development 
The primary future developments needed for alternators in a Brayton unit is an insulation 
system able to withstand the necessary temperatures along with being chemically compatible 
with the rest of the materials in the loop, and the development of a high power electrical 
feedthrough with acceptable hermiticity for retaining the gas inventory. The design and build of 
this component appears to be an engineering challenge at this time, but it is possible. 
9.1 3 . 3  Bearing Development 
In the NRPCT Feasibility Report (Reference 9- 35), gas foil bearings were identified as one of 
the key issues requiring special consideration in the development of Brayton technology. 
Specifically, concerns were raised on the ability of the gas foil bearings to perform without 
failure and with no maintenance for a period of 20 years. Although the report indicates this 
concern was partially alleviated due to the reliable experience gas bearings have demonstrated 
in the aircraft industry (See Table 9-7), it was still understood that further testing and 
development would be required prior to launch to minimize the risk of a bearing failure. This 
testing and development was to have occurred primarily at NASA Glenn with input from the 
NRPCT. The planned focus of the testing was to occur in the following areas: high speed and 
high pressure testing, imbalance and misalignment sensitivity, alternate gas performance, and 
solid coating development. The details of this work can be found in the NASA Glenn Research 
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Center FY06 Workscope (Reference 9- 36). Additionally, the existing NASA Glenn facilities are 
described in Reference 9- 30. 
In addition to the bearing development work conducted at NASA Glenn, a smaller effort was to 
be focused specifically on the rotor dynamics of the proposed concepts. A preliminary effort 
was completed in this area and reported in Reference 9- 32. This paper focused on the 
conceptual design proposed by Hamilton Sundstrand. This study concluded that the conceptual 
design was feasible from a rotor dynamic standpoint. This preliminary study was to be followed 
in FY06 by a more rigorous study of new conceptual designs and more prototypic bearing 
properties for the high pressure He/Xe fluid. Later in FY06, a simulated rotor was to be created 
and rig tested to characterize the stability of the system. 
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9.2 Recuperator 
9.2.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The recovered heat in the recuperator significantly improves cycle efficiency for the relatively 
low pressure ratios (-2) of the turbomachinery. This component has been evaluated on a 
conceptual level in this report. The following provides a summary of the main conclusions: 
Based on vendor discussions, resizing a single recuperator to handle 100% of the 
envisioned recuperated thermal load for a 200 kW electric plant is expected to be feasible. 
In the current recuperator sizing assumptions two recuperators are assumed to share the 
recuperated thermal load. 
Initial studies indicate that for the high effectiveness designs being considered (> 0.9), the 
recuperator performance may be influenced more by flow rnaldistribution than by 
uncertainties in heat transfer coefficients. Further studies to quantify flow maldistribution 
would need to be performed as more detailed designs progressed. 
Based on constructed units under similar operating conditions, component reliabilities of 
greater than 0.95 are expected to be achievable with development and testing. 
The largest material challenges for this component are the braze performance and 
creep/creep fatigue tolerance of the hot end of the unit over mission life. The mechanical 
design basis for this component will need to be further developed to minimize mass while 
providing a robust design over mission tife. 
9.2.2 Introduction 
9.2.2.1 General Configuration 
The recuperator designs being considered for Prometheus are based on compact plate fin 
designs. Compact plate fin designs provide compact, lightweight and highly effective heat 
exchanger configurations. The importance of mass in space applications makes the plate fin 
configuration an attractive alternative to more conventional, bulkier shell and tube heat 
exchanger designs. The basic geometry of a plate fin design is provided in Figure 9-16. 
Typically the fin geometry is configured t6 break up the thermal boundary layer of the working 
gas. Figure 9-17 provides an example of two standard fin configurations, the offset fin design 
and wavy fin design. The offset fin configuration and the wavy fin configuration improve heat 
transfer characteristics relative to fully developed flow conditions at the expense of pressure 
drop through the heat exchanger core. 
Typically, a recuperator can be subdivided into the following regions: (1) the heat exchanger 
core, (2) the headers and (3) the inlet manifolds or plenums. Figure 9-16 provides a simple 
schematic illustrating the various regions of a recuperator. For a highly effective recuperator 
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design, a counter flow arrangement is desired for the heat exchanger core. A counter flow 
arrangement minimizes the required heat transfer surface area for a given thermal load relative 
to parallel or cross fiow configurations. In order to deliver the gas flow to the counter flow core 
region of the recuperator, header regions are required as shown in Figure 9-16. Due to 
geometry constraints the flow configuration in the header regions is typically cross flow. 
Because of the tower heat transfer performance associated with the cross flow configuration 
relative to the counter flow configuration it is desirable to minimize the fraction of cross flow heat 
exchanger area. 
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Cross Flow Header Cross Flow Header 
Manifolds 
Header Bars 
Manifolds 
1 Low Pressure Gas 
Flow 
Fin Structure on High / Pressure Side 
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View 1A 
Offset Fin Geometry 
I, View 2A 
Wavy Fin Geometry 
Figure 9-17: Examples of compact heat exchanger fin configurations. 
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9.2.2.2 Recuperator Benefits in a Closed Brayton Cycle 
The recuperator is an essential component in the closed direct cycle Brayton system being 
considered for Prometheus. For the compressor pressure ratios being considered (- 2.0) for 
Prometheus applications the thermal load of the recuperator is a significant fraction of the 
coolant enthalpy rise from the compressor exit to the turbine inlet and enthalpy reduction from 
the turbine exit to compressor inlet. 
Figure 9-18 provides a simplified temperature entropy diagram of the Brayton cycle illustrating 
the effects of compressor pressure ratio on the thermodynamic cycle (the heat transfer in the 
recuperator is larger than the heat transferred in the reactor). The recovered heat in the 
recuperator increases efficiency for Brayton cycles with relatively low compressor pressure 
ratios by increasing the temperature difference between the high temperature expansion in the 
turbine and low temperature compression in the compressor for a fixed reactor thermal rating. 
For the direct Brayton systems being considered for Prometheus, the turbine inlet temperature 
is expected to be limited to approximately 11 50K due to material limitations and the compressor 
. inlet temperature is limited to approximately 400K due to the increased size of the heat rejection 
system at lower compressor inlet temperatures. In this scenario where the temperatures are 
constrained the recovered heat in the recuperator reduces the thermal load needed from the 
reactor. 
At higher pressure ratios the enthalpy increase across the compressor becomes a significant 
fraction of the total fluid enthalpy rise. When the compressor exit enthalpy is greater than the 
turbine exit enthalpy, the presence of a recuperator in the system reduces cycle performance. 
For the power ratings being considered for Prometheus, low pressure ratio, radial 
turbomachinery designs provide the best design options; and therefore, require a recuperator 
for system efficiency improvements. 
Designing the recuperator to transfer heat in a configuration providing a large heat transfer area 
per unit volume is a primary design consideration for space applications. Another consideration 
in recuperator designs is the effect of pressure drop on overall system performance. For a 
desired electrical output, an increase in the nonrecoverable pressure drop in a recuperator is a 
system irreversibility that must be compensated for by an increase in turbine work and system 
mass flow. The typical parameter for assessing pressure drop is to ratio the stagnation 
pressure drop across a component to the inlet pressure of that component (APIP). 
Another approach in assessing the effects of pressure drop on system performance is to 
express the pressure drop in terms of system entropy as discussed in Reference 9- 44, This 
Reference also compares various recuperator designs and evaluates their performance from 
both a pressure drop and entropy increase perspective. 
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9.2.2.3 Recuperator Component Requirements 
Final functional requirements for the component design have not been established. Table 9-8 
presents notional component operating conditions assuming two engines operating at 100% of 
designed power capacity to support full mission lifetime with two spare units available for 
backup. These operating conditions are consistent with the four Brayton configuration 
discussed in Section 6. As indicated in the table the recuperator heat transfer results in a 
significant temperature difference in the working gas. The heat transfer rate in a single 
recuperator (-757kW) is almost twice as large as the gas cooler (-382kW) and for two 
operating recuperators the thermal rating of the recuperators (-1514 kW) is larger than the 
thermal rating of the reactor (-1002 kW). 
Table 9-8: Summary of recuperator operating conditions for a four Brayton/Recuperator 
configuration as described in Section 6. 
% , Parameter 
Inlet Temperature (K) 
Exit Temperature (K) 
Inlet Pressure (MPa) 
Pressure Drop (MPa) 
9.2.2.4 DesignlFabrication Considerations 
' Effectiveness (-) 
Mass Flow (kgls)  
Single Brayton Electrical 
Load IkWe) 
The ability to join the loop piping to the inlet plenum piping of the recuperator is a critical aspect 
of the plant design. Various material options have been considered for loop piping. For the 
titanium based piping materials, joining to a Ni base recuperator material will require 
development. Reference 9- 45 provides a summary of joining issues and potential design 
solutions for various dissimilar metal joints being considered in the direct Brayton plant. 
High Pressure Side 1 ' Low Pressure Side, . . 
0.92 
3.08 
-100 
The fin structures in a recuperator are typically structurally more limiting than the braze joints for 
the primary pressure loads. As described in Reference 9- 46, the governing equation for 
evaluating fin tensile stress is given by the following equation: 
538 
91 1 
1.98 
0.01 5 
Thermal Rating (kWt) 
Where: P = internal pressure (Pa) 
bfi, = fin spacing (m) 
tfi, = fin thickness (m) 
f = fin strength efficiency factor 
943 
57 1 
1 .04 
0.015 
757 
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An excerpt from Reference 9- 46 provides more details on the fin strength efficiency factor: 
'Fin strength efficiency factors have been found to range from 0.33 to 0.60 based upon actual 
test results on a wide variety of plate and fin configurations. The 0.33 factor is used in creep 
designs and 0.60 is used in short time load situations. The strength efficiency factor is defined 
as the ratio of actual burst pressure to burst pressure as calculated from ultimate stress 
properties. The apparent reduction in strength is attributable to non-uniform load distribution 
across the fins that arises due to inequality in fin height. The taller fins actually buckle during 
the braze operation and, as a consequence, the shorter fins carry the bulk of the pressure 
containment forces. Since the fins are never perfectly straight, pressure loads will also cause 
fin bending stresses. Finally, the fins can not be formed with perfectly square corners, and 
stress concentrations will actually occur at the fin-to-plate braze fillet joints. This strength 
reduction factor is based upon the performance of successfully brazed heat exchangers, i.e., 
the failure mode at burst is tensile rupture of the fins. For poorly brazed heat exchangers, 
(incomplete braze joining of the fins and plates), the pressure containment capability of the 
plate-fin structure is drastically reduced. For this reason, all heat exchangers are subjected to a 
proof pressure test at 150 percent of working pressure. This proof test is expected to cause a 
failure in defective cores, and conversely, a unit that passes the proof test is expected to 
achieve the required pressure capability." 
In fin design, fin uniformity must not only be maintained for structural reasons as discussed 
above, but also for thermal hydraulic reasons as well. Variations in fin dimensions within a heat 
exchanger core can result in flow maldistribution which impacts recuperator performance as 
discussed in Section 9.2.3.2. The fin material must be capable of withstanding the maximum 
turbine exit temperature and lifetime requirements (- 20 years) for proposed Prometheus 
missions. The header bars, parting plates, plenumlmanifold structure and braze materials must 
be designed to meet the temperature and lifetime requirements. For the hot end temperatures 
and lifetimes of proposed Prometheus missions, creep fatigue is a critical design consideration 
for the recuperator. The creep characteristics of potential recuperator materials are discussed 
further in Section 9.2.2.5. Any cyclic transients would need to be considered in conjunction with 
the creep characteristics in assessing the long term reliability of a recuperator unit. Although 
transients were expected to be minimal during the Prometheus mission, for other nuclear space 
missions thermal transients may be significant and low cycle creep fatigue would be of even 
greater importance. 
For the direct cycle Brayton system being considered, appropriate structural design criteria will 
need to be developed for the various components in the primary coolant path. Reference 9- 47 
provides an initial NRPCT assessment of necessary structural'design requirements for the 
various primary system components. As stated in Reference 9- 47: 
"Since mass is one of the critical challenges for the SNPP design, structural design 
methodologies emptoyed in various weightlmass critical applications such as aircrafts and 
space vehicles will be assessed to explore ways to reduce the design factors that are applied to 
land-based nuclear reactors and yet to enable a safe, capable, reliable and deliverable SNPP 
design. Pending this review, basing the SNPP structural requirements on the ASME Code for 
high temperature nuclear components is appropriate." 
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The recuperator designs for an envisioned Prometheus application have been based on 
standards established for the aircraftlspace industry. At the hot end temperatures of the 
recuperator, some of the materials under consideration are not qualified for nuclear applications 
in the ASME Code. Brazing is also not recognized as a typical joining method for a pressure 
boundary in the nuclear section of the ASME code. To assist in meeting mass goals for a 
launch application, standards similar to the aerospace industry will need to be explored. For a 
ground based prototype, the level of risk associated with the aerospace standards may not be 
acceptable from a safety perspective and additional structural containment may need to be 
considered for the design. 
Initial criteria were established in Reference 9- 47 for the structural boundaries in the primary 
loop of the plant. The structural boundary of the recuperator to space would need to be 
assessed based on these criteria. If the project were to proceed, more detailed criteria would 
need to be established for assessing structural boundary integrity as a function of lifetime and 
temperature to meet mass goals of a space application while providing adequate safety margin 
for a nuclear application. 
9.2.2.5 Potential Materials of Construction 
Recuperator vendor contracts were not established prior to the termination of the project and 
specific materials were not defined for the construction of the recuperator. NRPCT was 
planning to competitively bid the Braytonlrecuperator design and fabrication as described in 
Reference 9- 48. Possible materials of construction included various Ni-base superalloys. In a 
previous design in Reference 9- 49, Hastelloy X was selected as the base material for the 
recuperator core. Hamilton Sundstrand was considering alloy 625 as a potential candidate 
material. Other possible materials included alloy 617 and Haynes 230. The biggest material 
challenge for the recuperator materials was the proposed long term operation at elevated 
temperatures. The combination of the hot end inlet temperature of 922K in combination with a 
20 year lifetime make creep fatigue, microstructural phase stability and long term material 
compatibility potential issues for the recuperator. 
Creep 
High temperature creep data is presented in Table 9-9 for alloys 625, 617, Haynes 230 and 
Hastelloy X. Initial strain in Alloy 617 will be due to yielding rather than creep due to its low yield 
stress at 922 K. Haynes 230 and Alloy 625 have fairly comparable creep properties, both of 
which are better than Hastelloy X. Alloy 625 is not recommended for long term service at 
elevated temperatures (>868K) due to the formation of a deleterious NisNb phase that impairs 
both tensile ductility and impact strength. Haynes International recommends the use of Haynes 
230 for situations where thermal stability is an issue. 
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aHaynes International, Inc. 
bSpecial Metals, Inc. 
*At 922K, 617 will plastically deform with a 0.2% yield stress of -250 MPa. 
Table 9-9: Approximate initial stress (MPa) to produce creep for selected Ni-base 
superalloys at a temperature of 922K. 
Microstructural Phase Stability 
All four of the above Ni-base superalloys contain about 0.1 wt.% carbon. At a temperature of 
922 K, it is expected that the kinetics for carbon release from the superalloys would be very 
slow. A number of references (References 9- 50 and 9- 51 ) have shown decarburization of 
superalloys only becomes a concern above -1 073 K. It is currently unknown if the kinetics are 
slow enough to be safely ignored for a period of 120,000 hrs. The acquisition of experimental 
data to determine the rate of impurity release from candidate superalloy materials was planned 
as part of the compatibility testing effort to support the SNPP (Space Nuclear Power Plant). 
Long Term BrazelBase Metal Material Compatibility 
In choosing a braze compound, it is important to select a material that demonstrates 
metallurgicat stability with the materials to be joined, as well as low volatility to preclude 
contamination of the HeXe gas loop. Table 9-10 lists the braze materials identified for potential 
use in the recuperator and Table 9-1 1 lists the vapor pressures of the elements found in these 
brazes. Based on the vapor pressure data (eiements with higher vapor pressures are more 
volatile), caution is warranted in the use of BNi-8 because of the danger of Mn preferentially 
evaporating from the braze and entering the He gas stream. The other components of the 
various braze materials have vapor pressures on the same order of the superalloys and should 
pose no difficulty. Under high neutron flux, the use of BNi-2 or Palnicro 36M raises concerns 
due to the transmutation of boron to helium under neutron irradiation. He will migrate to grain 
boundaries to form voids (bubbles) and subsequently decrease the ductility of the material. 
However, for the flux levels expected behind the shield, boron transmutation to helium is not 
expected to be a concern. 
Testing and joining development should concentrate on BNi-5 and the eutectics Pd-Co and Pd- 
Ni. BNi-5 is promising because Haynes 230 already contains all of these elements, whereas 
Pd-Co and Pd-Ni are systems with complete solid solubility and should braze the materials well. 
Long-term testing should be conducted to identify any phase evolution between the braze 
materials and base superalloys. Pd does form an intermetallic phase with Mo, and at least 8 
intermetallic phases with Al, both of which are alloying elements of Haynes 230 (see Reference 
Creep % 
Time (hrs) 
Rupture 
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9- 52). Intermetallic phase formation between braze and base metal could compromise the joint 
integrity. 
Table 9-10: Brazes identified for potential use in the recuperator. Nominal compositions, 
along with melting points are provided. 
1 Name Chemical Composition I Melting Range (K) ] 
BNi-5 Ni-I 9Cr-I 0.1 Si 1 353-1 408 
Palnicro 36M Ni-36Pd-10.5Cr-38-0.5Si 1093-1 233 
Pd-Co 65Pd-35Co 1492 (eutectic point) 
Pd-Ni 60Pd-40Ni 1 151 1 (eutectic point) I 
Table 9-11: Vapor pressures of the braze constituents at 922 K. The value for Si has been 
extrapolated from higher temperatures (from Reference 9- 53). 
In addition to the Ni base materials being considered for recuperator construction, 
developmental work exploring carbonlcarbon recuperators is ongoing at NASA Glenn with a 
contract through Allcomp. The feasibility of a carbon-carbon (CIC) recuperator for space 
systems has been assessed in Reference 9- 44. The excellent thermal properties, high- 
temperature capabilities, and low density of carbon-carbon materials make them attractive for 
use in the recuperator, but development issues such as compatibility, joining, and fabrication 
must be addressed. 
Carbon-carbon materials provide high-strength at low weight and can withstand operational 
temperatures up to 2273 K in a non-oxidizing environment. Also, C/C composites present the 
opportunity to tailor their thermal or mechanical properties, which can be controlled by the 
different fiber, matrix, or processing options. 
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CIC composites present significant risks that can prohibit their adoption into the direct gas 
Brayton system. Foremost is the concern over corrosion. Incorporating a C/C composite into 
the primary working gas could yield gaseous C or CO leading to contamination of Nb- or Ta- 
base refractory metal alloys. Also, the corrosion of carbon produces impurities that can drive 
the coolant chemistry into a regime where superalloys carburize, decarburize, or oxidize 
depending on the specific chemistry of the coolant. Carbonkarbon composites are expected to 
be compatible with a Sic reactor; however, the previously mentioned compatibility issues with 
the remainder of the Ni base plant loop piping may still pose a concern. 
Integrating a carbon-carbon composite into an otherwise all-metallic energy conversion system 
raises concerns over joining the composite to the metal structure of the recuperator. The 
coefficient of thermal expansion mismatch between CIC and metal interfaces may create 
excessive thermal stresses causing failure at the joint and catastrophic gas leakage. The 
joining technology between CIC and metal is underdeveloped and unproven for high- 
temperature joint reliability over a long mission lifetime. Fabrication of CIC recuperators must 
also overcome obstacles such as developing uniform fin heights, and properly joining plates to 
fins. 
9.2.2.6 Recuperator Sizing Evaluations 
Both fin configurations provided in Figure 9-17 were considered in recuperator designs for 
Prometheus. Figure 9-19 from Reference 9- 54 provides a conceptual design from Hamilton 
Sundstrand for a 514 kW thermal rating. The fin structure for this design is wavy fin. An offset 
strip fin design has also been considered for high temperature recuperator applications in the 
past as documented in References 9- 49 and 9- 55. For the recuperator, a sizing model based 
on a double stacked offset fin design has been used for mass estimates. This model was 
developed by NASA Glenn and independently verified through an NRPCT recuperator model. 
The mass estimates for this model are larger than the proposed Hamilion Sundstrand 
recuperator design by a factor of approximately 1.3. Table 9-12 compares various aspects of 
the offset fin design used for mass estimates to the Hamilton Sundstrand design for the thermal 
rating and design conditions assumed by Hamilton Sundstrand in Reference 9- 54. 
Due to the large size differences between the offset strip fin design and the Hamilton 
Sundstrand design, an independent sizing assessment was also performed to confirm the sizing 
and pressure drop of the Hamilton Sundstrand design. Simple counter flow calculations were 
performed assuming the same thermal load and flow areas. The largest driver in the heat 
transfer area is the improved fin effectiveness of the Hamilton design relative to the double 
stacked offset strip fin design currently being used for mass estimates. The tighter fin pitch 
associated with the Hamilton design also results in reduced recuperator size. The independent 
NRPCT calculations did not attempt to capture the cross flow characteristics of the headers for 
the Hamilton Sundstrand design and assumed the same Reynolds Colburn and friction factor 
analogy currently being assumed for the offset fin model. The required heat transfer areas of 
the high pressure and low pressure sides of the recuperator core were estimated at 21 -4 m2 
and 32 m2 respectively. Assuming the offset fin friction analogy, the estimated pressure drop for 
this design was consistent with the Hamilton estimates of pressure drop after correcting for flow 
length differences. 
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At this point in the design process the more conservative offset fin mass estimates are being 
reported. The justification for using the more conservative mass estimate is based on the 
following: 
I. The absolute system pressure is a factor of approximately 1.6 larger in the current 
plant concept (compressor exit pressure is 2.0 MPa vs 1.28 MPa in the Hamilton 
Sundstrand concept). The compressor pressure ratio is also larger in the current 
base case design resulting in a larger pressure difference between the high pressure 
and low pressure side of the recuperator. The high to low side pressure differential 
in the Hamilton Sundstrand design is approximately 0.56 MPa compared to 1 MPa in 
the current base case design. The higher pressure improves the thermal hydraulic 
performance of the recuperator but also requires additional structure to support the 
increased primary loads. Structural analysis and redesign has not been performed 
on either the Hamilton or the offset fin design to calculate the potential mass 
increase associated with the higher system pressure. The heavier mass estimate 
associated with the offset strip design provides margin to accommodate the 
increased pressure differentials. 
2. The baseline recuperator effectiveness has been increased from 0.90 to 0.92 and 
the thermal load has been increased from 514 kW to 761 kW relative to the Hamilton 
Sundstrand recuperator configuration in Reference 9- 54. 
3. Assessments of creep on the recuperator core fin configuration were considered by 
Hamilton in the design; however, detailed structural models assessing creep fatigue 
performance have not yet been performed for the Hamilton Sundstrand recuperator 
for a twenty year life which integrated the manifold structure and evaluated potential 
thermal transients. The higher mass estimates provide margin to absorb potential 
mass increases associated with creep fatigue design details. 
4. Literature (Reference 9- 58) suggests that for the low Prandtl number HeXe fluid 
being considered for the direct Brayton cycle, the heat transfer coefficients may be 
lower resulting in larger heat transfer area requirements to meet the desired 
recuperator effectiveness. 
5. The effects of flow maldistribution on recuperator performance have not been fully 
addressed. For highly effective recuperator designs with low pressure drop 
requirements, flow maldistribution in both the recuperator headersicore and the 
plenums/manifolds can adversely affect both effectiveness and pressure drop goals. 
Detailed assessments of flow maldistribution on specific recuperator designs for 
Prometheus have not been performed. In Reference 9- 54 the following concern 
was raised relative to flow maldistribution for the Hamilton Sundstrand design: 
"With respect to the many previous NASA Brayton system studies, the allowable 
pressure drop for the heat exchangers usually falls into the 2-3% range for APIP. At 
low percentage pressure drops, flow distribution in the headers and heat exchanger 
core is an issue that leads to over sizing the heat exchanger to account for such 
inefficiencies. Therefore, after subsequent discussions and assessments, it was 
agreed to establish 0.020 MPa as the allowable pressure drop for both sides of the 
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Table 9-12: Comparison of geometry and operating parameters for the proposed 
Hamilton Sundstrand recuperator design (from Reference 9- 54) to the mass models 
being used by NRPCT. 
Thermal Rating (ION) I 51 4 I 514 I 76 1 
. - .. . . 
. .. 
- . -, 
, ,  . 
. . - . . 
. .  . 
. . 
. .. . - . 
. .. 
, , 
Effectiveness (%) I 90 I 90 I 92 I 
Mass Flow Rate (kgls) I 2.07 I 2.07 I 3.08 I 
I 
NRPCTIGI~~ Reatperator 
Mock$ S i i  C Cbnqitiaiis 
'.Assumi3@hy Hanigtan: 
Sun* 
.&ow 
.qessure 
Side 
MW of working fluid (kgknol) 31.37 I 31.37 i 31.5 I 
-High . ' - Low 
hessuie 
Side Side 
Inlet pressure (MPa) 
Pressure drop (MPa) 
Inlet temperature (K) 
Outlet temperature 
1.04 
0.01 5 
943 
568 
Fin Spacing (mm) 
0.71 
0.02 
947 
573 
1.98 
0.01 5 
536 
910 
-- -- - 
Fin Height (rnm) 
Fin Thickness (mm) 
Total Surface Effectiveness - 
110 
Fin Effectiveness - 111 
Recuperator Core Volume 
(m3) i 
1.59 
3.139 
0.1 524 
Heat Transfer Surface Area 
(m2) 
1.28 
0.02 
53 1 
904 
1.28 
0.01 
531 
905 
1.59 
0.48 
0.39 
-- 
** NRPCT estimated values based on information provided in Reference 9- 54. 
0.7t 
0.02 
947 
573 
0.7943 
3.139 
0.1 524 
49.3 
Recuperator Core Mass (kg) 
Recuperatar Total Mass (kg) 
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1.058 1.59 
0.49 
0.39 
1.59 
2.540 
0.076 
49.3 
84.3 
112 
0.66" 
0.57- 
-- 
1.905 
0.076 
32.0** 
64.4 
83.9 
0.78" 
0.67" 
169 
214 
3.239 
0.1 524 
21.4- 
3.139 
0.1524 
0.49 
0.40 
0.49 
0.40 
99.2 99.2 
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9.2.3 Design Tradeoffs/Performance Estimates 
9.2.3.1 Heat Transfer Coefficient Uncertainty Effects 
For the HeXe gas mixtures being considered as the working coolant, the Prandtl number of the 
mixture is approximately 0.2. Test data from Reference 9- 56 indicate that for fully developed 
turbulent flow, a significant decrease (as much as a 66% reduction relative to Dittus Boelter) in 
heat transfer coefficients has been observed for these low Prandtl number gas mixtures relative 
to the standard Dittus Boelter heat transfer correlation. For the heat transfer geometries being 
considered for the recuperator, the flow is typically in the undeveloped regime due to the 
interrupted surfaces used in these designs; and therefore, the fully developed turbulent results 
are not expected to be applicable. Typically for these interrupted surface geometries, the heat 
transfer and pressure drop correlations are based on test data for the specific geometry being 
considered. For offset fin geometries, Manglik and Bergles in Reference 9- 57 have provided 
geometry based correlations for calculating heat transfer coefficients and friction factors which 
are in good agreement with experimental results. However, these correlations were compared 
to heat exchanger test data in air and do not address the low PrandtI number effects associated 
with HeXe. 
Reference 9- 58 provides a summary of open literature for heat transfer and pressure drop 
correlations/test data for offset strip and wavy fin surface geometries. Only one set of test data 
for a fixed offset strip geometry have been identified for HeXe gas mixtures in the 
PrandtVReynolds regime being considered for the recuperator. Reference 9- 59 provides a 
summary of test data for various gas mixtures of HeXe for an interrupted plate fin geometry. 
The authors from this reference recommended a 0.516 exponent (vs. 0.667) on the Prandtl 
number in the Colburn correlation. This difference results in a reduction of approximately 8% in 
heat transfer coefficient for a helium xenon gas mixture relative to the previous Colburn 
correlation being assumed. It should be noted that this is a limited set of data for a specific fin 
geometry and detailed'descriptions of the surFace geometry, materials and experimental 
apparatus/procedures were not provided. 
Reference 9- 60 provides a summary of pressure drop and heat transfer test data for a variety 
of surface geometries tested in air or water. For the recuperator sizing evaluations provided in 
Section 9.2.2.6, a power fit to the experimental data from Reference 9- 60 was used to calculate 
the heat transfer coefficient for the design. Because of the limited information available in open 
literature, no corrections were made to compensate for the low Prandtl number associated with 
the HeXe mixture being investigated for the Prometheus mission (He mole fraction = 0.784, Xe 
mole fraction = 0.216). 
For the recuperator designs being considered for Prometheus, a reduction in the overall heat 
transfer coefficient corresponds to a relatively small reduction in recuperator effectiveness due 
to the high effectiveness of the design. This result is illustrated in Figure 9-20 and 
Figure 9-21. In these figures the effectiveness and fraction of thermal load of the recuperator 
are plotted as a function of percent reduction in overall heat transfer for various recuperator 
thermal ratings. In these figures, the inlet temperatures on the high pressure and low pressure 
side of the recuperator are fixed at 538K and 922K respectively based on the system state point 
assessment for a direct gas Brayton system documented in Reference 9- 62. The mass flow 
rates for both the high and low pressure sides of the recuperator are also fixed at 2.31 kgisec. 
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Fixing these parameters implies that for recuperator thermal ratings lower than the 539 kW load 
the gas cooler and reactor loads would need to increase to supply the same cycle compressor 
and turbine inlet temperatures relative to the 539 kW case. 
The maximum theoretical heat transfer rate possible for a counter flow or cross flow design 
assuming infinite heat transfer is defined as: 
Where: 
Cmin is defined as the minimum of the product of mass flow rate and working fluid specific heat 
for the high pressure and low pressure gas streams. 
Because specific heat is independent of temperature and pressure at the conditions being 
considered for this application and the mass flow rate is equal for the high and low pressure 
sides of the recuperator, the maximum theoretical heat transfer rate for the conditions described 
above is: 
kg J Q,,,, = 2.31-e659.7-n(922K -538K) = 585.2kW 
sec k g - K  
Since heat exchanger effectiveness is defined as : 
and Qmm is fixed as defined above, the thermal rating of the recuperator establishes the 
effectiveness with the lower thermal ratings resulting in lower effectiveness as shown in Figure 
9-20. As the overall heat transfer coefficient is reduced for the 539 kW base case, relatively 
large changes in the overall heat transfer coefficient result in smaller percent changes in the 
actual heat being transferred. This is driven by the large percent increase in the log mean 
temperature difference for a relatively small percent decrease in thermal load as shown in 
Figure 9-21. At the high effectiveness of the recuperator envisioned for the Prometheus mission 
(0.92), the tog mean temperature difference is approximately 31 K. This 31 K temperature 
difference is a small fraction of the total temperature difference of 353K associated with the 
enthalpy change of the gas. 
Figure 9-22 provides a plot of overall system efficiency and power output as a function of 
recuperator effectiveness. If after constructing a recuperator unexpected reductions in overall 
heat transfer coefficient result in reduced recuperator effectiveness, three options are available: 
(1) redesign the recuperator to add heat transfer area to accommodate the reduced heat 
transfer coefftcient/effectiveness resulting in an increase in overall system mass, (2) redesign 
the remainder of the system to accommodate the reduced effectiveness resulting in an increase 
in system mass, (3) accept the overall reduction in system performance associated with the 
lower recuperator effectiveness. The selected option would be driven by the system margin in @ the as-built Brayton cycle. 
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As discussed in Reference 9- 63, flow maldistribution can be categorized in the following two 
areas: (1) flow maldistribution due to heat exchanger geometry, and (2) flow maldistribution due 
to heat exchanger operating conditions. Specifically, flow maldistribution due to the recuperator 
manifold geometry is being addressed in this write up to provide better design guidance when 
integrating the recuperator with the remaining loop piping. To assess the effects and level of 
.flow maldistribution in a highly effective recuperator design, the recuperator from Reference 9- 
49 was modeled. This recuperator is designed to operate in a closed Brayton cycle (Mini-BRU) 
with a thermal rating of approximately 24 kW and an effectiveness of 97.5%. Figure 9-25 
provides a schematic of the mini-BRU recuperator design. A one dimensional model of the 
recuperator was constructed and coupled with flow distribution maps to assess the performance 
sensitivities to various levels of flow maldistribution. To evaluate the level of fiow rnaldistribution 
expected in a highly effective recuperator application, a CFD model was developed based on 
geometry similar to the mini-BRU recuperator geometry described in Reference 9- 49. 
Modeling Assumptions 
To simplify modeling, counter flow geometry was assumed over the entire length of the 
recuperator for both the high pressure and low pressure flow streams. The cross flow regions at 
the entrance and exit of the recuperator core were modeled as counter flow regions. For the 
large inletloutlet temperature differences associated with the recuperator designs for 
Prometheus, a significant variation in fluid properties is observed from the hot end to the cold 
end of the recuperator. The property differences coupled with the cross flow nature of the 
header regions can result in pressure drop differences from one side of the recuperator to the 
other. This difference was reported in Reference 9- 49 for the recuperator constructed for the 
Mini-BRU. The effects of fluid property variations in these cross flow regions and the associated 
variations in pressure drop and flow maldistribution were not considered in the cases 
considered. 
The flow maldistribution evaluations on recuperator effectiveness assumed that the integrated 
mass flow rate of the uniform fiow case was conserved for the nonuniform cases. Additional 
system performance reductions will result due to the larger recuperator pressure drops 
associated with the nonuniform flow conditions. The increased pressure drop for the 
nonuniform flow condition was not modeled. The effects of reduced effectiveness and 
increased pressure drop were also not iterated on in a system model to establish the reduced 
flow conditions for the nonuniform distribution cases relative to the uniformly distributed case. 
For the CFD model the heat exchanger core is assumed to have a uniform hydraulic resistance 
for all of the sub passages making up the heat exchanger core. The recuperator is subdivided 
into 300 subunits for the low pressure side and 294 subunits for the high pressure side at the 
inlet and exit core faces. No fluid mixing between the subunits is assumed in the vertical 
direction, since each subunit is separated from its adjacent subunit in the vertical direction by a 
separation plate that divides the hot and cold side layers in the core. However, migration of flow 
from side to side in a given hot or cold side layer is not assumed negligible, especially in the 
headers. Although flow generally is assumed to stay within the channels of the split fin 
geometry, especially within the center region of the core, flow in the headers must migrate 
horizontally outside the split-fin channels due to the fact that the flow cross sectional area 
a diverges at the inlet and converges at the exit header regions. 
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Flow Maldistribution Performance Sensitivities 
In order to assess the effects of flow maldistribution on recuperator effectiveness an approach 
similar to the approach outlined in Reference 9- 63 was taken. In this approach the recuperator 
is subdivided into a matrix of M by N subunits. In Reference 9- 63 the effectiveness of each 
subunit was evaluated to obtain the total integrated effectiveness of the recuperator. The 
approach assumed uniform flow for one of the flow streams and nonuniform flow for the other 
stream. In the following approach nonuniform flow distributions can be assumed for both sides 
of recuperator. Each recuperator subunit has a flow rate assigned to the high pressure and low 
pressure sides based on the expected flow distribution for this region. A thermal hydraulic 
model of the recuperator was used to map the exit temperatures of both the high pressure and 
low pressure fluid streams assuming fixed inlet temperatures for a range of high pressure and 
low pressure flow combinations. The exit temperature maps were then coupled with flow 
distribution maps and double linear interpolation was used to determine the exit temperature of 
a particular subunit for a given high pressure side and low pressure side flow rate combination. 
The overall effectiveness of the recuperator was then calculated based on the following 
equations: 
Qoeruo, &=r- 
em, 
The actual heat transfer rate in the expression above can be defined as: 
r = l  
Where: 
i is the index denoting the ith subunit of the MxN matrix of "mini" heat exchangers 
Ip denotes the low pressure side of the recuperator 
hp denotes the high pressure side of the recuperator 
c, specific heat of the working fluid (J/kg/K) 
m is the mass flow rate of the working fluid (kgls) 
T j n , ~ ~  is the inlet temperature for the low pressure side of the recu.perator (= 995K for the 
Mini-BRU recuperator being studied.) 
T,n,hp is the inlet temperature for the high pressure side of the recuperator (= 380K for 
the Mini-BRU recuperator being studied) 
The maximum heat transfer rate in effectiveness definition can be expressed as: 
Qmax = Cmin ' (I;p,m - Thp,tn ) 
Where: 
Cmi, is the smaller of the following two expressions: 
MxN 
'hp = Z 6 1 p i  ' C p , h p , ~  
i=l 
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The minimum fluid capacity rate in the above effectiveness equation is not the minimum for 
each subunit, but is rather the minimum of the integrated high pressure and low pressure heat 
capacity rates. From an overall system perspective this provides an effectiveness which can 
be related to the mixed mean exit temperatures of the two recuperator fluid streams, and does 
not require knowledge of the effectivenesslflow distribution for the individual recuperator 
subunits. 
To generate exit temperature maps for the mini-BRU recuperator a flow forced TRACE model 
was developed. This model assumes air as the working fluid for both sides of the recuperator. 
The air mass flow rates were established by matching the air Reynold's numbers at the 
entrance for both the high pressure and low pressure sides of the recuperator to the helium 
xenon mixture Reynolds numbers proposed for the Mini-BRU application (HeliumIXenon mole 
fraction of 0,37310.627). The inlet temperatures for both flow streams for the air model were 
consistent with the helium xenon conditions (high pressure side inlet temperature = 380 K, low 
pressure side inlet temperature = 995 K). Figure 9-26 and Figure 9-27 provide the high 
pressure side and low pressure side exit temperature maps respectively. 
To evaluate the sensitivity of recuperator effectiveness to flow distribution, four sets of flow 
fraction maps were generated. The four sets of flow maps are provided in Table 9-23. For each 
of the maps, the integrated flow of the uniformly distributed case was conserved. Figure 9-28 
provides a comparison of the effectiveness for each of the four flow distribution combinations. 
From the figure one can see that the overall effectiveness is essentially unaffected for cases 
where the high pressure and low pressure flow distribution maps are balanced. As the 
difference between the flow fractions of the high pressure and low pressure sides for individual 
subunits increases, the overall effectiveness decreases. This trend is driven by the heat 
capacity rate differences between the high pressure and low pressure gas streams and the fact 
that the recuperator was designed for balanced heat capacity rates. 
One technique to help balance the flow maldistribution effects is to maintain symmetry in the 
manifold designs for the high pressure and low pressure sides of the recuperator. In a 
recuperator design which is primarily counter flow, this symmetry helps to maintain similar flows 
for a given region of the recuperator for the low pressure and high pressure side flow paths. 
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Figure 9-25: Mini-BRU recuperator internal flow configuration (from Reference 9- 49). 
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orientation and to impose loss characteristics in order to achieve a required pressure drop 
through the media. Air was used as the fluid in the FLUENT model rather than the Helium- 
Xenon mixture used in the (Mini-BRU) recuperator to avoid the need to input property data in 
FLUENT. Recuperator core temperatures were fixed in a stepwise fashion in the direction of 
flow in order to approximate the fluid property changes. 
Results form the hot and cold side cases indicate that flow is not uniform at the inlet core face 
for the hot side case to a much larger degree than for the cold side case. This is believed to be 
in large part due to the fact that although the flow rates for both the hot and cold side are similar 
(. 1048 kg hot side vs .TI56 kg/s cold side), the higher inlet temperatures for the hot side (995 K) 
produce an inlet plenum velocity of 22.34 m/s (73.3 Ws), which is three times as great as the 
cold side inlet plenum velocity of 6.35 m/s (20.83 Ws) at 380 K. The flow fields in both the high 
pressure and low pressure inlets are depicted in Figure 9-30 respectively showing the flow 
pathlines from the plenum inlet faces. Figure 9-31 illustrates the significantly increased inlet 
plenum velocities in the low pressure, high temperature side in comparison to the high pressure, 
low temperature side. Whereas the flow from the hot side inlet duct appears to "impinge" on 
the inlet face of the core due to it's higher velocity as shown in Figure 9-32(a), the lower velocity 
flow from the cold side inlet duct is "dispersed", and distributed more evenly across the inlet face 
as shown in Figure 9-32(b). The "side-to-side" or horizontal flow distribution in these figures is a 
function of the porous media assumptions within the core and may not accurately reflect the 
actual horizontal distribution in the core. Further work would be needed to evatuate and confirm 
the true horizontal distribution of flow within the recuperator core. Details of the modeling 
assumptions are documented in Reference 9- 61. Because the geometry in the vertical @ orientation is much less ambiguous (is based on the separating plates between the hot and cold 
sides) the flow distribution in this direction can be more accurately represented in the FLUENT 
model. Figure 9-33 provides a plot of the relative flow fractions for each flow channel in the 
vertical direction. This plot further emphasizes the vertical mismatch in flow in the low pressure 
side relative to the high pressure side. This "mismatch" of non-uniform flow between the hot 
and cold sides as discussed in the pre-ceding section promotes lower heat exchanger 
effectiveness. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 




Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 / 
0-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 9-80 
Vertical Maldistribution Assessment 
Figure 9-33: Mass flow fraction ptot of the high pressure and low pressure sides of the 
recu perator. 
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9.2.4 Failure Modes 
Two main failure modes are of concern for the recuperator. The first failure mode is a direct 
leak to space due to a containment structure failure. The second failure mode is interchannel 
leakage due to a failure of the pressure boundary between the high pressure side (compressor 
discharge side) of the recuperator and the low pressure side (turbine discharge side of the 
recuperator). Low cycle creep fatigue is the main design consideration for both of these failure 
modes. Due to the relatively high operating temperatures at the recuperator hot end (-890 - 
940K nominally) creep is a concern for the structural materials. These structures include 
manifolds, parting plate structures, closure bars and fin structures as shown in Figure 9-16. For 
the plate fin designs envisioned for the recuperator, brazing is typically the joining method used 
to form the heat exchanger core structure. The braze joints must be capable of withstanding 
both the hot end and cold end recuperator temperatures and provide the necessary strength to 
survive any thermal cycles through life and vibratorylacceleration loads during launch. The Ni- 
base super-alloy materials currently being considered for recuperator construction are not 
considered susceptible to radiation exposure damage at the exposure levels expected behind 
the shield. 
9.2.4.1 Leakage to Space 
Per Enclosure 7 of Reference 9- 62 an acceptable leak rate to space from the system was 
estimated at 1.27E-7 kg/min assuming a 10% reduction in system pressure could be tolerated at 
the end of a 15 year mission for a four Brayton direct gas reactor system. This leakage rate is 
the equivalent of a 1.1 3E-6 mm2 hole size. Similar to the interchannel leakage evaluation, at 
the current stage of the design the actual probability of developing a recuperator teak to space 
is difficult to estimate. As mission requirements and design configurations of a specific 
recuperator design evolve, the probability of developing a space structural boundary leak will 
become better defined. Typically the most vulnerable areas for developing a leak to space are 
along brazed and welded joints in the design. The manifolds and manifold joints at the hot end 
of a counter flow recuperator are typically most susceptible to thermal fatigue failure. During a 
thermal transient, the differences in thermal mass and heat transfer characteristics between the 
heat exchanger core and the manifold structure produce thermal gradients with the thermal 
response of the manifold structure typically lagging in response relative to the header region of 
recuperator core. The fins in the header region of the recuperator provide improved heat 
transfer relative to the manifold structure; and therefore, the header region thermal response is 
more rapid than the manifold structure. These cyclic thermal gradients coupled with the high 
temperatures at the hot end of the recuperator make the brazed and welded joints in this portion 
of the recuperator more susceptible to failure. Due to the large number of brazed header joints 
along either side of the recuperator these are also susceptible to leakage to space. 
Recuperator designs in the past have incorporated plate overlays which are brazed to the sides 
of the recuperator and welded to the toplbottom plates and the manifold structures to minimize 
the number of exposed brazed joints to space. One example of this design approach is 
provided in Reference 9- 49. NRPCT recommends that a similar all-welded external structure 
(vs exposed brazed joints) be incorporated to minimize the likelihood of a recuperator mission- 
ending leak to space. 
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9.2.4.2 lnterchannel Leakage 
Recuperator interchannel leakage is defined as leakage from the high pressure side of the 
recuperator to the low pressure side due to unwanted leakage paths in the structure separating 
these flow paths. lnterchannel leakage results in the loss of overall system performance due to 
the bypass effect of the leak on the system. This bypass flow path results in increased flow and 
work input from the compressor with no increase or a possible decrease in work output from the 
turbine depending on the control system in place. The most probable locations for interchannel 
leakage paths are at the braze joints along the header bars and at the manifold structure 
separating the high pressure and low pressure sides of the recuperator. An example of 
interchannel leakage due to cyclic fatigue is provided in Reference I. In this reference, 
interchannel leaks developed in the recuperator during thermal cycle acceptance testing of the 
unit. lnterchannel leak rates following 200 thermal cycles were estimated at 0.2% of the rated 
system flow. This leak rate had an insignificant impact on the overall performance of the 
Brayton system. 
A preliminary, simple system state point evaluation was performed to estimate the system 
performance impacts for various leak sizes. This evaluation was non-conservative because the 
effects of reduced compressor efficiency and the increased pressure losses in the system were 
not considered in the evaluation. The effects of leak size on system performance are 
summarized in Figure 9-34. Included in this figure are the state point assumptions. Based on 
bypass control analysis performed in Reference 9- 64 an additional reduction in overall system 
performance is expected based on more detailed system models which capture the effects of 
system pressure, variations in component pressure drop and turbine/compressor efficiency 
variations. For a 10% bypass flow on the compressor side of the 100 kWe Brayton system in 
Reference 9- 64 a reduction in electrical output of approximately 37% was calculated compared 
to 24% predicted by the simpler state point model. 
From a system reliability perspective, a much larger interchannel leak can be tolerated relative 
to a system leak to space. Assuming a 1% reduction in system performance can be tolerated, 
an interchannel leak area of approximately 3 mm2 wouid be acceptable for a leak on the 
compressor side of the recuperator. The as-built system design margins and mission 
requirements will set the acceptable interchannel leak sizes. At the current stage of the design 
the actual probability of developing an interchannel leak of this size is difficult to estimate. As 
mission requirements, design configurations, structural design evaluations and testing of the 
recuperator evolve the probability of developing a leak of this size will need to be better defined. 
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Reference 9- 66 provides life data for recuperators designed by AiResearch, now part of 
Honeywell, and operated in a 15,000 horsepower gas turbine system. Table 9-14 summarizes 
the operating data for the various units. These recuperators were designed for a 140,000 hour 
lifetime and 5,200 cycles at an operating temperature of 866K. These units were ground based 
and were not designed to the same mass and leakage constraints imposed on a fight qualified 
unit; however, the lifetime and temperatures are fairly similar to those envisioned for the 
Prometheus mission. At the time Reference 9- 66 was issued these units had accumulated 
approximately 768,000 hours of operation and over 9,250 starts with no failures. 
In Reference 9- 67 Garrett Corporation (now part of Honeywell) estimated the failure 
probabilities of various Brayton system components based on a variety of open cycle engine 
data. Table 9-15 summarizes the projected failure probabilities for the various Brayton system 
components. For the recuperator a failure probability rate of 3 x lo4 failureslyear was 
estimated. This estimate is based on open cycle systems and is not directly applicable to a 
recuperator designed for a Prometheus based mission. However, the estimates provide 
confidence that a reliable recuperator can be constructed for a 15 to 20 year operational life. 
Closed cycle Brayton system testing through NASA also has demonstrated single unit reliability 
at the temperatures expected in the actual application for extended periods of operation. In 
Reference 9- 55, a Brayton system was designed to produce 2 to 10 kilowatts of electric power 
for a minimum of five years. In this program four. Brayton units were constructed. At the time of 
publication, over 21,000 hours of operating time was accumulated on one of the units. For a 
large fraction of test time (17,568 hours), the turbine inlet temperature for this unit was 
maintained at 1144K. Another unit was operated for 11,000 hours. Some leakage from the heat 
exchangerlrecuperator units to the atmosphere was reported during testing. The extent of the 
leaks and the details of the leak paths to ambient were not clearly explained in the report. 
Another closed cycle Brayton loop, the Mini-BRU, was tested at NASA Glenn as documented in 
Reference 9- 68. This Brayton system was sized for 1200 watts electric. This system was 
operated for over slightly over 1000 hours. For the first 700 hours the turbine inlet temperature 
was maintained at 1025K and for the last 300 hours the turbine inlet temperature was reduced 
to 866K. No system problems were reported during testing. 
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Table 9-14: Recuperator data for groul nd based gas turbine units (from Reference 9- 66) 
Operating Experience as of 
January 1985 
Regenerator Model Hours 1 Starts Name and Location . . . . .. . .
PacMc Can and Elsctrlc Company 
~elev~an.  ati if ha 
Delevan. Cal~fomia 
Canadian Plpdlne 
Cabri, Saskatchewan 
Herbed. Saskatchewan 
Texaa Eaatsrn, Tmnsmluion Corporation 
Danville. Kenlucky 
Danville. Kentucky 
Alhem. Ohio 
Ahns, Ohio 
St. Frandsville, Lwisiana 
St. Frandsville. Louisiana 
Clinton, Masissippi 
Cl~nton. Mississippi 
Yazw C~ty. M~ssissippi 
Grantville. Pennsylvania 
Grantville. Pernsylvania 
Athens. Ohio 
Athens. Ohio 
St. Francisville. Louisiana 
St. Franurviile. Louisiana 
Clinton. Mississippi 
Glavevllle. Tennessee 
T r ~ ~ ~ w s t o r n  Pipeline (Divlslon of Texas Eastam Tranamlssion 
Corporation) 
Corona, New Mexico 
Chamlcal Plant 
Louisiana 
Louisiena 
El Paso Natural Gas Company 
Caprock New Mexico 
Leupp,  OM 
Gallup. New Mexico 
rennesree Gab Plpelina 
Leavlile. Louisiana 
Pwt Sulphur, Louis~ana 
Alexandria, Lwisiana 
C ~ l l t f i ~ ~ ~ d .  Te eSSee 
Bay St. Louis, Mssissippi 
Port Sulphur, Lou~siana 
Hamilim. Alabama 
Marehead. Kentucky 
Columbus. Mississippi 
Savannah. Tennessee 
raxas Gaa Transmission Company 
Columbus, Louisiana 
Greenville. Mwissippi 
Slaughters. Kentucky 
Lake Cornant.  Louisiana 
Jetlenontown. Kentucky 
Clarksdale. Mississippi 
Kenton. Tennessee 
Hardingsburg. Kentucky 
\NU Pipeline Company 
Delhi. Lcuislana 
Bmwnville. Tennessee 
ireat Lake Transmission Company 
Crystal Falls. Michigan 
'hiladelphla Electric 
Philadelphia. Pe~sylvan~a 
Philadelpnia, Pennsylvania 
Ph~ladelphia. Pernsylvama 
Ph~ladeloha. Pennsvlvania 
~hiladelbhii; ~enn&ania 
Philadelphia. Pennsylvania 
:wthllln Pipeline 
Piept. Saskatchewan 
krco-Parsons 
Prudhoe Bay. Alaska 
Irtuml Gas Plpellna Company 
Glasw. Kansas 
rdependsnce Powsr and Light 
Independence. Missouri 
Independence. Missouri 
'mnkllna Gas Comnanv 
27400 
To start first quarter 1985 
.- . - 
Eppe, Lou~s~ana ARG262H To start thrd quarter 1985 
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Table 9-1 5: Reliability study form Garrett Fluid Systems (see Reference 9- 67). 
I Foil Bearings I 3 x I o - ~  I 3 x l o 4  I 
Component 
I Turbine I 1  x 10.~ I 1 x 10' 1 
Failure Rate 
(per hour) (per year) 
Compressor 
9.2.5 Future Development Needs 
Recuperator 
Bleed Cooler 
Be1 low/Ducts 
To deliver a reliable recuperator to meet the design needs of a Prometheus mission, the 
following near term development needs were identified: 
6 x lo-' 
Establish competitive bid vendor contracts to identify conceptual designs and materials 
of construction and have vendors initiate small scale coupon fabrication and testing to 
identify fabrication and material compatibility issues with a focus on braze fin integrity. 
Identify accelerated testing to ensure braze base metal compatibility and fin and braze 
interface strength over mission life. 
6 x l o 4  
3 x 
9 x 
1  x 
Develop a more detailed structural design basis that addresses the operating 
temperatures, operating lifetimes and manufacturing practices for a recuperator design 
in the primary direct Brayton system envisioned for Prometheus. This work would need 
to address operational and safety issues in both the flight unit as welt as any ground 
based prototypes. 
5 x l o 4  Alternator 
3 x l o 4  
9 x l o4  
1  x lo4  
Develop a better definition of nominal and design operating conditions for the 
recuperator as mission requirements become better defined. This work would involve 
identifying temperature and pressure conditions as a function of time for normal plant 
conditions (including operating and uncertainty bands) and recoverable system failure 
scenarios. These temporal operating conditions would be supplied to perspective 
vendors to ensure that the structural design criteria for the recuperator were satisfied. 
5 x 10' 
Perform further flow maldistribution studies on the recuperator designs proposed for 
Prometheus. In conjunction with these studies, perform component design trades on 
recuperator mass, pressure drop and effectiveness to determine if the low pressure drop 
goals can be met with the current mass and effectiveness goals. 
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9.3 Gas Cooler 
9.3.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The gas cooler transfers heat from the primary HeXe coolant to the heat rejection system 
coolant, and lowers the compressor inlet temperature. The amount of heat transfer in the gas 
cooler must be weighed against the corresponding increases in mass and pressure drop across 
the component as well as the corresponding increase in heat rejection size due to the reduced 
average heat rejection temperature. 
Initial scoping phase contracts with Hamilton Sundstrand, Heatric, Holtec International, Inc., and 
Honeywell International, Inc. assessed gas cooler material options, recommended design 
configurations and provided an initial reliability assessment. Various component configurations 
were recommended for water and NaK heat rejection coolants by each of the vendors. Heat 
rejection coolant selection (H20 or NaK) impacts both the gas cooler material and configuration 
selection. 
A chemically etchedlbrazed fin design offers the lightest configuration option while a shell and 
tube design is considered to be a more robust design (see Section 9.3.6 for a detailed mass 
comparison). A conventional platdfin configuration is not considered suitable for use with the 
pressure requirements of water coolant, though could be considered for a NaK coolant design. 
Ni-based alloys were identified as a more reliable material option for the water environment. 
Thorough evaluation and testing is required if it is decided to use dissimilar materials, e.  g., 
titanium alloys and stainless steels, in common contact within either of the working fluids. 
The main areas of development for this component include: 
Developing a reliable design over the projected 20 year life of the component. The largest 
reliability challenge is eliminating the potential of a mission ending leak from the high 
pressure water in the heat rejection system to the lower pressure primary coolant for the 
aggressive water side pressures and temperatures. 
Establishing design standards to provide an adequate structural design over a 20 year 
operating life while minimizing the overall component mass and volume. 
Selecting a material system which meets the component mass and reliability design goals. 
Conceptual development of both the shelt-and-tube and chemically etchedlbrazed fin design 
configurations were to be the focus in the next phase of development due to the competing 
design trades of reliability and mass with each of the design options. Ni- based and titanium 
based alloys were considered the leading material options. 
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9.3.2 Component Description 
The gas cooler transfers heat from the HeXe working fluid in the gas reactor system to the heat 
rejection system. The gas cooler is located in the HeXe flow path between the recuperator 
discharge and the compressor inlet. The performance of the gas cooler has a significant impact 
on Brayton cycle efficiency because the HeXe flows from the gas cooler discharge to the 
compressor inlet and the compressor inlet temperature is a key determinant of cycle efficiency. 
A gas cooler development program (Section 9.3.3) was initiated to develop a fully qualified and 
operational heat exchanger for use in a space based nuclear electric power plant. 
There are several issues associated with the gas cooler that make it a critical component. High 
operating pressure in the water heat rejection system, significant joints and joining issues, and 
large surface area combine to contribute to leakage concerns, with leakage considered mission 
ending. The high water pressure may shift the design from the lighter plate-fin style heat 
exchangers to heavier types such as shell and tube. Materials being considered for heat 
exchanger construction include titanium and titanium alloys, stainless steels, and Ni-base alloys. 
The gas cooler may include dissimilar material joints as the current Prometheus design uses Ni- 
base alloy primary piping and titanium Heat Rejection System (HRS) piping. Specific to the 
three main challenges associated with the gas cooler (leakage, material selection, and mass 
and volume minimization) the following are noted as potential challenges and vulnerabilities 
associated with the gas cooler: 
20 year continuous operation with minimal degradation in performance 
Leakage 
o Gas/coolant cross contamination 
o Gastcoolant to space 
Material Selection 
o Bimetallic joining to other piping or components 
o Base metal joint integrity 
o Chemical incompatibility (NaK, Water) 
o Mass transport contaminates (Carbon, Nitrogen, Oxygen, 
Chromium) 
o Mechanical properties (creep, yield/tensile stress, ductility 
Mass minimization 
Volume minimization 
o Performance (efficiency versus size) 
Manufacturabilitytlnspectability 
iydrogen, Nickel, Iron, 
fatigue) 
Initial plant operating parameters and design requirements were developed, based on the 
current heat balance (See Figure 9-35) at the initiation of the gas cooler development program. 
The heat balance described in Section 6 reflects work performed since the inception of the gas 
cooler development program. The next phase of the gas cooler design would use the more 
recent heat balances, although the differences are not envisioned to have an appreciable affect 
on the gas cooler configuration and materials selection. 
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Design and Performance Requirements 
20 year maintenance free operation while achieving thermal performance and 
maintaining mechanical integrity 
No cross leakage of fluid or loss of fluid to space 
Minimum mass 
Minimum volume 
Maximum gas pressure = 3000 kPa absolute 
Maximum gas temperature = 600 K 
Maximum water pressure = 10500 kPa absolute 
Maximum water temperature = 559 K 
Maximum metal temperature = 600 K 
Minimum number of joints and joint length 
Corrosion allowancelfouling factor to be recommended by seller 
Assume no thermal losses to ambient 
10% margin on heat transfer surface 
Titanium/titanium alloy as the material of construction 
Alternate alloy as the material of construction 
Final product that will be designed to the methods and limits of the ASME B&PV Code 
Gas cooler foundation/mounting arrangement to be determined 
Development Program 
The development program was envisioned to have multiple phases associated with vendor 
design input, NRPCT independent design, modeling, and testing, and component construction 
and integration. The initial phase, termed the Scoping Phase, was completed and investigated 
gas cooler materials of construction and heat exchanger styles that could potentially satisfy the 
parameters and requirements above. Subsequent design phases would produce a first cut at 
fabrication drawings for gas cooler manufacturing development and test hardware. Future 
phases of the proposed development plan are documented in Reference 9- 38. 
Scoping Phase Development 
Ten vendors were solicited for this initial scoping study. Vendor selection was based on a 
combination of experience, past performance, current capabilities, heat exchanger style 
experience, and cost. Hamilton Sundstrand, Heatric, Holtec International, Inc., and Honeywell 
International, inc. were selected as the four vendors to receive Scoping Phase contracts. The 
contract report references are included (9- 39, 9- 40, 9- 41, 9- 42). The Heatric report was 
received concurrently with the issue of this closeout report. Information from this contract was 
not incorporated into the limited description of vendor evaluations. 
The Scoping Phase included an evaluation of: gas cooler materials of construction, a 
preliminary gas cooler style and configuration analysis, and a reliability evaluation. The vendors 
were required to perform an evaluation of, at a minimum, two materials of construction for the 
gas cooler. As a base case the vendor was required to evaluate titaniumhitanium alloys and a 
recommendation of the titaniumhtanium alloy considered best suited for this application. In 
addition, the vendor was required to consider materials capable of meeting the design and 
operating parameters other than titanium and a recommendation of one of those materials as an 
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alternate. The vendor was to indicate if the alternate material was superior or inferior to the 
titaniurnjtitanium alloy. 
The vendors were required to recommend a style and configuration for a gas cooler that met the 
design operating and performance requirements. The vendors were to provide a summary of 
the alternative configurations considered and the evaluation of each with emphasis on reliability 
and mass. The vendors were to indicate the impact of material selection on style and 
configuration and to identify design pressure, temperature, and flow breakpoints that impact 
their selection. These evaluations were to include a description of the proposed gas cooler 
including materials of construction, unit construction, unit mass, and a pictorial representation. 
A reliability assessment was to include potential failure modes, including procedures and 
features intended to mitigate failure, the potential for corrosion, and a summary of company 
historical data and past experience that supports component lifetime (20 years) expectations. 
Reference 9- 38 provides a detailed summary of the results of the Scoping Phase. 
9.3.4 Design Configuration 
A number of heat exchanger configurations were reviewed within the gas cooler scoping phase. 
These configurations consisted of a variety of compact heat exchangers (platelfin, chemically 
etched, and hybrid designs), and shell-and-tube designs. 
9.3.4.1 Compact Heat Exchangers 
Of the multiple configurations possible for heat exchangers, the highest performing provides a 
large heat transfer surface area with a high thermal efficiency. A "compact heat exchanger" is 
defined by AIChE to have a heat transfer area to volume greater then 400 m21m3. This 
configuration assumes elimination of all configurations that do not satisfy this requirement based 
on achieving the gas cooler performance requirements at minimum mass and volume. As an 
example, a sheil and tube configuration is not typically considered a compact heat exchanger 
because its heat transfer area to volume ratio is typically only 65-70 mz/m3. Several high 
performance compact heat exchangers were eliminated for reliability reasons. As an example a 
Primary Surface Recuperator (PSR) allows inter-path leakage, which is not acceptable for the 
gas cooler application. 
It should be noted that while the compact heat exchanger minimizes mass and volume; it does 
not minimize the number of joints and joint length. This is a reliability issue that would need to 
be explored further prior to configuration selection. 
Hamilton Sundstrand, Heatric, and Honeywell reviewed compact heat exchangers during the 
scoping phase. All vendors assessed this design configuration from a performance and 
reliability perspective. One example of a compact heat exchanger is described below. This 
example is a chemically etchedlplate formed fin hybrid design reviewed by Hamilton 
Sundstrand. 
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Example Compact Heat Exchanger: Chemicallv etchedlplate formed fin hvbrid 
The hybrid chemically etchedlplate formed fin configuration is a three pass cross counter flow 
design. The core is vacuum brazed and consists of chemically etched water layers, closure 
bars, formed gas fins, parting sheets, and end sheets. Headers and mounting brackets are 
welded onto the core. This design was evaluated for three materials, titanium CP-70, stainless 
steel 347, and nickel alloy 625. 
The proposed design consists of a hybrid configuration comprised of a gas side heat exchanger 
formed from layers of very thin tightly spaced formed fins and the water side of the heat 
exchanger is a chemically etched plate to handle the high water pressure. The layers are 
separated by parting sheets and brazed together. 
Gas Side Design 
As with most gas to liquid heat exchangers the gas side drives the design since the thermal 
performance of the liquid is an order of magnitude higher. A counter flow heat exchanger would 
typically be the most effective solution. The density difference between the HeXe mixture and 
the water is rather large. This constrains the gas side pressure difference and increases the 
flow areas for both the water and gas. Increasing the flow area for the water decreases the 
velocity of the water, and the convective heat transfer coefficient, making a larger heat 
exchanger to account for this. This problem can be accommodated by using a multi-pass cross- 
flow design. The wavy fin proposed for the gas circuit prevents a uniform velocity profile by 
interrupting boundary layer formation. Other fin types are considered (ruffled, serrated, straight) 
and the selection is based on the heat exchanger application. 
Water Side Design 
The required water side pressure is too high for the traditional plate and fin design. As a result, 
the water side is designed with chemically etched mini-channel plates. The result is a heavier 
heat exchanger than the traditional plate fin, but one that can handle the high pressure of the 
water. The heat exchanger would be constructed of alternating layers of formed fins for the gas 
side and etched plates for the water side, which are all brazed together. 
Effect of Pressure on Core and Header Geometry 
A large duct diameter is needed for the gas side of the heat exchanger to meet pressure drop 
limitations. The water side is not an issue. There are two types of headers considered, domed 
and tapered conical parallel. Typically a domed header is used. It is a simple design for low 
pressure, low flow systems, and has a thin wall thickness that minimizes the mass. For the gas 
cooler, the gas side pressure and flow is high enough that an alternate header is needed. As a 
result, tapered conical parallel flow header may avoid load on the core and ensure effective flow 
distribution. 
Design Against Inter-path Leakage 
This design of heat exchangers typically exhibits leakage as low as 1 . ~ X I O ' ~  scckec. The gas 
cooler specification outlined a zero leakage requirement, as the allowable leakage rate has not 
been defined. As an option, a "barrier layer" that can be vented to space could be used to 
ensure any leakage to not cross the boundary from the water side to the gas side. Leakage of 
any water to the gas side of the system could result in mission failure. This is an option that 
could be considered in a future design phase and was not outlined in detail for the Scoping 
Phase. The addition of the barrier would increase the reliability of the heat exchanger, but 
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increase its mass and volume by approximately 55-85% and 33% respectively, while 
maintaining the same heat transfer capability. Other potential leakage could occur at the 
headers where the closure bars are exposed to the other fluid. In this instance, a double 
closure bar could be added with a gap to vent any possible leakage. 
lmpact of Material on StyleXonfiguration 
The impact of material choice on style and configuration is secondary to design temperature, 
pressure, flow rates and required effectiveness. The material fabrication factors and material 
properties will drive thickness and weight. 
Heat Exchanger Style lmpact Due to Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Breakpoints 
With the exception of materials, the only definable breakpoint is pressure. At approximately 
400-600 psig (2700-4100 kPa) a transition needs to be made from conventional plate and fin 
type heat exchanger to a chemically etched plate or shell-and-tube design to handle the water 
pressure, as the operating pressure far exceeded the 400-600 p i g  limit for plate and fin. 
9.3.4.2 Shell and Tube 
While the compact hybrid design provides a heat exchanger that is small and low mass, gas 
cooler reliability is a major factor (20 year maintenance free requirement). The shell-and-tube 
design is envisioned to have a higher reliability as compared to conventional compact heat 
exchanger designs for high pressure water gas coolers. Honeywell and Holtec reviewed the 
performance capability of shell-and-tube designs during the scoping phase. Material types 
reviewed for the shell-and-tube design included Ni-based alloys 617, 690,625, stainless steel 
304, 316, and titanium based alloys. One example (Honeywell configuration) of a shell-and-tube 
design is described below. 
Exam~le  Shell-and-Tube Heat Exchanger 
The hot gas side is two-pass cross-counterflow with the coolant side folded once in order to 
create a compact package. The gas flows down and across one-half of the tube bundle, and 
then flows back up and over the second half of the tube bundle before exiting. The water flows 
through haif of the tube bundle in one direction, reverses directions in the manifold and then 
flows through the second half of tubes before exiting. 
Both configurations utilize smooth tubes with turbulator inserts that disrupt the flow. The tubes 
are staggered and the number of tubes in the flow direction was adjusted to manage the gas 
side pressure drop. 
Impact of Material on StyldConfiguration 
Titanium shell and tube design were found to be lower mass than the lnconel designs studied. 
The lnconel shell and tube design utilizes thinner walled tubes with slightly higher thermal 
conductivity, allowing reduction of the overall tube length. 
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Pressure Drop 
To ensure that most of the allowable pressure drop is available in the heat transfer section, the 
inlet and outlet ducts and manifolds must have a large effective diameter. For the shell and 
tube gas cooler, two passes with a limited tube density limited pressure drop. 
The pressure drop of the HeXe mixture is a significant design driver. Increasing the flange-to- 
flange pressure drop requirement would allow for a wider range of surfaces to be explored and 
would yield smaller gas duct sizes, reducing weight and volume. 
9.3.5 Materials 
In selecting candidate materials for their gas cooler design proposals, vendors chose from three 
classes of materials: titanium alloys (CP Gr. 2, CP Gr. 3, Ti-3AI-2.5V, Ti-6A1-6V-2Sn, TIMETAL, 
CP 70), stainless steels (SS304, SS316, SS347), and nickel alloys (617, 690, 625). 
In making a final gas cooler material selection, the heat rejection system working fluid chemistry 
and rnateriak of construction (e. g., piping, valves, heat pipes, etc.) must be considered. All 
three classes of materials are extremely susceptible to accelerated corrosion in the presence of 
chloride ions in aqueous media. Titanium cannot be exposed to fluorides since they readily 
attack and strip the protective oxide layer. Previous studies have shown that hydrogen 
absorption is significantly increased whenever titanium is contaminated by iron ions, 
hypothetically because the iron contamination provides convenient sites for hydrogen 
absorption into the oxide layer and metal. Thorough evaluation and testing is required if it is 
decided to use dissimilar materials, e, g., titanium alloys and stainless steels, in common 
contact with the working fluid. 
Fabricability, Strength & Mass Issues 
Given the complexity of heat exchanger fabrication, the necessity to accommodate formability 
requirements limits titanium alloy selection to those with higher fabricability and lower strengths. 
To tolerate proposed water coolant pressures, titanium walls would need to be thicker than 
initially envisioned when only higher strength titanium alloys were considered. if it had become 
necessary to use thicker wall material to meet minimum strength requirements, then any 
potential mass advantage gained by using titanium becomes marginal. Therefore, material 
reliability in terms of corrosion resistance, long-term mechanical properties, and compatibility 
(including the effects of possible mass transport and transfer of impurities) with other materials 
in the heat rejection system, as well as the potential impact on chemistry in the reactor plant gas 
system, were likely to have been decisive factors in material selection rather than any presumed 
mass advantage of titanium alloys. 
Corrosion 
Water Working Fluid 
Because of the oxide layer (Ti02) that forms instantaneously on its surface when exposed to O2 
or H20, titanium is generally considered resistant to aqueous corrosion up to 589 K. assuming 
that the oxide layer is present on the surface of titanium, absorption or release of impurities or 
interstitials, such as hydrogen, is unlikely. 
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Titanium alloys may have experienced crevice corrosion or pitting if the heat rejection system 
working fluid had become trapped in a stagnant area. Galvanic corrosion was also a concern. 
Materials that are considered "safe" to be coupled to titanium include the 300 series of stainless 
steels and Alloy 625, as long as titanium and the alloys in question maintain a passive oxide on 
their respective surfaces. However, titanium should not be coupled to alloys that have high 
contents of magnesium, zinc, aluminum, copper, or chromium. In addition, studies have shown 
that in certain environments, alloys with more than 20% chromium content also may create a . 
galvanic couple with titanium. 
Most studies have shown that there should be few corrosion concerns for stainless steels or 
nickel base alloys in water aside from stress corrosion cracking, crevice corrosion and pitting; 
however, the use of stainless steels and nickel alloys with NaK can present significant 
problems. 
All three classes of materials are particularly susceptible to enhanced corrosion in aqueous 
environments containing small concentrations of chlorine ions. Assurance and maintenance of 
extremely low concentrations of chlorine (and, likely, other halides ions) would have been 
mandatory. 
NaK Workina Fluid 
A literature search did not reveal any serious concerns with molten NaK -titanium systems. 
However, oxygen as an impurity can directly or indirectly contribute to corrosion of stainless 
steels and nickel alloys exposed to NaK. Oxygen impurity levels greater than 100 ppm in NaK 
accelerate intergranular infiltration in stainless steels and nickel alloys, and can promote mass 
transfer of impurities from other materials coupled to the system. If oxygen levels reach 200 
ppm, corrosion rates in stainless steels increase substantially. If oxygen is present at 
concentrations greater than 1000 ppm, extensive, rapid intergranular corrosion is observed in 
stainless steels and nickel alloys. Extensive surface, intergranular, and grain boundary 
dissolution have been directly observed in Ni-based alloys 600 and 718, and is expected in 
similar nickel alloys. Oxygen will catalyze the mass transfer of Ni, Cr, Co, Mn, and Ta from 
stainless steels and of Fe and Cr from nickel alloys via the NaK, thus depleting these elements 
from the base materials. Ni-based braze alloys are also particularly susceptible to dissolution 
by NaK, especially when pure Ni phases are present. Depletion of the base materials and/or 
dissotution of the brazing alloys could increase the risk of various system failures, including 
failure of the pressure boundary between loops, thus allowing NaK to leak into the inert gas 
system loop. 
Hydrogen Embrittlemenf of  Tifaniurn 
Hydrogen ernbrittlement is a particular concern when using titanium. Whenever titanium 
absorbs hydrogen above a threshold of 30-1 50 ppm, hydrides can form and create stress fields 
which reduce ductility of titanium and induce brittle behavior. For hydrogen embrittlement to 
occur, three conditions must exist simultaneously: 
1) the surface Ti02 layer must be compromised as an effective barrier against hydrogen, 
2) the temperature m.ust be above 353 K, 
3) a mechanism for generating hydrogen (such as dissociation of water, radiofysis of water 
or hydrogen impurity). 
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In addition to the hydrogen embrittlement issue, it is plausible that hydrogen would actually 
diffuse through the titanium and into the He-Xe working fluid of the reactor plant. This is 
hypothesized to be a particularly problematical issue since addition of hydrogen in the inert gas 
would irpset the equilibrium of oxygen, carbon and hydrogen believed to be critical to 
maintenance of satisfactory chemistry in the gas system. The result could have been extremely 
detrimental, and potentially catastrophic, for Ni-base alloys and/or refractory metal alloys that 
were proposed for use in the reactor core and power conversion system. However, at the point 
of project restructuring, it was unclear whether hydrogen would pose any problem for the He 
coolant as it was likely to diffuse through hot structural materials and escape into the vacuum of 
space. 
Other Materials Compatibility Concerns 
Carburization of structural materials may occur if carbon is either present as a working fluid 
impurity or is transferred between dissimilar metals through the NaK working fluid. 
Carburization of stainless steel embrittles the metal surface through grain boundary diffusion. 
Solid metal exposed to carbon and oxygen impurities in the NaK may also undergo 
sensitization, which occurs when carbon forms chromium carbide precipitates at the grain 
boundaries. While this does not increase the likelihood of corrosive attack by the NaK, it can 
negatively impact the material's mechanical properties. While at the low proposed gas cooler 
operating temperatures carburization would not have been considered a major threat to 
stainless steels and nickel alloys, it still could have been a concern for titanium alloys and would 
have been addressed during the proposed environmental testing. 
9.3.6 Heat Rejection System Fluid - impacts of Using NaK-55 Instead of Water 
Design and Operating Pressures 
The use of NaK-55 (45 weight % sodium and 55 weight % potassium) instead of water as the 
heat rejection system fluid results in significant decreases in design and operating pressures (all 
pressures cited below are absolute). The specified water pressures proposed are 10,500 kPa 
(1523 psia) for design and 5,000 kPa (725 psia) to 7,800 kPa (1 131 psia) in operation. The 
specified NaK-55 pressures proposed are 400 kPa (58 psia) for design and 276 kPa (40 psia) in 
operation. The reduced pressures with NaK may allow the use of compact plate-fin style heat 
exchangers rather than the larger and heavier alternatives (e.g. shell and tube or chemically 
etched plates) required to contain the higher water pressures and the use of reduced material 
thicknesses with resulting reductions in heat exchanger mass and volume. 
The direction of the liquid to gas pressure gradient will be reversed with NaK. The specified gas 
pressures proposed are 3,000 kPa (435 psia) for design and 1,000 kPa (145 psia) to 2,000 kPa 
(290 psia) in operation. This means that gas side pressure will be lower than water pressure 
but higher than NaK pressure. This reverses the likely direction of fluid to fluid leakage. 
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Fluid Properties 
The following are representative properties of water at gas cooler conditions: 
Density = 56 lbM3 
Specific Heat = 1 .O5 Btullb-F 
Absolute Viscosity = 0.4 Iblhr-ft 
Thermal Conductivity = 0.4 Btulhr-ft-F 
Prandtl Number = I. 1
The following are representative properties of NaK-55 at gas cooler conditions: 
Density = 54 Iblft3 
Specific Heat = 0.27 Btullb-F 
. Absolute Viscosity = j .O Iblhr-ft 
Thermal Conductivity = 15.1 Btulhr-ft-F 
Prandtl Number = 0.02 
Fluid Properties and Pump Power 
Pump power is equal to pump energy per unit mass of fluid multiplied by fluid mass flow rate. 
Pump energy per unit mass of fluid is equal to fluid specific volume times pump pressure rise 
divided by pump fractional efficiency. An increase in fluid mass flow rate results in a double 
penalty if system pressure drop increases due to the higher fluid mass flow rate. 
The specific heat of water is approximately four times the specific heat of NaK-55 meaning that 
the mass flow rate of NaK will be approximately four times the mass flow rate of water for a 
fixed heat duty and fixed terminal fluid temperatures. The ratio of volumetric flow rates will be 
also be approximately four as water and NaK densities are similar. For a fixed flow area, NaK 
velocity will be approximately four times water velocity while the Reynolds Number with NaK will 
be approximately 1.6 to 1.7 times the Reynolds Number with water for a given equivalent 
diameter. While the higher Reynolds Number will reduce the friction factor with NaK, the higher 
NaK velocity will still result in increased pressure drop due to friction relative to water for a given 
equivalent diameter and flow path length. 
These considerations' may be more of an issue for the liquid piping external to the gas cooler 
where the liquid flow path length is relatively fixed and the primary means to reduce pressure 
drop is to increase pipe diameter. Increased pipe diameter carries a penalty of increased pipe 
mass and pipe volume while increased pressure drop carries a penalty of greater pump energy 
per unit mass of fluid. Even for a fixed system pressure drop, pump power will still increase by 
the ratio of mass flow rates. Pipe diameter would have to be further increased to reduce system 
pressure drop from the baseline value with water to fully offset the impact of greater mass flow 
of NaK. 
The greater mass flow rate of NaK may have less of an adverse impact on heat exchanger 
pressure drop where a change in configuration to a more compact heat exchanger style could 
reduce flow path length or allow other modifications to mitigate the potential increase in 
pressure drop due to higher velocity. Pump power would still increase with NaK due to the 
increased mass flow rate unless pressure drop could be reduced from the baseline value with 
water to fully compensate. 
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Fluid Properties and Heat Transfer 
The dominant resistance to heat transfer in the gas cooler is the gas side film. While the 
significantly higher thermal conductivity of NaK relative to water will result in a greater 
convective heat transfer coefficient wiih NaK than water, the magnitude of the overall heat 
transfer coefficient will not be greatly enhanced because of the relatively low gas side 
convective heat transfer coefficient controlling the magnitude of the overall heat transfer 
coefficient. Also, the higher thermal conductivity of NaK will increase axial conduction which, 
while probably not a very significant factor, will actually adversely impact heat exchanger 
effectiveness. 
Fluid Compatibility 
The subjects of fluid compatibility and potential for corrosion are addressed in the materials 
section. The use of reduced material thicknesses due to reduced operating pressure with NaK 
is subject to an assessment of corrosion potential with NaK relative to water and the possibility 
of additional thickness required as corrosion allowance. 
9.3.7 Reliability 
Gas cooler reliability was evaluated by each of the vendors during the scoping phase of the gas 
cooler contract. Internal leakage and external leakage were identified as two mission ending 
failure modes. Blocked passages were also identified as another potential failure mode 
resulting in reduced component performance and possible mission termination depending on @ the extent of blockage. Hamilton Sundstrand performed an initial assessment of heat 
exchangers designed and operated by the company in a space environment as documented in 
Reference 9- 39. Using a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) prediction in conjunction with 
the operating data for Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) heat exchangers a 
gas cooler reliability over mission life was approximated at 97.5% for the chemically etched 
plate fin design proposed by Hamilton Sundstrand operating for 20 years. The operating 
temperatures for the Space Shuttle and ISS heat exchangers are significantly lower (-150 - 250 
K lower) than the Prometheus gas cooler operating conditions and would need to be evaluated 
in any future reliability assessments. 
A relative reliability comparison between various heat exchanger configurations and material 
options was provided by Holtec and Honeywell. In the Holtec comparisons mechanical 
properties and corrosion resistance were evaluated for stainless steel, titanium alloys and Ni- 
base alloys. If reliability is the main design consideration, Holtec identified the ~ i -base shell- 
and-tube designs as the best material design option at the expense of mass. 
Honeywell evaluated the relative reliability of both plate fin and shell-and-tube heat exchanger 
design configurations and Ni-base and titanium-base material options using a Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA). From a reliability perspective Honeywell identified a shell-and- 
tube configuration as the only acceptable configuration for a high temperature water-based HRS 
from their design experience. For a NaK- based HRS, a plate fin design was only considered 
due to the considerable mass savings of a plate fin configuration and lower operating pressures 
associated with NaK. They also evaluated both titanium-base and Ni-base material options 
from a reliability perspective. Corrosion, pressure overload and vibrations were identified as the 
@ three categories of failure mechanisms. A risk level was assigned to each of these failure 
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mechanisms for the material options, configuration and HRS coolant. A Ni-base shell-and-tube 
water design was identified as the design option with the greatest reliability/lowest risk and a 
NaK titanium plate fin design was identified as the option with lowest reliabilitylgreatest risk. 
In summary a shell and tube Ni-base design provides the best perceived overall reliability at the 
expense of mass. Chemically etched plate fin heat exchanger designs provide a substantial 
mass savings relative to shell-and-tube designs (see Section 9.3.9) and the mass benefits 
would merit further work in demonstrating reliability over the operating conditions envisioned for 
this component. 
9.3.8 Gas Cooler Siting 
Gas cooler sizing is based on the number of Brayton loops and system operations. The number 
of Brayton loops range from one to four, while system operations include multiple possible 
combinations of operating Braytons. Brayton full load capacity may be 100 kWe or 200 kWe and 
Braytons may operate at full or partial load. Possible combinations of Brayton loops and the 
resulting gas cooler are discussed in the following sections. The Scoping Phase was based on 
the heat balance of Figure 9-35 for a 444 Brayton configuration. 
Since the inception of the Scoping Phase, Project Prometheus work has progressed. The gas 
cooler development program was setup as an evolutionary process to facilitate the modification 
of plant operating and design and performance requirements as a result of NRPCT work since 
the initiation of the Scoping Phase. Other configurations have since been proposed and are 
discussed below. The NRPCT would have evaluated these configurations and modified the 
plant operating and design and performance requirements from the Scoping Phase to reflect 
this work and incorporated it into the Phase I Statement of Work. 
The following assumptions are made for the gas cooler configurations: 
800 kWth generated by the reactor 
200 kWe produced by the Brayton 
The gas cooler must reject the remaining 600 kWth to the Heat Rejection System (HRS) 
Redundant radiator loops are used -two pumped loops per radiator half 
The gas cooler may be over sized to accommodate the redundancy of radiator loops 
without using valves 
Normal operation requires the gas cooler to dissipate 600 kWth to the heat rejection system. If 
the gas cooler is not capable of dissipating 600 kWth, full power operation is not attainable. 
Reference 9- 38 reviews the redundancy of operationlfailure scenarios (Brayton failures, heat 
rejection loop failures) for each system architecture described below. 
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9.3.9 Mass Summary 
A summary of mass estimates for the designs provided by each of the four vendors is as 
follows: 
Table 9-16 Mass Summary for a Water Coolant Design (Total Gas Cooler Dry Mass in kg) 
Material HS - Plate-fin/ Honeywell Holtec 
Etched hybrid Shell and tube Shell and Tube 
Titanium alloy 42.6 11 8.8 NA 
Stainless Steel 57.2 NA NA 
Nickel alloy 60.3 217.5 407.3 
Differences in weights by vendors are based on several factors. Mass estimate differences 
cannot be fully accounted for, but several differences have been found in the Scoping Phase 
final reports. The following are cited as potential mass discriminators: 
A chemically etched design will be higher mass than a plate-fin 
Shell and tube will be higher mass than the chemically etched 
Welds are heavier than brazes 
Assumed corrosion rates affect thickness, and therefore mass 
Followed structural design basis code application (ASME, TEMA, Aerospace 
Standards) 
These mass estimates provided in Table 9-16 were based on the Scoping Phase requirements 
and heat balance shown in Figure 9-35. The vendor gas cooler mass estimates can be scaled 
to reflect work completed since the Scoping Phase. 
Table 9-17 through Table 9-22 show the results of scaling Honeywell and Hamilton Sundstrand 
gas coolers to current projected component design specifications. Section 4 provides the 
closeout non-optimized heat balances that establish these current design parameters. The 
change in mass is due to increases in required heat transfer by the gas coder from the primary 
loop to the heat rejection system, and increased water side temperatures and pressures of the 
heat rejection system. 
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Table 9-17: Gas Cooler Mass Estimates Scaled from a Titanium Shell and Tube Design 
1-1-1: 437.9 kg 
2-1-1 (Ion, 1 off): 437.9 kg 
2-2-2 (Ion, loff): 218.3 kg each, 436.7 kg total 
2-24? (2 at full capacity): 278.7 kg each, 557.3 kg total 
3-3-3: 139.3 kg x 2 + 278.7 kg x 1, 557.3 kg total , 
3-2-2: 278.7 kg each, 557.3 kg total 
4-2-2: 302.2 kg each, 604.4 kg total 
4-4-4: 151.1 kg each, 604.4 kg total 
Table 9-18: Gas Cooler Mass Estimates Scaled from a Titanium Plate-finlchemically 
etched Hybrid Design without a Barrier Layer 1 1-1-1: 157.1 kg 
2-I-? (Ion, 1 off): 157.1 kg 
2-2-2 (Ion, low: 78.3 kg each, 156.6 kg total 
2-2-2 (2 at full capacity): 100.0 kg each. 200.0 kg total 1 3-3-3: 50.0 kg x i + iO0.0 kg x 1: 200.6 kg total I - 
3-2-2: 100.0 kg each, 200.0kg total 
4-2-2: 108.4 kg each, 216.8 kg total ( 4-4-4: 54.2 kgeach, 216.8 kgiotal 
Table 9-1 9: Gas Cooler Mass Estimates Scaled from a Titanium Plate-finlchemically 
etched Hybrid Design with a Barrier Layer / 1-1-7: 290.6 kg 
2-1-1 (1 on, 1 off): 290.6 kq 
2-2-2 (lon, loff): 144.9 kg each, 289.7 kg total 
2-2-2 (2 at full capacity): 185.0 kg each, 370.0 kg total 1 3-3-3: 92.5 kg x 2 + 185.0 kg x 1: 370.0 kg total 
3-2-2: 185.0 kg each, 370.0 kg total 
4-2-2: 200.5 kg each, 402.1 kg total 
1 4-4-4: 100.3 kg each, 401.1 kg total 
Table 9-20: Gas Cooler Mass Estimates Scaled from an lnconel Shell and Tube Design 
1 7-1-1: 801.8 kg 
2-1-1 (Ion, 1 off): 801.8 kg 
2-2-2 ( I  on, I off): 399.7 kg each, 799.7 kg total 
2-2-2 (2 at full capacity): 510.3 kg each, 1020.5 kg total 
3-3-3: 255.1 kg x 2 + 510.3 kg x 1, 1020.5 kg total 
3-2-2: 510.3 kg each, 1020.5kg total 
4-2-2: 553.4 kg each, 1106.7 kg total ( 44-4: 276.7 kg each, 1106.7 kg total 
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Table 9-21: Gas Cooler Mass Estimates Scaled from an lnconel Plate-finlchemically 
etched Hybrid Design without a Barrier Layer 
I 1-1-11 222.3 kg 
2-1-1 (lon, 1 0%: 222.3 kg 
2-2-2 ( I  on, 1 off): 1 10.8 kg each, 221.6 kg total 
2-2-2 (2 at full capacity): 141.5 kg each, 283.0 kg total 
3-3-3: 70.7 kg x 2 + 141.5 kg x 1, 283.0 kg total 
3-2-2: 141.5 kg each, 283.0 kg total 
4-2-2: 153.4 kg each, 306.7 kg total 
44-4: 76.7 kg each, 306.7 kg total 
Table 9-22: Gas Cooler Mass Estimates Scaled from an lnconel Plate-finlchemically 
etched Hybrid Design with a Barrier Layer 
1 1-1-1: 411.3 kg 1 
2-1-1 (Ion, 1 0%: 41 1.3 kg 
2-2-2 (Ion, loff): 205.0 kg each, 410.0 kg total 
2-2-2 (2 at full capacity): 261.8 kg each, 523.6 kg total 
1 3-3-31 131.0 kg x 2 + 261.6 kg x 1, 523.6 kg total I 
3-2-2: 261.8 kg each, 523.6 kg total 
- 
4-2-2: 283.8 kg each, 567.6 kg total 1 4 - 4 4  141.9 kg each, 567.6 kg total 
9.3.10 Future Work 
A three phase gas cooler development plan had been envisioned to follow the Scoping Phase 
discussed. The next phase in the program would have been Phase I, a detailed gas cooler 
design. This design phase included initial design drawings with thermal, hydraulic, and 
structural analyses of the manifolds and internals. It would have been recommended that a 
minimum of two types of heat exchangers be included in Phase I. The two represented styles 
would have included a plate formed fin, chemically etched, or hybrid of the two, and a shell and 
tube design. 
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9.4 Piping 
9.4.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The baseline Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) incorporates a piping system which circulates 
He-Xe coolant through the reactor and closed Brayton energy conversion system. Hydraulic 
analyses have been performed which calculated the percentage APIP for various piping 
arrangements. When coupled with heat balance models, these analyses have shown that 
minimizing pressure drop is critical to maintaining the viability of the SNPP energy conversion 
cycle. The section of the piping between the reactor and the turbine required special design 
features to incorporate Ni-base superalloy pressure boundary. Due to the complexity of the hot 
leg piping design, further development efforts would have been required. The following sections 
- discuss the methods used to calculate the system percentage AP/P as well as requirements of 
the hot leg piping development effort. The major development area with respect to piping 
includes: 
The section of the piping between the reactor and the turbine required special design 
features to incorporate a Ni-base superalloy metal pressure boundary. As a result, in 
Reference 9- 78, NR approved the Reference 9- 77 NRPCT hot leg piping 
recommendation, which recommended the development of internally insulated Ni-base 
superalloy hot leg piping. Due to the complexity of the hot leg piping design, further 
development efforts would have been required to overcome challenges in material 
selection, manufacturability, modeling, testing, and the turbine entrance temperature 
measurement. 
9.4.2 Background 
The SNPP design incorporates a piping system which circulates He-Xe coolant through the 
reactor and closed Brayton energy conversion system. The piping is comprised of high 
pressure (-2 MPa (290 psi)) and low pressure (-1 MPa (I 45 psi)) sections. The high pressure 
sections include piping from the reactor to the turbine inlet, piping from the compressor outlet to 
the recuperator, and piping from the recuperator to the reactor. The low pressure sections 
include piping from the turbine outlet to the recuperator, piping from the recuperator to the gas 
cooler, and piping from the gas cooler to the compressor inlet. The following heat balance, 
generated from the NASA-Glenn Excel spreadsheet, SRPS-opt, shown in Figure 9-37, depicts 
the nominal operating conditions for the plant piping used in calculations. A number of 
additional nominal heat balances have been created since the heat balance was established, 
but the heat balance below is still representative of the likely design. 
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The piping from the reactor outlet to the turbine inlet, hereafter referred to as "the hot leg 
piping," would have contained the highest temperature gas and operated at high pressure. In 
the absence of a heat transfer barrier, the pipe metal temperature would approach the 
temperature of the coolant in contact with the piping. At temperatures above 900 K (1 160 O F ) ,  
Ni-base superalloys begin to significantly reduce their creep resistance and consequently lower 
material design strength. The reduced design strength can be be addressed by increasing ping 
wall thickness, but the mass of the system will increase. In addition, Ni-base superalloys may 
begin to decarburize at temperatures above 1050 K, leading to loss in creep strength and 
potentially contamination of refractory metal alloys exposed to the gas stream. As a result, the 
hot leg piping would have had distinctive design considerations which would not apply to the 
rest of the piping sections. The hot leg piping design is further discussed in Section 9.4.6. It 
should be noted that the turbine to recuperator piping section also contains gas at a 
temperature in excess of 900 K. However, the lower gas temperature and pressure (relative to 
the hot leg piping) and the ability to increase the wall thickness of this piping section likely 
preclude the need for additional control of pressure boundary temperature. 
The hot leg piping, along with the reactor inlet piping, must travel around or through the reactor 
shielding. In order to minimize the impact of neutron and gamma streaming through the piping, 
the piping outer diameter has been limited to 16 cm (6.3 in.) for the preliminary arrangement 
studies. In the plant concepts with multiple Braytons, the energy conversion system piping is 
limited to 10 cm (3.9 in.) in diameter to facilitate arrangements. These sires would have needed 
to be revisited and optimized as the design matured. 
9.4.3 Pipe Sizing Calculations 
Piping wall thickness calculations were performed for both straight piping and pipe bends to 
provide a preliminary estimate of acceptable pipe wall thicknesses. The wall thickness used in 
pressure drop calculations and mass estimates was conservatively based on the pipe wall 
thickness prior to bending, since these sections of piping require thicker walls to account for 
thinning due to bending (Reference 9- 69). Given a fixed outer pipe diameter, increased wall 
thickness decreases pipe inner diameter and increases pressure drop. Pipe sizing calculations 
were performed based on the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code for the straight 
sections of piping (Reference 9- 70). For pipe bends, wall thicknesses prior to bending were 
approximated by multiplying the thickness dictated the by the ASME B&PV Code by a bending 
ratio (Reference 9- 69). 
The minimum thickness of a pipe wall (t,), prior to bending, required for the system design 
pressure was calculated using the following equation: 
Equation 9-1 
where P is the internal design pressure (operating pressure), Do is the outside diameter of the 
pipe, Smt is the maximum allowable stress intensity from the Space Structural Design Basis 
(SSDB) (Reference 9- 71), y is a coefficient having a value of 0.4 (Reference 9- 70), C , a 
corrosion factor, has a value of 0.1651 cm (0.065 in.) and is the additional thickness for plain 
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end pipe or tubes for diameters above one inch (Reference 9- 70), and Rats is the bend ratio as 
defined in Equation 9-2 below from Reference 9- 69: 
Equation 9-2 R + OSD, Rat, = 
R 
where R is the bend radius of the pipe. 
For the base case material, lnconel617, the SSDB defines Smt for two separate temperature 
ranges as specified in Equation 9-3 and Equation 9-4 below: 
25.1966gT-40152 
Equation 9-3 (2.4820br-a654 . , 162.3 - 0.0078- T ( M P ~ )  1 
for 294K I T < 1002K 
2.5.19668T-40152 T 
Equation 9-4 248206r-8654.23) - t  EoL [ 2,&32o6r-86s4.23), 634.4 - 0.479. T 
for 1002K I T < 1200K 
where T is the pipe wall temperature in Kelvin and tEot is the time at end of life in hours. 
Table 9-24 below, presents several wall thickness values for varying bend radii and pipe 
operating parameters (temperature and pressure) which would have been experienced in the 
piping assembly for a mission lifetime of I 5  yrs (-132,000 hrs). It should be noted that these 
values are minimum wall thicknesses and additional phenomenon may occur which would could 
have required the wall thicknesses to increase, such as creep-fatigue interactions, irradiation, 
and thermal ratcheting. 
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where p is the fluid density (calculated using the ideal gas law), v is the fluid velocity, AL is the 
length of the pipe segment, D is the inner pipe diameter, and f is the fanning friction factor 
(Equation 9-6). The friction factor was calculated using the Barenblatt formula (Equation 9-6 - 
Equation 9-8) which represents the friction factor presented in the Moody diagram for Reynolds 
numbers in the following range: 3.07 x lo3  c Re < 3.23 x 1 o6 (Reference 9- 73). The Barenblatt 
formula assumes a hydraulically smooth pipe, which is a reasonable assumption for the range 
of Reynolds numbers encountered, since the pipe would have been polished. 
Equation 9-6 
where 
Equation 9-7 
and 
Equation 9-8 
such that Re is the Reynolds number as defined in Equation 9-9 below. 
Equation 9-9 PVD Re = -
P 
where p is the viscosity of the He-Xe coolant, which is based on the first order Chapman and 
Enskog correlation for estimating mixture viscosity, see Section 9.3. 
9.4.4.2 Pressure Losses Due to Dividing Flow Junctions 
Pressure losses due to dividing flow junctions were calculated utilizing data provided in Section 
73022 of Reference 9- 74. Equation 9-10 and Equation 9-1 1 were used to calculate the 
pressure drop for dividing flow junctions, with leg angte 8, as shown in Figure 9-38 and Figure 
9-39: 
Ql 
Figure 9-38: Dividing Y-Junction Schematic Figure 9-39: Dividing Angled-Junction 
Schematic 
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Data are presented for symmetrical Y-junctions as functions of flow ratio with the cross sectional 
areas in legs 1 and 2 being equal. The total pressure loss coefficient between leg 3 and leg 1 
(K3,) is given in Figure 1 of Section 73022 of Reference 9- 74. The corresponding loss between 
leg 3 and leg 2 (K32) can be found by reversing the labels on legs 1 and 2 and repeating the 
calculation. 
In a dividing angled-junction, the total pressure loss coefficient for Re3 > 200,000 between leg 3 
and leg 1 (&,) is given in Figures 2a to 2d of Section 73022 of Reference 9- 74 with the cross 
sectional areas in legs 2 and 3 being equal. The total pressure loss coefficient between leg 3 
and leg 2 (&) can be assumed to be unaffected by the geometry of \eg 1 and is given by 
Figure 3 in Section 73022 of Reference 9- 74 as a function of the flow ratio only. 
After the appropriate total pressure loss coefficients were found for either dividing Y-junctions or 
dividing angled-junctions, the pressure losses in legs 1 and 2 were found using the following 
equations: 
Equation 9-1 0 
and 
Equation 9-1 1 
where dPd,,epl is the pressure loss due to dividing flow in leg I, APd,teg2 is the pressure loss due 
to dividing flow in leg 2, and v~ is the fluid velocity in leg 3. Additionally, for all dividing junctions, 
it was assumed that the junction corners were sharp. 
9.4.4.3 Pressure Losses Due to Combining Flow Junctions 
Pressure losses due to combining flow junctions were calculated utilizing data provided in 
Section 73023 of Reference 9- 74. Equation 9-12 and Equation 9-1 3 were used to calculate the 
pressure drop for a combining flow junction, with leg angle 8, as shown in Figure 9-40 and 
Figure 9-41. 
Qz 
Figure 9-40: Combining Y-Junction 
Schematic 
Leg 2 QZ Leg 3 
- -43 
Figure 9-41: Combining Angled-Junction 
Schematic 
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Data are presented for symmetrical Y-junctions as functions of flow ratio with the cross sectional 
areas in legs 1 and 2 being equal. The total-pressure loss coefficient between leg 1 and leg 3 (K13) is 
given in Figure 1 of Section 73023 of Reference 9- 74. The corresponding loss between leg 2 and leg 
3 can be found by reversing the labels on legs 1 and 2 and repeating the calculation. 
In a combining angled-junction, the total-pressure loss coefficient for Re3 > 200,000 between leg 1 
and leg 3 (&) is given in Figure 2 of Section 73023 of Reference 9- 74 with the cross sectional areas 
in legs 2 and 3 being equal. The total pressure loss coefficient between leg 2 and leg 3 (K,,) can be 
assumed to be unaffected by the geometry of leg I and is given by Figure 3 in Section 73023 of 
Reference 9- 74 as a function of the flow ratio only. 
After the appropriate total-pressure toss coefficients were found for either combining Y-junctions or 
combining angled-junctions, the pressure loss in legs 1 and 2 were found using the following 
equations. 
Equation 9-1 2 
and 
Equation 9-1 3 
where APc,,,,l is the pressure loss due to combining flow in leg 1,  LIP,,,,^ is the pressure loss due to 
combining flow in leg 2, and v3 is the fluid velocity in leg 3. Additionally, for all combining junctions it 
was assumed that the junction corners were sharp. 
9.4.4.4 Pressure Losses Due to Pipe Bends 
Pressure losses due to pipe bends @Pb) were calculated using data provided in Section 83037 of 
Reference 9- 74. Equation 9-14 through Equation 9-22 were used to calculate the pressure drop for 
bends in circular ducts with turbulent flow (Re 2 4000): 
Equation 9-14 
where 
Equation 9-1 5 KS, ,  = K ,  + Kc  + K ,  
such that Kb is the friction loss in the piping, Kc is the friction loss due to the curvature of the pipe, and 
Kd is the loss due to reestablishment of fully established turbulent flow: 
Equation 9-1 6 K,  = 0 .079(~  I D) f
where 9 is the bend angle in degrees. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 9-1 17 
Equation 9-1 7' 
where E is the pipe roughness factor, which is assumed to be zero for a hydraulically smooth pipe. 
For R/D r 1: 
Equation 9-1 8 
and for RID < 1.: 
Equation 9-19 
where #, is the Reynolds number correction factor, Q2 is the downstream tangent correction factor, 
and q5 is the bend angle correction factor. 
Equation 9-20 4 =(1+104/Re)  
and 
T L  - ---r\ - m e -  d '  - /  * (R I DY 7 such that 4 is the distance to the next bend, tee, or component. 
Equation 9-22 @5 =1.04-[(I 1 0 - 0 ~ / 1 0 ' ]  
9.4.4.5 Pressure Losses Due to Valves 
Pressure losses due to valves were calculated using data for U D  values provided in the Valve 
Section, Section 9.5. In the various arrangements analyzed, both isolation and check valves were 
used which have U D  values of 13 and 115 respec'tively. Equation 9-23 was used, derived from 
Equation 9-5, with the above U D  values to determine the pressure loss associated with the use of 
isolation and/or check valves (LIP,): 
Equation 9-23 
9.4.4.6 Percentage AP/P Calculation 
The pressure drops, described in the sections above, were used to calculate the percentage AP/P for 
the piping system, defined in Equation 9-24. This percentage AP/P was calculated for various piping 
arrangements in order to compare hydraulic performance. 
Equation 9-24 Total%AP/P =1.2 ~ % A P / P  
p i p g  seclion 
AS mentioned in Section 9.4.4.1 the pipe is assumed to be smooth which sets E in Equation 9-17 equal to zero. 
I 
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where the total percentage A P P  is found by summing the individual percentage AP/P for each piping 
section and multiplying by 1.2 in order to add twenty percent margin to the percentage AP/P for 
conservatism. The percentage dP/Pfor each section is found using Equation 9-25: 
where APp,leg3, APhleg3, and APv,1eg3 are the pressure drops in leg 3 for the straight piping, bends, and 
valves, respectively, and the second component of the equation is the average of the pressure drops 
in legs 1 and 2 since these are parallel legs. APp,,egi, dPb,i, and L ~ P , , , ~ ~ ~  are the total pressure drop 
in legs 1 or 2 for the straight piping, bends, and valves, respectively, and APC,lwi and APd,legiare the 
pressure drops in legs 1 or 2 for either the combining or dividing flows, respectively, which is 
dependent upon the piping section being analyzed. P,,,, is either the compressor inlet or discharge 
pressure (1 or 2 MPa (145 or 290 psi)) depending on the piping section under analysis. 
The model divides mass flow between parallel legs such that the total pressure drop from common 
point to common point is equal through the two legs. In general, mass flow is not equal in the two 
parallel legs because the piping configurations are not identical, i.e. parallel legs often have an 
unequal number of bends with different bend angles and radii as well as unequal piping lengths. 
9.4.5 Piping Mass Estimates 
Mass estimates were performed to provide a preliminary estimate of the plant piping mass for various 
piping arrangements. The mass estimates for each arrangement were calculated utilizing an Excel 
spreadsheet analysis, by combining the masses of the straight sections of piping and the pipe bends. 
Piping lengths and bend specifications were obtained directly from the piping arrangement drawings. 
The total plant piping length was determined by summing the straight piping lengths with the 
equivalent straight piping lengths of bends. The equivalent straight length of the pipe bends was 
found using Equation 9-26: 
Equation 9-26 
where 8 is the bend angle (in degrees) and R is the bend radius. The mass of the piping was then 
determined using the following equation: 
Equation 9-27 
where p p  is the density of the piping, LS is the total straight piping section length, Do is the piping outer 
diameter, and t,,, is the pipe wall thickness from Section 9.4.3. The masses were calculated for each 
piping segment and then summed to provide the total mass for each arrangement. The mass of the 
insulating layer and liner were also calculated. For mass estimates, both the liner and insulation were 
assumed to be lnconel 617, with the density of the insulation being approximately 8.5% of that of the 
solid pipe. 
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There is a possibility of exposure to space-born chemical contamination from 
micrometeoroid impacts and gas particles in planetary orbits which are incompatible with 
refractory metals. 
Surface mission extensibility would be decreased since refractory metals could not be 
exposed to atmospheric constituents. 
A bimetallic pressure boundary joint would be required between the refractory outer pipe 
and the cast Ni-base superalloy turbine housing. 
Refractory piping requires either the reactor pressure vessel to be refractory metal or the 
addition of a second bimetallic pressure boundary joint at the reactor pressure vessel to 
the hot leg piping interface. 
Three wrought high-temperature Ni-base superalloys were identified as candidate materials for the 
hot leg piping: Inconel61 7, Haynes 230, and Nirnonic PE-16. Throughout the evaluation presented 
in Reference 9- 77, Inconel617 was used as a baseline to provide a common comparison. Although, 
all three Ni-base superalloys are considered equal candidates. 
To maintain sufficient material strength and creep resistance with a reasonable wall thickness, 
analyses determined that the Ni-base superalloy pressure boundary should be maintained at a 
maximum of -900K (1 160 "F)~,  which is shown in the material breakpoint curve presented in Section 
1.4 of Attachment B to Reference 9- 77. Reducing the pipe wall temperature from 1150K (1610 OF) to 
900K (1 160 O F )  reduces the required pipe wall thickness from 2.9 cm (1.1 in.) to 0.5 cm (0.2 in.). In 
order to maintain the hot leg piping wall temperature at 900K (1 160 O F ) ,  several concepts were 
developed which would reduce the wall temperature by adding additional paths of heat transfer 
resistance and/or cooling while protecting the pressure boundary from direct contact with the high 
temperature coolant. The hot leg piping concepts compared included four main variations termed 
internally insulated, counter flow, bypass flow, and stagnant gas layer which are described in 
Attachment A to Reference 9- 77. The remaining plant piping would have been below -900K (1 160 
O F )  and, therefore, this piping would not have required high temperature design features. 
For the internally insulated piping concept, approximately 15 kW (14.2 BTUls) total or 2 kW/m (0.6 
BTUls/ft) of heat must be removed from the hot leg piping to maintain an outer wall temperature of 
900K (1 160 O F ) ,  Attachment B to Reference 9- 77. As a result thermal management of the hot leg 
piping would have been developed as discussed in Section 10.3. 
9.4.6.2 Baseline - Internally Insulated Hot Leg Piping Concept 
In the internally insulated hot leg piping concept shown in Figure 9-43, the hot reactor outlet gas flows 
within a lined layer of ceramic or metallic insulation. 
- 
This is a reference value which could have changes in the future as the design evolved and more materials 
data become available. 
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consisting of slurry coating. This process is composed of dipping or spraying uniformly sized 
polystyrene spheres using ceramic oxide or metal-precursor oxides (single element or alloy precursor 
mixtures), burning out the polystyrene beads, and subsequently sintering the microspheres in a 
reducing and/or a vacuum atmosphere to fully densify the sphere wall. This results in uniform sized, 
thin walled, hollow spheres whose interior contains the process gas or a vacuum. Other alternative 
foams and insulation materials would have been evaluated and tested to determine their suitability for 
this application. Given the complexity of the foam insulations under consideration, a research plan 
would have been developed. 
9.4.6.3.4.3 Liner 
The purpose of the liner is to protect the insulation from the hot gas, which could possibly erode or 
break up the insutating structure, as well as minimize pressure drop by isolating the coolant from the 
rough insulation surface. The liner was not intended to act as a pressure boundary. Consequently, 
the material strength becomes less important, requiring only that the liner material can withstand 
1 l5OK (1 61 0 O F )  without deformation. 
There were two different liner material classes under consideration: a refractory metal alloy and a Ni- 
base superalloy. The refractory options consist of niobium, tantalum, or molybdenum alloys. The Ni- 
base superalloy options are the same as those for the outer pipe: lnconel617, Haynes 230, and 
Nimonic PE-16. -Considerations that would have affected liner selection include the performance of 
the material at high temperatures, material compatibility with the insulation, reactor core materials, 
and turbine, as well as the interface with the reactor and turbine. 
9.4.6.3.2 Manufacturability 
The purpose of a manufacturability study would have been to determine the feasibility of acquiring 
and assembling the hot leg piping. Manufacturability issues for the internatly insulated Ni-base 
superalloy hot leg piping include material availability, piping assernbjy, and component interfaces, 
including insulation containment and joining issues. 
9.4.6.3.2.1 Material Availability 
The foremost concern for manufacturability would have been material availability; procurement of the 
piping materials would have been required prior to testing and analysis of the hot leg piping concept. 
After material selection, vendor searches would have commenced, in order to determine the supplier 
for the piping sections including the Ni-base superalloy outer pipe and either a Ni-base superalloy or 
refractory metal liner and insulation. Piping and liner thicknesses and diameters would have been 
selected based on preliminary strength and creep data. Insulation thickness would have been based 
on preliminary heat transfer and energy balance calculations. Additionally, the favored insulation, 
sintered hollow metal microspheres, has only been made in small quantities for research purposes. 
More material development would have been needed before this insulation could have been 
manufactured in its final form. However, a vendor search would still have been required to establish 
the lead time and manufacturability concerns for the chosen insulation. 
9.4.6.3.2.2 Piping Assembly 
The piping assembly would have consisted of straight sections of piping with various bends and 
intersections as specified in the final SNPP arrangement. The outer pipe was intended to act as the 
pressure barrier for the hot leg piping. To ensure this, the annular insulation space between the outer 
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pipe and the liner must be maintained at the same pressure as the working gas. It was assumed that 
this pressurization would have occurred through leakage of the working gas through the liner slip fits. 
However, if the gas leakage into the annular space was insufficient, then an alternative leakage 
method, such as drilling holes into the liner would have been considered. While equalization of 
pressure across the liner was required, gas flow through the slip fits would be minimized. To maintain 
a consistent conductivity through the piping layers, the insulation would have been installed into the 
piping assembly in such a way that the density of the insulation was uniform throughout and the 
concentricity of the liner to the outer pipe was maintained. 
A manufacturing study of bends and tees would also have been necessary. Bends and tees in the 
piping increase the manufacturing complexity of the hot leg piping. Issues that would need to be 
addressed include variations in the outer pipe and liner wall thicknesses due to bending and the 
uniformity of the insulation in these bends. Increases in outer pipe, liner, and insulation thicknesses in 
tees would also need to be addressed. Bends and tees would have been manufactured in 
accordance with the SSDB which is based on the ASME B8PV Code. As with the straight pipe, any 
changes in density or thickness would affect the thermal performance of the piping, potentialty 
creating hot spots. 
9.4.6.3.2.3 Component Interfaces 
The hot leg piping joins the reactor outlet to the turbine inlet. Both of these component interfaces 
would have required significant development, including potentially the development of bimetallic joints 
and methods for insulation containment. At the reactor outlet there was the possibility of a bimetallic 
joint between an inner refractory metal alloy reactor vessel and the Ni-base superalloy piping liner, if a 
Ni-base superalloy was chosen as the liner material. Another dissimilar joint would have occurred 
between the cast Ni-base superalloy turbine inlet and the wrought Ni-base superalloy outer piping. 
Finally, should a refractory metal alloy liner have been selected, the end caps for insulation 
containment would have required bimetallic joints. 
These dissimilar metal joints have a propensity to form brittle intermetallic phases at elevated 
temperatures leading to joint embrittlement. Intermetallic formation can occur during joining by fusion 
weld processes or in service due to interdiffusion at elevated temperatures. lntermetallics must be 
avoided to ensure that joint integrity would be maintained over the life of the mission. Therefore, 
susion-weld processes are unacceptable and solid-state joining methods would have been explored 
for dissimilar metals because of the lower heat input. Another degradation mechanism associated 
with dissimilar metal joints and interdiffusion is Kirkendall void formation. These voids form as a result 
of atoms diffusing at different rates, with larger atoms typically diffusing more slowly than smaller 
atoms. If the differences in the diffusion rates are large enough, a significant amount of vacancies 
would have formed and possibly coalesced into voids. In addition to non-fusion welding studies, 
diffusion studies were recommended to study the formation of intermetallics, voids, and other long- 
term thermal aging effects. More detailed information on bimetallic joints can be found in Reference 
9- 81. 
Inertia (friction) welding, a solid state joining method, has been used to join refractory metal alloys to 
Ni-base superalloys at the Edison Welding Institute (EWI). Successful material combinations of Mo- 
47.5Re or T-l I I to Mar M-247 or Hastelloy X were joined in air with no adverse effects. However, 
detrimental metallurgical issues found in these joints included the production of small interdiffusion 
layers and intergranular cracking. A complete record of the results can be found in Reference 9- 82. 
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The thermal and hydraulic performance testing focuses on the radial and axial temperature profile of 
the piping and the pressure drop through the piping. Transients and thermal cycling would have also 
been included in this testing. 
The first and most basic testing to be performed on the piping would have been qualification of a 
straight section. CFD would have been used to model the flow of the hot gas through the piping as 
discussed above. In order to qualify this model, a straight section of the piping assembly would have 
been inserted into a high temperature helium loop. Pressure transducers would have been mounted 
at either end to measure the pressure drop through the piping length. Thermocouples, or other such 
measurement instruments such as infrared cameras, would have been utilized to provide the axial 
and radial temperature profiles. 
After the straight section of piping was qualified, the models for both bends and tees would be 
qualified. A straight section of piping with bends and tees would have been mounted on the same 
high temperature helium loop with pressure and temperature measurement capabilities as described 
above. If thermocouples were used, the spacing in these test sections becomes more important, in 
that no hot spots should be created by changes in density of the insulation as it is bent through the 
piping and tees. The use of infrared cameras should be evaluated, since these cameras can provide 
a continuous thermal image of the system, rather than discreet points as measured by thermocouples. 
9.4.6.3.4.2 Structural Testing 
Structural testing would have measured both the rupture and fatigue strengths of the piping, as well 
as have quantified the coupled thermal expansion and creep of the piping assembly. Coolant loss 
would have been the main failure mode for a direct gas cooled reactor, so the leakage from the test 
piping should be carefully quantified. The reactor would have undergone several dynamic loads; 
including launch and normal operational loads. Vibration and shock testing would have been included 
in the structural test program to account for these expected dynamic loads. 
As stated previously, the expected temperature of the He-Xe coolant in the hot leg piping would have 
been 1 150K (1 61 0 OF), with the outer piping operating at approximately 900K (1 160 O F ) .  Over the 
change in temperature from ambient to operational, thermal expansion becomes significant. Finite 
element models would have been used to explore various design variations. To qualify the model, 
strain gages would have been attached to the sections of the test piping to measure displacement. 
The information that would have been acquired from these tests consists of how much the piping 
assembly expands overall and how much each component expands in relation to each other. One 
area of concern would have been the slip fit between the liner and its interfaces with the reactor inner 
vessel and the turbine end caps. 
9.4.6.3.5 Turbine Entrance Temperature Sensor Placement 
The temperature of the coolant in the hot leg piping (Thd) may have been monitored to supply 
feedback for reactor controt or to determine overall system performance. It would have been highly 
desirable that the sensors making this measurement be as non-invasive as possible in order to 
minimize flow disruptions and discontinuities in the pressure boundary. The sensors may also have 
been required to meet a short response time if used as part of the reactor control scheme. The 
inherent response times of all sensors which were under consideration for measuring That were on the 
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Attaching the sensor in this way would require a known relationship between the temperature of the 
gas and the temperature of the outer pipe. The sensors need to see the temperature of the gas or an 
equivalent temperature from the pipe surface to make an accurate reading. The reason for the hot leg 
piping concept is to limit the amount of heat transferred between the inner and outer pipe. This woutd 
then reduce the amount of heat transported to the sensor causing the sensor temperature to lag 
behind the gas temperature significantly, see Section 9.4.6.3.5.1 for a quantification of the sensor 
delay time. 
For ultrasonics, the attachment block would become the sensing element, and the wire waveguide 
would transition to the block with an acoustic horn. This presents an additional challenge in that the 
block must be attached with enough pressure to maintain good thermal contact with the pipe, but 
small enough pressure to limit acoustic coupling between the block and the pipe. Depending on the 
composition of the pipe, a coupling layer may be required which would have slowed the response time 
of the system. Depending on the system response time, this approach may not be acceptable for 
responding to changes in plant conditions. 
Welding a RTD or thermocouple to the pipe would have been the least desirable option for attaching 
the sensor. Welding would require that the sheath be made of a material compatible with the pipe and 
would expose the sensing element to extremely high temperatures that could damage it. The weld 
joint would provide the lowest thermal time constant between the pipe and sensor but at a high cost. 
One related method, diffusion bonding the sheath to the attachment block and welding or fixturing that 
block to the pipe would be an alternative to welding if suitable materials could be identified. 
The simplest, and perhaps the best, attachment technique for optical pyrometry would be to probe the 
infrared radiation directly from the pipe surface, if the time delay associated with transient response 
was judged to have been acceptable. The fiber optic waveguide would then be fixed to a part of the 
spacecraft support structure and, not in direct contact with the pipe surface. In lieu of this 
arrangement, the optical fiber would have to have been fastened to the coolant pipe in such a manner 
as to maintain alignment but not conduct a significant amount of heat. The fixture would have been 
lightweight, as it would be neither load bearing nor intended to conduct heat; however, it would need 
to withstand vibration, resist sagging, and be chemically compatible with the pipe wall material for the 
life of the mission. 
The analytical "surfacen could be, but would not have been required to be a "blackbody cavity." It 
would be more advantageous to direct the fiber optic's collecting lens onto a flat surface a few 
centimeters in diameter. The acceptance angle of the lens would be set quite small, so as to allow for 
modest changes in alignment due to thermal expansion of components, vibration, or other causes. A 
small acceptance angle might also reduce concerns regarding stray reflected light, and/or sunlight. 
Alternatively, a more elaborate fixture would be made light-tight, or the fixture itself would serve as the 
shadow, preventing direct sunlight from being reflected into the pyrometer. 
An additional concept under consideration for the ultrasonic temperature sensor would have been to 
transmit the ultrasonic signal from a wire waveguide, through an acoustic horn into the inlet wall, and 
through another acoustic horn into a refractory waveguide in the gas. Figure 9-51 is a diagram of this 
concept. The internal refractory waveguide is notched since it serves as the sensing element. 
Optimal performance would have been obtained if the ultrasonic signals transmit through the turbine 
inlet where no pipe insulation or inner liner would be present since the turbine casing would have 
been a cast Ni-base superalloy. 
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The refractory wire inside the pipe would be either centered in the flow stream or attached to the inner 
liner surface. The wire waveguide would remain acoustically isolated from all other components both 
inside and outside of the pipe. Materials would have been carefully chosen for the internal waveguide 
and horn that would allow attachment to the internal surface and would not diffuse into the gas stream 
at elevated temperatures. The horn and waveguide materials on both sides of the inlet should have 
similar acoustic impedances to the inlet material in order to minimize reflections at 'the interfaces. 
Nonrefractory transmission wire \ 
Alternate fixturing of refractory coated sensing wire /'- Awustic Horns 
Turbine Inlet 
/ 
Insulation / I 
Ni Superalloy / 
Refractory coated sensing wire 
Figure 9-51: Through lnlet Transmission of Ultrasonic Signal 0' Again, the non-invasive requirement for the hot leg temperature sensor would have been balanced 
with the reactor control response time requirement in order to maximize sensor performance while 
minimizing the invasiveness of the sensor placement technique. 
9.4.6.3.5.1 Quantification of Sensor Delay Time 
A scoping analysis of the hot leg piping was performed in ABAQUS to quantify the delay time of 
external temperature measurement, This model made the same material property assumptions, 
thermal radiation parameters, and wall thicknesses provided in Reference 9- 77. Additionally, an 
inner wall convective heat transfer coefficient from the reactor plant transient model was assigned to 
provide the model conditions. 
The thermal transient studied was a gas temperature increase from 900 K to 1150 K over a period of 
I second. A plot of the transient temperature response of the inner and outer walls is provided in 
Figure 9-52. As shown in the plot, there is a very targe time tag in temperature response of the outer 
wall. It takes approximately 5000 seconds (-1.5 hr) for the outer wall to come within 2 degrees of its 
final steady state temperature. The inner wall responds more rapidly, coming to'within 2 degrees of 
its final steady state value in 415 seconds. 
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9.4.7 Future Development Needs 
The internally insulated Ni-base superalloy hot leg concept presented a number of significant 
development issues including: 
In order for the internally insulated hot leg piping concept to have adequately performed 
hydraulically, thermally, and structurally, appropriate materials would need to have been 
selected. In addition, the chosen materials would need to have met all system requirements 
and constraints. Material development efforts would have been required for outer pipe, 
insulation, and liner. 
The purpose of a manufacturability study would have been to determine the feasibility of 
acquiring and assembling the hot leg piping. Manufacturability issues for the internally 
insulated nickel superalloy hot leg piping include material availability, piping assembly, and 
component interfaces which include insulation containment and issues associated with joining 
the hot leg piping to both the turbine inlet and reactor pressure vessel outlet. 
The temperature of the gas in the hot leg piping may have to have been monitored to supply 
feedback for reactor control. It was desired that the sensors making this measurement be as 
non-invasive as possible in order to minimize flow disruptions and discontinuities in the 
pressure boundary. The inherent response times of all sensors which were under 
consideration for measuring the coolant are on the order of several milliseconds. Placing them 
outside the gas stream would have introduced a finite delay time for the temperature at the 
sensor location to reach equilibrium during a transient. This delay time would have depended 
primarily on the heat transfer properties of the piping configuration and would dominate the 
response time of the hot leg temperature sensor. The non-invasive requirement for the hot leg 
temperature sensor must therefore be evaluated against impacts on reactor control response 
time. 
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9.5 Valves 
9.5.1 Summary and Key Conclusions 
Isolation valves and valves that minimize reverse flow may be required if multiple Brayton units or 
shared heat exchangers are utilized in the Reactor Coolant segment of the Reactor module. During 
operations with an idle Brayton unit, valves are required to minimize reverse flow through the idle loop 
(to reduce the amount of gas bypassing the reactor) and to prevent counter rotation of the Brayton 
unit (a bearing concern). A Brayton unit bypass valve may be needed to terminate an over-speed 
Brayton unit transient caused by a complete loss of electrical load on an operating Brayton unit. 
The number and location of valves will impact system reliability, performance and mass, and could 
increase system and operational complexity. Large diameter, high temperature, low pressure drop 
valves may need to be developed that will meet the functional requirements of the Reactor Coolant 
segment. The number of valves should be minimized (pressure drop concern), valves should be 
located in portions of the system with the lowest operating temperatures (reliability concerns). The 
following provides a summary of the main conclusions: 
Gas valves which meet the preliminary functional requirements (high temperature, long life, 
reliable, large diameter) are not available commercially. Testing is needed to better qualify 
actual requirements. If the preliminary functional requirements cannot be relaxed, the valves 
would have to be specifically designed, fabricated, and rigorously tested to demonstrate 
acceptability at the conditions identified for the space reactor coolant segment application. 
Pressure drops across currently available check valves are unacceptably high. A low pressure 
drop, high temperature gas check valve that operates independent of gravity is needed for this 
application. An isolation valve with an appropriate control scheme may meet the functional 
requirements of and be used in place of a check valve. 
9.5.2 Valve Locations 
The number, type, function, location, and size of required valves would have ultimately depended on 
the selected system architecture for the Reactor module Reactor Coolant segment (number of 
Brayton unit loops and shared components - see Section 3). As stated in Section 6, the current 
SNPP heat balance assumed a check valve and isolation valve would be included at the compressor 
outlet. Valve location and function is dependent on the specific plant configuration. Isolation valves 
may eliminate the need for check valves. 
Section 3, System Archetecture, discusses the potential valve locations for several SNPP system 
architectures under consideration. The valve locations and combinations shown on the schematics do 
not depict all combinations of valves that could meet the segment functional requirements. Effects on 
overall system mass and pressure drop must be evaluated. 
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System valves range in sizes from 5 crn or 8 cm (outside diameter piping - the alternator cooling line) 
to 12 cm or 16 cm (outside diameter piping) for all other locations. 
Check Valves 
The primary function of a check valve is to prevent reverse flow to an idle Brayton unit. As discussed 
above, an isolation valve with the appropriate control scheme may be utilized to replace a check 
valve, if the pressure drop across a check valve is detrimental to system performance. Seat leakage 
specifications have not been determined, but a small amount of bypass flow may be beneficial in 
maintaining an idle loop warm. Bypass flow would need to be low enough not to overheat 
components in an idle loop. 
Check valves being considered include ball check valves, traditional disc check valves and butterfly 
valves. These valves need to operate independent of gravity. A ball valve consist of a light ball in a 
cage that "seats" upon reverse flow. 
System valves range in sizes from 12 cm to 16 cm (outside diameter piping). 
9.5.4 Functional Requirements and Design Challenges 
There were many demanding preliminary functional requirements and design issues identified for the 
various valve applications that would have challenged current commercial, aeronautical and space 
valve technology. Testing and further system analysis needed to establish minimum functional 
requirements for these valves. 
9.5.4.1 Key Design Goals 
The key goats for the valve designs are listed below and discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
Required Attributes 
Minimize mass and space envelope. 
Meet system requirements for pressure drop across valve and seat leakage. ' 
Valve sealed from the external environment to avoid gas leakage to space. 
Check and isolation valve stroke times meet system requirements. 
Construction materials are compatible with piping, system components and system 
temperature. 
Radiation hardened. 
Launch and operating load certified. 
Desired Attributes 
Minimize amperage or power draw of operator. 
Minimize number of weld joints and joint length. 
Minimize seat leakage to the maximum extent practical. 
e 
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9.5.4.2 Service Life 
Contingent upon the final mission, the overall service life was identified as a minimum of 12 years to a 
maximum of 20 year of maintenance free operation while maintaining functional performance and 
mechanical integrity. Based on pipe size, operational environment, and ambient environment this is a 
challenging requirement. Typically, a spacecraft design would include redundant valves, operators or 
systems to ensure that critical functions could be performed for this duration. Redundancy must be 
balanced against mass and space considerations for the overall spaceship. 
9.5.4.3 Valve Operational Pressure Drop 
The lowest possible pressure drop across each valve is required. As the pressure drop induced by 
flow through a valve increases, the required reactor thermal rating would also increase. A preliminary 
design goal of a maximum pressure drop across each valve type was 5 kPa, including the check valve 
applications. Isolation valves could easily satisfy this requirement since current technical references 
(e.g. CRANE Technical Paper 410, 1988 Editions and later) cite that gate and ball type isolation 
valves result in resistances equivalent to equal lengths of pipe UD ratio of S 8, but it could be a 
challenge or limitation for check valves. 
Preliminary concept and design efforts were terminated prior to obtaining formal vendor input on 
whether this value was practical or attainable for any or all valve applications. Initial values for valve 
loss coefficients, k-factors, were calculated in the following subsections. This work was performed in 
support of heat balance development, Section 6. For loss coefficient impact on plant heat balance, 
refer to the heat balance section. 
9.5.4.3.1 Check Valve Applications 
Without gravity, most check valve designs require a mechanical means of closing (e.g., springs). The 
in-line check type considered viable for space application is designed to be fully opened (backseated) 
at the minimum flow requirements, and fully closed with sufficient force to achieve seat leakage goals 
(not yet determined) at all flows less than the minimum required. This is necessary to reduce 
cycles/fatigue of parts and maximize maintenance free service life. Hence the design is a balance 
between the spring load required to close versus the flow area of the disc required to fully open. The 
maximum area of the disc is dependent upon the maximum allowable pressure drop permitted for the 
application. Based on available vendor data, a minimum resistance value, equal to the length of pipe 
UD ratios of around 1 15, seems achievable for larger diameters of pipe (16 cm and greater) but could 
be a challenge for the smaller diameter applications. 
The optimization of the design most likely would have required further overall plant development and 
analysis refinement, and a better understanding of expected isolation valve performance in this 
regard, so that the maximum available pressure loss available for the check valve application is better 
known. 
Other check valve designs were not evaluated. 
9.5.4.3.2 Isolation Valve Applications 
Valve types with low K values or UD ratios are required due to the need to minimize pressure drop 
losses to optimize and maintain system efficiency. Hence, standard globe-type valves, angle or in-line 
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these applications. 
9.5.4.3.2.1 Gate Valves 
Reference 9- 85 states that the flow resistance of a conventional gate valve wilt be approximately 
equal to a length of pipe 13 times the diameter of that pipe (UD = 13). Reference 
9- 85 cites page A-30 of reference 9- 87 for this information. An UD ratio of 13 with friction factors of 
0.01 I I to 0.0127 results in a K value range of 0.14 to 0.165 for gate valves in the 4 to 6-inch (10 to 16 
cm) sizes. Testing of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) 4-inch and &inch gate valves in 
clean, smooth stainless steel pipe supports these values. 
However, page A-27 of reference 9- 88 shows that K = 8 f, for conventional Wedge Disc, Double Disc 
or Plug Type Gate valves where there is no venturi effect or reducers used (P = 1, 8 = 0) and where ft 
= the friction factor at fully turbulent flow. Assuming that f, = 0.01 11 to 0.0127 results in a K value 
range of 0.089 to 0.102 respectivly or a equilvant UD ratio of 3. 
Since reference 9- 88 is primarily based on empirical data, the reduction in hydraulic resistance 
between the 1965 edition and the 1988 edition must be a reflection of improved design and fabrication 
practices for conventional gate valves, but the Naval Reactors Prime Contractors Team (NRPCT) 
cannot substantiate this performance with NNPP data. 
9.5.4.3.2.2 Ball Valves 
Reference 9- 88 shows that K = 3 ft for a Ball Valve with no venturi effect or reducers (B = 1. 8 = O), 
and with no shaft in the flow stream (UD = 3). Reference 9- 84 shows that the typical cv performake 
of a 2-inch Full Port Ball Valve used in aerospace applications in the full open position is 440. This 
resulted in calculated UD ratios between 6.5 and 8. 
Accordingly, NRPCT concludes that an UD ratio range from 3 to 8 seems practical and achievable for 
full open ball type Isolation valves in the 5 cm to 16 cm pipe sizes provided they have no shaft in the 
flow stream. 
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Table 9-26: Ball. BL 
Aerospace Ball Valve-Reduced Trim 
Aerospace Butterfly - 7% thick 
Aerospace Butterfly - 35% thick 
Aerospace Swinn Check 
Enertech DRV-Z Nozzlecheck 
Enertech DRV-Z Noulecheck 
Enertech DRV-Z Noulecheck 
Enertech DRV-Z Noulecheck 
Enertech DRV-Z Noulecheck 
Notes: 
:erfly and C 
Norn. Size (in.) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
.--- ......... --. 
2 
3 
4 
4 
6 
8 
eck va 
c v  
440 
131 
333 
1 54 
76 
123 
.-----.-- 
74 
I98 
237 
287 
772 
1694 
Space 
UD(min) 
6.6 
74.6 
11.5 
54.0 
221.7 
84.6 
, . -- - - - - . - . 
181.1 
126.6 
267.6 
182.5 
129.7 
82.6 
I .  Cv data for 2" aerospace valves obtained from Table 3.8.4.2~ of Aerospace Fluid Component Designers' 
Handbook, Volume 1, Revion D; Technical Documentary Report No. RPL-TDR-64-25 dated February 1970. 
2. Nominal Valve SizelC, Information for Enertech valves obtained from technical specification data 
available on internet for Model DRV-Z Nozzlecheck Vake. 
3. Pipe OD data obtained from Table 1 of Machinews Handbook, Twentieth Edition. 
4. d = D - (2 x t) where t for the Enertech Nozzlecheck valves is for Schedule 80 5L, 5U( and XS pipe 
and for the aerospace valves is for Schedule 40 5L, 5 U ,  and STD pipe per Table 1 of Machinevs Handbook, 
Twentieth Edition. 
5. K = 891 x d4/c/; CRANE Technical Paper 410-1988, equation 3-16 
6. UD = Klf, where f = pipe friction factor; CRANE Technical Paper 410-1988, equation 315. 
7. f = 0.01 11 to 0.0127 (per E. Clementoni e-mail dated 1011 9/05 2:38 PM). 
9.5.4.3.2.3 Butterfly Valves 
Butterfly valves generally have higher resistance than gate or ball valves due to the need to have the 
vane and stem in the flow stream. Reference 9- 88 shows K = 45ft for conventional butterfly valves in 
the 2-inch to 8-inch range (UD = 45), which is significantly higher than the UD ratios of gate and ball 
valves. 
However, there are design features and techniques that can be implemented to lower buttedy valve 
resistance values. Reference 9- 84 shows that the typical Cv performance for a 2-inch butterfly valve 
used in aerospace applications with a 7% thick vane is 333 and with a 35% thick vane it is 154, in the 
full open positions. This results in calculated UD ratio ranges of 11 to 13 for the 7% thick vane valve 
and 54 to 62 for the 35% thick vane valve. 
9.5.4.3.2.4 Summary - Isolation Valves 
An UD ratio of 8 for isolation valve resistance performance as identified in the later issues of CRANE 
Technical Paper 410 seems reasonable since both gate valve and ball valve current technology can 
support this level of performance. However, NRPCT cautions using this value as a design value since 
little-to-no margin will exist between operating performance and design criteria. Additionally, 
specifying an UD ratio of 8 as design criteria would preclude the consideration of using butterfly 
valves in the application. 
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Accordingly, NRPCT concludes that an UD ratio of 4 3 should be used for isolation valve resistance 
performance assessment because: 
1. NRPCT experience supports this level of flow resistance performance for 4-inch and &inch 
gate valves. 
2. It would potentially provide some margin between design criteria and operating 
performance, and, hence, margin to accommodate degradation of performance with time. 
3. It may permit the use or consideration of butterfly valves for the application. 
9.5.4.4 Fluid Leakage to Ambient 
All valve applications must 100% hermetically seal the working fluid from the ambient. It was intended 
to test all valves for leakage-to-ambient using Helium gas as the test fluid and to certify them to the 
lowest detectable leakage rate capable by technology. Leakage from any component or piping to 
ambient decreases the amount of available working fluid and reduces system efficiency. Accounting 
for gross leakage to ambient with a fluid make-up system would add a significant amount of mass and 
complexity to the spacecraft. 
9.5.4.5 Valve Seat Leakage 
The allowable seat leakage and leakage testing methods for the isolation and check valves were 
given as preliminary constraints. These limitations were driven by the heat balance for the plant. 
Testing and additional analysis is needed to determine required seat leakage limits. Some backflow 
may be beneficial to maintain an idle loop warm. 
9.5.4.5.t Isolation valve applications 
Isolation valve seat leakage was required to be minimized to the lowest level practical. This 
preliminary requirement reduces the impact on the overall system efficiency. 
Moreover, significant leakage past a shut isolation valve and check valve into an idle loop could cause 
reverse rotation of the Brayton unit, which could potentially damage the bearings. The amount of flow 
or bypass leakage to cause reverse rotation of an idle Brayton unit was not established, nor were 
means to "lock" the Brayton unit shaft to prevent rotation. However, "soft seat" materials most likely 
could not be used to accomplish this objective due to the operational and environmental conditions 
discussed in 9.5.4.6 and 9.5.4.7. 
Testing and additional analysis is needed to determine required seat leakage limits. 
9.5.4.5.2 Preliminary Check valve Seat Leakage Specification 
Check valve seat leakage was required to be minimized to the lowest level practical. A preliminary 
design goal of a maximum target value was Set to no greater than 0.5% of the mass flow rate when 
tested with helium per an established test method when seated with the baseline system dp of 
100 kPa. This requirement may be necessary to minimize the impact on overall system efficiency and 
prevent reverse rotation of a Brayton, although some allowable leakage may be desirable. 
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9.5.4.6 Operational ConditionslEnvironment 
The valves were required to operate in a high temperature He-Xe inert gas environment where 
friction, galling and wear (tribophysics) of moving parts are critical concerns. With the current plant 
design, the fluid temperature for all potential locations except at the turbine outlet ranged from 350K to 
600K. The temperature range for the turbine outlet location was identified as 875K to 950K, which 
posed serious challenges from the materials, operator, design analysis, and long term functionality 
viewpoints. Placing valves in the locations with the lowest possible operating temperature would help 
to negate the problem. 
The operating pressure range for all locations except at the compressor outlet location ranged from 
690 kPa to 2000 kPa. The pressure range for the compressor outlet location was identified as 1350 
kPa to 4000 kPa. These operating pressure ranges were not considered to be a significant design 
challenge. 
9.5.4.7 EnvironmentaIIAmbient Conditions 
Some of the main challenges in designing valves for a non-isolated space plant were the ambient 
conditions. The space environment is harsh in both temperature and radiation. These variables 
became amplified and more complex when plant temperature fluctuations and reactor radiation were 
added to the design environment. 
9.5.4.7.1 Temperature 
The plant design did not include a controlled environment or additional means of temperature control 
(e.g., coolinglheating jackets or coils) for valve operators. Employing either one of these features 
would have added mass and complexity to the spaceship. These valves will be housed within the 
reactor module. Prudent plant arrangement would be employed to minimize the extremes of the 
environmental temperature range to which the valves would be exposed. For all locations, except the 
turbine outlet, the ambient temperature range was identified as 200K to 500K. For the turbine outlet 
location the ambient temperature range was identified as 200K to 650K. These ambient temperature 
ranges posed challenges for valve operators and could preclude the use of solenoids as operators to 
actuate valve movement. 
9.5.4.7.2 Pressure 
The ambient pressure range was identified as 0 to 1 atmosphere. This pressure range was not 
considered to be a significant design challenge for valves or operators. 
9.5.4.7.3 Radiation 
It was not intended to include valves and operators in a shielded volume or space other than the 
reactor shield. Again, prudent plant arrangement would be used to attempt to provide some shielding 
for the valves and reduce the service life levels. However, preliminary maximum values of 0.833 giga 
rad (1 x 10' rad) and 1 x 1 o ' ~  neutrons/cm2 over a 20 year service life were initially identified for valve 
applications. Radiation levels of this magnitude would dictate material selections for construction of 
the valve and operator and mandate that operators and associated electronics be radiation hardened. 
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9.5.4.8 Valve Operators 
Since the system would have to be an autonomous design and additional hydraulic or pneumatic 
subsystems where not planned to be incorporated, any actuation of isolation or throttling valves would 
have to be via an electromechanical operator from a primary power supply voltage of 28 VDC. As 
discussed in 9.5.4.7, the environmentaVarnbient temperature and radiation conditions posed serious 
challenges for the design and development of any type of operator. The temperature range potentially 
limited the types of operators that could be used (e.g. solenoids) and the radiation environment 
mandated that all operators and associated electronics be radiation hardened. 
Additionally, for the turbine outlet location, the operational temperature of the fluid would necessitate 
that the operator be thermally isolated from the working fluid. Another design concern that existed for 
all types of electromechanical operators was the potting of electrical connections to the operator or 
the use of canned solenoids actuated across a pressure boundary. 
9.5.4.9 Materials of Construction 
Several challenges existed concerning selection of materials of construction for valves. To minimize 
corrosion and joining issues, the bodylend connections of the valves should be designed and 
fabricated using the same material as its connecting pipe where practical. This limits the available 
valve vendors because many commercial vendors are not familiar with analyzing and machining 
equipment with the materials under consideration under consideration (i.e., titanium or ni-base 
superalloy). 
Furthermore, due to the operational fluid environment, any material in contact with the working fluid 
must be compatible with the fluid and this environment due to concerns of material corrosion - 
contamination in the fluid stream and the potential to deposit these materials to other parts of the plant 
and other components. Due to this concern, ambient radiation levels and the ambient and operational 
temperature ranges, the use of "soft-seat" materials for seating surfaces (non-metallics) to achieve 
leak tight goals most likely would not be possible, and "hard-seat" materials, such as Stellite or 
Colmonoy, would be used. 
9.5.4.1 0 Design Basis 
It was intended to impose Section 3, subsection NH of the ASME Pressure Vessel and Boiler Code 
(PVBC) for the design of valves and other components in the reactor plant. This design basis is 
consistent with commercial "N" stamp nuclear components and mandates a thicker wall and hence, 
heavier components. Hence, the space gas reactor valve applications were potentially a merging of 
requirements and technologies between commercial nuclear "N" stamp valves and aerospacelspace 
valves. 
As a result, the majority of vendors that typically provide valves for aerospace and space applications 
were not familiar with the design requirements and analysis techniqueslcodes required by Section 3 of 
the ASME PVBC. Additionally, not all of the materials considered for the fabrication of space plant 
components were covered by subsection NH, and for those that were, there was limited high 
temperature parameters and guidance available (i-e., long term creep). 
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9.5.4.1 1 Pipe Diameter 
Valves used in relatively high temperature, light gas applications exist in the aerospace and space 
industries, but they are typically used in smaller and even fractional size piping systems (2 5 cm [2- 
inch] pipe diameter). The potential need for larger diameter pipe in the 10 cm to 16 cm outside 
diameter range was beyond the current commercial, aerospace, and space industrial gas valve 
applications. 
Valve and operator mass increase significantly, and the ability to maintain leak tightness decreases, 
with increases in pipe and valve size. Use of reducers or venturi body designs to reduce 
valveloperator size was not considered practical from a hydraulic performance viewpoint. 
Larger diameter valves have been used in land based High Temperature Gas Reactor applications, 
but these were one-of-kind designs where significant effort and cost was expended to design and 
qualify for the specific application. Additionally, the valves were relatively large and heavy designs 
with large electro-mechanical operators that could be maintained with periodic maintenance. 
Discussions with space valve vendors indicated that the service life requirements combined with the 
size and performance requirements were a potential merging of satellite (smalllfractional valves with 
long service life) and launch vehicle valve technologies (larger, high performance, but short life cycle 
valves). 
Minimizing pipe size would allow use of existing valve technology, lowered valve design costs, and 
improved valve seat tightness performance. 
9.5.4.12 Operational Cycles 
Based on the latest operating schemes, it was not expected for any valve to exceed 200 cycles of 
operation over a 20 year service life. Some cycling may be needed to ensure proper valve operation 
and to prevent binding. 
9.5.4.13 Thermal Cycles 
The valves will be subjected to thermal cycles and stresses induced by heat-ups and cool-downs. It 
was anticipated that approximately less than 5 testing and additional analysis is needed to determine 
required seat leakage limits, 0 heat-uplcoot-down cycles would be experienced between the 
temperature extremes identified in Section 9.5.4.6 for each potential valve application. At least one 
heat-up cycle will occur from the minimum temperature specified in Section 9.5.4.7.1 to the maximum 
temperature specified in Section 9.5.4.6 for each potential valve application. 
9.5.4.14 Launch and Operating Loads 
  he valves will be subjected random high amplitude vibrations and the associated mechanical loads, 
and shock loads, during launch into space. They will also be subject to mechanical loads during 
transport and operation (normal, transient and vibration). All components must be certified to the load 
ratings as specified in the Environmental Requirements Document, Reference 9- 89. 
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9.5.4.15 Position Indication 
Isolation valve applications will require remote position indication to monitor the full open and full 
closed status of the isolation valves. If throttle valves are needed, they will require remote position 
indication to monitor the full open, full closed and intermediate positions. The intermediate positions 
should be monitored to the nearest tenth of a percent. The required input and feedback electronics 
necessary to accommodate the proposed valve position indication instrumentation needs to be 
identified by valve vendors. 
9.5.5 Potential Failure Modes 
Additional and new failure modes are introduced with the use of valves that could impact plant 
performance and operation. Table 9-27 provides an outline of the most probable valve failure modes 
and potential causes for the SNPP application. Some of these items are discussed in more detail 
below. These have been accounted for in Section 7 reliability evaluation. 
9.5.5.1 Seat Leakage 
Leakage of fluid past valve seats into an idle Brayton loop could lower the plant efficiency. If 
significant, this would be accounted for by increased radiator sire and mass. In addition, it could 
cause reverse rotation of an idle Brayton unit and cause damage to the gas foil bearings. Seat 
leakage specifications have not been determined, but a small amount of bypass flow may be 
beneficial in maintaining an idle loop warm. Valve body and seat design, valve body and seat 
materials, and operator loadlthrust capability must be sufficient to last the service life in the 
operational and ambient environments identified. This is so that deformation or deterioration over time 
does not cause a significant impact to plant efficiency. 
Additionally, particulates in the fluid stream must be minimized since it could cause accelerated seat 
erosion and interference between seating surfaces. 
9.5.5.2 Leakage to Ambient 
Leakage of cooling fluid impacts plant efficiency. Accounting for this leakage with a fluid make-up 
system adds mass and complexity to the spacecraft. Gross leakage could cause plant failure. The 
most probable locations for leaks are along valve stems. This can be minimized by utilizing welded 
valve caps with canned operators. 
9.5.5.3 Sticking in the Shut PositionlFailure to Open 
If an isolation valve is stuck in the shut position it would prevent a standby Brayton unit from starting 
and would preclude bringing the loop on-line. If a check valve stuck in the closed position it would 
render that loop unusable. 
Radiation hardening of the valvefoperator and associated electronics, minimizing operator seating 
force, prudent selection of valve body and seating materials, and locating the valves in the regions of 
the plant with the lowest system and ambient temperatures would help mitigate this failure mode. 
Also, periodically cycling the valves during the service life could help mitigate the mechanical failure 
mode of sticking between seating surfaces, and would provide assurance that the valve and operator 
are functioning, although this action would introduce a potential for failure. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 9-148 
9.5.5.4 Sticking in the Open PositionIFailure to Close or Partial Closure 
If an isolation valve stuck in the open position it would preclude the ability to isolate a loop. Also, if it 
partially closed, it would significantly increase system pressure drop thereby reducing system 
efficiency and could result in stalling an operating Brayton unit. If a check valve stuck open, it would 
lower plant efficiency. The potential causes and actions to mitigate this failure mode are consistent 
with those discussed in 9.5.5.3. 
9.5.5.5 Wear ParticlesIMaterial Introduction to the Fluid 
Material contamination into the fluid stream would cause a decrease in system efficiency, and 
because of the potential to be deposited to other surfaces and components, could increase the 
likelihood of overall system failure. Both wear of contacting parts and material deterioration due to th le 
high temperature and radiation environment could cause material contamination into the fluid stream. 
Prudent design, selection and qualification of materials and valves, radiation hardening of equipment, 
and locating the valves in the regions of the plant with the lowest system and ambient temperatures 
would help mitigate this concern. Additionally, minimizing the overall number of cycles of valve 
operation would minimize mechanical wear, but this action would have to be leveraged with the 
potential mitigating action discussed in 9.5.5.3 of occasionaliy cycling valves to assure they are 
functioning. 
9.5.5.6 Electromechanical Operation 
Failure of the electro-mechanical operator would render the isolation valve inoperable. Depending on 
the valve design and its position at time of the failure, this could cause the valve to stick shut and fail 
to open, stick open and fail to close, or stick somewhere in the mid-position. The consequences of 
these valve failure modes are discussed in 9.5.5.3 and 9.5.5.4. 
Degradation of materials used for insulation, windings, coils and other electronic parts due to the 
radiation and temperature environments could cause electro-mechanical operator failure. 
Temperature variations also affect winding resistance and could affect operator function. Proper 
selection of materials, radiation hardening of all electronics, and testing to confirm the appropriate 
level of radiation hardening would be required to mitigate failure due to the radiation environment. 
Proper selection of materials and operator type, and prototypic testing would be required to mitigate 
failure due to the ambient temperature environment. Prudent plant design and arrangement would 
provide shielding from radiation sources. Placing valves in locations with some degree of temperature 
control or reduced variation would also be required to mitigate electro-mechanical operator failure. 
9.5.6 Summary 
The preliminary functional requirements specified for the space gas valves were beyond the current 
state-of-the-art of commercialand aerospace valve technology. As such, the valves would have to be 
specifically designed, fabricated, and rigorously tested to demonstrate acceptability at the conditions 
identified for the space application. Including provisions to ensure that quality is designed and built 
into the valves, performing prototypic qualification test programs both independently on the valves and 
as part integrated testing with sub-systems, and prudent plant design and arrangements would all be 
required to mitigate potential failure modes and assure long-term valve functionality. 
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The valve equipment would be required to be NASA launch certified, but may also be required to be 
designed to Section 3, subsection NH of the ASME Pressure Vessel and Boiler Code, which is 
consistent with commercial nuclear "N" stamp component design requirements. This application also 
required a merging of space valve technology between that used on launch vehicles with that used in 
satellites. As such, the NRPCT considered solicitation of concepts from vendors who not only have a 
history of providing gas valves that have satisfied NASA requirements for launch vehicles and 
satellites, but who also have experience in supplying valves for commercial or Naval Nuclear 
applications. Capability to analyze and fabricate valves using the materials required for the SNPP 
application, in-house Quality Control standards satisfying a minimum of IS0 9000 standards and 
requirements, and familiarity with NNPPIDOD contracts terms and conditions were additional 
characteristics used as a criteria for vendor selection for the space gas valve conceptual study. 
Failure Mode 
Leakane Modes 
-Across seats 
-Through Wall 
Operational Modes 
-Sticks in the Open, 
Closed or Mid- 
position. 
Table 9-27: Failure Mode S 
Consequence 
-Lowers overall plant efficiency 
-Could cause reverse rotation of 
Brayton unit 
-Lowers overall plant output 
-Could render a loop unusable or 
cause plant failure 
-An isolation valve sticking open 
would preclude the ability to isolate 
a loop 
-A check valve sticking open would 
lower overall plant efficiency 
-An isolation valve sticking shut 
would prevent a standby Brayton 
unit from starting and bringing the 
loop on-line 
-A check valve sticking shut would 
render that loop unusable 
-If either type valve stuck partially 
open it would lower plant efficiency 
and could stall an operating 
Brayton unit 
nmary 
Potential Causes 
-Erosion 
-Corrosion 
-Scoring, spalling, fretting, wear, 
cracks 
-Particle interference 
-Valve seat distortion 
-Improperly seating disc 
(misalignment) 
-Improper contact or contact loads 
-Erosion 
-Corrosion 
-Poor welds 
-Rupture, cracking, structural failure 
(due to creep, fatigue, shock, 
meteorite impact, etc.) 
-Mechanical binding of contacting 
parts due to misalignments, 
corrosion, galling, chemical 
precipitation or thermal expansion in 
either the full open or full closed 
positions 
-Differential thermal expansion of 
seating surfaces 
-0vertorquedlloaded in the open or 
closed seats 
-Operator failure 
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- DisdBallNane 
detachment or 
stemlattachment 
part fracture. 
- Electro-mechanical 
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-Render any valve type inoperable, 
and one of the Consequences for 
sticking open, closed or mid- 
position would occur 
Operator Failure 
-Structural failure of retaining 
deviceslparts 
- Fatigue 
-0vertorquinglLoading 
-Render any valve type inoperable, 
-Corrosion 
-Degradation of insulation, coils or 
and one ofthe con-sequences for 
sticking open, closed or mid- 
position would occur 
windings due to environmental 
temperatures and exposure to long- 
term, high levels of radiation 
-Affect on resistance of coils/windings 
due to environmental temperature 
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9.6 Heat Rejection Segment 
9.6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The heat rejection segment (HRS) couples with the gas coolers to reject the Brayton energy 
conversion cycle's waste heat. Northrop Grumman Space Technologies (NGST) was the Project 
Prometheus design agent for this system with government oversight and concurrence from NASA 
Glenn. The NRPCT also retained design concurrence for this system from our role as the space 
nuclear power plant design lead. Reference 9- 89 describes the NGST description of this system 
prior to project termination. 
The heat rejection segment consists of a fluid loop that transports heat from the gas cooler to heat 
pipe radiator panels rejecting waste heat to the space environment. The base case heat rejection 
segment architecture at project termination consisted of: 
Two independent heat rejection assemblies 
An operating and redundant high temperatureihigh pressure heat transport water loops per 
heat rejection assembly 
Radiator panels consisting of gas loaded TilH20 heat pipes with CarbonlCarbon fins joined to 
the heat transport loops. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from conceptual development and segment integration with the 
Reactor Module. They are: 
A large number of heat transport loop coolants were studied during Project Prometheus. 
Water and Sodium-Potasium alloys (NaK) were the only two coolants that Met the functional 
requirements. 
The interface of this segment to the Reactor Module requires significant integration to resolve 
key tradroffs for reducing mass, spacecraft size, and project risk. Key integration items include 
the heat transport loop coolant and ducting materials that interface with the gas cooler, start- 
up and normal operational stragety, radiator mass versus temperature capability, heat load 
capability, and size. 
Continued research is required to understand high temperature water heat pipe performance 
and life capability needed for this application operating at relatively high power throughput and 
evaporator surface heat flux. 
The design requirements for this heat rejection system needed a significant amount of 
continued definition by analyzing the space nuclear power plant potential system design 
events. This would allow for whether protection actions were required to allow for recoverable 
credible design events scenarios. 
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into the heat pipe for low maximum ( - 4 0  w/cm2) radial heat flux. The saddle (yellow structure on 
figures) is constructed of POCO graphite foam brazed to the heat pipes, heat transport loops, and C- 
C fins. NASA Glenn is working to define braze materials. The fluid in the heat pipes most likely need 
to be filled after the radiator panel is constructed due to these braze processes occurring at high 
temperatures. The capability of having a low temperature (~540K) bonding technique would be 
preferred over brazing if such a material existed that would be thermally stable at 500K for the mission 
life. 
For start-up considerations, the current driving requirements are to keep the fluid in the ducts thawed 
with requiring less than -1 kWe of survival heater power. If assuming the full heat rejection segment 
with all radiator area is maintained at 300K (sufficient temp above freezing point 273K), the heater 
power required for a potential space sink temperature of 200K would be 20% of the normal heat 
rejected power, or 120kWe. This is clearly unacceptable. Heat pipes with a small amount of non 
condensable gas (Ar, Ne, Kr), referred to as a gas loaded heat pipes are used to effectively turn off 
the heat flow through the heat pipes at a determined temperature not allowing the heat rejection 
panels to be maintained at the loop temperature. This gas loaded heat pipe characteristic allows for 
low required survival power of -1 kWe needed to maintain the ducts thawed. At this cold "survival" 
condition, the non condensable gas expands due to the water vapor pressure being very low, 
preventing the water from being transported to the condenser. The current design allows for the heat 
pipe to effectively impede transporting heat below 31 3K1 and is effectively fully operational over the 
'entire condenser length above 343K. 
The heat pipe technology currently being assumed is based on the NGST slab wick design with radial 
groveslthreads in the evaporator to allow for a "boiling tolerant" wick. This technology has not been 
fully disclosed to NRPCT, though has been developed specifically for the Prometheus project under 
IRAD funding. Heat pipe power capability analysis has been performed at KAPL on the NGST heat 
pipe (Reference 
9- 92). This analysis shows that the current Icm OD heat pipe design barely supports initial normal 
steady state conditions. Later in the missions life, the radiator may degrade (heat pipe failures, 
decreases in emissivity) leading to the heat rejection segment operating at a higher temperature, 
while also needing to transport more power (heat flux) due to the system being less efficient to 
generate design electrical power. The current performance margin (power, temperature) of this design 
seems unacceptable. 
Figure 9-60 and Figure 9-61 shows the geometry and estimated performance and operating curve of 
the NGST designed heat pipes. If the heat pipe operated above this capillary limit, the heat pipe 
evaporator would dry out, stopping heat transport and potentially freezing the water in the condenser 
of the heat pipe leading to an unrecoverable equipment failure. This could also cascade through the 
radiator failing all heat pipes. Further plant transient analysis with a detailed gas loaded heat pipe 
model developed from prototypic heat pipe testing is needed to evaluate this scenario. 
The required radiator area is determined from the following key assumptions. The full design heat 
balance has been selected to have the capability of reaching full electrical power with 5% of the heat 
pipes failed, and a space effective sink temperature of 200K for the entire radiator surface area. 
Another 10% margin is built into the radiator to handle uncertainty of the heat load to the heat 
rejection segment from the energy conversion subsystem. 
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9.6.3 Failure Modes 
The foHowhg failure modes have been considered and are being used to mitigate mission failure. 
9.6.3.1 Launch / Deployment Failure Modes 
Launch loads - Launch loads could cause a fluid loop rupture if this fluid line was not supported 
effectively. Greater than two loop failures would lead to mission failure. The launch loads could also 
debond dissimilar material joints if the bond strength or process control was insufficient. This would 
lead to degradation of the radiator panel effective surface area, which has limited degradation margin. 
Survival heater failure - Loss of electrical power to the heaters, either by loss of the solar power, or 
energy storage would lead to all loops freezing, and likely mission failure. The survival heater circuits 
are currently redundant on each loop. 
Panel/ Boom Deployment - The boom and heat rejection panel deployment is needed prior to 
reactor start-up. If there are deployment failures, the available heat rejection area would be affected, 
degrading the maximum heat rejection power capability. The deployment technology envisioned has 
not been reviewed by the NRPCT team, though had been studied by NGST IRAD funds prior to 
winning the JIM0 Phase A contract. 
9.6.3.2 Normal Operation Failure Modes 
Loss of heat transport circulation - The loss of fluid circulation could occur from pump failure(s), 
check valve failure to openkhut on a pump switch, loss of the pump controller(s), fluid leak to space, 
or from a loss of pressure control (accumulator failure). 
Fluid leak to space - Losing fluid inventory to space is the most likely failure mode of the proposed 
system. Orbital debris and micrometeoroid (MM) damage could fail the relatively large projected area 
of ducting. The flexible joints are of concern due to the deployment, and added risk due of MM 
damage from the increased envisioned duct diameter and the potential unavailable use of standard 
MM shielding. Other sources include having a weld failure, or the pressure relief valves or burst disk 
failing. 
Accumulator Failure - The accumulator includes metal bellows to allow for coolant expansion and a 
gas charge to maintain system pressure in an appropriate banc. A gas or water leak to space or a gas 
leak to the fluid would be a failure of this component leading to a loop failure. 
Heat Pipe Failure - Failures of the heat pipes can occur from a variety of known modes, and 
unknown modes. The known failure scenarios for this application include micrometeoroids impacts 
leading to loss of fluid inventory, materials chemical stability including build up of non condensable 
gas and mass transport of corrosion products to the evaporator, and an over temperature (over 
power) leading to evaporator dry out from exceeding the heat pipes capillary limit. 
Over Power- Over Temperature - The over temperature scenario as discussed in the previous 
failure description could lead to a cascading effect that would fail all heat pipes on one side of the full 
radiator, leading to loss of mission. Heat pipe transient testing in a simulated environment is needed 
to examine the capability for the heat pipes to reprime once the coolant loop cools. Plant transient 
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simulations of credible casualty scenario would need to be evaluated to understand the over 
temperature capability needed to be built into the heat pipe design. 
9.6.4 Future Development Needs 
Continued research is required to understand high temperature water heat pipe performance 
capability needed for this application operating at relatively high power throughput and evaporator 
surface heat flux. The heat pipe design had no test data / operating experience that supported the 
proposed heat pipe design, only analytical performance modeling. A development program by NASA 
Glenn and NGST was in place to address the technology gaps and develop refined component and 
system designs that would have lead to a fully functional / reliable system architecture. The design 
requirements for the heat rejection segment needed a significant amount of continued definition by 
analyzing the space nuclear power plant potential system design events. This would allow for 
whether protection actions were required to allow for recoverable credible design events scenarios. 
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9.7 Thermal Stress Analysis of Hot Leg Piping 
9.7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Analyses have been performed of a pre-conceptual four Brayton hot pipe arrangement. The 4-44 
(revision 2b) system arrangement which is discussed in Section 5.4.6 of this report was analyzed. 
These analyses assess the effects of piping wall thickness, primary support structure temperature and 
material, and the piping support flexibility on primary (pressure) and secondary (thermal) stress levels. 
Piping stress equations and limits are taken from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code 
Section Ill Div I - NB (Reference 9- 70). lnconel 617 was used for the piping material. The material 
design strength of this material are taken from the Space Structural Design Basis (SSDB) (Reference 
9- 47). 
A 3D beam element finite element model (FEM) was analyzed using the commercial code ABAQUS 
to obtain beam section moments at each point in the hot leg piping. These section moments have 
been used in spreadsheet calculations to determine the primary stress intensity and primary plus 
secondary stress intensity range values using the ASME NB pipe stress equations. 
Important conlusions made from this analysis include: 
When the piping is assumed to be rigidly connected to the primary support structure the resulting 
pirrnary plus secondary stresses are as high as eight times the ASME piping stress limits. In 
addition, the piping support flexibility study indicates that when the stiffness of the connectors are 
decreased to obtain a reasonable primary plus secondary stress level during operations, the result 
is an unsatisfactory low piping natural frequency for launch which is one fourth the acceptable 
leve I. 
The flexibility in the secondary support of the piping will not be sufficient in reducing thermal 
stresses in the hot pipe. The secondary supports are the the structural connections between the 
primary structure of the spaceship to the components of the reactor plant and energy conversion 
system. It is likely that the conclusions made in this analysis would be the same for a system with 
fewer Brayton energy conversion units. A smaller system would likely have shorter piping runs, 
but the differential thermal expansion between the piping and structure per length of piping would 
be the same if the operating temperatures are the same. Possible methods of designing around 
this issue are discussed below. The cold leg piping would have the same issues since the 
arrangement is similar and expected operating temperature is close to that of the hot pipe. The 
other piping sections have not been assessed in this analysis. 
The primary support sensitivity studies show that, high thermal stresses in the hot piping cannot 
be avoided solely through the use of a higher coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) primary 
structure material andlor a higher primary support structure temperature. 
A number of stress relief methods could be considered as options but have not been explicitly 
evaluated, including: 
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FloatingISliding support at the Braytons and energy conversion components which are 
locked during launch and released during operation may be required. When they are 
released, the support will allow the approximately 3cm required by the piping expansion. 
Releaseable piping support collars along piping length. 
Use of more flexible piping elements such as Bellowed piping bends or increased numbers 
of expansion loops and bends in the piping. 
Pre-stressing the piping such that the stresses will be partially relieved during normal 
operations. This will reduce the stresses at the operating point of higher temperature and 
lower design strength. 
It can be concluded that the structural design and analysis of the piping systems will be a significant 
effort. Balancing the competing factors of relief of thermal expansion stresses and providing sufficient 
structural support for launch would be a significant effort. This effort although challenging is not unlike 
the problems encountered during the design of other power piping systems. 
9.7.2 Analysis Results 
A number of sensitivity studies have been performed which investigate the effects of changing piping 
wall thickness, secondary support stiffness, and structure material and temperature on the ASME 
primary and primary plus secondary stress limits discussed above. A summary of the cases run is 
listed in Table 9-32. The primary stresses are only evaluated for the wall thickness study, because 
the primary stresses are not dependent on the other parameters studied. For all of the results tables, 
the minimum, average, and maximum stress values refer to the minimum, average, and maximum 
stress intensity values at all of the element nodes evaluated in the model. It is presented in this form 
to better comprehend the distribution of stress values. 
The base case parameters listed in this table are taken from Reference 9- 93. The base case 
assumptions are: 900 K piping temperature, 400 K structure temperature, Titanium alloy structure 
material, piping 8 cm outer diameter (OD) and 0.8 crn wall thickness, and infinitely stiff secondary 
supports connecting piping to the primary structure. For these base case conditions, the primary 
stress intensity limit is met, but the primary plus secondary stress intensity range exceeds the the limit 
by about a factor of eight. The results are shown in Table 9-29, Figure 9-62, and Figure 9-63. 
Table 9-29, Figure 9-62, and Figure 9-63 also include the results for the piping wall thickness study. 
The primary and primary plus secondary stresses decrease with increasing wall thickness. For this 
study the wall thickness is decreased from 8 cm to 3 cm. The primary stress limit is exceeded for the 
3 mm case. The primary plus secondary stress limit is exceeded for all cases. Thinner walls were 
evaluated in this study because of mass concerns with the piping. 
Table 9-30, Figure 9-64, and Figure 9-65 show the results from the primary structure temperature and 
material study. The base case structure temperature is increased from 400 K to 600 K. The primary 
plus secondary stresses were reduced to approximately six times the limit. This study was repeated 
to determine if designing the primary structure with a higher CTE material, Aluminum, improved 
stresses. Stresses are reduced to approximately three times the limit at a structure temperature of 
600 K. The conclusion drawn from this study is that the piping stresses can't be sufficiently reduced 
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Table 9-32: Analysis Case summary4 
Load Case I 
4 Bold parameters are deviations from the base case. 
Name 
8mm 
(base case) 
3mm 
4mm 
6mm 
8mm 500K 
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Piping 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
8 
3 
4 
6 
8 
8mm 600K 1 8 
Structure 
Ti-6Al-2% 
4Zr-2Mo-0. I S 
Ti-6Al-2Sn- 
4Zr-2Mo-0.1 S 
Ti-GAI-PSn- 
4Zr-2Mo-0.1 S 
Ti-6Ai-2Sn- 
4Zr-2Mo-0.1 S 
Ti-6Al-2Sn- 
4Zr-2Mo-0.1 S 
TibAI-2Sn- 
Seconda y 
support 
Stiffness 
(~/m) 
Infinite 
Infinite 
Infinite 
Infinite 
Infinite 
Infinite 
Primary Stress Case Primary + Secondary Stress 
Case 
Primary 
Pressure 
(Mpa) 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 2.0 1 900 
Piping 
and 
Structure 
Temp (K) 
299 
299 
299 
299 
299 
299 
Structure 
Temp 
(K) 
400 
400 
400 
400 
500 
600 
Primary 
Pressure 
(MPa) 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
Piping 
Temp 
(K) 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
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9.7.3.4 Material Properties 
The following lnconel 617 properties used for the piping analyses are obtained from 
9- 93. 
Reference 
I Temperature I Coefficient of Thermal I 
(Reference Temperature=299K) 
The following Ti-6AI-2Sn-4Zr-2Mo-0.1s properties from reference 9- 97 are used in the analyses. 
These properties are used for the structure material for the Titanium structure analysis cases. 
Elastic Properties: 
( Temperature (K) [ Poisson's Ratio [ Elastic Modulus (Pa) 
Coefficient of Thennal 
9.OE-6 
(Reference Temperature=299K) 
PRE-DECISIONA L - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure I to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 9-1 74 
The following T6 Aluminum properties have been used for the piping analyses from reference 9- 96. 
The elastic properties and geometry weren't changed for the T6 Aluminum cases, because the 
structure stiffness requirements will be independent of material. The only difference for the structure 
properties is the CTE used for the T6 Af analysis cases is actually that of T6 Aluminum. The CTE of 
Aluminum is higher than any other primary support structure material possibilities. 
Elastic Properties: 
Coefficient of Thermal 
Temperature (K) 
293 
922 
(Reference Temperature=299K) 
9.7.3.5 Section Moment Calculation 
Poisson's Ratio 
0.33 
0.33 
An ABAQUSIStandard job has been run for each analysis case in Table 9-32. For each of these 
cases a pressure only steady state step and a case at operating temperature and pressure. These 
two steps correspond to the primary and the primary plus secondary stress cases respectively. 
Elastic Modulus (Pa) 
1.18E+11 
7.4€+10 
9.7.3.6 Method to Evaluate Piping Stress Limits 
The SMI, SM2, and SM3 output parameters are section bending moments in the piping about the , 
three local element axes (x, y, & z). These three output parameters are taken from the ABAQUS 
output and used in ASME B&PV Code Section Ill Div I - NB piping limit equations. The primary and 
the primary plus secondary stress range limits are evaluated for this analysis. The primary stress limit 
is evaluated for the pressure only load case for the cases listed in Table 9-32. The primary plus 
secondary stress limit is a limit on the stress intensity range. This requires a stress state at each end 
of the range. The range used to evaluate the limit is: 
Stress State at (Hot steady state normal operation) - (cold and zero pressure) 
The limits refer to a design stress intensity value (S,). The time dependent stress intensity limit (Smt) 
at 135,000 hours and 900K is used from reference 9- 94 for this value. The Smt value is 100.6 MPa 
which results in 1.5Smt= 151MPa and 3.0Smt=302MPa. The two limits evaluated from the piping 
design criteria in subsection NB-3600 are: 
Primary stress intensity limit 
Equation N8-3652 (9 )  
Primary plus Secondary Stress intensity Range Limit 
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The third term of Equation NB-3652.1 (10) corresponds to the stress resulting from a temperature 
gradient across a gross structural discontinuity. As assumed, the temperature along the hot leg piping 
is constant with no temperature gradient. Since there are no structural discontinuities with 
temperature gradients in this segment of piping, the third term in the equation is neglected and then 
becomes: 
The B,, and B2 terms are the primary stress indices. C1, and C2 terms are the secondary stress 
indices. As taken from Table NB-3681 (a)-1 of Reference 9- 95, the values for straight sections of 
piping are as follows: B1=0.5 and B2=C1=C2=l .O. The values for these terms in the sections of curved 
pipe are calculated from the equations in section NB-3683.7 from Reference 9- 95. The equations are 
as follows: 
Where: 
But not ~0.0 nor > 0.5 
But not <I .0
But not < I  -5 
t - R  h = ,  
r m  
rm = (Do - 0 
2 (Mean, pipe radius) 
R=nominal bend radius 
The resulting stress indices for the curved pipe and elbows is shown in Table 9-33. 
Table 9-33: Curved Pipe or Elbows Calculated Stress Indices 
The terms from the above equations are defined below. 
Table 9-34 shows the moment of inertia values used in the calculations. 
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(Resultant Moment) 
Do = Outer Diameter 
t = wall thickness 
P = Pressure 
(Moment of Inertia) 
Table 9-34: Moment of Inertia for Pipe Sections 
9.7.4 Piping Modal Analysis 
A modal analysis with the 1 E5 N/m connector stiffness case has been run. The model is the same as 
the 8mm f5 static stress analysis case, except that four 81 kg point masses are added to the ends of 
the pipe to simulate the mass of the Brayton engines and the analysis type is changed to a frequency 
extraction. The purpose of performing this calculation is to determine if flexible connectors which 
provide enough flexibility to make thermal stresses acceptable, can also provide sufficient support 
during launch. 
I: Moment of 
l nertia 
DO 
(cm) 
A target goal of 20 Hz has been identified as a lower limit for the piping natural frequency in order to 
withstand launch dynamics. The 1'' four modes from this analysis are at 5.0 Hz, 5.3 Hz, 13 Hz, and 
15.6 Hz. This indicates that with the secondary support stiffness of 1 .OE5 N/m, the piping is not 
sufficiently supported during launch. 
t: Wall 
thickness 
Additional dynamic analysis has shown that a connector stiffness of 2.8E6 N/m is sufficient to 
increase the minimum frequency of the hot leg piping to greater than the 20 Hz threshold. 
9.7.5 Checks 
The displacements shown in Table 9-31 have been compared to the hand calculations in Figure 10-1 8 
of this document. According to both calculations, the piping will expand about 3 cm if unconstrained. 
This serves an independent confirmation of proper application of the material properties in ABAQUS. 
Ryan Bechtel (KAPL) has performed an independent verification of the material properties used and 
the ASME B8PV spreadsheet calculations. Jay Schuren (Bettis) has reviewed the application of 
material properties, section properties, beam element cross sections, load amplitudes, and boundary 
conditions in the ABAQUS model. 
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10 Plant Structure and Environmental Protection 
10.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This section presents results from efforts to describe the Plant Structure and Environmental Protection 
(PSEP) segment of the Reactor Module. The primary functions of this segment are to provide physical 
support for the various elements of the module, to control the thermal environment of the reactor 
module so that stress and temperature limits are not exceeded, and to protect the module from 
external environment effects, especially orbital debris and micrometeoroids. This section also 
considers the varying internal thermal and radiation environments for the instrumentation and control 
equipment Internal environment considerations such as fission products and impurities in the 
heliumlxenon working gas are not described in this Section. 
Key conclusions are: 
Structure: 
Accommodation of the differential thermal expansion between the primary structure and the 
piping of the reactor coolant system would be a significant design challenge. For nickel-base 
super-alloy piping at 900 K and titanium structure at 400 K, the differential expansion is near 3 
cm. Further discussion of possible approaches to mitigate this concern is in Section 10.2.4.3 
and 9.7. Use of a one or two Brayton system might partially alleviate this problem relative to a 
larger and longer three or four Brayton system. 
Three basic structure types need to be evaluated for the primary support structure. Each has 
strengths and weaknesses relative to the needs of the reactor module. An outline of the 
planned approach to evaluation is presented. 
Thermal: 
The leading candidate for hot leg piping, internally insulated nickel-base super-alloy, requires 
specific external thermal management to reject heat in a controlled manner so that piping 
temperature remains within acceptable limits and heat loss is not excessive. Methods to 
transport the heat from the hot leg to an external radiator would need to be developed and 
would likely include a combination of radiation, conduction and possibly heat pipes. Isolation of 
the hot leg from internal components (probably via multi-layer blanketing) would be necessary 
to keep temperatures of other components outside the reactor coolant segment (primarily 
electronics and mechanisms) below 400 K. A balanced approach would be necessary to 
assure that beginning and end of life temperatures and heat loss are within desired ranges. 
r Identification of thermal management materials is needed early in development phase so that 
testing can verify performance at high temperatures (around reactor and hot leg piping) and 
after extended exposure to high radiation levels (especially around reactor). The types of 
materials that need to be developed andlor demonstrated include high temperature blankets, 
high emissivity coatings or finishes for a variety of materials. 
Micrometeoroid protection and thermal management requirements are both realizable. 
However, where heat rejection to space is required, as may be the case for the reactor and 
portions of the shield, the number of protective layers may need to be limited to one or two. 
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Otherwise, heat rejection to space may be significantly reduced and undesirably high 
temperatures may result. 
The electric power needed to maintain all the reactor module external surfaces above 200 K 
prior to reactor start-up could be kept below approx 1500 Watts in the absence of solar 
illumination. This is below the anticipated start-up power. Orienting the radiator surfaces 
toward the sun would reduce required power and increase those external surface 
temperatures, although it would be necessary to determine if thermal cycling due to periodic 
absence of solar illumination would be detrimental. Although internal temperatures have not 
been calculated, maintaining external temperatures above 200 K would permit internal 
electrical component and sensor temperatures to be above 239 K (-34 C) which is a typical 
lower limit for widely available electronics. 
Environmental: 
A detailed evaluation is needed to investigate the accumulated effect of the reactor upon 
charging of the spacecraft. Three major sources of charging include the reactor, the ion 
thrusters, and the external charged particle flux. The effects of the multiple charging sources 
needs to be studied, as well as possible interactions between spacecraft charging and electro- 
magnetic fields. As part of the mitigation for charging, it would be important to include electrical 
conductivity measurements as part of the material testing efforts. 
There are many different options available to provide a range of micrometeor protection levels. 
Multi-layer, special material options could provide protection from micrometeors up to 1 cm 
diameter, but the thickness of such a system may make it unsuitable for use near the reactor. 
Simpler, single or dual layer barriers may provide adequate protection for most of the reactor 
module. Another complication regarding protection near the reactor or shield is that the 
envelope of a protection system might be a source of radiation scattering which could impact 
on reactor shield design. Identification of candidate protection options is needed early in a 
development phase so that testing can be performed to verify effectiveness, especially for 
materials used near the high temperature, high radiation conditions around the reactor. 
The instrumentation and control (I&C) system components are distributed over a large portion 
of the spaceship, from the sensors and actuators located near the reactor (fore, in, and aft of 
the radiation shield) to the electronics located in the enclosure at the rear of the spaceship. To 
allow definition of the environmental requirements for the I&C components the thermal and 
radiation influences in different regions of the spacecraft must be evaluated including the 
thermal controls and radiation shielding affecting each zone. 
The different subsystems within the PSEP segment are described below, and some of the important 
related requirements are discussed. These include both internal as well as external requirements, 
and some of the significant interface requirements. 
Among the key external requirements are the environments that the spaceship will encounter before, 
during and after launch. The pre-launch environments are described in general, since these are 
rarely primary design drivers. The launch and post launch environments are discussed in more detail. 
Of special significance are radiation environments and considerations for instrumentation and control 
components, which are discussed in Section 10.5. 
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Each of the primary subsystems is described in detail, with particular focus on efforts to date and 
anticipated efforts that would follow, if continued. 
10.1.1 Description of Segment Elements 
1, Structural Support Subsystem - Supplies structural load paths necessary to maintain physical 
support and alignment of equipment and to accommodate all anticipated static, dynamic and 
thermally-induced loads. The system includes the primary support strudure that provides 
overall support and connection of the Reactor Module to the Spacecraft Module, including the 
module portions of the separable interfaces. The system also includes the secondary support 
structure that provides structural connections among Reactor Module components and the 
primary support structure. 
2. Micrometeoroid Protection Subsystem - Consists of material barriers around critical elements 
to protect the Reactor Module against impact damage, erosion and chemical contamination 
from micrometeoroids. This protection comes, in part, from existing structural elements and 
thermal control elements supplemented by other materials to provide the degree of protection 
desired. 
3. Thermal Management Subsystem - Provides the heat rejection, thermal isolation, and 
supplemental heating needed to keep.the different Reactor Module elements within 
temperature limits. The thermal management subsystem would include insulating materials 
(insulation, multi-layer blankets, spacers), surface thermo-optical materials (paints, coatings, 
treatments, etc), conductive and isolating materials, and probably more active elements such 
as heaters, temperature sensors and heat pipes. 
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@ 10.1.2 Driving Requirements 
Summarized below are some of the key requirements which apply to the Plant Structure and 
Environmental Protection (PSEP) segment of the reactor module. Some of the requirements come 
from higher level sources, such as Level 2 specifications which apply to the complete spaceship. 
Others are derived from the higher level requirements or have been recognized as important for the 
reactor module to satisfy mission requirements (such as rejection of internally generated heat). The 
requirements are listed in three categories: 
Performance Requirements, which address the primary functions of the PSEP segment 
Design Constraints, which are bounding limits on the PSEP characteristics or constraints on 
how the PSEP must be configured. 
Interface Requirements, which describe how the PSEP segment must interface with the 
space vehicle or with other elements of the reactor module. 
These lists represent only some of the more important requirements identified to date, and are far 
from a complete listing. 
90.1.2.1 Performance Requirements 
operations. (Level 2 Requirement) 1 environments. 
The Project shall design the Deep Space Vehicle to / Selected materials and segment design would have to 
Requirement (Source) 
The Space Nuclear Reactor design shall utilize 
technologies that facilitate extensibility to surface 
Impact on Plant Structure and Environmental Protection 
Segment 
Must consider compatibility of pressure boundaries, 
external surfaces, mechanisms, etc with surtace 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
have anoperating lifetime greater than or equal to 1201 
years. (Level 2 Requirement) 
The Project shall assure that all Science System 
hardware in its deployed configuration, except approved 
science hardware, shall remain within the protected 
zone of the reactor radiation shield. (Level 2 
Reguiremenf) 
The Project shall obtain launch approval as specified in 
the Prometheus Launch Approval Plans. (Level 2 
Requirement) 
The Spaceship total dry mass at launch shall not 
exceed [25,000] kg. (Level 2 Requirement) 
satisfy performance requirements over long mission life. 
Key performance elements include providing radiation 
protection, accounting for radiation effects, and protecting 
from external environments such as rnicrometeoroids. 
Coordination between the shield and spaceship design is 
required to assure that maximum dose levels are not 
exceeded. This limits the envelope of the PSEP segmeni 
and could influence arrangements in order to maximize 
protection of critical components. 
Safety assurance must be considered during design of 
PSEP elements. Influences could include design of the 
shield interfaces to separate from the reactor during a re- 
entry event, consideration of environmental impact when 
selecting materials, and preferential orientation of 
structure or components for safety considerations. 
Minimum module mass would be a goal and a selection 
criteria for evaluation of different design options. 
Note: Values in brackets [XX] are preliminary or placeholder values and thus would be subject to change. 
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10.d 2.2 Design Constraints 
Requirement (Source) 
-he Project shall comply with the Prometheus Single Point 
:ailure Policy as documented in the Prometheus Project 
'olicies Document 982-00057. (Level 2 Requirement) 
The Spaceship launch configuration shall be compatible 
vith a [5-m] launch vehicle payload fairing (dynamic 
mvelope dimensions [4.5ml diameter & [26m] height), or 
imaller. (Level 3 Requirement - Based on Boeing Delta IV 
Specification) 
The Prometheus flight hardware shall be designed and 
~erified to meet applicable functional, performance, 
)peration, and other design requirements without damage 
)r dearadation when ex~osed to the design environments 
Ipec$ed herein {in ERD). (Level 3 ~equiemenf) 
luring no-thrust periods of Science Orbits, the Deep Space 
System shall continuously point a Spaceship-fixed vector to 
:ornmanded directions in the target-centric reference frame 
.o within 20, 20 and 20 mrad (3 sigma) about the reference 
'rarne X, Y and Z axes respectively.. . (Level 3 
qequirement) 
The Prometheus Spaceship, cantilevered at the 
separation plane (i.e., with no compliance from the 
Payload Adaptor Fitting (PAF) or separation mechanism), 
shall have a minimum frequency of 30 Hz [TBR] in the 
thrust axis and 8 Hz [TBR] in the lateral axis. (Level 2 
Requirement, from Reference 10- 2) 
Impact on Plant Structure and Environmental 
Protection Segment 
Structure and thermal management subsystems must 
be designed with fault tolerant capacity. This would 
include features such as ability to react flight loads in 
presence of element failure (with reduced margin) and 
redundant heaters and temperature sensors. 
Micrometeoroid and orbital debris protection reduce 
the risk in areas where single point failure can not be 
eliminated, such as the pressure boundaries. 
Arrangements and overall sizing must fit within 
allocated space inside the fairing. This drives the 
overall dimensions of the plant structure, and bounds 
the volume within which all the components must be 
packaged. 
The module must withstand particle and radiation 
environments, launch loads,'charging, and other 
space environments. 
This requirement drives the need for positional 
stability of the spaceship. Counter-rotating Braytons, 
or alternate localized means to offset angular 
momentum, was anticipated to provide the needed 
stability. The need to eliminate dynamic coupling 
between the reactor and the mission module might 
- 
have become a structural consideration. 
In order to meet the spaceship requirement, the 
constituent elements of the vehicle must have higher 
frequencies. Based upon previous experience (and in 
the absence of detailed analyses), a minimum 
frequency of [I 01 Hz Lateral and 1381 Hz Vertical are 
reasonable goals for the reactor module in the launch 
configuration, as measured from the vehicle interface I of the vehicle to module support struts. 
Note: Values in brackets [XX] are preliminary or placeholder values and thus would be subject to change. 
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10.1.2.3 . Interface Requirements 
Collected below are requirements which need to be in place between the reactor module and the 
spacecraft module or between the PSEP and other reactor segments in order for the reactor module 
to meet performance requirements. Most of these represent requirements which were recognized as 
necessary during design efforts but which have not been captured in other released requirements 
collections. 
- 
Requirement (Source) 
The Spacecraft Module shall be capable of rejecting 16821 kWt 
of heat from the Reactor Module. (Level 3 Requirement) 
structure shall provide attachment interfaces between space 
lehicle and reactor module which shall meet the following 
equirements: 
Provide sufficient stiffness to meet overall stiffness goal 
Be positioned inside shield cone angle (whether on front 
or back of shield) to avoid scattering 
'Derived from shield and dynamic requirements) 
The PSEP shall provide support for the module components 
hat prevent excessive stresses or deflections in the 
:omponents or the supporting structures. (Derived from 
;tructural requirements) 
ieat rejection from hot leg piping shalf be controlled so that 
nagnitude of heat transfer from piping is maintained at [2.1] 
:W/meter. (Derived from hot leg piping analyses) 
remperatures shall be maintained above minimum acceptable 
evels using electrical heating power levels that are below 
hose reauired for start-up. (Derived from survival temperature 
ind pre-&rt-up power availability limits) 
Jnless specified otherwise, temperatures of electronics and 
nechanisrns (primarily including I & C electronics and CDM's) 
;hall be maintained below [400] K, with target temperature goal 
~f [300 K]. (Derived from equipment temperature limits and 
toat of ~roviding moderate tem~erature for electronics and 
hechanisms toimprove petforiance and reliability) 
Note: Values in brackets [XX] are preliminary or placeholder vi 
lm~act  on Plant Structure and Environmental 
Protection Segment 
This is a place-holder requirement that captures 
the need to reject waste heat to the space 
environment via the radiators. The PSEP must 
accommodate the piping to and from the gas 
cooler and accommodate the differential 
expansions that will occur as the HRS and Braytor 
piping loops approach different temperatures, as 
well as the more moderate temperatures of any 
non-operating loops. 
Structural interface between boom and reactor 
module shall be controlled so that launch and 
deployed dynamic requirements are satisfied 
Structure and components must be designed to 
avoid amplification of dynamic excitation from the 
vehicle and from the energy conversion system. 
Structurat supports must withstand launch loads 
and accommodate large temperature induced 
- 
deflections. 
Specific means to trans~ort he heat from the hot 
leg piping to external radiating surfaces must be 
developed. Heat rejection approach must 
maintain the protection of the hot leg piping from 
the external threats of orbital debris and 
micrometeoroids 
Most of the external surfaces of the module must 
be blanketed. Exceptions include the radiator 
surfaces for hot leg heat rejection, portions of the 
shield, and portions of the reactor. 
Isolation of the hot leg piping and hot components 
from the rest of the module is necessary. 
Blanketing of all components except the hot leg 
piping is anticipated. More detailed analyses 
would have indicated where further thermal 
isolation or coupling would be needed. 
ues and thus would be subject to change. 
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10.1.3 Overview of Environments 
The Reactor Module would be-subjected to a wide variety of environments during assembly, test and 
launch, and then throughout its mission in space. Most of these would be quantified based upon 
analyses and measurements of the launch and space characteristics. Some would be determined 
based upon existing knowledge and codes for handling and test of nuciear components. Still others, 
such as pre-launch temperature and humidity, are established within limits and then the local 
environment controlled to remain within these limits. In all cases, the environments must be fully 
characterized and the required testing and analyses performed to demonstrate that the module will 
perform as required during and after exposure to the various environments. 
For convenience, the different sets of environments are grouped according to when they would occur: 
before launch, during launch, and after launch. Each of these is described below in more detail. 
Further details are available in Ref. 10- 9 or in other available literature. 
10.1 -3.1 Pre-Launch Environments 
The pre-launch environments primarily comprise the atmospheric and dynamic conditions to which a 
component or assembly will be exposed prior to launch. These do not include the simulated launch 
and flight environments to which hardware is subjected during test events. Generally, pre-launch 
environments are controlled so that they do not drive the design of flight hardware. These include, 
Dynamics - Vibration induced loads result primarily from handling and transportation of 
components and assemblies. Seismic loading must also be considered, especially in 
regions where such activity is frequent. The normal approach to pre-launch environments 
is to design handling equipment and containers to isolate the flight hardware from loads to 
an extent that resulting stresses are lower than those during or after launch. 
Temperature - Usually held within a nominal range. Preliminary JIM0 range was 5 C to 
40 C. 
Relative Humidity - Usually held between 30 % and 70 %. Lower limits are set to minimize 
risk of electrostatic discharge, while upper limits reduce oxidation and other interactions 
with atmosphere. When necessary, more narrow limits can be established. 
In addition to utilizing facilities and equipment to limit pre-launch environmental effects to acceptable 
levels, it is important to also consider during the design phase what accommodations or protections 
need to be included in the flight hardware. A key example is the need to incorporate handling, ,lift and 
support locations into the structure early in the design phase. This allows for load paths, access, and 
manufacturing requirements for flight and non-flight to be addressed together. Another example is 
protection of sensitive finishes, such as high emissivity surfaces. It may be necessary to protect these 
surfaces during normal processing and to make accommodations for removal of these protective 
surfaces prior to testing or launch. 
10.1.3.2 Launch Environments 
The most significant environment during launch is the collection of dynamic and load events which 
occur during the launch vehicle thrust stages. These include quasi-static loads due the combined 
accelerations, launch vehicle dynamic excitation and responses, and acoustic loading. There is also 
a high-frequency shock event resulting from the release of energy in the structural elements attaching 
the space vehicle to the launch vehicle. Other environments are the relatively rapid transition to 
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space vacuum conditions and localized heating of the fairing due to atmospheric friction. The latter is 
generally benign and is not discussed further here. 
lO.l.3.Z.l Quasi-Static Loads 
Accelerations associated with quasi-steady flight events are generated by engine-induced and 
external forces, which change slowly with time and for which the elastic responses are relatively 
small. Low frequency (<80 Hz) vibratory accelerations acting through the Spaceship c.g. induced by 
various launch vehicle dynamics events are added to the appropriate quasi-steady accelerations to. 
produce worst-case quasi-static acceleration loads for Spaceship structural design purposes. Typical 
maximum accelerations are approximately 6 g's in the axial direction and 3 g's in the lateral direction. 
(Ref 10- 2, 10- 15) 
10.T.3.2.2 Dynamic Loading 
The reactor module will experience random, periodic, and transient vibrations mechanically 
transmitted from the launch vehicle, as well as acoustically induced random vibrations mechanically 
transmitted from adjacent Spaceship elements. (Ref 10- 2) These environments are typically 
described by a random vibration spectrum for components which are not directly excited by the 
acoustic environment. 
10.1.3.2.3 Acoustic Environment 
The acoustic environment occurs during the first minutes of launch, when the vehicle is exposed to 
the high noise levels from the rocket engines. Acoustic loading directly excites large surface areas, 
which can result in locally high loads as well as a dynamic response which would be reflected in the 
random vibration spectrums for different zones of the module. 
10.1 -3.2.4 Shock 
Shock within a space vehicle occurs as a result of separation events between the space and launch 
vehicles or at the restraint points of deployable assemblies. Shock results either from the explosive 
actuation frequently used to initiate a separation event or from the release of energy stored in the 
preioaded elements used to provide constraint prior to separation. These shock events are normally 
high frequency and primarily affect electronics, although brittle material such as ceramics could be 
affected. 
lO.l.3.2.S De-Pressurization 
Pressure drop from sea-level atmospheric to near vacuum occurs soon after launch. Analysis is 
required to show that venting paths are sufficient to prevent differential pressures from exceeding 
limits for the equipment being evaluated.. The rate of depressurization is typically defined in the 
applicable launch vehicle spec. 
10.1.3.3 Past-Launch Environments 
Post-launch environments can be described as falling into two categories - external and internal. 
External environments are predominantly described by the radiation, elemental, thermal, particle and 
electro-magnetic conditions that exist outside the Earth's protective atmosphere. The internal 
environment results from events and operational conditions within the space vehicle, often combined 
with interaction with the external environment. Examples of internal environments include dynamic 
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conditions due to equipment operational and vehicle response frequencies; radiation and charging 
due to reactor operation; deployment related shock loads (which are similar to those described in 
Section 10. I .3.2.4, Shock); internal heat generation (which is described in Section 10.3, Thermal 
Control Subsystem); and loads due to differential thermal expansion (which is discussed in 
Sectionl0.2, Structural Support Subsystem). 
10.1.3.3.1 Thermal Environments 
The external thermal environment is described below and is characterized by the heat flux on the 
external surfaces and the deep space temperature to which the external surfaces radiate. Solar flux 
is largest, followed by reflected and emitted flux from the Earth. Above low-earth orbit (-1 0,000 
kilometers), Earth reflected and emitted fluxes are minimal, and thus would have little influence upon 
the reactor module. When orbiting the Earth, there would probably be short periods of eclipse when 
solar and reflected flux would be blocked - however, these would have little effect upon the reactor 
module due to its high mass. An important characteristic of solar flux is the wavelength of the peak 
energy level, 0.5 pm. This value can be significant when evaluating external surface characteristics 
for effectiveness in either absorbing or reflecting solar energy. 
Near-Earth Space Thermal Environment 
Direct solar flux 
- j360 W/m2 (average) 
Earth-reflected solar flux (Albedo) and Earth emitted Infra-Red flux 
- Albedo is 0.29 to 0.31 of direct solar flux 
- Earth emitted flux is 227 to 241 Wlrn2 at infra-red wavelength 
Deep Space Temperature 
- -4OK 
Near-Jupiter Space Thermal Environment 
Direct solar flux 
- 50 w/m2 (average) 
Albedo and emitted flux - Negligible for Reactor Module 
Deep Space Temperature 
- -3OK 
10.d.3.3.2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
Micrometeoroids and orbital debris are space-borne particles ranging in size from very small (1 0-l2 g) 
to very large ( lo2 g), and with velocities sometimes exceeding 20 kmls. Protection from these threats 
must be provided, especially for the critical pressure boundary components. A more detailed 
description of this environment, and a discussion of protection techniques, is located in Section 10.4, 
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris. 
10.1.3.3.3 Radiation Environments 
The external radiation environment is described in detail in the Environmental Requirements 
Document (982-00029). The internal radiation environment will be influenced by position relative to 
the reactar and shield, by local shielding, and by the external radiation levels. Solar, galactic and 
Jovian radiation sources, coupled with reactor radiation, must be considered during electronics 
selection, shielding trades and material evaluation. A detailed description of the internal radiation 
environments relative to the different zones of the reactor modute can be found in Section 10.5, 
PRE-DECSCONAL - For pkmniag ar;d discussion purpcses on& 
Enclosure t to 
SPP-67210-0010 / 
0-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 10-15 
Environmental Considerations for Instrumentation and Control. The significant effect radiation has 
upon many materials must be a central focus during the materials selection and testing phase of any 
future effort. 
10.1 3.3.4 Charging and Electromagnetic fields 
The primary source of charged particles for space vehicles is usually the Sun. The total solar electron 
and proton fluence for the Prometheus mission is given in the table below, which is taken from the 
Environmental Requirements Document. However, significant energetic plasma exists around Jupiter 
which would have a signif cant influence on the spacecraft. Data on this environment was not yet 
available. A third source of charged particles would have been the reactor itself, which exposes the 
hardware to neutron fluence and gamma rays. A fourth source of charged particles would have been 
the ion thrusters, which emit charged xenon particles. The interaction among all the different charging 
fields and resulting electric currents and potential differences would require significant evaluation to 
quantify and to mitigate negative impacts. 
Table 10-1: Prometheus Mission Fluence. 
Energy (MeV) Electron Integral Fluence (cm-2) Proton Integral Fluence (cm-2) 1 
0.1 5.84E15 8.50E.16 
0.2 3.07Et5 1.70E16 
0.3 1.93E15 6.60E15 
- 
0.5 1.07E15 2.21E15 
1 5.28E14 4.91E14 
2 2.46E14 1.02E14 
3 1.48E14 4.48E13 
5 7.23E13 1.50E13 
10 2.34E13 3.31E12 
20 6.34E12 6.27E11 
30 
- -~ - 
2.77El2 2.36E1.1 
50 9.23E11 9.57E10 
100 1.96El l 4.37E10 
200 4.18E10 1.31E10 
300 1.69E10 4.70E09 
500 !ME09 2.88E04 
1000 1.17E09 6.39E02 
Some other related considerations which were to be addressed include: 
Reactor counter-acceleration due to neutron flow from reactor. 
Thrust imbalances due to reactor asymmetries and unbalanced flux of neutrons and charged 
particles from the reactor. 
Options to mitigate charge build-up 
Implementation of electrical conductivity testing to support evaluation of charge build-up and 
mitigation options. 
PRE-DECISIONA L - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure I to 
SPP-67210-0070 I 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 10-16 
Several high level environmental requirements regarding charging and electromagnetic fields appear 
in the Level 3 Key and Driving Requirements summary. Three which would directly affect the reactor 
module are listed in the following table. 
The Spaceship design shall control possible high 
voltage breakdowns such as corona, 
multipaction, and secondary arcing anywhere 
during the mission, but especially in the Jovian 
plasma environment, as specified in the 
Environmental Requirements Document. 
The Spaceship design shall control low 
frequency electric and magnetic fields (LFE and 
LFH), as specified in the Environmental 
, Requirements Document (ERD) 
Table 10-2: Prometheus Mission Fluence. 
Select and use high voltage insulators that will perform in 
high radiation, high temperature, charging environment. 
Use separation of high voltage components where 
t Requirement 
The Spaceship shall be designed to avoid 
spacecraft charging in the energetic plasma of 
Jupiter, as specified in the (ERD), or shall be 
designed to perform its mission in the event of 
resultant electrostatic discharge (ESD) events. 
practical. 
- Verify performance with multi-environment testing. 
Typical Approaches to Meet Requirement 
Connect all internal and external conductive components 
with appropriate resistance to prevent ESD. 
Use ESD dissipative coatings on external dielectric 
materials. 
Use electrical interface surge protection. 
Use twisted shielded pair cables and coaxial cables for 
power. 
Run power cables inside the boom. 
- Design radiation and micrometeoroid shielding to also 
provide EM1 shielding. 
Maximize separation of sensitive science instruments from 
interference sources. 
10. I .3.3.5 Vehicle Dynamics 
After launch, the primary structural concerns of a space vehicle are accommodation of the thermal 
environment and management of the small vibration and acceleration forces. The thermal 
environment is discussed elsewhere, although one aspect, time variation, has not been discussed. In 
Earth orbiting vehicles, transitions from cold to hot, or the reverse, can force relative motions and 
cause low frequency vibrations. Design must account for these motions in order to assure that they 
are below certain levels and outside critical control frequencies. Although external induced transients 
for a vehicle in deep space would likely be small, there may be scenarios during transit to deep space 
or resulting from internal transients that must be considered. 
Similarly, moving parts or fluids can create vibrations which must be considered during the design of 
the structure. Within the reactor module, the braytons and moving fluid are two clear sources of 
vibration which must be considered. Reactor control drive mechanisms will also create vibrations, 
although the relatively small associated mass and speed would likely make these vibrations low. 
Each of the potential vibration sources must be understood so that vehicle resonances are not excited 
and to assure that the attitude control system is able to handle any low level disturbances. 
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10.2 Structurat Support Subsystem 
10.2.1 Introduction 
A multifunctional support structure that provides the load paths necessary to maintain physical 
support and alignment, as well as accommodates all anticipated static, dynamic, and thermally 
induced loads, is  a fundamental requirement for all reactor module elements. This structure would 
include the Primary Support Structure and the Secondary Support Structure. The Primary Support 
Structure would support the reactor, shield, coolant, control and aero-thermal protection segments of 
the reactor module and supply attachment points for the Secondary Support Structure. The Primary 
Support Structure would provide the launch (support struts) and deployed (boom) interfaces between 
the spacecraft and reactor modules. 
The Secondary Support Structure would interface between the Primary Support Structure mounting 
locations and component subassemblies, micrometeoroid shielding and thermal control subsystem 
elements such as radiators and thermal barriers. The Secondary Support Structure would provide 
thermal and mechanical isolation as required. Reactions in the Primary Support Structure depend 
partially on interactions with the Secondary Support Structure, which would require that development 
of both occur somewhat in parallel. 
Efforts to date focused on capturing requirements and objectives for the structural support subsystem, 
identifying candidate structure types, and initiating efforts to model and perform sensitivity studies for 
different structure types. Creation of finite element models of the different structure types was 
underway when cancellation of the project was announced. Thus, significant results and conclusions 
are not available. Candidate structure types are described. An outline of the anticipated evaluation 
approach is presented, and important evaluation criteria are summarized. 
10.2.2 Requirements and Objectives 
There are numerous requirements and objectives which must be considered when identifying and 
evaluating the different structure options. Some requirements are descriptions of the primary 
functions. Others result from the fact that the structural support subsystem (hereafter referred to 
simply as structure subsystem) interfaces with each of the other segments and the space vehicle. 
Those items identified as requirements indicate that a minimum acceptable performance must be 
achieved, although that minimum value might not be identified yet. Objectives and considerations 
include secondary functions and characteristics which should be considered when evaluating 
candidate structure types. 
The requirements and objectives in the following sections are not meant to be a complete listing - 
simply a presentation of requirements identified during development efforts as important to capture 
and consider during early phases of the structure development. 
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10.2.2.1 Structural Requirements 
Requirement (Source) Discussion and Impact 
4chieve minimum structural frequencies of [ lo] Hz (This requirement would have been driven the stiffness of the 
lateral and [38] Hz axial. (See Section 10.1.2.2) 
Provide attachment interfaces between space 
\enough to meet budget values once established. 
Structure shall provide sufficient volume to house  his is a basic requirement of the plant support structure, 
plant support structure. 
A team including space vehicle vendor and NRPCT would 
tehicle and reactor module which: 
Provides sufficient stiffness to meet overall 
stiffness goal 
Is located inside shield cone angle (whether on 
front or back of shield) to avoid scattering 
(Derived from shield and dynamic requirements) 
Maintain structure mass below [TBD] kg (Would be 
derived from mass budge0 
and protect reactor module elements aft of shield and would have been one of the evaluation-criteria for the 
without exceeding volume allocation within taunch different structure options. 
have developed the structural interfaces. 
Mass budgets for the reactor module had not yet been 
developed but would have been a basic requirement and 
evaluation criteria for the different structure options. 
Working goal for ongoing efforts was to keep mass low 
from component functional requirements) 
Maintain alianment of the different reactor module I It is antici~afed that controlled movement of the CDMs 
vehicle fairing (~erived from design constraints) 
Support the reactor module segments such that 
static and dynamic loads do not exceed limits for 
the different segments and components. (Derived 
Coupled models would have been used to determine loads 
and response frequencies, and to develop a structure 
system that meets the requirements. 
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c~m~onent~wi th in  limits defined for each of those 
components. (Derived from component functional 
requirements ) 
Accommodate thermally-induced relative 
displacements (Derived from functional 
requiremen fs) 
Provide thermal isolation (or coupling) at 
component mounting interfaces as determined 
necessary to meet component and thermal 
management requirements (Derived from thermal 
control requirements) 
Provide support for the thermal management 
subsystem (Derived from segmen f functional 
requirements) 
Provide support for the micrometeoroid protection 
(Derived from segment functional requirements) 
Note: Values in brackets [XX] are preliminary or 
relative to local structure and to the Reactor would have 
been an important and at times challenging requirement. 
Due to its effect on the vehicle and possible local dynamic 
effects, alignment control and knowledge for the moving 
parts of the module, especially the turbinelcompressor 
assembly, would have been required. Alignment of piping 
and cabling would also need to be controlled. 
Due to high temperatures that will be present in the module, 
significant relative displacement will occur between different 
module segments and within different segments. These 
relative displacements must be accommodated while still 
meeting other strength and stiffness requirements. 
Because of high temperatures, it would sometimes be 
necessary to thermally isolate components from supports to 
prevent energy loss and to avoid exceeding temperature 
limits. In some cases, it will be desirable to minimize therma 
isolation in order to reject heat or minimize thermal stresses. 
Both interface types will pose challenges and require 
materials with demonstrated performance characteristics. 
The structure subsystem must provide radiative surfaces, or 
accommodate external radiators. Other thermal control 
elements such as heaters, temperature sensors and 
blankets must also be accommodated. 
At a minimum, the structure would need to support and be 
compatible with the micrometeoroid protection approach 
selected. It is possible that the structure itself could become 
an integral part of the protection. 
placeholder values and thus would be subject to change. 
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10.2.2.2 Objectives and Considerations 
In addition to.the requirements which the support structure must meet, there are a variety of other 
functions and characteristics which should be considered when evaluating the different types of 
structure. Some of these are listed and briefly described below. 
Point Interfaces vs Distributed I Line Interfaces - Some structures, most notably the truss, read (e.g., 
transition) loads at specific points, or nodes. This forces the interfacing components and structure to 
react loads at matching locations. This can be a benefit when there are only a discreet number of 
interfaces, such as support struts extending from the space vehicle to the reactor module interfaces. 
However, if loads and masses are distributed, or if support interfaces are large, then multiple interface 
points can be more efficient. How the support structure interfaces with other segments, with 
components in the reactor coolant segment, and with the space vehicle must all be considered when 
evaluating structure types. A hybrid structure, combining truss type characteristics near the point load 
locations and a more distributed structure away from these interfaces might have important 
advantages over a single structure type. 
Secondary Attachment - Distributed structures, such as skin-stringer and especially honeycomb 
panels, provide large areas over which components can be attached. If the components are small, 
such as sensors, harness and piping supports, and heaters, then special local reinforcements would 
not typically be necessary. However, if items are large, special features may be necessary to provide 
sufficient distribution of the loads. With truss structures, secondary platforms are often necessary in 
order to provide sufficient mounting area for all the major and minor components. This can be 
burdensome if components are distributed throughout a region. However, if the components are 
concentrated in certain areas, this approach can provide advantages. 
Radiation Protection - A  distributed structure will generally provide some degree of radiation 
protection. If the materials are sufficiently dense, this protection may be important. 
Micrometeoroid Protection - Distributed panel structures generally provide a significant degree of 
micrometeoroid protection. However, for deep space missions this protection may not be sufficient. 
Further investigation and probably test would be necessary to determine if additional protection would 
be required and whether an open or closed structure is preferable. 
Heat Rejection - Distributed structures have large surface areas which can be used as radiative 
surfaces to reject heat. This can be advantageous when the temperature at which the heat is being 
rejected is within acceptable limits. However, if it is desirable to separate a higher temperature 
radiative surface from the rest of the structure, and I or to couple it with other components that are 
also at elevated temperature, a separate platform may be necessary and thus the advantage of 
available surface areas may not be realized. 
Acoustic Excitation - Open truss structures generally experience less acoustic excitement than 
distributed structures. This generally results in lower vibration loads in the acoustic frequency range. 
Shock Attenuation - Some structure types, such as welded assemblies, efficiently transmit shock. 
Others, such as bolted and distributed systems, tend to attenuate shock. This would be a 
consideration if components have parts which are sensitive to high shock levels. 
Design flexibility - Generally, distributed structures offer more flexibility for placement of secondary 
structure and components. Changes after fabrication has begun are typically more difficult to make 
when working with the specific node points of a truss type structure. 
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Accessibility to Equipment - An open truss structure provide a high degree of access to the 
components mounted inside the truss assembly. Panel and skin type structures provide less access, 
and require specific design features (eg, removable access panels) to permit access to internal 
components. 
Producibility -All structure types must be evaluated relative to how easy it will be to make and 
assemble the elements. Due to the elevated temperatures, high radiation levels, and need to 
minimize weight, it is difficult to characterize the relative advantages of the different options. Material 
and process development may be necessary for each option. 
Cost - The relative cost of the different options will be closely coupled to the producibility. Cost must 
be a consideration from the beginning of the selection process through the detailed design process. 
10.2.3 Primary Support Structure Types 
Three construction types were considered most promising for the multiple requirements of the Primary 
Support Structure (PSS): trusslframework, sheet stringer, and skin-frame using honeycomb panels. 
Depending on the priority of technical and programmatic requirements, each structure provides a 
unique set of advantages and challenges. In order to design a PSS, the fundamental characteristics 
of each structural type should first be understood. Each is discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
lO.2.3.l .I Truss Structure 
The truss is a basic engineering structure that provides a simple solution to many situations. A typical 
truss consists of straight members connected at joints, also known as truss nodes. Each member is 
connected at its extremities only, resulting in no continuous members through a joint. In general, the 
members of a truss are slender and can support little lateral load. Consequently all loads must be 
applied at the joints and not to the members themselves. 
A common truss framework, the square truss, is shown in Figure 10-1 (From NASA Marshall Glen). 
This early concept contained a five section square truss structure with an adapter to connect to the 
back plate of the shield. Though not shown, each of the energy conversion units would need to be 
attached to the Primary Support Structure with individual mounting plates or adapters. 
Another truss example provided is shown in Figure 10-2 (From NASA) and shows a hexagonal two 
section truss with adapters to the shield back plate and main boom of the reactor module. In this 
example the components are mounted inside the truss structure as opposed to the external mounting 
required in the square truss example of Figure 10-1. The two examples demonstrate two different 
options of truss configurations and highlights how they can be altered to meet mass, volume, or 
interface objectives. 
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the perimeter of the volume also requires the secondary structures to span larger distances to 
connect the components to the Primary Support Structure than the square truss design. The sheet- 
stringer design does not provide ready access to internal components, which would make installation 
of components difficult and require that special access features be designed into the structure. 
10.2.3.j.3 Honeycomb Panel I Frame Structure 
A honeycomb structure consists of honeycomb sandwich panels attached either to a frame or in some 
instances to each other. The honeycomb panels consist of a honeycomb core sandwiched between 
metallic or composite face sheets. This arrangement permits use of stabilized, lightweight panels to 
carry most of the structural loads. Secondary supports would mount to inserts bonded within the 
honeycomb structure in various locations and orientations. Fittings or load spreaders are frequently 
required to transfer loads into and out of the honeycomb structure. 
The honeycomb structure provides several advantages over the truss and sheet stringer designs. The 
honeycomb structure allows for placement of large quantities of equipment without predefined spatial 
locations. It provides a large proportion of useable volume and provides significant design flexibility. 
The ,honeycomb structure does not have the interruptions of stiffeners or rings, which allows for the 
removal of honeycomb panels for access once the structure is assembled. In addition to its spatial 
benefits, the honeycomb structure provides micrometeoroid protection and could provide additional 
area for heat rejection. 
The construction of honeycomb structure presents several challenges that would need to be 
addressed during the design process. Materials that can withstand the elevated radiation and 
temperature environment would need to be demonstrated. If the components produce large point 
loads, additional structural elements to transmit loads to the panels would be required. Therefore, 
location, orientation, and load distribution for the components and secondary support structure needs 
to be evaluated early in the design. An additional concern is the large surface area of the honeycomb 
panels. The large surface area to mass ratio results in sensitivities to vibro-acoustic excitations. 
10.2.3.2 Primary Support Structure Modeling Approach 
Initial models were produced to investigate structure parameter sensitivities. The structures 
investigated were not optimized designs, but rather a tool for comparisons, within an individual 
structure, to understand the impact of variations such as support thickness or sheet material. This 
method would have lead to an optimization of the three structure types, and then a cross structure 
comparison would have been made, leading to a potential support structure candidate. It is important 
to understand that without optimization, .cross structure conclusions can not be made. 
Models were produced for two structure types: a square truss and a sheet-stringer assembly. A 
variation of the sheet stringer, referred to as the stringer ring, was also modeled, but it did not show 
advantage over the others. Sensitivity studies were established to determine stability of the model and 
the basic parameter effects on the natural frequencies for each structure. The structures could then 
have the secondary structure, piping, and micrometeoroid protection incorporated so they could be 
optimized for strength and mass requirements. The optimizations would also include variations to the 
foot print of the structures. Once optimized, the structures could be compared. The thermal 
requirements would be incorporated based on results of the preliminary studies. 
The NRPCT determined Finite Element Analysis (FEA) models using ABAQUS 6.5-3, would help 
increase the familiarity with the behavior of the three Primary Support Structure configurations. 
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ABAQUS is the Naval Reactors program standard FEA code; it was verified with a suite of problems 
at the time of installation. Several simple models were created and tested for comparison to hand 
calculations for qualification. In addition, the class of problems analyzed is similar to the dynamic 
models used in the Naval Reactors program. 
Details of the modeling effort can be found in Reference 10- 3. These details are not presented 
herein because the effort was still in the beginning stages when program termination started. 
10.2.3.3 Structure Material Selection 
Major considerations for the primary structure materials include stiffness, strength, mass, locally high 
temperatures and elevated radiation areas. Materials commonly used for space applications, where 
stiffness, strength and mass are primary considerations, include carbon composites, titanium, 
beryllium, and aluminum beryllium. Aluminum is also frequently used, especially where mass is less 
critical or where thermal spreading is desired. 
Typically, if mass and stiffness are the primary drivers, composites and beryllium are the most 
effective, although each of these has drawbacks. Beryllium can be a hazardous material if dust is 
generated, such as during machining or during a casualty event. Carbon composites can be 
I susceptible to radiation induced damage, and workmanship is more of a concern than with less labor 
intensive material systems. Thus, there is no clear choice for structural material. Due to potentially 
significant mass advantage, it would be advantageous to determine if carbon composites can 
i withstand the radiation environment aft of the shield. 
Since there is no clear choice for structural material, a number of candidate materials would need to 
be identified for both the primary and the secondary structures. Materials that can be used for 
multiple functions should be sought. For example, titanium can be used as a primary structure 
element, as a fastener, and as a moderately thermal isolating material due to it low conductivity 
compared to other metals. However, titanium would not be a good choice for an application requiring 
good thermal conduction, such as a heat spreader. Thus, a number of different materials will need to 
be identified and tested in order to assure that sufficient options are available for the different 
challenges. 
10.2.3.4 Primary Structure Development Approach 
Development of the reactor module primary structure would require several iterations to identify and 
evaluate different design options. The intended approach would have included the following steps 
and considerations. Many of the steps would necessarily be performed in parallel and repeated as 
necessary in order to achieve a realizable design. 
Develop structure designs which meet the key performance requirements such as stiffness, 
strength, volume, mass, etc. 
Initiate materials testing to demonstrate feasibility of using typical lightweight structure 
materials and systems (eg, graphite composite, aluminum beryllium, honeycomb panels). 
Identification of lightweight materials for use near the reactor and in the shield would also be 
needed so that testing can also be performed for these candidate materials. 
. Perform analyses and design iterations of the different design candidates in order to progress 
the different design options to similar levels of maturity. During this process, the focus would 
be on achieving designs which best meet the different competing constraints such as mass, 
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stiffness, volume. Consideration would also be given to meeting other design objectives such 
as thermal control, micrometeoroid protection, design flexibility, cost, producibility, etc. 
Perform a trade study of the different design options in order to select the best option for 
detailed development. Each option would be assessed against the requirements and the 
objectives in order to identify a baseline design. It is possible that a baseline might combine 
aspects of the different construction types in order to best meet the competing requirements, 
and that alternate designs might be developed in order to accommodate different material 
sets and other variables that would still be under investigation. 
Further develop the baseline design, and alternates if available, using similar approach as 
described above. 
10.2.4 Secondary Support Structure 
Many components of the Reactor Module will be supported off the Primary Support Structure ussing 
Secondary Support Structure (hereafter referred to simply as secondary structure). Harness, sensor, ' 
radiator, blanket and control drive supports are examples of secondary structure. 
A significant secondary structure challenge'would be the structural connections between the Primary 
Support Structure and the Reactor Coolant Segment (RCS). These connections, which support the 
RCS throughout the duration of the mission, experience two distinctly different loading conditions. At 
launch, high strength and stiffness are required to withstand the launch loads, minimize deflections 
and prevent dynamic amplification of the structural vibrations. Upon start-up of the reactor, high 
temperatures and the resulting thermal expansion must be accommodated. 
The dynamic loading during launch will be governed predominately by the Primary Support Structure, 
dynamic characteristics of the various components, and the number and type of connections between 
the Primary Support Structure and the components. Another consideration for support of the RCS is 
the need to avoid amplification, and if possible provide isolation, of the resonant frequencies within the 
operating brayton assemblies and the RCS. 
Combined with the requirement to accommodate thermal expansion would be several other thermal 
considerations. Structural elements in contact with the high temperature components such as the 
piping, turbine, and recuperator would have to maintain structural adequacy at elevated temperatures. 
It is likely that RCS supports would have to provide thermal isolation in order to avoid locally elevated 
temperatures outside the RCS and the corresponding temperature decrease in the RCS component 
locai to the support. In some cases, high thermal conductivity may be desirable, such as in the zones 
local to the hot leg piping where a significant amount of energy needs to be transported to external 
radiators for rejection to space. 
Further development of the secondary structure would have addressed the challenges that both load 
conditions introduce, while also satisfying overall thermal management requirements. 
10.2.4.1 Preliminary Thermal Expansion Evaluation 
The NRPCT performed analyses to compare the relative difference in expansion between a four 
meter section of hot leg pipe and a titanium alloy Primary Support Structure. The four meter length 
corresponds to the approximate length of a three or four Brayton RCS. The analysis focused on the 
difference in thermal expansion between candidate hot leg pipe materials at a uniform temperature of 
900 K andthe Primary Support Structure at a temperature of 400 K. This range of differences in 
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thermal expansion would have guided future designs of the secondary structure by providing limits for 
the amount of relative movement that must be accommodated. 
10.2.4.1 .I Assumptions 
Several simplifying assumptions were utilized in the thermal expansion analysis as follows: 
- Fixed uniform hot leg pipe temperature and Primary Support Structure temperature of 900 K and 
400 K, respectively. The actual temperatures would have slight variation and would not be uniform 
through the thickness or along length, Ignoring these variations tied to geometric factors and 
focusing on material comparisons was more useful, because it provided a potential range for the 
difference in thermal expansion. 
- The total hot leg pipe length estimated as four meters from the back of the shield as approximated 
from the arrangement drawings for a three or four Brayton RCS. A simple representation of the 
geometry can be viewed in Figure 10-5. 
- The Primary Support Structure was assumed to be made of Ti-6AI-2Sn-4Zr-2Mo-0.1 Si; Duplex 
Annealed (To be referred to as 'Titanium Alloy'). The hot leg pipe material options reviewed were 
the nine different selections shown in Figure 10-6. 
Figure 10-5: Sim 
Primary Support Structure 
Shield 
P 
4 meten 
ple representation of the thermal expansion analysis geometry. 
lO.2.4.1.2 Analysis Description 
Analysis was performed using a Microsofi Excel spreadsheet based upon the following equation for 
thermal expansion: 
Expansion = aATL 
Equation 10-1: Expansion due to Thermal Strain 
Table 10-3: Description of Parameters Used in the Model 
( a ( Coefficient of Thermal Expansion between the target temperature and room 1 
AT 
The value of thermal expansion for each candidate material was calculated using Equation 10-1. The 
difference in expansion between the pipe candidate materials and titanium Primary Support Structure 
is the relative movement between the two that secondary structure would need to accommodate. 
temperature 
Temperature difference between room temperature and the current temperature 
L 
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necessary to provide for adequate piping system stiffness during launch and allow for sufficient 
differential thermal expansion of the piping to reduce stresses to an acceptable level. 
10.2.4.3 Secondary Support Structure Development Needs 
As identified previously, accommodation of thermal expansion would be a major function of the 
secondary structure. A number of stress relief methods may be considered as options but have not 
been explicitly evaluated, including: 
FloatingISliding support at the Braytons and energy conversion components which are locked 
during launch and released during operation. When they are released, the support will allow 
the approximately 3cm movement required to accommodate the piping expansion. Use of 
this approach might also make grouping of the Brayton components advantageous so that the 
entire group can be allowed to move on a single platform. 
. Releasable piping support collars along piping length. These releasable supports would react 
loads and assure adequate system dynamics during launch and then permit movement after 
reactor start-up. 
Materials with temperature dependent properties or with orientation dependent properties 
such that both sets of load conditions (launch and thermal) could be accommodated. 
Evaluation of material groups that better accommodate the differential movement would also 
warrant investigation. 
. More flexible piping methods including Bellowed piping bends or more expansion loops and 
bends in the piping. 
Pre-stressing the piping such that the stresses will be partially relieved during normal 
operations. This will reduce the stresses at the operating point of higher temperature but 
reduce margin during launch. 
An alternative to accommodate thermal expansion would be selection of materials which do not 
develop significant differential expansion induced stresses. For example, several materials shown in 
Figure 10-6 have lower relative expansion than the'baseline nickel based super-alloys. However, 
these materials are not without other disadvantages, such as sensitivity to air, which make use 
difficult. With the materials within the RCS, particularly the hot leg pipe, not selected, there could 
have been an investigation into primary and secondary support structure and RCS materials that 
better accommodate thermal expansion on the basis of favorable coefficient of thermal expansion. 
A combination of the above options might be desirable because not only must the hot and cold leg 
piping expansions be accommodated but also relative movement of the different components within 
the RCS as the system heats up (or cools down i f  switching to a backup Brayton or changing state 
points). As part of this hybrid accommodation approach, the use of more compliant materials for 
some of the supports might accommodate differential expansion as well as provide desirable vibration 
isolation and damping. 
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In addition to accommodation of thermal expansion, the secondary structure would need to perfom 
other functions such as support other module components (cables, sensors, thermal control and 
micrometeor protection elements, etc), interface to hot components, provide dynamic isolation during 
operation, etc. Some of the challenges include: 
+ Provide thermal isolation of components while providing adequate strength and stiffness. 
This isolation would minimize temperature and thus stress gradients within the components 
being supported and the primary structure elements to which they would be attached. Testing 
would need to demonstrate performance and ability to withstand the elevated temperatures 
and radiation in the reactor module. A combination of different materials, joints and support 
configurations would need to be investigated. 
Withstand locally high temperatures, especially at joints. This is similar to the prior item, but 
focuses specifically at the need to withstand the high temperatures. 
Removal of heat away from the hot leg. 
. Provide adequate stiffness, strength, and dynamic isolation during launch. 
Prevent transmission of dynamic excitations and prevent resonance amplification of vibrations 
during operation. 
As component development continued, it would have been essential to include the dynamic response 
of each component and the connection to the secondary structure into an overall dynamic model. The 
component, secondary, and primary structures would be dynamically coupled, and a refined design 
would have been reached through parallel investigations. 
10.2.5 Summary 
A multi-functional support structure would be needed to satisfy the requirements of the reactor module 
throughout the life of the mission. The Primary Support Structure would supply strength and stiffness 
to the reactor module while providing mounting locations for the secondary structure and 
micrometeoroid protection. The Primary Support Structure would also need to account for thermal 
expansion and allow the components to radiate heat to space. The Secondary Support Structure 
would need to provide isolation and protection for the component subassemblies throughout the 
mission. It would also need to account for thermal expansion of the components relative to the 
Primary Support Structure while allowing heat to be radiated to space. 
Successfut development would require the Primary and Secondary support structures to work 
together, each performing specific tasks to support the overall objectives. Coordination of the support 
structure design with the design development of the piping, components, arrangements, and thermal 
management would be required to determine the best type of structure. As the reactor module design 
matured, each structural configuration would need to be optimized and compared to determine the 
best structure with respect to the mission requirements. The current support structure efforts do not 
indicate a clear solution, but rather a path for future investigations. 
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40.3 Thermal Control Subsystem 
10.3.1 Introduction 
The primary purpose of a thermal control subsystem is to maintain ail the elements of a spacecraft 
system within minimum and maximum temperature limits for all mission phases. Another role of the 
Reactor Module thermal control subsystem is to minimize heat loss from the Reactor Coolant 
Segment (RCS) in order to prevent loss of usable energy. These goals are achieved through the use 
of thermal isolation between elements with different temperature limits, by thermal coupling of 
elements where applicable to minimize temperature differences and to transport heat energy as 
required, by addition of heat where necessary to maintain temperature above lower limits, and by 
rejection of heat to space via radiation. 
The following sections summarize the pre-conceptual scoping efforts to develop an integrated thermal 
management approach for the reactor module. Several general conclusions are presented, based 
upon preliminary evaluation efforts. Subsequent sections also capture some of the important 
requirements and goals for a thermal control subsystem, describe basic thermal control approaches 
commonly used for space applications, describe the various environmental zones in the reactor 
module, summarize scoping calculations for several segments, and summarize the pre-conceptual 
thermal model efforts. 
10.3.2 Summary of Conclusions 
There are several competing thermal requirements within the reactor module. These include 
minimizing heat loss from some components; rejecting significant heat from some components; 
maintaining heat loss from the hot leg piping near a nominal level; maintaining sensitive components 
such as the alternator, the CDM1s, sensors and other electronics at moderate temperatures; keeping 
pre-start-up temperatures and power demands within reasonable limits; and providing micrometeoroid 
protection. Scoping analysis and modeling were performed to assess the methods required to satisfy 
some of these requirements, to assess possible limitations on design options and to identtfy areas 
where more effort would be needed to develop and demonstrate materials or methods necessary to 
achieve the design goals. 
One of the central thermal management requirements aft of the reactor is rejection of approximately 
2.1 kWImeter of heat from the hot leg piping in order to maintain temperature within the pipe wall near 
900 K. To meet this requirement, heat must be transferred away from the piping via radiation and/or 
conduction to surfaces with thermal properties selected and controlled to achieve the desired heat 
rejection flux. To maintain lower temperatures in the other portions of the reactor module, it is 
desirable to transport the heat to a radiative surface for rejection to space and to thermally isolate the 
hot leg from the rest of the plant. With this approach radiator area is kept small by rejecting heat 
during normal operation at an elevated temperature (assumed 500 K in the scoping calculations). 
Keeping the radiator area small permits a small amount of heat to maintain temperatures above lower 
limits before start-up. Non-uniform distribution of temperatures could pose an additional challenge in 
terms of distortion and stresses. Thermal and structural isolation of the heat rejection elements would 
help reduce impact of high temperature zones on other parts of the reactor module. 
PRE-DEC!SIOMAL - For planning and discussion purposes on!y 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
8-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 10-31 
In order to implement effective rejection of heat from the hot leg piping, and isolate from the rest of the 
plant, several elements need to be demonstrated. These include: 
A means to transport heat from hot leg piping to external radiator. Depending on the number of 
braytons, which would drive the amount of hot leg piping, the amount of heat to reject to space 
would likely be between 10 and 15 kW, which corresponds to a radiator area of approximately 4 to 
7 m2 assuming 500 K rejection temp. An effective means of transport will be needed to deliver 
this amount of heat to the radiator area. Further effort will likely be needed to demonstrate options 
such as a high conductive material, two-phase transport (heat pipe), or perhaps a light pipe for the 
needed temperature range. 
Thermal coatings good to 500 - 600 K, (or higher near the reactor) with high emissivity, for the 
surfaces radiating to space. These need to be demonstrated for the radiation environment that 
will be encountered. 
A complicating factor for both the structure and the thermal control subsystems would be the 
differential expansion between the primary support structure and the reactor coolant segment. Heat 
rejection elements would either need to be structurally un-coupled from the hot leg piping (eg, rely on 
radiative transfer) or move with the hot leg piping (eg, a floating platform that moves with the piping). 
These considerations would need to be a primary consideration as the structure and thermal control 
subsystems are developed. 
Insulation is required to minimize the heat loss from most elements of the reactor coolant segment 
except the hot leg piping. A high temperature multi-layer insulation system was described in 
Reference 10- 4 which would provide an effective emissivity of .02. Scoping calculations using an 
effective emissivity of .03 (higher value to account for other parallel heat flow paths) for the hot 
components, except the hot-leg pipe and the turbine, show that heat loss is reduced by nearly half 
through the use of blankets (from approx 35 to 17 kWt). 
The non-radiator portion of the reactor module envelope aft of the shield must be blanketed in order to 
keep pre-start-up temperatures above 200 - 250 K with a reasonable amount of heat input. However, 
excessive blanketing could result in excessive temperatures during normal operation. Preliminary 
calculations indicate that reducing the effective emissivity below - 0. I to 0.2 could result in excessive 
temperatures during normal operation. Thus, a balance must be achieved between the normal and 
pre-start-up thermal requirements. It is possible that micrometeoroid protection could provide the 
degree of blanketing desired. 
Power required to maintain pre-start-up temperatures above 200 K without solar illumination is 
estimated to be approximately 1500 Watts (see scoping calculations for plant support, shield, and 
reactor), which is below the power required for start-up. This assumes emissivity of 0.95 for the 
primary support radiator region (-4 - 7 m2 as described previously), the shield, and the reactor 
envelope, and effective emissivity of 0.2 for the non-radiator regions of the primary support. If the 
radiator areas can be oriented toward the sun, the power to maintain temperature can be reduced 
significantly with proper selection of surface emissivities, and pre-start-up temperatures closer to room 
temperature. 
It is highly likely that some sort of environmental shield would be desired to protect the reactor 
assembly from the detrimental effect of rnicrometeoroids, and a one or two layer shield is likely the 
best means to maintain modest heat rejection capability while providing significant protection. 
Scoping calculations indicate that a two layer micrometeoroid shield would result in effective 
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emissivity of approximately 0.3 (actual value would depend on thermal-optical properties of materials 
selected). It is likely that the leading surface (which would be located opposite the shield) would need 
to be more substantial to provide adequate protection. Prelimha# analysis in Reference 10- 16 
indicates that the effect on temperature of increased protection axially above and below the reflectors 
would be small. Efforts directed toward increasing emissivity of the reflector outer surfaces and 
reducing thermal coupling between the reflectors and the pressure vessel may help relieve the 
temperature increase caused by micrometeoroid shielding. 
9 0.3.3 Development Process 
The process to determine the thermal control measures needed for the reactor module would include 
the steps indicated below. An important effort that would need to happen in parallel with the process 
described would be the identification and testing of candidate materials and processes required to 
achieve the desired thermal control. 
Define requirements, acceptable temperatures and heat loss limits for each component 
- Depends mostly on the materials limits and operational constraints of each component 
- Mosi electronics perform better, and with greater reliability, at temperatures near 20 C, 
motivating efforts to reduce temperatures where possible. 
- Typically, minimum heat loss would be the goal except where temperature limits might be 
exceeded. 
Quantify heat sources 
- External Sources (Primarily solar) 
- tnternal Sources (Includes Reactor, Reactor Coolant Segment, Radiation Heating, Energy 
Conversion and Transmission) 
Develop detailed mathematical models of the conductive and radiative heat transfer paths 
- Finite difference and finite element codes to handle the complex geometry and time 
varying conditions are available. 
- Correctly show interaction between the various reactor module segments, so that coupling 
and isolation can be captured. 
Implement required thermal isolation, thermal conduction, and thermal radiation control 
- Hot items are isolated from cooler items using low conductivity materials, blankets, and 
selective thermal coatings. 
- Excess heat is delivered to radiator surfaces using high thermal conductivity materials or 
heat transport systems. 
Test completed system to demonstrate control and update thermal model 
- Model correlation is performed in a thermal vacuum environment. 
- Design modification is sometimes required after test to achieve the desired temperature 
ranges and margins. 
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10.3.4 Requirements and Goals 
Some important requirements which apply to the thermal control subsystem are listed below. For 
each, the source, a discussion of how it would affect the thermal control subsystem and possible 
impacts are given. The requirements and objectives which follow are not meant to be a complete 
listing - simply a presentation of requirements identified during development efforts as important to 
capture and consider during early phases of the design development. 
wformance and reliability) 
Note: Values in brackets [XX] are preliminary or placeholder values and thus would be subject to change. 
Requirements (Source) 
Heat rejection from hot leg piping shall be 
controlled so that magnitude of heat 
transfer from piping is maintained at [2.1] 
kwlmeter. (Derived from hot leg piping 
analyses) 
Temperatures shall be maintained above 
minimum acceptable levels using electrical 
heating power levels below that required 
for start-up. (Derived from sun4val 
temperature and pre-st&-up power 
availability limits) 
Temperatures and temperature induced 
stresses shall be maintained within the 
minimum and maximum allowable limits for 
materials and components 
(Derived from environmental and 
performance requirements module) 
Thermal performance requirements shall 
be met under the conditions of the external 
thermal environment as described in 
Section 10.1.3.3.1 (Level 2 Requirement) 
Jnless specified otherwise, temperatures of 
!lectronics and mechanisms (primarily 
ncluding 1 & C electronics and CDM's) shall 
)e maintained below [400] K, with target 
emperature goal of [300] K. (Derived from 
?quipment temperature limits and goal of 
mviding moderate temperature for 
?lectronics and mechanisms to improve 
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Discussion and Impact 
At 500 K, approximately 0.75 rn' of radiator area is needed for 
each meter of pipe. Special accommodations must be made to 
transport the rejected heat to the radiator area, and minimize 
thermal and structural impact on nearby elements. Heat rejection 
approach must maintain the protection of the hot leg piping from 
the external threats of orbital debris and micrometeoroids. 
By keeping outer surface temperatures above 200 K, internal 
temperatures will generally be well above 200 K. Goal is to keep 
stresses low, avoid temperatures outside the limits of widely 
available electrical components, and minimize temperature 
gradients during start-up without power levels exceeding those 
needed for start-up (thereby not increasing power demand for 
reactor module). Significant portions of the module aft of the shield 
must be blanketed to meet this requirement. 
Temperature extremes and differential temperatures must be 
minimized to achieve this requirement. This will require thermal 
isolation of some components, blanketing of components and 
surfaces, and effective coupling to radiator surfaces, and other 
thermal control techniques. 
Low space temperature and solar flux are the primary external 
thermal environments that would affect the module. Outer surface 
properties would be designed to provide the needed coupling to 
space. Solar flux would generally not be difficult to accommodate, 
and could provide desired heat prior to start-up. 
Isolation of the hot leg piping and hot components from the rest of 
the module is necessary. Blanketing of all components except the 
hot leg piping is anticipated. 
Note: The target temperatures which appear in brackets are 
placeholder values only. Actual values could differ and values for 
CDMs and other electronics could differ from each other. 
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In addition to the requirements listed above, there would have been a number of considerations which 
would have influenced the design of the thermal control subsystem. These include: 
- Creation of thermal zones to meet the specific requirements of different components 
- Changes in performance of components, thermal control materials, etc, over temperature and 
from beginning of life to end of life 
- Interface heat transfer, which is often a limiting factor in heat transport 
- Available power to provide supplemental heating during cyclic or transient events, and to make 
up for beginning vs end of life performance changes. 
- Temperature effects on performance 
Thermal gradient induced stresses 
CTE Difference induced stresses 
Reliability vs temperature 
Performance vs temperature 
Ability of heaters, temp sensors, etc to perform beginning of life functions and then 
withstand high temperatures 
- Charge build up and conductive paths 
All layers of a blanket system must be grounded to provide a means for charge dissipation. 
Outer surfaces in general need to be treated to prevent charge build up, provide means for 
charge dissipation, and minimize SGEMP (system generated electro-magnetic pulse) due 
to impact of charged particles. 
- Micrometeoroids 
Blankets are generally the first layer of micrometeoroid protection. Goal would be to 
satisfy micrometeoroid protection needs using same materials used for thermal control. 
Micrometeoroids erode and therefore compromise the effectiveness of external thermal 
surfaces. This effect must be taken into account in determining performance of the system 
near the end of the mission life. 
Micrometeoroid protection around reactor could result in radiation scattering outside . 
reactor envelope, which could cause shield size and mass to increase. Scattering and 
envelope considerations may also affect approach to orientation and selection of the 
CDM's to minimize impact on shield configuration. 
- Radiation 
Materials selected for thermal control must perform after exposure to long periods of 
radiation. 
Solar ultraviolet light causes many thermal coatings to degrade over time. This 
degradation must be taken into account in determining performance of the system near the 
end of the mission life. 
- Orientation and variation with time 
Over time, the orientation of a system relative to the sun will change, and at times there will 
be no solar flux, requiring that the thermal control system account for this absence of 
external heating. 
Different mission phases and operating modes will result in transient conditions which must 
be evaluated. 
- Contamination 
In low earth orbit, atomic oxygen has been found to severely erode and compromise 
performance of all thermal control surfaces. 
Surface missions will have to account for performance reductions due to erosion, chemical 
interactions, and deposition onto reflective surfaces. 
Thermal control materials must be selected that meet out-gassing requirements. 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that the outer surfaces and radiators, due to 
their relatively low temperatures, could be accumulation surfaces for outgassed materials. 
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10.3.5 Thermal Control Methods 
Heat transfer is divided into three major categories: 
Conduction is energy transfer through matter in the absence of fluid motion. In spacecraft 
components, conduction is primarily used within components and smaller assemblies. 
Convection is energy transfer between a moving fluid and a solid interface. Convection requires 
the presence of a fluid, which in space only takes place in a closed system and so is not a major 
factor in most space systems. 
Radiation is energy transfer via electromagnetic waves. Radiation is the only means of heat 
rejection to space (with exception of an open refrigerant cycle which is rarely used and very short- 
lived). Radiation is the means of heat transfer between different components which are not 
conductively coupled. 
Thermal isolation through use of low conductivity materials and (or) radiation barriers is frequently 
required when hot components are located on or near components that can not tolerate high 
temperatures. 
There are two categories of spacecraft thermal control - passive and active. A detailed discussion of 
each of these follows. 
10.3.5.1 Passive Thermal Management Methods 
Passive methods maintain the component temperature within the desired range by control of 
conductive and radiative heat paths, through selection of the geometric configuration of surfaces and 
optical properties of materials. There are no moving parts or fluids. 
- Thermal coatings - Typically used to minimize solar flux absorptance, maximize heat rejection, 
or control radiative coupling between components. 
Commonly used coatings include chem-glaze and silicone paints. 
Sometimes anodized surfaces are used, but non-conductive quality poses a charge build- 
up concern. 
Reflective surfaces are frequently used to minimize solar heat flux while allowing heat 
rejection. Includes mirrors, aluminized tape, metallic coatings (Germanium, aluminum, 
etc). 
- Blankets - Used to eliminate radiation coupling between hardware elements or between 
hardware and space environment. 
Usually made from lightweight multiple layers of kapton or mylar with spacing material to 
eliminate conduction. 
High temperature blanket materials include metal foils (e.g., nickel alloy, titanium) and 
glass fiber fabric. 
See Figure 10-7 for example of typical blanket construction. 
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Figure 10-7: Schematic Cross Section of Typical Multitayer Insulation (MLI) Construction 
(Not all elements need be present in every design) (Reference 10- 19) 
10.3.5.2 Active Thermal Management Techniques 
Active thermal management techniques involve the use of moving elements or fluids, most commonly 
heat pipes, and the use of heaters which require active control and management. Other examples 
include moving louvers, which vary the amount of surface area exposed to space, and refrigeration 
cooling systems. Heat pipes and heaters are described below. 
- Heat pipes are generally simple two phase fluid systems in which heat is removed from a 
source by evaporation, transported to the cooler end of the pipe, and then deposited into the 
sink by condensation, as shown in Figure 10-8. Some key characteristics of heat pipes 
include: 
The fluid is transported by capillary action via external channels or through a wick. 
EVAPORATOR FIXED CONOUCTANCE CONDENSER 
HEAT SOURCE u HEAT SINK u 
Figure 10-8: Example of Heat Pipe Configuration (Reference 10- 20) 
Heat pipes are used extensively in spacecraft as an effective means to transport heat from 
the point of generation to the point of removal to space. 
Different fluids are used in different temperature ranges. As indicated in the figure below, 
the capacity to transport heat near 300 K and above 500 K is somewhat limited. Further 
efforts to develop and fully demonstrate higher power heat transport near these 
temperatures, especially the range between 500 and 600 K, would increase design options 
for transport of the excess heat within the reactor module. 
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impact on the reactor. Temperature increases due to micrometeoroid shielding might be lessened if 
the thermal coupling between the reactor pressure vessel and reflectors could be reduced and the 
thermal coupling could be increased between the micrometeoroid shielding and the reflectors, position 
controllers, etc. 
There are several considerations regarding use of micrometeoroid protection around the reactor. 
Among the key advantages is protection of the vessel and the CDM's from the constant barrage of 
particulate it would experience during a long mission through different regions of the solar system. 
These materials would include a variety of elements, mostly carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen. 
If unprotected, reactivity of exposed surfaces with these elements would need to be evaluated. Also, 
impact of micrometeoroids on CDM's may be a significant failure mechanism. It might be possible to 
provide a significant degree of protection by placing the majority of the protection forward of the 
reflectors, which would reduce the thermal impact on the reactor. A negative point would be the 
scattering that shielding outside the reactor envelope would create. If the shield is increased in size to 
protect against this scattering, a weight penalty could result. Another consideration when assessing 
the protection envelope is the position of the CDM's during launch. If the CDM's are full out away 
from the shield, the size of a protective envelope may be significantly larger, resulting in even further 
increases in shielding to protect from scattering. A final consideration is the selection and 
demonstration of protective material. Candidate materials would need to be tested for micrometeoroid 
protection effectiveness, for thermal properties, for radiation effects, and to assure that elements and 
compounds coming from the protective material, either in normal vacuum or following impact from 
micrometeoroids, does not have significant adverse effects on the reactor segment. 
The scoping analysis indicated that the heat required to maintain the reactor outer surfaces above 
200 K is around 400 Watts with no blanketing and conservatively assuming emissivity of 0.95. This 
represents an upper bound. Shielding, blanketing, lower emissivity and solar heating would all reduce 
this power level and/or increase the minimum temperature level. 
The hot leg piping into the reactor poses two potential challenges - implementation of micrometeoroid 
protection and rejection of the heat necessary to keep the piping wall temperature at 900 K. An 
important option to consider would be thermally coupling the hot leg to the shield, thus using the 
shield area to reject the excess heat. A means to evenly transport the heat away from the piping and 
implement micrometeoroid protection would need to be worked out. Approaches to achieve these 
goals might use methods and materials similar to those used in the plant support area, but testing 
would be necessary to demonstrate these same methods can withstand the elevated radiation levels 
local to the reactor. Another constraint worth mentioning is the need to accommodate interface points 
for primary supports from the space vehicle and interface points for the aerothermal protection 
segment (aeroshell). These interfaces would need to be kept within the cone angle to avoid 
scattering and avoid interference with piping, reactor support, or other items. 
10.3.6.2 Shield Thermal Management 
The shield would comprise a large portion of the mass of the reactor module, and a significant surface 
area. This, combined with its location between the reactor and the rest of the reactor module, would 
make it an important element of the overall module thermal management. The target temperature of 
the shield would have to satisfy shield material requirements foremost - but other considerations 
would also be important. For example, shield temperatures mid-way between the reactor temperature 
and temperatures aft of the shield may help mitigate thermal stresses. The shield would need to 
reject heat from the hot leg piping (about 2.1 kW/meter of piping), which would necessitate that a 
portion of the shield be at elevated temperatures to effectively reject this heat. The shield might also 
need to reject heat near the reactor support locations to help moderate temperatures. 
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Several different shield options were being evaluated, and a discussion of these evaluations can be 
found in Reference 10- 18. With the exception of water, most materials considered for the shield can 
, 
easily withstand the temperatures that would be expected. Extra measures would be required to 
isolate the water, if used, from higher temperature regions of the shield. 
A scoping analysis for the shield was performed (Reference 10- 17) in order to describe the overall 
thermal behavior of the shield. A shield thermal model was created (Reference 10- 18) which 
provided some insight to how temperatures would be distributed within the shield, but this analysis 
was for early design configurations and does not match some boundary conditions. The scoping 
analysis characterized the average temperature and heat rejection characteristics of the shield, so 
that general feasibility can be evaluated and technical challenges identified. Specifically, sensitivity of 
the average temperature to blanketing and micrometeoroid shielding, and pre-start-up power 
requirements, were explored. 
The following observations follow from the scoping analysis: 
- The pre-start-up power required to maintain the shield outer surfaces (with emissivity of 0.95) at 
200 K is about 300 Watts. This value could be up to 20 % higher for some of the larger shield 
sizes being considered. Solar energy would reduce this value somewhat, depending upon 
orientation and surface properties. 
- Without blanketing or micrometeoroid protection, average temperature of the shield would be near 
450 K. Addition of single or dual layer micrometeoroid shielding woutd result in significant 
increases in average temperature. 
- Addition of a multi-layer insulating blanket over space-facing surfaces would result in significant 
heat retention, and unacceptable high temperatures. 
- Thermal isolation of the shield from the module elements afi of the shield would probably be 
necessary to keep the non-RCS temperatures aft of the shield near target of 400 K. 
Thermal management of the shield would need to consider the energy from the reactor and from the 
hot leg piping which passes through the shield. Energy from the reactor would be due to radiation 
induced heating inside the shietd, as well as conductive and radiative transfer of thermal energy. The 
energy due to radiative heating is described in Reference 10- 18. The energy transfer due to thermal 
radiation and conduction are approximated in Reference 10- 17. 
The latest concept for routing of hot leg piping through the shield has the pipe entering the shield top 
surface near one side, wrapping around the perimeter of the shield (just inside the outer surface), and 
exiting the opposite face up to 180 degrees from where it entered. As documented in the hot leg 
piping evaluations, approximately 2.1 kW/m of heat must be rejected form the hot leg to maintain 
acceptable temperature. 
The combined energy input from the reactor and hot leg piping would need to be balanced primarily 
by heat rejection to space, with the resulting average temperature depending primarily upon the 
thermal optical properties of the space facing surfaces of the shield. Due to its elevated temperature, 
it is likely that the shield would need to be thermally isolated from the electronics and plant structure 
elements aft of the shield. 
10.3.6.3 CDM Thermal Management 
The region of the reactor module just aft of the shield houses the Control Drive Mechanisms (CDIWs) 
The primary thermal goalin this region would be to maintain temperatures as near to room 
temperature as possible away from the reactor coolant piping. To achieve this goal, thermal isolation 
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from the coolant piping would be required. It would probably also be necessary to isolate from the 
shield. Multi-layer blankets could provide the degree of isolation desired, along with thermally 
isolating materials at the CDM and structure interfaces with the coolant piping and shield. 
10.3.6.4 Reactor Coolant and Plant Structure Thermal Management 
Thermal management concerns identified during the pre-conceptual efforts for the Reactor Coolant 
and Plant Structure segments include the following: 
- Excess heat from the reactor coolant segment hot leg must be transported away from the hot leg 
piping and rejected to space. The amount of heat that must be transported away is approximately 
2.1 kW per meter of pipe. The approach used would need to prevent large deviations from the 
targeted amount because too little heat removal would cause high temperatures and too much 
would force higher reactor power or temperatures to meet power demands. 
- Heat loss from the reactor coolant segment must be minimized in order to minimize loss of power 
and to avoid excessive temperatures for nearby electronic components, cabling, mechanisms, 
and other components which would benefit from lower temperatures. In order to accomplish this, 
effective multi-layer insulation must be demonstrated to satisfy isolation requirements at high 
temperatures and elevated radiation levels. Further evaluation would be necessary to assess the 
degree of micrometeoroid protection provided by the multi-layer insulation. 
- Related to the prior item is the need to provide thermal isolation of the reactor coolant segment 
components in order to minimize local heat transfer at interfaces. This would require identification 
and demonstration of insulating materials which can also meet structural requirements. 
- Prior to start-up, temperatures within the plant must be maintained above minimum levels in order 
to prevent over-stressing electronics and structural elements. For the most readily available 
electronics, -34 C (239 K) is a minimum allowable temperature, and thus 239 K is a good goal for 
internal temperatures. If one assumes that there will be temperature gradients through exterior 
surfaces and blankets, and that zoning can be established to preferentially direct heat where 
desired, then a goal of 200 K for the outer plant surface appears reasonable. The heat input to 
achieve this goal is assessed. 
- Protection from micrometeoroids typically requires multi-layer materials. These protective layers 
will reduce coupling to space of covered surfaces. The approaches to provide the necessary 
protection would need to be integrated with the thermal management efforts in order to satisfy 
both sets of requirements. The greatest challenge this would present would be meeting the 
microrneteoroid protection of the hot leg piping while simultaneously meeting the heat rejection 
requirements. Development of a heat rejection approach which transports the heat around the 
microrneteoroid protection might be necessary. This could be more difficult in the shield region, 
where envelope restrictions due to scattering restrict the available volume. 
- Moderate temperatures for the electronic components aft of the shield would yield reliability and 
performance improvements over higher temperatures. For example, effective rejection of heat 
from the power transmission elements, especially near the alternator, will improve transmission 
efficiency. The CDM's would also benefit from moderate temperatures. In order to maximize 
transmission efficiency and avoid exceeding allowable insulation temperatures, similar heat 
rejection approaches used for the hot leg piping may be applicable. 
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10.3.6.4.3 Scoping Calculations for Reactor Coolant and Plant Support Segments 
Scoping analyses for the Reactor Coolant and Plant Structure segments were performed. These 
analyses, which can be found in Reference 10- 17, are a simplified evaluation of the portion of the 
reactor module aft of the shield. A 2 brayton system was evaluated in order to match the thermal 
model effort described in the next section and capture an intermediate level of heat rejection. 
The primary purpose of the analyses was to provide first order approximations for the amount of heat 
that must be rejected, the area needed to reject heat, the effect of blanketing, and the pre-start-up 
power needed to maintain external surface temperatures above 200 K. The latter evaluation was 
performed in order to determine if the power required to maintain moderate temperatures would be 
beyond the level which would be available prior to start-up. 
In the scoping analyses, several global assumptions were made which are not defined elsewhere. . 
These include: 
- The ends of the plant support region are assumed to be adiabatic. (At shield and boom 
interfaces). 
- No other module elements are included. 
- Plant Support Segment dimensions are nominally those detailed in the Northrop -Grumman 
baseline configuration. 
The following observations follow from the scoping analysis: 
- Blanketing of the non-hot-leg components results in total of about 17 kW of heat that must be 
rejected, about 10 kW from the un-blanketed hot leg, 5 kW from the high temperature elements 
(turbine, turbine to recuperator piping, recuperator, and cold leg piping) and the balance from the 
other components. This result supports the observation during the modeling effort that grouping 
of higher temperature elements could establish easier to manage thermal zones. 
- If assume that the excess heat from the hot leg piping, the turbine and the piping from the turbine 
to the recuperator (total of about 14 kW) is rejected via radiation to a 600.K sink, and then 
transported across a 100 K temperature delta to 500 K radiator surfaces, then the required 
radiator area to reject the excess heat is approximately 5 square meters, which is about 25% of 
the assumed plant outer envelope area. A more effective heat transport and distribution system 
that increases the heat rejection temperature would decrease radiator area. For example, an 
increase from 500 to 560 K would reduce area to almost 3 square meters. 
- The average temperature for the remainder of the plant outer envelope is near 360 K, if assume 
that the effective emissivity for the non radiator area is 0.2. The effective emissivity of 0.2 is 
compatible with micrometeoroid protection. The value of 360 K is qualitative only, and there 
would be variation in the outer envelope temperatures. However, it does indicate that 
temperatures could be kept at moderate levels away from the reactor coolant segment 
components. 
- The total power needed to maintain the radiator regions (effective emissivity 0.95) and non- 
radiator regions (effective emissivity 0.2) at 200 K before reactor start-up is approximately 700 
Watts. Though only qualitative, this value indicates that modest power input will maintain pre- 
start-up temperatures above low extremes. 
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10.3.7 Power Plant Thermal Model 
10.3.7.1 Modeling Goals 
The overall goal of the plant thermal model was to quantify differences in heat fluxes, heat transfer 
within the plant, and global temperature fields for development of a thermal management strategy. 
During steady-state operation, thermal management strategy must balance component heat 
dissipation requirements and the need to thermally isolate hot components to prevent overheating of 
the support structure or loss of thermodynamic system efficiency. The initial modeling focused on the 
investigation of two thermal management concerns: development needs for passive strategies such 
as thermal coatings, blankets, isolation materials and the need for active heat dissipation during 
steady-state operation. 
The expected use of the initial model was not to analyze a specific combination of arrangement 
geometry, heat balance state points, and thermal management strategy, but to use the arrangement 
and heat balance as the basis for running sensitivity studies. 
10.3.7.2 Modeling Approach 
The thermal modeling strategy explored appropriate use of flux or temperature boundary conditions 
as model inputs and the resulting model outputs. Due to the directional nature and the non-linearities 
inherent in the problem, prior spreadsheet calculations were of limited use for predicting local system 
temperatures. Use of system heat balance temperatures in the model ensured that an internally 
consistent set of temperature inputs was applied to the model. The model temperature outputs and 
heat balance temperatures were input into a spreadsheet catculation to predict model heat fluxes. 
This spreadsheet result was used to benchmark the model's estimate of system heat fluxes. 
The model analysis code selected for the initial effort was ABAQUS version 6.5-3, because it was 
judged able to meet all of the stated requirements while also being the NR program standard finite 
element software. The 2: 1 : 1 version 5 arrangement (Reference 10- 3) was selected for investigation 
to minimize the effort required to generate a layout and ensure some similarity between the thermal 
model and the state of the arrangements. Further details about the model, such as modeling 
assumptions, boundary conditions, modeling strategy, verification, qualification and sensitivity can be 
found in Reference 10- 17. 
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The fourth case took advantage of the off design capabilities of the NRPCT heat batance to 
investigate the difference in plant heat loss at different points during the mission lifetime. The heat 
balance incorporates a 14.5% margin in radiator area for the design point to account for damage to 
the radiator or radiator performance degradation (only 85.5% of the radiator would dissipate heat at 
end of life). The beginning of life cases assume that 100% of the radiator area (required area plus 
margin) is used resulting in increased system efficiency. This case resulted in a 2% decrease in plant 
heat loss. This change in heat loss is comparatively insignificant compared to the effects of thermal 
blanketing and change in shielding temperatures. Plant heat loss is a comparatively weak function of 
radiator margin within the operating range. 
10.3.7.6 Future Modeling Approach 
The next iteration of the model would have included a representation of the Secondary Structure. This 
inclusion would have provided a conduction path between the Reactor Coolant Segment and the 
Primary Support Structure. The addition of the Secondary Structure would likely create local hotspots 
on the Primary Structure, resulting in an increase in the overall amount of flux dissipated to space. 
The resulting temperature profile through the Secondary Structure could aid in the overall design of 
the Secondary Structure by means of providing an input to the thermal expansion analysis discussed 
in Section 10.2.4. 
Future model development would be coupled to the Primary Support Structure discussed in 
Section 10.2. Currently the Primary Support Structure is represented as a sheet-stringer and a 
variation in this type to a truss, or honey-comb could cause great variation in the results. A model 
corresponding to each configuration would have been generated to ascertain which Primary Support 
Structure had the best thermallsystem performance. 
Future sensitivity studies would have focused on thermal blanketing, geometric dependences, 
variable boundary conditions, varying emissivities, and potential arrangement considerations like 
overall pipe layout optimization. 
Component thermal models would have been incorporated into the second order model for future 
model iterations. Second order thermal models would have exceeded the current limitations of 
ABAQUS 6.5-3, leading to other modeling techniques being investigated. Future versions of 
ABAQUS will likely parallelize the calculation of the view factors and also allow the view factor matrix 
to be saved and reused in later calculations. These simple advancements would greatly reduce the 
run time, enabling more sensitivity studies to be run. It was further expected that nodal and memory 
limits would be raised in keeping with computational development. If ABAQUS were still found to have 
insufficient capability in the future, there are other aerospace thermal codes such as TRASYS and 
TSS that would warrant evaluation as the primary thermal modeling tool for the Reactor Module. 
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10.3.8 Summary 
Several important observations resulted from the thermal control system efforts. These include the 
following: 
Thermal control demands would be a significant driver for the arrangements. Placement of the hot leg 
piping away from the center and near the outer portions of the module would make isolation of the hot 
leg from other components easier and more importantly facilitate rejection of the excess heat to 
space. Isolation of hot and cold elements from each other, by a combination of blanketing and/or 
grouping into thermal zones, would be necessary to minimize heat toss and heat exchange between 
different plant components. 
Technology development would be necessary to demonstrate the needed elements necessary to 
provide adequate thermal management. These include but are not limited to 
Demonstrate thermal coatings that can survive the temperatures and radiation levels within the 
different zones 
Demonstrate blanketing material options for different spacecraft zones 
Demonstrate thermal interface materials that can withstand the high temperature and radiation 
while providing the thermal conductivity or isolation required 
Demonstrate heat pipe or other heat transport performance for the needed heat input levels 
over the temperature range of 400 - 600 K 
The non-radiator portion of the reactor module envelope aft of the shield must be blanketed in order to 
keep pre-start-up temperatures above 200 - 250 K with a reasonable amount of heat input. However, 
excessive blanketing could result in excessive temperatures during normal operation. Preliminary 
calculations indicate that reducing the effective emissivity below - 0.1 to 0.2 could result in excessive 
temperatures during normal operation. Thus, a balance must be achieved between the normal and 
pre-start-up thermal requirements. It is possible that micrometeoroid protection could provide the 
degree of blanketing desired. 
The detail needed to provide complete thermal models would have exceeded the current limitations of 
ABAQUS 6.5-3, leading to other modeling techniques being investigated. Future efforts would need 
to evaluate available analysis tools early in the design process, so that appropriate tools could be 
made available when necessary. 
It would be necessary to consider other requirements while developing the thermal control 
methodology. For example, micrometeoroid protection will serve as part of the thermal blanketing in 
some area. However, regions requiring both heat rejection to space and micrometeoroid protection 
might require special arrangements. For example, it might be necessary to place micrometeoroid 
protection between the radiator and the protected elements, and find methods to transport the heat to 
the radiative surfaces. Thermal protective surfaces would also need to mitigate charge build-up and 
minimize contamination. 
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10.4 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
Micrometeoroids and orbital debris are space-borne particles ranging in size from very small (10-l2 g) 
to very large ( lo2 g), and with velocities sometimes exceeding 20 km/s. Without adequate protection, 
there is an unacceptable chance that an impact by a micrometeoroid or orbital debris would result in a 
mission ending failure. To underscore this concern, the loss or termination of approximately eleven 
previous space missions is attributed to a micrometeoroid impact (Giotto, Image, ISEE-3, Mariner 4 
and 7, MSTl 2,  Olympus, SEDS 2, Vega, Voyager, and Wind), Reference 10- 6. Although unproven, 
several other missions are also thought to have been ended by a micrometeoroid impact. 
The JlMO spacecraft would be much larger than most previous spacecraft. This fact, combined with 
the long mission duration and proven vulnerability of a spacecraft to mission ending damage, makes 
protection from micrometeoroids and orbital debris an important design consideration. To properly 
address this issue, it is important to understand the different protection methods and to incorporate 
them into the spacecraft design during the preliminary project efforts. 
This section describes the nature of the micrometeoroid and orbital debris environments, methods for 
evaluating the threat to mission success, and approaches to design and testing of various mitigation 
systems. The goal of this section is to present the basic principles and to summarize how they could 
be applied to the reactor module design. 
This section resulted from efforts to collect and organize the large amount of information regarding 
micrometeoroid and orbital debris protection. Most of the information in this section comes from other 
sources, mostly NASA. More detailed information can be found in the indicated references. 
10.4.1 Orbital Debris 
Orbital debris is classified as man-made debris in near Earth orbit with a mass typically greater than 
several grams. The orbital altitude for the majority of these objects ranges between 700 km and 2000 
km, but it is possible for the debris to be in orbits higher and lower than those altitudes. Figure 10-14 
is an example of the altitude dependence of the flux data. 
There are approximately 100,000 objects in low Earth orbit greater than 1 cm in diameter, 12,000 of 
these are greater than 5 cm in diameter. Orbital debris can range from the microgram scale to 
kilograms. Aluminum is the predominant material due to prevalence of space junk, Reference -lo- 14. 
The velocity profile for orbital debris is between 2 kmlsec and 14 kmisec with the average velocity 
being around 10 kmtsec. 
The next two sections discuss data for orbital debris, how to apply it, and different methods that could 
be implemented to mitigate the possibility of mission ending failures due to orbital debris impact in low 
Earth orbit. 
10.4. I .I Orbital Debris Flux 
The flux of orbital debris, particles per square meter per year, for the JlMO mission was modeled 
using the Orbital Debris Engineering Model ORDEM2000 from the Johnson Space Center (JSC). This 
model provided flux data by specifying a combination of parameters. From these parameters, data 
can be obtained as a function of orbital altitude, velocity, inclination, and/or particle sire. Tables were 
available from the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Prometheus Project Environmental 
Requirements Document (ERD), Reference 10- 9, and directly from JSC. JSC can also provide 
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The following sections step through the different levels of data required and the methodology that 
would be used for selecting an appropriate protection system that would ensure mission completion. 
Most data can be obtained through the various NASA facilities as discussed below. Means to apply 
this data for preliminary sizing estimates and key factors in evaluating different protection systems are 
covered in Section 10.4.2.2. Historical examples of spacecraft protection systems are summarized in 
Section 10.4.2.3. Basic designs of various protection systems are described in Section 10.4.2.1. 
Analysis and selection of materials for micrometeoroid protection is covered in Section 10.4.2.5. 
Lastly, methods of testing and test performance are covered in Section 10.4.2.4. A summary of this 
information is available in Section 10.4.3. 
10.4.2.1 Micrometeoroid Flux and Velocity 
The micrometeoroid flux and velocity for each mission segment can be modeled using the Meteoroid 
Engineering Model METEM from JPL or the older Divine model from JSC as stated in Reference 10- 
7. The data for these models is based on previous satellite missions and ground-based radar. The 
models provide flux data at a specified location in the solar system for particle masses between 10- 
129 and 102 g. This data can be specified by particle velocity or local distance measurements 
depending on the selected output. Examples of the location dependant data are represented in Figure 
10-1 5 ,  Figure 10-1 6, Figure 10-1 7, and Table 10-5. Tables are available from the JPL Prometheus 
Project ERD, Reference 10- 9, and directly from JPL and JSC. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
was working on a new and better model for micrometeoroid fluxes at the time of this report. 
This data would be utilized after calculating the critical penetration thickness for a candidate protection 
system and the critical mass of a micrometeoroid that would cause penetration of the candidate 
protection system, Sections 10.4.2.2.1 and 10.4.2.2.2 respectively. The flux data could then be 
applied to the probability of component failure analysis, described in Section 10.4.2.2.3. Once the 
probability is calculated, an evaluation would take place to assess whether the calculated probability 
is within acceptable mission parameters. Iterations in the design of the protection system would occur 
until an acceptable probability of failure is reached. 
For the JIM0 mission, the primary micrometeoroid concerns would occur at the asteroid belt and at 
Jupiter. The moons of Callisto, Europa, and Ganymede would be the primary mission objective for 
JIMO, Reference 10- 8. The moons orbit at 26.33, 9.40, and 14.97 Jovian radii, respectively, which 
are beyond the range of the rings. Micrometeoroids velocities of 60 - 70 kmlsec near Jupiter are 
possible, but velocities between 14 kmisec and 22 km/sec are more likely per Table 10-7. Table 10-6 
and Figure 10-16 shows typical micrometeoroid velocities and flux distributions between Earth Orbit (1 
AU) and Jupiter (5.2 AU). 
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Table 10-6: Average Speed of Micrometeoroids - METEM 
(Reference 10- 9) 
1 Heliocentric 1 Avg Speed I 
Table 10-7: Average Speed of Jovian Micrometeoroid 
, (R.:feyc I 0- 9) , 
Flux - METEM 
10.4.2.2 Development of Protection Systems 
A micrometeoroid protection system would be designed to protect against particles ranging from a few 
milligrams to a maximum of 3 - 4 grams, depending on the mission, risk evaluations, and other 
variables. Demonstration of protection for smaller particles would be difficult because they could not 
be accurately simulated in a test. More massive particles typically have high kinetic energy, making it 
difficult to design a mass efficient shield that would protect sufficient protection using current 
technologies. The details of the critical calculations that have to he made when designing a protection 
system to account for varying micrometeoroid types, sizes, and velocities are covered in the following 
three sections. 
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found in References 10- 10 and 10- 11. Most of the multi-bumper (multi-layer) designs implement a 
form of the Cour-Palais equation also found in References 10- 10 and 10- 1 I. However, these 
formulas have only been demonstrated valid for velocities between 7 krnlsec and 10 kmisec due to 
testing limitations as discussed in Section 10.4.2.4. Beyond these velocities, results would have to be 
extrapolated using assumptions and uncertainty factors of safety. This was not taken into account in 
Table t 0-8 
d: Particle Diameter; KE: Kinetic Energy 
K,: Material Constant, 0.57 for Aluminum 
- K m~.352P~.167 (vp COS ~ 7 . 0 7 5  bal l ,  critical - I p where: m,: Particle Mass; V,: particle velocity 
p: Particle impact angle (direct impact assumes 0°) 
p,: Particle density 
10.4.2.2.2 Critical Impact Mass 
The critical particle impact mass, m ,  ,.,, is the mass of a micrometeoroid traveling at specified 
velocity that would penetrate through the protection system. This value should be calculated for each 
component during protection system design. This is to ensure that.each component can function 
following a particle impact that is within the design parameters. The equation listed below is simply a 
rearrangement of the Fish and Summers equation listed in the previous section for single wall 
protection, Reference 10- 12. Different equations will have to be implemented for different types of 
protection systems. Many of these equations are available in References 1 0- 10 and 10- 1 I. 
K1: Material Constant, 0.57 for Aluminum 
tmlr: Component Wall Thickness 
V,: Particle velocity 
p: Particle impact angle 
p,: Particle density 
10.4.2.2.3 Component Probability of Failure 
A key to evaluating a protection system is to incorporate the orientation and location of a component 
within the spacecraft. This information would then be used to determine the probability that a critical 
component would fail due a micrometeoroid impact. This probability could be calculated per 
Reference 10- 10. Once the critical impact mass has been calculated, the appropriate flux data for 
each mission phase could be selected and translated into fluence data, impacts/m2, over mission life. 
After this, appropriate components can be evaluated. 
Critical spacecraft systems and components that would be evaluated include pressurized vessels and 
conduits such as the reactor and piping, electricaf equipment, reactor control drive mechanisms and 
power cables essential to mission success. It is anticipated that reactor protection would be one of 
the more significant design challenges, due to the importance of the continuous reactor operation, the 
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presence of mechanisms around it, the interaction between the protection and the reactor, influence 
on shielding, and because the reactor would be oriented toward the foward (ram) facing direction for 
much of the mission. 
After defining components requiring protection, the field of view (geometric factor corresponding to all 
visible surfaces on an object) and spacecraft attitude would be defined using information from NASA. 
The surface perpendicular to the velocity vector of the spacecraft would receive the highest fluence 
levels. Finally, the probability of failure for each component would be individually calculated. 
The probability of failure would be calculated by multiplying the area of interest's impact surface area, 
fluence, geometric factor, and attitude factor for each mission phase to give the number of impacts in 
a certain area of the spaceship. A factor of 2 would typically be applied to any specified fluence data 
used for calculations to account for uncertainty. A Poisson distribution is then applied to the multiplied 
value to obtain the probability of failure. Using cumulative probability formulation, the overall 
probability of micrometeoroid induced failure for the reactor module could be calculated using the 
results from the individual area of interest calculations. 
An alternative to this method is calculating the fluence level from the required probability of failure as 
specified by requirements documents. This would be performed by using the reverse of the previously 
stated probability analysis. Mass and velocity combinations could then be found at the required 
fluence level from the flux tables. The kinetic energy worst case combination of mass and velocity 
would then be taken from the accumulated data. After this, the protection system's thicknesses and 
standoff distance(s) could be designed to withstand the worst case mass and velocity combination. 
This should then meet the requirements for the probability of failure specified in mission assurance 
documents. 
10.4.2.3 Historical Methods 
When designing a micrometeoroid protection system, past designs should be evaluated for their 
relevance and scalability to the current project. The following are several different types of past and 
current spacecraft that have used varying forms and levels of micrometeoroid protection. 
10.4.2.3.1 Cassini 
This spacecraft is a scientific probe that was sent to study Saturn, Saturn's rings, and its moons. To 
withstand the transit through the asteroid belt and the Saturn micrometeoroid environment, Mylar was 
used in a Whipple shield arrangement (Section 10.4.2.4.2). It served the dual purpose of 
micrometeoroid protection and multi-layer insulation (MLI). The standoff distance from the secondary 
shield varied from 2.5 inches to 18 inches. In some critical locations on the spacecraft, fuel tanks for 
example, two layers of beta cloth were added behirid the Mylar. 
IO.4.2.3.2 Contour 
This probe was launched primarily to study two comets, Encke and Schwassmann-Wachmann. It 
employed five layers of Nextel and Kevlar to protect against impacts from the comet tail. The total 
thickness of the protections was 25 cm. 
I 0.4.2.3.3' Galileo 
The primary mission for Galileo was the exploration of Jupiter. Its protection was designed to 
withstand particles up to 0.8 mm in diameter. The protection varied depending on the different 
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sections of the spacecraft. On the outside was a layer of 25.4 pm thick aluminized Kapton. Beneath 
the outer layer were two layers of 25.4 pm carbon filled polyester coating on 12.7 pm of Kapton. 
Lastly, there were 10 - 20 layers of 6.3 pm thick aluminized Mylar and Dacron net. 
10.4.2.3.4 Giotto 
Researching Halley's Comet was the primary mission for Giotto. Its closest approach to the comet 
was 596 km. It employed a 1 mm thick bumper panel of aluminum with a standoff distance of 25 cm 
from 12 mm thick Kevlar arranged in a Whipple shield configuration. The protection was designed to 
withstand particle impacts up to one gram. 
10.4.2.3.5 International Space Station (ISS) 
The protection system design for the ISS is multi-layered. The level of protection employed on the 
space station varies by location and criticality. The critical compartments and components have a 0.80 
in aluminum bumper and a 0.1 88 in aluminum secondary protection wall. The spacing between the 
two is approximately 4.5 in. Between the two are 23 layers of multi-layer insulation, 6 layers of Nextel, 
and 6 Layers of Kevlar, Reference 10- 14. This is designed to withstand an impact of a 1 cm particle 
traveling at 10 km/sec. 
10.4.2.3.6 Stardust 
The mission for this spacecraft was to collect dust and carbon-based samples from the comet Wild 2 .  
It came within 240 km of the comet. It employed a double Whipple shield design to protect against the 
cometary coma. The bumper shields (Section 10.4.2.4.3) were, made from composite panels. Beneath 
them were blankets of Nextel used to spread out the debris and dissipate the energy. It was designed 
to protect against particles up to 1 cm in diameter. 
10.4.2.4 Current Methods 
There are many different designs used to prevent against hypervelocity impacts. The following six 
methods are the most predominant designs that have been implemented in recent years and are 
being further developed. 
10.4.2.4.d Single Layer Protection 
For this design, the rear wall of the chosen protection material is in direct contact with the component 
it is protecting, Figure 10-1 8. The alternative is that the component wall thickness is made thick 
enough to withstand the design impact level. This is the simplest form of protection and thus more 
effective protection schemes exist. 
The protective layer could be fastened to the component by wrapping the material directly over the 
component or being tied to the component. A single layer of protection is subject to pitting if it does 
not fail. The pitting could induce spalling of the component wall due to the shock wave created during 
pitting. This could be mitigated by keeping the material speed of sounds constant between the 
impacting material and the protection materia). 
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10.4.2.6 Impact Testing 
Impact testing is arguably the most important part of determining the proper protection system. 
Currently there are only limited mathematical models used to predict how different types of protection 
designs would react to a hypervelocity impact. This is because particle impact probability is a 
Gaussian distribution. This means the interaction with the protection system based on particle mass, 
size, and density cannot be accurately modeled since it is random. To account for this, multiple runs 
of testing for each evaluated protection system would have to be made. This is to determine the 
proper mathematical correlations of particle size and velocity to impact depth. The correlations could 
then be extrapolated out to higher velocities with the caveat of adding a margin of design safety into 
any probability and material thickness equations. This would account for the extrapolation uncertainty. 
As previously stated, this is typicaHy done by increasing the Ruence level by a factor of two. See 
References 10- 13 and 10- 22 for more information. 
'l0.4.2.6.1 Testing Material Simulation 
Micrometeoroids have been most accurately simulated by using naturally occurring silica balls that are 
indigenous to Hawaii. The test specimens typically range in size from micrograms to milligrams and 
have a density between 2 g/cm3 and 3 g/cm3. Micrometeoroids could also be modeled using iron for 
iron micrometeoroids and polyethylene for CHON. Orbital debris could be modeled using aluminum 
balls of about the same density. The material chosen would have a large impact on test results since 
the chemical compatibility between the test particle and protection system material would be one of 
the factors that would determine the amount of damage sustained on impact. See References 10- 13 
and 10- 22 for more information. 
I O.4.2.6.2 Testing Facilities 
There are multiple facilities at which hypervelocity impact testing could be performed including NASA 
facilities and national laboratories. Most of these facilities predominantly use one of the two testing 
methods listed below. 
10.4.2.6.2.1 Light Gas Gun 
NASA Ames and MSFC both contain testing facilities with light gas guns. These guns are capable of 
accelerating small particles (0.1-1 mm in diameter) to velocities between 3 krnlsec and 9 kmlsec. 
Velocities greater than this are not recommended due to the potential for over-heating and damaging 
the light gas gun. Little testing data is thus available for higher hypervelocity impacts. The test 
chamber allowed for target samples up to 20 by 20 cm. Two guns have been shot at each other to 
achieve relative velocities of 20 kmlsec. 
1 O.4.2.6.2.2 Electrostatic Gun 
This form of testing could achieve velocities near 100 kmisec, but the particles would have to be 
electrically conductive. Since the best material to model micrometeoroids is silica, which is not 
conductive, this test would have limited applicability. Orbital debris rarely travels above 10 kmlsec so 
this test would be considered overkill if aluminum were used far testing. 
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10.4.3 Summary 
The threat of a mission ending failure due to micrometeoroids or orbital debris is real, but it is also 
manageable. Many different options exist to mitigate the risks and they wilt most likely increase in 
effectiveness as new technology is developed. 
Options currently available include: 
Proper selection of launch vector and assembly altitude to avoid substantially large particles 
Inclusion of a ram shield over the reactor and reactor side of the hot-leg piping 
Use of protection system designs and materials for different components and regions within 
the spacecraft, such as 
o Singk Wall 
o Whipple Shield 
o Multi-Bumper Whipple Shield 
o Honeycombed Modification of Whipple Shield 
o Stuffed Whipple Shield 
o Modified Whipple Shield 
In order to comptete a successful design, the following steps, extracted from NASA sources, would be 
recommended: 
Obtain mission specific orbital debris and micrometeoroid flux and velocity data from NASA. 
Select several combinations of particle mass and velocity that accurately represent the most 
likely and worst case design scenarios. 
Calculate the minimum component~system/region wall thickness for a single wall protection to 
obtain a reference point for starting the design process. 
Evaluate current and historical applicable protection system designs that have been effective. 
Learn current and state-of-the-art methods of protection. 
Quantitatively and subjectively rank different materials available for key attributes. 
Evaluate required level of protection for each spacecraft component/system/region per 
requirements documents. 
Calculate the probability of failure for each componentlsystemlregion and determine the 
overall reactor module probability. of failure. Alternatively, use a target probability of failure to 
properly select a fluence, which will yield mass and velocity combinations to use for design. 
Design several protection systems for each component/system/region based on what level of 
protection is required, best suited materials, most applicable technology, and trade studies. 
Test the designs for: 
o Effects of reactor and environmental radiation on protection system. 
o Chemical compatibility between impacting particles and protection system. 
o Protection system material compatibility with nearby components and structures. 
o Sirnuiation of hypervelocity particle impacts. 
Once impact testing is completed, determine test data correlations to extrapolate data to high 
velocities and different size masses. 
Evaluate each protection system. 
Iterate to completion. 
These steps are deemed to be the most prudent way to design a mass conscious and highly effective 
protection system for the reactor design module. Much of the data, information, and facilities needed 
to complete this are available through NASA. 
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10.5 Environmental Considerations for Instrumentation and Control 
Developing the instrumentation and control system of the reactor power plant would require 
understanding of the environments which affect its sensors, cables, and electronics. These 
components would be distributed throughout the Reactor Module and spacecraft in regions that vary 
strongly in their local radiation and thermal conditions. This section describes these environments at 
the pre-conceptual stage of the SNPP development. 
10.5.1 Environmental Spacecraft Zones 
The spaceship includes six distinct environmental zones in which the I & C equipment must function. 
These zones are shown in Figure 10-10. These consist of the reactor, shield, control drive 
mechanisms (CDM's), reactor coolant and plant structure, signal and power transmission, and the 
electronics vault regions. Radiation and thermal phenomena drive the I&C system component 
designs through the interaction of radiation with electronic devices and materials, and their sensitivity 
to temperature and heat. The selection of these devices would require a detailed understanding of 
the radiation and temperature sensitivities of each device. The internal radiation environment induced 
by the SNPP in these six zones is summarized in Table 10-10 with a listing of the reference radiation 
levels predicted for each region. The source and significance of these radiations for the I&C 
components is developed in Section 10.5.2. Similarly Table 10-11 presents the temperatures in the 
same regions and their significance is discussed in Section 10.5.3. 
Table 10-10: Radiation Environment Induced by SNPP 
Region Radiation 
Total Ionized Dose 1 Displacement Damage Dose (nlcmL) 
Reactor Coolant and plant 1 2x1 0' [Ref. 10- 271a I 6x1 014 ~ ~ e f .  I 0- 271d I 
3
3.8~10" [Ref. 10- 261 a 
5.2~10'" [Ref. 10- 261 a 
6x1 014 a 
(rads(Si)) 
I 
Control Drive Mechanism 
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3
4.5~10' [Ref.lO- 261 a 
5x1 o8 [Ref. 10- 261 a 
2x1 o8 
Reactor 
[Ref. 10- 271b 
2x10" 
Structure 
Signal and Power 
Transmission 
Electronics Vault 
Shield 
(centerline) 
3 6x10151~ef 10- 231" 
Fore 
In 
Aft 
" Assumes a 12 year mission. 
Assumes 15 full power year mission. 
Localized streaming around the control drive mechanisms. 
Maximum radiation for the power conversion system. Maximum radiation is located in region closest 
to the shield and CDM. The components will provide some shielding and the radiation will fall off as 
the inverse square of the distance. 
The radiation level will be reduced by shielding from components in the power conversion system. 
Approximate fall off as inverse square 
of distance plus shielding provided by 
the power conversion system 
[Ref. 10- 2718 
25x1 0' [Ref. 10- 91 
Approximate fall off as inverse square 
of distance plus shielding provided by 
the power conversion system 
[Ref. 10- 27je 
5x1 0'' [Ref. 1 0- 91 
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10.5.2 Radiation Environment 
10.5.2.1 Summary 
The JlMO spacecraft would be subjected to radiations from two sources during its journey through 
space: the internal radiations generated by SNPP reactor and the external radiations generated by the 
stellar and planetary objects in space. The SNPP reactor would subject the remainder of the 
spacecraft to a continuous stream of neutron and gamma radiations at nearly constant levels for the 
duration of the mission, while space sources would impinge on the spacecraft in varying forms, rates, 
and intensities. It is the electrical and electronic systems aboard the spacecraft that would be 
particularly vulnerable to these radiations and that are the focus of the considerations herein. 
The SNPP reactor induced radiations would subject the spacecraft and the I&C electrical and 
electronic components to radiation exposures larger than normally found in terrestrial nuclear 
applications, but they would be expected to be quite moderate compared to the Jovian radiation 
levels. In addition, the reactor gamma interactions at the outer surface of the reactor could knock 
electrons off the surface of the reactor to form an electron cloud that could travel around the shadow 
shield to the remainder of the spaceship. The existence of this electron radiation had not been 
confirmed, but needs to be evaluated for reactors which do not have significant amounts of gamma 
attenuation around the reactor, as would be the case with shadow shields as applied on the JIM0 
spaceship. 
The JlMO spacecraft would be subjected to space radiation from a wide variety of sources while 
traveling through the radiation belts of Earth, interplanetary space, and the radiation belts of Jupiter. 
Moreover, the radiation exposure rate of the spacecraft would not be constant over the flight, but 
rather would vary from relatively low rates during the first years of flight to very large values near its 
termination. The Van Allen belts of Earth would initially subject the spacecraft to modest levels of 
, electron and proton radiation. During the interplanetary journey to Jupiter, solar flares from the Sun 
and intergalactic cosmic rays would give rise to proton and heavy ion radiation at modest levels. As it 
traveled about the moons of Jupiter, the spacecraft would be exposed to intense electron, proton, and 
heavy ion radiation. The radiation in the Jovian environment was expected to be the most limiting 
source of radiation in so far as the spacecraft electronics and electrical components are concerned. 
At Jupiter, high electric field strengths and high electron energies would be expected. 
10.5.2.2 Transient and Trapped Particles 
There are two natural space radiations that are a particular concern for electronic components: 
transient particles such as high energy protons and heavy ions, and trapped particles consisting of 
protons, electrons, and heavy ions. Transient radiation consists of galactic cosmic rays and solar 
events including solar flares and solar coronal mass ejections. Galactic cosmic rays have omni- 
directional particles with low level fluxes and energies up to 10'~eV. Solar eruptions consist of 
energetic protons, alpha particles, heavy ions, and electrons with energies in 100s of MeV Reference 
10- 9. 
Trapped particles, on the other hand, are found near the planetary environments of Earth and Jupiter. 
The environment near Jupiter contains high levels of energetic particles trapped by Jupiter's magnetic 
field. This radiation is similar to, but much more intense than that found within the Earth's Van Allen 
belts. Earth's trapped protons and heavier ions have energies exceeding 100 MeV and electrons with 
energies up to 10 MeV, whereas Jupiter's trapped particles have electrons with energies exceeding 
100s MeV and protons with energies up to about 100 MeV. . 
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10.5.2.3 Interaction of Radiation with Electronic Devices 
Radiation interacts with materials and electronic devices through ionizing dose, displacement damage 
dose, and single electron effects. Ionizing dose and displacement damage dose are cumulative 
effects. The contributing environments are the Earth's Van Allen belts, the continuous irradiation due 
to gamma rays and neutrons from the reactor, and the intense radiation belts of Jupiter. Galactic 
cosmic rays and solar eruptions would contribute to the cumulative ionizing dose and displacement 
damage dose to a lesser degree than those environments stated earlier. Total ionizing dose (TID) 
and displacement damage dose (DDD) would degrade device performance and possibly render the 
device ineffective. Single electron effects are the result of impact into an electronic device from a 
single high energy particle. Transient radiation such as galactic cosmic rays particles and particles 
from solar events in space can cause single event upsets that complicate the reactor control function. 
Single event upsets can manifest themselves as noisy data or the upset can inadvertently trigger a bit 
flip at any point in time. The severity of the effect depends upon the criticality of the system in which 
the single event upset occurs. Galactic cosmic rays, solar eruptions, and high energy protons and 
heavy ions from the Earth's and Jupiter's radiation belts contribute to single electron effects. 
The dominant sources for total ionizing dose and displacement damage dose are dependent upon the 
mission, as stated earlier, and the shielding capability. For the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) 
mission a shielding thickness of approximately 1000 mils (25mm) was being considered to satisfy the 
total ionizing dose and displacement damage dose requirements provided in the Parts Program 
Requirements Reference 10- 25. At 1000 mils the trapped Jovian electrons dominate the mission TID 
 and^^^ since most of the Earth's trapped electrons and protons and Jovian trapped protons would 
be effectively shielded. 
10.5.2.4 External Radiation Contribution from Space 
For the JlMO mission, the unshielded external total ionizing dose and displacement damage dose 
was specified as 1 XI o9 rads(Si) and 5.7~1 oq5 1 -MeV equivalent neutrons per square centimeter, 
respectively (Reference 10- 9). The external environment would be dominated by charged particles, 
but it is described by a 1-MeV equivalent neutron. The radiation incident upon a component of 
interest is the sum of the external (shielded or unshielded) and internal radiation environment. 
10.5.2.5 Internal Radiation Contribution from Reactor 
The JIMO spacecraft would be subjected to radiation originating from the reactor throughout the 
mission. The estimated levels for the various regions of the spacecraft from the reactor are tabulated 
in Table 10-10. The region just aft of the reactor would experience high levels of radiation that would 
be subsequently attenuated through the shield. The radiation level throughout the shield would be 
high to modest and decrease to a minimum aft of the shield. 
A design limit of 0.5x109 rads(Si) TID was initially established for the I&C equipment immediately aft 
the reactor radiation shield based upon the most limiting elements in that region, i.e., electrical 
insulation materials for the cable, motors, and sensors. This design value 0.5~10' rads(Si) TID 
incorporated a radiation design factor (ROF) of 2 and included contributions from the internal and 
external environment. The RDF is defined as the ratio of the device or material capability in the given 
application to the radiation environment at the device or material location. The internal and external 
contributions were assumed to be 2x1 0' rads(Si) and 5x1 O7 rads(Si), respectively. It was found that 
the external radiation source could be easily attenuated by nearly an order of magnitude by as little as 
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10 to 20 mil of aluminum shielding (Reference 10- 9). This evaluation formed the basis for the 
estimate of internal radiation in the regions adjacent to the aft portion of the shield. 
The control drive mechanisms would experience a highly localized spike in the radiation level due to 
streaming along the CDM rods through the shield. Aft of the shield the radiation level would fall off 
inversely with distance squared. The radiation level at a particular component would depend on 
shielding provided by other components in the plant along with the radiation level falling off as the 
inverse square of the distance. 
The internal radiation falls off such that the TID and DDD at the electronic vault plane due to the 
reactor could be designed to be 25x1 o3 rads(Si) and 5x1 0" 1 -MeV equivalent neutrons per square 
centimeter (Reference 10- 9) based on an RDF of 2.. 
The TID and DDD requirements for the electronic corn onents used in the JIM0 mission are specified R as 3x1 o5 rads(Si), preferably I x loe  rads(Si), and 6x1 0 1 -MeV equivalent neutrons per square 
centimeter as documented in the Parts Program Requirements, Reference 10- 25. Thus, the radiation 
environment inside the electronics vault would be shielded to a 1 .5x105 rads(Si) region and a 5x1 o5 
rads(Sj) and 3x10" 1-MeV equivalent neutrons per square centimeter region. The external and 
internal radiation values along with the radiation hardened level for the components would determine 
the amount of shielding required for the electronic vault to achieve these desired dose levels. 
10.5.3 Thermal Environment 
As discussed earlier in this section, the spacecraft would be subject to a variety of external thermal 
environments during pre-launch activities, launch, orbital flight, and interplanetary flight to Jupiter. It 
would be exposed to a wide variation in temperature, To accommodate these extremes, the thermal 
management segments of the Reactor Module and of the spacecraft must provide the necessary 
thermal environments for the structures and components of the spacecraft to survive and operate 
reliably for the duration of the mission. /- 
The reactor I&C equipment would be distributed over many regions of the spacecraft, such that 
interrelated elements of its subsystems would often be subjected to very different thermal conditions. 
An understanding of the thermal elements within each zone would guide the design and development 
of the I&C system components and the local thermal management subsystems to ensure that the I&C 
component thermal requirements would be met. This section presents the initial efforts to identify the 
thermal environments within the various regions of the spacecraft to allow the development of a 
rational set of requirements for the I&C equipment that reside within them. 
10.5.3.1 Thermal Environment by Zones 
Table 10-1 1 summarizes the baseline temperatures in each of the six regions of concern to the design 
of the I & C Segment. This summary identifies the temperature of major thermal elements within each 
zone including fluids that may be measured, surfaces that may have I&C components attached to 
them, as well as sources that may radiate or conduct energy to a component. These temperatures 
represent a snapshot of the SNPP and spacecraft thermal environments during the pre-conceptual 
SNPP design process. The values were obtained from a wide variety of references that were 
undergoing constant revision as more became known of the reactor plant and spacecraft designs. 
These values would have eventually formed the basis for the system requirements for the I&C 
equipment. 
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10.5.3.1 .I Aft of Reactor and Fore of Shield 
In the internally insulated, nickel superalloy hot leg piping design, the temperature of the gas inside 
the hot leg is 11 50 K (Section 2) with the outer surface insulated to 900 K (Reference 10- 28). The 
primary cold leg coolant return pipe is 891 K (Section 2). 
ItO.5.3.1.2 Interior of Shield 
There were four shielding materials considered; lithium hydride (LiH), beryllium and boron 
tetrachloride (Be & B4C), Boron, and water. The LiH material would require the interior neutron shield 
portion of the reactor shield operate between 600 K and 800 K for best material stability. The 
estimated thermal values for the Be & B4C, Boron, and water assumed that the heat was radiated to 
space, while the LiH shield assumed heat was radiated to an insulated layer. If a micrometeoroid 
shield was determined necessary then the temperature of the Be & B4C, Boron, and water shield 
would likely increase. Furthermore, the above values assumed that the hot leg travels a straight path 
through the shield. In order to reduce radiation streaming along the coolant pipes through the shield, 
other piping configurations, including a spiral path through the shield, would be considered and the 
longer path through the shield would likely increase the shield temperature (Reference 10- 18) 
10.5.3.1.3 Control Drive Mechanism and Aft of Shield 
The goal of thermal control within the control drive mechanism region would be to limit CDM 
temperatures to 400 K maximum to satisfy the material requirements and to maximize the reliability of 
the CDMs. This goal may require the addition of thermal insulation or supplemental heat rejection. 
Insulation materials, if needed, would require development to insulate properly above 500 K. Near 600 
K the permanent magnets may begin to degrade and would require further study. 
10.5.3.1.4 Reactor Coolant and Plant Structure 
Similar to the control drive mechanism zone, there would be 300 K to 400 K regions within the 
Reactor Coolant and Plant Structure zone to satisfy the thermal requirements of the electronic 
components (primarily the cable and connectors). See Section 10.3.6.4. The temperature of the gas 
and surface pipes is provided to assist the design of the sensor and sensor fixture technology. 
10.5.3.1.5 Signal and Power Transmission 
The region from the reactor coolant and plant structure zone to the electronics vault would be 
occupied by cabling and connectors for which temperatures from 200 K to 400 K would be targeted. 
After launch and prior to start up, the boom will be unfolded. In order to assure the cables unfold 
successfully at the hinge, heaters may be required to keep the temperature within the desired range. 
Thermal management is required to balance resistive heat generation with heat transfer external to 
the boom to maintain target temperatures. 
10.5.3.1.6 Electronics Vault 
Thermal management would be needed to balance electronics heat generation with heat transfer 
external to the enclosure to maintain temperatures. Thermal control within the electronics vault would 
be designed to satisfy the 238 K to 348 K requirements far electronics. 
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I 1 889 K Cold ~i~ Surface I I 
Table 10-11: Baseline Temperatures for 1 & C Component and System Design 
470 K (Boron) 
535 K (BelB4CIH20) 
Current References 
Section 10.3.6.1, Section 2 
and Ref. 10- 28 
Reactor 
Thermal (Internal) (K) 
Snapshot Values 
1150 K Gas Hot Leg Interior 
900 K Hot Leg Surface 
Shield (centerline) 
I I I 
Control Drive Mechanism I 11 SO K Gas Hot Len Interior I Section 10.3.6.3 
670 K (Be/B4C/LiH) 
405 K (Be/B4C) 
Fore 
In 
Aft 
Section 10.3.6.2 
Ref. 10- 18 
665 K (BelB4CILiH) 
388 K (BelB4C) 
400 K (Boron) 
393 K (Be/B4C/H20) 
650 K (Be/B,C/LiH) 
379 K (Be/B4C) 
370 K (Boron) 
350 K (BeIB4CIH20) 
900 K Hot Leg surface 
400K Ambient Temperature 
Reactor Coolant and Plant 
Structure 
Section 10.3.6.2 
Ref. 10- 18 
Section 10.3.6.2 
Ref. 10- 18 
Ref. 10- 28 
Section 10.3.6.3 
400 K CDM Temperature 
I 1 300 K to 400 K ambient 
Section 10.3.6.3 
temperature 
900 K Hot Len Surface 
1 150 K Gas lnterior Hot Leg 
11 50 K Gas Turbine lnlet 
927 K Gas Turbine Outlet 
450 K Alternator Bleed Leg 
556 K Gas Cooler lnlet Leg 
390 K Compressor lnlet Leg 
537 K Compressor Outlet Leg 
891 K Reactor lnlet Leg 
530 K Radiator lnlet Leg 
379 K Radiator Outlet Leg 
I 
Section 10.3.6.4 
Section 2, Section 6, and 
Ref. 10- 28 
I I 
Electronics Vault 1 238 K to 348 K I Reference 10- 29 
Signal and Power Transmission Signal and Power Transmission: 
218 Kto378K 
Radiator: 379 K to 530 K 
Section 2 (radiator values) 
Reference 10- 30 
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10.5.4 Summary 
The thermal and radiation requirements for the components making up the I&C system depend 
heavity on the ability to accurately describe the Reactor Module and spacecraft environment induced 
both the by the SNPP and the space environment. These requirements are crucial to the design, 
development, test and certification of the components. For this reason, the creation and development 
of quality models of the thermal and radiation environments for all the major regions of the SNPP and 
spacecraft is necessary. 
10.6 References 
10- 1 : Prometheus Baseline 1 - Li/Brayton Concept, Northrop Grumrnan Space Technologies 
10- 2: "Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) Environmental Requirements Document - Preliminary", 982- 
00029, Rev. 0, July 6, 2005 
70- 3: B-SE(SPS)FMS-008, "Technical Documentation in Support of Project Prometheus Plant Pre- 
Conceptual Design Report," November 1 1, 2005 
10- 4: Haley, V.F., "Insulation for TEM Pump", General Electric Corporation, Sept. 23, 1987 
10- 5:Cooke, Bill. "Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter MeteoroidslOrbital Debris and JIMO" Presentation. 
MSFC/UNITeS. July 27, 2004. 
10- 6: Garrett, Henry B. "Space Environment Interactions for JIMO" Presentation. JPL. August 4, 
2004. 
10- 7: JPL D-10178-3 Cassini Earth Swingby Plan Supplement @ 10- 8:JPL D-982-00001. Prometheus Nuclear Systems and Technology Program. Preliminary 
Prometheus Project Plan. NASA Unique Project Number: UPN # 982-00. Revision 1. May 
2005 
10- 9: JPL D-982-00029. Prometheus Project. Environmental Requirements Document. Revision 0. 
July 6, 2005. 
10- 10: NASA Preferred Reliability Practice PD-EC-1107. 
10- 11 : NASA Contractor Report 4706 Structural Damage Prediction and Analysis for Hypervelocity 
Impacts- Handbook. 
10- 12:NASA Conference Publication 31 94-Part 2- LDEFSO Months in Space. 
10- 13: NASAITM-2003-212440 Hypervelocity Impact Test Results for a Metallic Thermal Protection 
System. 
10- 14: Wiliiamsen, Joel. "Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Design Considerations for Space Operations." 
2001 Core Technologies for Space Systems Conference. November 28,2001. 
10- 15 Larson, Wiley J. and Wertz, James R, Space Mission Analysis and Design, Mircocosm Inc and 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 
10- 16 Bettis Letter B-SE(RE)THD-0007, "Pressure Vessel and Reflector Temperature Sensitivity 
Studies", Volk, David R., October 31, 2005 
10- 17: KAPL Letter SPP-SPPS-0035 and Bettis Letter 6-SE(SPS)FMS-012, Reactor Module Thermal 
Zone Scoping Analyses, For Information, To Be Issued 
10- 18: KAPL Letter SPP-67210-0011, "Space Reactor Shield Design Summary, For Information", To 
Be Issued. 
10- 19: NASMP-1999-209263, "Multilayer Insulation Material Guidelines." M.M. Finckenor, a an hall 
Space Flight Center, April 1999 
10- 20: NASA SP-8105, Spacecraft Thermal Control, May 1973 
10- 21: NASAICR-1999-000000; Design, Fabrication and Test of a 6 kWt Space Radiator 
Demonstration Unit (RDU) - Phase I Final Report; September, 2004 
PRE-DECISIONA L - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 I 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 10-74 
10- 22: NASA/TP--2002-212076, Test and Analysis Capabilities of the Space Environment Effects 
Team at Marshall Space Flight Center 
10- 23: KAPL letter FSO-64R00-05-096, Control Drive Mechanism Streaming Analysis for Space 
Reactor Shield, August 24, 2005 
10- 24: JPL Systems Description 982-00051 Rev.0 August 6, 2004. 
10- 25: Casani, J., Jet Propulsion Laboratory, "Parts Program Requirements" (982-00025), dated 
March 2004. 
10- 26: ORNULTWNR-JIM0105-01, "JIM0 Reactor Sensor Technology Development Plan," Holcomb, 
D. E., et al., ORNL report, January 2005. 
10- 27: ORNULTR/NR-PROMl/05-21, "Radiation Transport Analyses to Support the Reactor Shield 
Materials Selection," Bucholz, J.A., et al., ORNL report, August 2005. 
10- 28: KAPL letter SPP-67210-0007, "Hot leg Piping Concept for Future Development," dated June 
30, 2005. 
10- 29: JPL Document D-17868, Revision 2 "Design, VerificationlValidation and Ops Principles for 
Flight Systems (Design Principles)", March 3, 2003. 
10- 30: JPL Document D-8208, Revision 1, "Space Craft Design and Fabrication Requirements for 
Electronic Packaging and Cabling", January 14, 2002 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 I 
0-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 11 -1 
Section I I
Potential Space Nuclear Power Plant Design Events 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enctosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 / 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 11-2 
(Intentionally Blank) 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure I to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 11 -3 
Potential Space Nuclear Power Plant Design Events 
Table of Con tents 
11 Potential Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) Design Events .................................................... 5 
11.1 Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................... 5 
11.2 Normal Design Events ................................................................................................... 6 
......................................................................................... 1 1.2.1 . 1 System Pressure Test 6 
17.2.1.2 Initial System Fill ................................................................................................ 6 
............................................................................................ 1 1.2.1.3 Acceptance Testing 6 
...................................................................................................... 11.2.1.4 Initial Criticality 6 
11.2.1.5 Launch .................................................................................................................. 6 
........................................................................... 112.1 6 Reactor Module Commissioning 6
...................................................................... 11.2.1.7 Temperature Adjustments over Life 6 
.................................. 11.2.1.8 Transition from Full Power Mode to Reduced Power Mode 7 
................................ 11.2.1.9 Transition from Reduced Power Mode to Full Power Mode 7 
...................................................................................... 11.2.1.1 0 External Thermal Cycling 7 
............................................................................................... I 1.2.2 Casualty Design Events 7 
.......................................................... 11.2.2.1 Loss or Reduction of Reactor Coolant Flow 7 
11.2.2.2 Stuck Open Check Valve in an Idle Loop .............................................................. 7
11.2.2.3 Partially Closed Check Valve or Control Valve in an Operating Loop .................... 8 
11.2.2.4 Loss of Brayton Speed Control ............................................................................. 8
................................................................................... 1 1.2.2.5 Startup of a Spare Brayton 8 
......................................................................... 1 1.2.2.6 Increase in Reactor Coolant Flow 8 
11.2.2.7 Loss of Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) Flow in a HRS Loop ............................... 9 
................................................................................... 1 1.2.2.8 Loss of Radiator Capability 9 
..................................................................................... 1 1.2.2.9 External Neutron Addition 9 
..................................................................................................... 11.2.2.10 Stuck Reflector 9 
................................................................................. 1 1.2.2.1 1 Inadvertent Reflector Motion 9 
................................................................................... 1 1.2.2.12 Loss of Coolant (Gas leak) 9 
........................................................................................................ 1 1.3 GTR Design Events 10 
11.3.1 Normal Design Events ................................................................................................ 10
1 1.3.1.1 Normal Reactor Startup and Shutdown ............................................................... 10 
.................................................................................... 11 .3. 1.2 External Thermal Cycling 11 
............................................................................................... 1 1.3.1.3 Coolant Sampling ?I 
........................................................................................... 1 1.3.2 Casualty Design Events 11 
............................................................................. 11.3.2.1 Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow 11 
................................................................................... 1 1.3.2.2 External Neutron Addition 11 
............................................................................... 1 1.3.2.3 Inadvertent Reflector Motion 11 
11.3.2.4 Loss of Coolant (Gas leak) .............................................................................. 11 
I 1.3.2.5 Emergency Shutdown ......................................................................................... 22 
1 1.3.2.6 Release of Cryogenic Fluid into Vacuum Chamber ........................................... 12 
11.3.2.7 Air Contamination or Leakage into Vacuum Chamber ...................................... 12 
1 1 .3. 2.8 Loss of HRS Flow ............................................................................................... 12 
1 1.3.2.9 Seismic Event ..................................................................................................... 12
..................................................... 11.3.2.10 Release of HRS Fluid into Vacuum Chamber 12
..................................................................................................................... t f  . 4 References 12 
PRE-DECISIONAL . For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 11-4 
(Intentionally Blank) 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-672104010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 1 1-5 
I 1  Potential Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) Design Events 
11 .I Summary and Conclusions 
This section describes potential design events for the Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP). Design 
events applicable specifically to the Ground Test Reactor (GTR) are listed in Section 11.3. A list of 
design events would have been finalized after the reactor module functional requirements were 
established and the system architecture selected. 
Key Conclusions Regarding SNPP Design Events: 
The system architecture will determine how some design events affect the SNPP, and whether 
the design events are recoverable. For example, a permanent Brayton failure will be non- 
recoverable for a 1-1-1 architecture, but may be recoverable for a 2-2-2 architecture. 
Preliminary evaluations indicate that autonomous control action will be required for some 
transients to prevent a breach in the primary system. A significant loss of gas inventory would 
be mission-ending for the direct gas Brayton system regardless of system architecture. 
The location and differences in use of the GTR Facility will cause the GTR to have different 
design events from the SNPP. 
Definition and characterization of design events are used to set design specifications for plant 
systems and components, as well as provide input for structural analyses such as fatigue and brittle 
fracture. A formal Design Events Document contains the list of events, the design number of cycles 
for each event expected during the lifetime of the SNPP, and a complete set of plant transient 
performance curves for all key plant parameters. The Design Events Document was not completed at 
the time of Prometheus Project termination; it would have been issued early in the Conceptual Design 
phase. This section provides a preliminary listing and qualitative description of each event. 
Section 12 provides transient analysis results for a subset of these events. 
Reactor control commands would be issued from the Reactor Supervisory controller. Plant control 
commands (e.g., PCAD functions) would be issued from the PCAD controller. These commands 
would be programmed functions in the respective controllers and would be initiated autonomously in 
response to plant conditions, or initiated in response to commands from ground control and received 
by the controllers via the telecom and flight computer subsystems. Autonomous control is necessary 
because of the limited communication between the SNPP and ground control once the spaceship 
launched. Ground control commands are human issued commands that can be either a single 
command, a set of commands, or an initiator for a set of autonomous commands. For the SNPP, 
ground control commands travel through the Deep Space Network (DSN) and along the spaceship 
communication bus to the Reactor Supervisory controller. 
The design events list was generated by reviewing historical references including the SP-100 Generic 
Flight System Duty Cycle Definitions (Reference 1 t- 1) and other appficable documents. Events that 
would create stress changes and that the SNPP would be designed to survive are considered design 
- 
events. These events are then further divided into Normal ~ e s i ~ n  Events and Casualty Design 
Events. 
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11.2 Normal Design Events 
Normal design events encompass events that the SNPP would be expected to experience during the 
course of normal operation. 
11.2.1.1 System Pressure Test 
The SNPP will be pressurized to [Reserved] times the maximum operating pressure at [Reserved] 
temperature using inert gas to check for structural integrity and leak tightness. 
11.2.1.2 lnitial System Fill 
The initial system fill will charge the SNPP with the proper amount and composition of gas to achieve 
normal conditions when operating. The method and procedures for filling the SNPP have not been 
established. 
1 1.2.1.3 Acceptance Testing 
lnitial system level tests will be run to ensure that there are no gross manufacturing defects. This may 
include exercising the reflectors, motoring the Brayton units, exercising valves, and testing the reactor 
controller computers and software. 
11.2.1.4 Initial Criticality 
lnitial reactor criticality will be part of a ground test program to verify that there are no gross 
manufacturing defects and to characterize the as-built reactivity characteristics of the SNPP reactor 
before launch. Reactor power and amount of time critical will be limited to prevent accumulation of 
fission products in excess of launch safety criteria. 
I 12.1 -5 Launch 
Significant mechanical loads will be experienced by the SNPP during launch. Launch loads are 
dependent on the launch vehicle design, support ring, folded boom geometry, etc. 
11.2.1.6 Reactor Module Commissioning 
Reactor module commissioning occurs after launch and includes pre-critical checks, initiating primary 
coolant flow, bringing the reactor to criticality, heating up the plant and starting the Brayton units, 
starting (or increasing) the heat rejection segment (HRS) flow, bringing the spaceship to self- 
sustaining on nuclear power. See Sections 8.5.1 and 12.4.1.6 for details of the startup sequence. 
I I 21.7  Temperature Adjustments over Life 
Primary coolant temperature would need to be adjusted over the life of the mission due to fuel burnup, 
aging of components and space environment changes (heat sink temperature). This will be 
accomplished by adding or removing core reactivity with the reactivity control devices. 
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1 'l.2.1.8 Transition from Full Power Mode to Reduced Power Mode 
Reduced Power Mode(s) could be used when the spaceship is entering a long period of decreased 
electrical demand. This potentially conserves fuel, minimizes fission product buildup, and reduces 
time-at-temperature and creep. More details on Reduced Power Mode options can be found in 
Sections 3.7 and 8.5.2.3. 
1 1.2.1.9 Transition from Reduced Power Mode to Full Power Mode 
The transition from Reduced Power Mode to Full Power Mode would occur when the spaceship is 
approaching a time of full electrical power demand (thrusting). More details on Reduced Power Mode 
options can be found in Sections 3.7 and 8.5.2.3. 
11.2.1 . I0 External Thermal Cycling 
The SNPP will experience thermal cycling as it orbits the Earth or a moon because it is alternately 
exposed to the Sun and in shadow. 
11 -2.2 Casualty Design Events 
Casualty design events are unexpected events, usually resulting from a temporary or permanent 
failure of a system component, that the SNPP would be designed to survive without permanent loss of 
capability. 
I I .2.2.1 Loss or Reduction of Reactor Coolant Flow 
The SNPP is assumed to be operating at full power when all or a portion of reactor coolant flow is lost 
(see Section 12). This could be caused by loss of a Brayton or an inadvertent valve closure. 
Preliminary modeling results have shown that both events are recoverable if negative reactivity is 
inserted and reactor coolant flow is maintained (multiple Brayton units running at the initiation of the 
casualty) or quickly reestablished (restarting a single Brayton unit or starting a standby unit). It may 
also be necessary to reduce HRS flow to minimize system cooldown. Restarting a Brayton with a 
cold HRS would produce a significant thermal transient in the gas cooler. See Section 12 for 
preliminary transient results of a partial loss of Row (Sections l2.4.1.3, 12.4.2.1, and 12.4.3.1) and a 
complete loss of flow (Section 12.4.3.6). 
11.2.2.2 Stuck Open Check Valve in an Idle Loop 
A check valve was placed in each of the Brayton loops to prevent reverse flow in an idle loop. If the 
valve fails to completely close, reverse flow through the idle loop will be driven by differential pressure 
across the reactor. [A backup isolation valve may be used to minimize the potential for this casualty.] 
This reverse flow can cause insufficient core cooling, overheating of idle loop components, or damage 
to the Brayton bearings. The reverse flow that bypasses the core causes reduced cooling flow 
through the reactor resulting in increases in temperatures. The amount of flow reduction will be 
dependent upon the flow resistance in the idle loop and the degree to which the valve remains open. 
Reverse flow is also a concern for the current design of the Brayton thrust bearing which is designed 
to operate in the forward direction only. The degree of reverse Row which could be permitted without 
overheating the reactor or idle loop components has not bean determined. A small amount of 
backflow may be desirable in an idle loop to maintain temperature. It may also be necessary to 
include a Brayton shaft locking mechanism to prevent reverse rotation caused by reverse flow. 
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11.2.2.3 Partially Closed Check Valve or Control Valve in an Operating Loop 
If the check valve or control valve fails to fully open in an operating loop, the valve will present a flow 
restriction in the loop. The overall system pressure drop will increase while reducing system mass 
flow rate, reducing the thermal efficiency of the system. A flow imbalance between the operating 
loops will exist because flow through the unrestricted loop will increase until its pressure drop equals 
that of the restricted loop. If the flow restriction is too severe, the reactor module may not be able to 
generate the required electrical power. 
I I .2.2.4 Loss of Brayton Speed Control 
Brayton speed is controlled through the Parasitic Load Radiator (PLR). Each Brayton would have a 
PLR. If the PtR fails, Brayton speed control will be lost. The type of PLR failure will determine what 
load can be applied to the Brayton alternator. Insufficient load will result in an increase in Brayton 
shaft speed until a new balance between turbine and compressor work is achieved. See Section 12 
for preliminary transient results of a complete loss of electrical load (Sections 12.4.1.4, 12.4.2.2, and 
12.4.3.2) and a partial loss of electrical load (Section 12.4.3.3). The Section 12 results show system 
response with no action. The high shaft speeds reached during this casualty could result in 
exceeding mechanical stress limits in the affected Brayton. Another significant impact of this casualty 
is overheating in the HRS. Boiling in the HRS water coolant may overpressurize the system leading 
to an unrecoverable failure of the gas cooler. Control actions to prevent this may include Brayton 
control valve closure to stop primary gas flow and shut down the Brayton. Actions could also include 
increasing HRS flow to reduce or prevent boiling and overpressurization. If boiling is prevented, the 
additional heat load on the radiator heat pipes is also a concern. Multiple heat pipe failures could 
prevent the affected HRS loop from rejecting the necessary heat upon future restart. A gas cooler 
failure is likely to also cause a primary gas leak that would potentially be mission ending. 
11.2.2.5 Startup of a Spare Brayton 
A spare Brayton would be started when a component (Brayton, valve, HRS loop) renders an operating 
Brayton unit unable to produce the necessary electrical power or when directed by ground control. 
Depending upon the plant arrangement, this could require opening and shutting valves. The spare 
Brayton unit would be started by motoring it using power from an operating Brayton or an energy 
storage system. Starting a spare Brayton could cause a significant thermal transient for system 
components. System design would attempt to minimize coolant temperature differences prior to 
spare startup. 
11.2.2.6 Increase in Reactor Coolant Flow 
An increase in reactor coolant flow will result from either a spare Brayton inadvertently starting while 
the plant is operating at full power (and the associated loop valve(s) opening) or by an increase in the 
speed of an operating Brayton. If the increased flow is from a spuriously started spare Brayton, 
shutdown of that Brayton will return flow to normal levels. If it is caused by an increase in the speed 
of an operating Brayton, the PLR could be used to reduce speed or a control valve could be used to 
shut the Brayton down. Any increase in primary flow could also increase the HRS heat load. HRS 
flow control actions could also be required. 
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I 1.2.2.7 Loss of Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) Flow in a HRS Loop 
Loss of HRS flow in a HRS loop can occur through loss of a pump or a breach in the secondary loop 
pressure boundary. This casualty will be mitigated by the HRS loop design (spare pumps and cross 
strapping), A breach in a HRS loop pressure boundary would lead to loss of fluid and an 
unrecoverable casualty for the affected HRS loop. See Section 12 for preliminary transient results of 
a loss of HRS flow (Sections 12.4.2.5, and 12.4.3.7). To prevent overheating in the primary loop it 
may be necessary to shut down the associated Brayton. This action would depend on the method 
and time required to restore HRS function. 
11.2.2.8 Loss of Radiator Capability 
Loss of radiator capability could be caused by heat pipe failure, reduction of radiator emissivity, and/or 
incident radiation. All three of these events will reduce the amount of heat rejected by the HRS and 
increase the HRS fluid temperature at the gas cooler inlet. This decreases the amount of heat 
transferred from the primary to the secondary coolant and increases the gas temperature at the 
compressor inlet, decreasing system efficiency. Margin would be built into the radiator area to offset 
this concern. Control action such as changes in HRS pump speed may also be used. 
1 I .2.2.9 - External Neutron Addition 
Solar flares have the potential to add high energy neutrons to the core. This is of most concern during 
startup, where there may be the potential to add enough neutrons to affect the nuclear instrument 
indications. 
17.2.2.1 0 Stuck Reflector 
A control device may become stuck because of an electrical fault or a mechanical failure. The plant 
would be designed to perform all normal events with one stuck reflector. 
I I .2.2.11 Inadvertent Reflector Motion 
A fault in the control drive mechanism (CDM) electronics or CDM controller could cause inadvertent 
motion of a reflector section, potentially driving it to its most reactive or least reactive position 
(although this is viewed as unlikely if the design utilizes stepping motors for reflector control). To 
maintain the desired power level, the control system would move the other reflector sections to 
counteract the reactivity change. 
I I .2.2.12 Lass of Coolant (Gas leak) 
A slow loss of primary coolant would reduce the cycle efficiency which would require adjustments in 
other cycle parameters (e.g., turbine inlet temperature) to continue to produce rated power. Over 
time, the SNPP would be unable to generate rated power, crippling the spaceship and eventually 
leading to a loss of mission. 
A large or sudden loss of primary coolant would result in a loss of the spaceship. 
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I t  .3 GTR Design Events 
This section describes the differences between the design events for the GTR and the SNPP. 
Preliminary functional requirements1'.' for the GTR Facility can be found in Reference 11- 2. 
The GTR is designed to be as prototypic of the SNPP flight unit as possible; however, the dissimilar 
operating locations (deep space versus Earth's surface), the functional requirements (GTR is a test 
bed that will be highly instrumented), and use (GTR operations will result in many more cycles) drive 
differences. Based on location, different safeguards, containment, and auxiliary systems are required 
for the GTR. These systems may include a decay heat removal system, a fast shutdown protective 
system (this will likely need to be non-prototypical of the flight unit), some form of external and/or 
internal core cooling in the event of a loss of coolant or loss of flow casualty to remove decay heat, 
sampling, and containment. Also, dependent on materials, a loss of vacuum may be a casualty. 
With the ability of operators to monitor the GTR and to restart the plant manually and because of 
personnel safety concerns, the GTR can be shut down in casualties where the SNPP would attempt 
to maintain criticality; if the SNPP shuts down following commissioning, the spaceship could be lost. 
The GTR plant and reactor would probably be operated in a cryogenically cooled vacuum chamber to 
simulate the space environment. The GTR secondary cooting loop is not a prototypic radiator but a 
cooting tower or some other appropriate heat sink. The presence of gravity is another complication 
the GTR must address. 
The GTR most likely would have two independent control and reactor safety systems; one simulating 
the SNPP (to support testing) and the other providing for manual operation of the GTR and rapid 
shutdown (scram) capability. Similar to the SNPP, the design events list was generated by looking at 
historical references including the SP-100 Generic Flight System Duty Cycle Definitions (Reference 
11 - 1) and other applicable documents. For this document, the plant arrangement was assumed to 
have no shared components. Events that would create stress changes and that the GTR would be 
designed to survive are considered design events. These events were then further divided into 
Normal Design Events and Casualty Design Events. 
11.3.1 Normal Design Events 
Normal design events encompass events that the GTR was expected to experience during the course 
of normal operation. All of the SNPP design events tisted in Section 11.2 are applicable to the GTR, 
although the GTR most likely will experience many more cycles for each transient. Transients are 
only listed below if there is a significant difference between the GTR and SNPP design events or if the 
design event is unique to the GTR. 
11.3.1.1 Normal Reactor Startup and Shutdown 
Normal startup and shutdown of the GTR may occur many times over the life of the unit for testing 
and maintenance. Normal shutdown will use power from the GTR Facility to drive the reflectors to 
their least reactive position and to maintain reactor flow (if required) to allow for decay heat removal. 
11.3 The functional requirements in the reference are preliminary, had not been reviewed against federal 
requirements, had not received any review, and had not been approved by Naval Reactors. They were a work 
in progress when the NRPCT participation in Project Prometheus was terminated. 
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11 .3.l .2 External Thermal Cycling 
The GTR may simulate the SNPP exterior thermal cycling through thermal management of the 
vacuum chamber cryogenic shroud temperature (Reference 11- 2). However, shroud cooling would 
not be continued once heat balance testing had been completed (external cooling of the vacuum 
chamber to alleviate gamma heating of the vacuum chamber walls would continue throughout life).. 
11 A.I.3 Coolant Sampling 
GTR primary coolant and HRS coolant sampling would be performed to study the coolant chemistry 
and composition. The method of sampling had not been defined. 
I I .3.2 Casualty Design Events 
Casualty design events are casualties the GTR is designed to survive without permanent loss of 
capability. All of the design events listed in Section 11.2.2 are applicable to the GTR, and are only 
listed if there is a significant difference between the GTR and SNPP design events, or if the design 
event is unique to the GTR. 
I I A2.1 Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow 
In the event of a complete loss of flow casualty, the GTR may require supplementary cooling to 
ensure the reactor core is not damaged. External cooling of the GTR may be accomplished by direct 
gas injection into the vacuum chamber. 
11.3.2.2 External Neutron Addition 
This may or may not be simulated on the GTR. 
I I .3.2.3 Inadvertent Reflector Motion 
A fault in the control drive mechanism (CDM) electronics or CDM controller could cause inadvertent 
motion of a reflector, potentially driving it to its most reactive or least reactive position (although this is 
viewed as unlikely if the design utilizes stepping motors for reflector control). To maintain the desired 
power level, the control system would move the other reflectors to counteract the reactivity change. 
The response to this may be to shut down the GTR. 
1 1.3.2.4 Loss of Coolant (Gas leak) 
A slow loss of primary coolant would reduce the cycle efficiency which would require adjustments in 
other cycle parameters (e.g., turbine inlet temperature) to continue to produce rated power. Over 
time, the SNPP would be unable to generate rated power, requiring the GTR to shutdown or to 
makeup the gas losses. 
A large or sudden loss of primary coolant would result in a shutdown of the GTR and potentially 
0 activation of engineered safeguards systems. 
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11.3.2.5 Emergency Shutdown 
An emergency shutdown of the GTR would be initiated in the event of a severe reactor or facility 
casualty. This may include activating a fast shutdown protective system, initiating external core 
cooling andlor activating an engineered safeguards and containment systems to prevent core damage 
and fission product release. If the casualty involved loss of coolant, a gas makeup system could be 
used to remove decay heat from within the core. 
1 1.3.2.6 Release of Cryogenic Fluid into Vacuum Chamber 
The GTR vacuum chamber is partially cooled by a cryogenic shield on the interior of the vacuum 
chamber. The release of this cryogenic fluid into the vacuum chamber could have a thermal impact 
on the GTR and may introduce material contamination concerns. 
1 I .3.2.7 Air Contamination or Leakage into Vacuum Chamber 
Dependent on the materials used for the SNPP pressure boundary, this may or may not result in a 
casualty. 
11 -3.2.8 Loss of HRS Flow 
Due to the non-prototypic nature of the HRS for the GTR, the GTR casualty may affect the cooling of 
additional components and impact the overall plant differently. 
I I A2.9 Seismic Event 
The GTR will be designed to account for seismic loads for the area where the Facility is sited. 
11.3.2.10 Release of HRS Fluid into Vacuum Chamber 
The HRS fluid penetrates the vacuum chamber pressure boundary. A leak in the HRS piping inside 
the vacuum chamber would have a thermal impact on the GTR and may introduce material 
contamination concerns. 
I 1.4 References 
11 - 1 : SP-100 Generic Flight System Duty Cycle Definitions, P1R-1009 Rev. B, SP-I 00 program 
Information Release, dated March 12, 1992 
11 - 2: B-SE(SPS)GT-005, "Space Nuclear Power Plant - Ground Test Reactor Facility Planning 
Closeout Report - For Information," dated December 13, 2005 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-00101 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 12-1 
Section 12 
Transient Modeling 
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12 Transient Modeling 
12.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The NRPCT developed scoping models to provide preliminary information on the transient 
performance of the Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP). Three different modeling tools were used in 
these scoping evaluations. Preliminary system transients were evaluated with a point kinetics model 
developed using MATLAB/Simulink and RELAPS-3D. More detailed models were developed using 
TRACE and RELAP5-3D. Each model was used to study the integration of the gas reactor with dual 
Brayton loops and the heat rejection segment (HRS) during plant transients. Based on preliminary 
evaluations, the NRPCT has found the following: 
No inherent instability in plant response to planned and unplanned transients has been 
revealed, with either a single Brayton or multiple units, assuming the overall reactor 
temperature coefficient is negative and the Braytons are operating with active speed control. 
A negative temperature coefficient is predicted for the core designs under consideration, and 
active speed control using a Parasitic Load Radiator (PLR) is a baseline assumption for the 
plant. 
Preliminary results indicate that the Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) is more vulnerable to 
exceeding design limits than other components in the SNPP, including the reactor. The 
concern in a water-cooled HRS is coolant over-pressurization, leading to a potential gas cooler 
failure. In a Sodium-Potassium (NaK)-cooled HRS, the coolant is not over-pressurized, but 
the load-carrying capacity of the heat pipes may be exceeded. Further development of the 
SNPP would require a control system is needed to prohibit HRS damage. 
Accurate turbine and compressor performance maps are needed to fully characterize plant 
transients. Plant operations like startup and transients like complete loss of load have 
required extrapolating performance beyond available performance maps. SNPP model 
accuracy with extrapolated performance maps will have significant uncertainty until 
prototypical test data is obtained. 
Transient results can be divided into two categories: I) final plant conditions are stable and are within 
acceptable equipment operating limits; and 2) final plant conditions are not stable or equipment 
operating limits may be exceeded. The loss of flow in one of two operating Brayton loops falls into the 
first category. Reactor and plant response is stable, without any control system action. Transients 
such as a positive reactivity addition could fall into either category. For example, increased heat loads 
in the gas cooler can produce boiling in a water-cooled HRS, and depending on the size of the 
reactivity addition and the final plant design characteristics, could lead to an over-pressurization of the 
HRS. On the other hand, a NaK-cooled HRS has additional margin to boiling, and preliminary results 
do not indicate any issues with respect to over-pressurization. Future modeling efforts would have 
increased the detail in the HRS to include specific heat pipe models that would determine if their 
capacities were reached. 
One of the limiting casualty design event transients in a multiple loop system is a complete loss of 
electrical load for a Brayton, which leads to an increase in reactor power and flow and potential for 
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overloading the HRS. Predictions indicate that with no control system response, the water in the gas 
cooler will heat up resulting in bulk boiling, which over-pressurizes the connected heat rejection loop. 
The likelihood of such a Brayton control system failure must be minimized through reliable electrical 
system design. Control system responses to the complete loss of load casualty could include closing 
an isolation valve in the applicable gas loop andlor increasing HRS flow rate. Figure 12-39 and 
Figure 12-40 show the response of the system to a loss of Brayton speed control with no control 
system response and with an increase in the HRS flow rate. 
Another transient that may require control system response is the complete loss of heat rejection loop 
flow. This transient produces significantly different results depending on the HRS design and working 
fluid. When the gas cooler is water cooled (TRACE model) boiling occurs, potentially leading to 
system over-pressurization. Numerous control actions or design features are described in the TRACE 
analysis discussion. A key takeaway from these transient results is that multiple heat rejection loop 
pumps may be required. On the other hand, when flow in the NaK cooled HRS is lost the increased 
compressor inlet temperature appears to stall the Brayton before the HRS is overheated (RELAPS-3D 
model). Again, to prevent Brayton loop shutdown it may be advantageous to include a spare heat 
rejection loop pump. The heat rejection architecture proposed by Northrop Grumman Space 
Technologies (NGST) assumed an operating and idle HRS pump in parallel for each HRS loop (see 
Section 9.6). 
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12.2 Description of Modeling Software 
MATLAB/Simulink is a software package for modeling, simulating, and analyzing dynamic systems. It 
supports linear and nonlinear systems, modeled in continuous time, sampled time, or a hybrid of the 
two. For modeling, Simulink provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for building models as block 
diagrams, using click-and-drag mouse operations. Sirnulink includes differential equation solvers. 
Simulink includes a comprehensive block library of sinks, sources, linear and nonlinear components, 
and connectors, and provides the ability for user-defined custom blocks as well. The software 
includes many features to view the simulation results while the simulation is running. Simulation 
results can be used in the MATLAB workspace for post processing and visualization. 
An advantage of using MATLAB/Simulink for early studies was that NASA contractors had already 
developed a MATIABiSimulink model for one of the space reactor plant concepts, making 
development of the gas-cooled concept quicker. However, the MATLAB/Simulink model solves 
equations in terms of lumped-parameters. It is not practical to include all thermal-hydraulic 
calculations available in the special purpose RELAPS-3D and TRACE codes. In addition, there has 
been a long history of RELAP5-3D and TRACE code verification and qualification for nuclear plant 
analysis that does not exist for Simulink coding. The NRPCT program had experienced model 
builders and analysts knowledgeable in TRACE and RELAPS-3D, making these codes the best 
choice for more detailed modeling tasks. 
a 
12.2.2 TRACE and RELAPS-3D 
TRACE and RELAP5-3D are used for safety analysis of land-based nuclear reactor power plants. 
TRACE was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and RELAP5-3D was developed by 
the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These codes use predominantly one-dimensional hydraulic 
components, though both have limited two and three dimensional hydraulic capability. The codes 
have similar functionality. They offer flexible component modeling capability in either open loop or 
multiple loop configurations. The primary system, secondary system, HRS, system controls, and 
reactor kinetics can be simulated. The code modeling capabilities include the simulation of large and 
small break loss-of-coolant casualties as well as operational transients such as anticipated transients 
without scram, loss of feed water, loss of power, loss of flow, and overcooling transients. The system 
behavior can be simulated up to the point of potential fuel damage and/or the validity of assumed 
coolant and material conditions (e.g., freeze-up of the coolants in a space environment and wall 
temperature melting limits). Hydrodynamic behavior is represented by a two-fluid, two-phase 
transient flow formulation in water loops and by a single-phase transient flow formulation in gas loops, 
with the ability to incorporate non-condensable gases in each loop type. Solution techniques replace 
the differential equations that enforce conservation of hydrodynamic mass, energy, and momentum 
with finite-difference equations that are partially implicit in time. Finite differences are used to 
advance the axialhadial heat conduction solutions. Reactor kinetics equations are solved using a 
Kaganove method in TRACE, and a modified Runge-Kutta method in RELAPS-30. Although both 
codes have traditionally been utilized for analysis of two phase light water reactors, they have been 
generalized to include the use of a variety of coolants, including non-condensing/non-boiling gases 
and liquid metals, so as to permit the analysis of systems outside the range of traditional commercial 
nuclear reactor configurations. 
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Both TRACE and RELAPS-3D utilize a comprehensive model builder called Symbolic Nuclear 
Analysis Package (SNAP) that allows the analyst to model any hydrodynamic and heat transfer 
system by building it from a predefined set of components. For example, the hydraulic network of the 
reactor is modeled predominately from a combination of a variety of pipes, pumps, valves, and 
associated heat structures. Changing the geometric volume, area, length, and wall thickness allows a 
representation of the physical configuration of the plant. Additional operational details, such as 
pump/turbine/compressor operating characteristics, piping and valve loss factors, and heat transfer 
coefficient changes allow additional control in generating a model that better represents the intended 
. physical system. 
The heat transfer characteristics of the model are simulated via heat structures.' Heat structures are 
one-dimensional abstract components used to represent the solid mass of the reactor plant. The one 
dimension is in the radial direction, perpendicular to the direction of fluid flow. Heat transfer in the 
axial direction (parallel to fluid flow) is represented by using several fluid volumes in the axial direction 
and connecting a heat structure to each. TRACE heat structures also permit two-dimensional 
. conduction in Cartesian, cylindrical or spherical geometry. Conduction, convection, and radiation heat 
transfer modes can all be represented with heat structures. Heat structures, with their associated 
boundary conditions and neutron kinetics calculations, provide the ability to link thermal conditions 
among the plant structural, fuel (power components), coolant, and ambient environment (radiation 
enclosures). 
Both TRACE and RELAP5-3D required modification to include compressor and turbine modeling 
capability. TRACE uses two specialized variations of the pump component to model the Brayton 
plant. The basic intent of a pump component in terms of its impact on the governing equations is to 
act as a source of momentum (pump head) and energy (frictional heating of the fluid). This 
characteristic is generalized to the compressor (which adds momentum and energy) and to the gas 
turbine (which extracts momentum and energy). The amount of momentum/energy addition/removal 
for the compressor/turbine is controlled either by supplying operational curves or via the definition of 
performance maps, depending on the level of modeling detail desired. 
In REtAP5-3D, the compressor model is similar to the pump model. It performs the same function on 
a gas as the pump performs on fluids. It can be driven by a shaft or use the other capabilities 
available to a pump (speed table, motor torque table and/or the coastdown feature). The homologous 
head and torque curves required for a pump are replaced with compressor pressure ratio and 
efficiency appropriate for the compressor as a function of mass flow rate for up to 99 different shaft 
I speeds. The compressor component consists of an inlet junction, a single volume and optionally an 
I 
I exit junction. Similar to TRACE, the turbine component in REtAP5-3D extracts momentum and 
energy. 
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In all three models, two independent Brayton energy conversion systems are connected in parallel to 
a single reactor, each capable of supplying 50% of the full rated electrical power. Brayton 
performance for all three models is determined by Closed Cycle Engine Program (CCEP) maps 
provided by NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) in Reference 12-8 (modified. CCEP curves are also 
available in TRACE, as described in Section 12.4.A.3). Helium-Xenon gas is heated in the reactor 
and directed to the turbine inlet. As the gas passes the turbine blades, thermal hydraulic energy from 
the fluid is converted to mechanical energy, which spins the shaft of the turbine-alternator-compressor 
unit. The gas mixture is exhausted from the turbine at a lower temperature and pressure. The gas 
mixture is then passed through a regenerative heat exchanger, the recuperator, to transfer some of 
the heat of the exhaust gas into the cold leg to increase cycle efficiency. The gas mixture is then 
further cooled in the gas cooler before entering the compressor. The low pressure, low temperature 
gas mixture is compressed to a higher pressure increasing the temperature as a result. The 
compressor extracts its power from the spinning shaft, which is powered by the turbine. The high 
pressure gas is then heated in the recuperator before returning to the reactor inlet. Brayton shaft 
speed is controlled with a PLR, which applies the appropriate amount of electrical load to the 
alternator to maintain the shaft speed at the set point. This speed control function is included in each 
of the three plant models. A speed control system assures that the Brayton operates at a stable 
condition and prevents undesirable changes in reactor power caused by changes in plant electrical 
load. Without a speed or reactivity control system the reactor plants modeled show an inverse 
relationship between electrical load and reactor power. This relationship is called non-load following 
and results in increasing reactor power when alternator load is reduced. A detailed explanation of this 
behavior is provided in Section 12.4.2.3. 
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Table 12-1 : Comparison of Direct Gas Brayton Model Parameters 
Location RELAPS-30 TRACE MATLABlSimulink 
Temp (K) Press (kPa) Temp (K) Press (kPa) Temp (K) Press (kPa) 
Turbine Inlet 1149 1933 1150 1902.8 1 144.6 973.90 
Recuperator LP Side Exit 565 ' 1036 574 1024 563.7 51 0.71 
Gas Cooler Gas Inlet 565 1037 1 559 1019 563.7 51 0.71 
Compressor Inlet 1 393 1026 1 392.3 999 373.5 507.78 
Recuperator HP Side Exit 1 894 1987 892 1979 879.7 993.1 
Gas Cooler HRS Inlet 1 382 276 1 377 7744.0 363.1 
Gas Cooler HRS Exit 1 521 1 273 1 510 1 7742.8 1 521.7 1 
System Flows (kgls) 
Brayton Loop Flow 2.28 2.47 1 .90 
Alternator Cooling Flow 0.0 'I) 0.34 0.04 (gas), 0.07 (NaK) 
Gas Cooler Gas Flow 2.28 (2) 2.81 1 .90 
Gas Cooler HRS Flow 2.36 0.52 1.453 
Reactor 1 I 1 
Reactor Thermal Ratina I 1000 kW+ I 1000 kW, 1 533.2 kW, 
Core Configuration Block Block Block 
Fuel Material UOa UN UN 
Clad Material MoRe Nb-1Zr 1 N bZr 
Core Block Material 1 MoRe I Nb-1Zr f Re 
Number of Pins 3 54 1 92 216 
Reactor Power (- losses) 796 kW, 899 kW, 533.17 kWt 
Reactor (AT) 255 K 273 K (fuel region) 270 K 
Reactor APIPi, 2.7% 2.43% 1.5% 
HeXe Mixture. mole fraction I 78.4% He I 78.4% He I 72% He 
Brayton Loop 
Rating of Each Brayton 100 kW, '2' 1 100 kW. 66 kW, 
Bravton (Confiaurationl I 2 lTACl 1 2 iTCA) I 2 ITACl 
Loop Transport Time 1.8 seconds 1.5 seconds 0.6 seconds 
Turbine PR (AT) 1 .84 (228 K) 1.82 (216.6 K) 1.88 (224 K) 
Compressor PR (AT) 1.95 (1 47 K) 1.99 (1 48 K) 1.97 (142 K) 
Recu~erator Effectiveness 93% 91.5% 90% . . . .
Recuperator APIPin LP (HP) 1.46% (1 .O%) 1.75% (0.73%) 1.5% (0.65%) 
Gas Cooler Effectiveness 94 % 91.2% 95% 
Gas Cooler Gas APIPin (AT) 0.9% (172 K) 1.4% (1 66 K) 0.37% (190 K) 
HRS 
Coolant NaK Water NaK 
HRS Loop Transport Time 38 seconds 116 seconds 66 seconds 
Radiator Area Applied 447 m2 447 m2 261 m2 
Notes: 
(1) Alternator cooling flow was not modeling in RELAP5-3D 
(2) Bleed path was not modeled in RELAPS-3D 
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12.3.2 Transients 
A summary of the transients analyzed is provided in Table 12-2. This compilation of transients 
provides initial insight into the SNPP design space that is the first step in specifying the specific 
design requirements of each power plant component. For some transients, numerous operating 
andlor protection strategies were modeled. Future transient analysis would involve model 
qualification and new model detail. Transients similar to those provided here would eventually 
become the Design Events Document (DED) that would be used for detailed equipment 
specifications, thermal-hydraulic and structural analysis, as discussed in Section 1 1. 
All three models include two parallel direct gas Brayton loops connected to a gas cooied fast reactor. 
Each gas Brayton loop is cooled by a dedicated gas cooler and heat rejection loop. Differences 
between the models include power rating, fuel system, Brayton alternator cooling method, gas cooler 
design and HRS working fluid. There are also differences in reactor and Brayton control systems. 
While the differences in computer code and computer models do impact the results, similar 
conclusions regarding the operability and stability of the basic plant design have been confirmed by all 
three. 
Table 12-2: Summary of Transients Analyzed during Pre-Conceptual Design 
Most of the Simulink transients listed in Table 12-2 have been reproduced with both the TRACE and 
RELAPS-3D codes. The TRACE and RELAP5-3D models are more consistent with the most recent 
NRPCT SNPP concepts than the Simulink model. The Simulink results are not included in this report, 
and can be found in Reference 12-3. A few differences in the Simulink transients are noted here for 
completeness. The Simulink positive and negative reactivity addition transients used a much slower 
reactivity addition rate. In Simulink the reactivity was added over 180 seconds, vice 1 second for 
TRACE and RELAPS-3D. Simulink was also used to verify stability of two parallel operating Brayton 
systems (degraded turbine efficiency). Finally, the effect of reverse flow in a failed Brayton system 
was also investigated with Simulink. 
Transients 
Mechanical toss of One Brayton 
Mechanical Loss of One Brayton with reverse flow 
Complete Loss of Electrical Load for One Brayton 
Partiai Loss of Electrical Load for One Brayton 
Positive Reactivity Addition 
Negative Reactivity Addition 
Positive Reactivity Addition with Unbalanced Load 
Complete Loss of Primary Flow 
Most of the Section I I casualty design events are included in Table 16-2. Section 11 defines a 
casualty design event as a transient that the SNPP is designed to suwive without permanent loss of 
capability. The transient results described in this section suggest that this requirement can be met. 
This conclusion is reached assuming that the SNPP will have a negative reactor temperature 
coefficient (as expected), a Brayton shaft speed control system and typical reactor protection features. 
Typical reactor protection may include a means to rapidty reduce reactivity (shim or scram). It may 
also be advantageous to use a reactivity control system based on Brayton coolant temperature. 
Other probable control features include a Brayton loop isolation valve that can be closed to rapidly 
stop loop Row. For example, the current SNPP design with a water-cooled HRS may be over- 
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pressurized during a complete loss of load event. For this and other transients the time it takes for the 
affected Brayton loop to stall on its own (no control actions) may overload the HRS. 
While Section 11 discusses protecting the SNPP from permanent damage there may also be a 
distinction in casualties relative to continuity of power. In the final design the complete loss of load 
event may have been found to be sufficiently improbable that it may have been acceptable to quickly 
shutdown the affected Brayton. On the other hand, it may have been a system control requirement 
that a partial loss of load will not require the affected Brayton to be shut down. In other words, the 
more severe transients may require protective action that shuts down a Brayton, while system design 
and control features can maintain Brayton operation for a less severe event. Control system 
responses to the complete loss of load casualty could include closing an isolation valve in the 
applicable gas loop and/or increasing HRS flow rate. Depending on the final design, the control 
system may not require Brayton loop shutdown for a partial loss of load event. Transient results with 
and without control system action are discussed for the partial loss of load in Section 12.4.2.3. For 
the complete loss of load case Figure 12-39 and Figure 12-40 show HRS system response with and 
without a control system response. In this case that response is an increase in the HRS flow rate. 
Brief descriptions of the TRACE and RELAPS-3D SNPP models are provided below. Following the 
TRACE model description a results section provides a summary of each transient. Many significant 
plant parameters are provided in the time-dependent plots after the results discussion. Similarly, 
RELAPS-3D results and plots are provided ,after the RELAPS-3D model description. 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-00101 
B-SE(SPS)-001 a 
(Intentionaily Blank) 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-00101 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 12-21 
12.4 TRACE Model Description and Results 
12.4.1 TRACE Direct Gas Brayton Model Description 
The TRACE executable is written in FORTRAN 90 and once compiled on a PC platform is run from 
the user's PC. The SNAP GUI provides a highly flexible and efficient way of building a complex 
thermal-hydraulic plant as well as complex control structures. Effective model building allowed for 
large models that could be quickly revised as the plant design evolved. The SNAP GUI also allows 
the input model to be quickly converted into an interactive animation tool. Monitoring the thermal- 
hydraulic and control system calculations interactively was an extremely valuable model building and 
debugging tool as well as a first cut at reviewing results. Results were also viewed using a plotting 
routine called ACGrace. 
Using the TRACEISNAP modeling tool, the SNPP model was developed in a modular fashion. Model 
buitders built and tested stand alone versions of the reactor, HRS, recuperator, gas cooler, turbine 
and compressor. The SNAP GUI was effective in joining the pieces as well as duplicating large 
sections. For example, the second Brayton and heat rejection loops were copied and pasted within 
SNAP from the first loops. The TRACE plant model originally included component models that were 
developed during the concept selection phase. In order to provide the most current model, most of 
these sub-models were updated to post-concept selection versions. 
The SNPP TRACE model shown in Figure 12-2 represents two parallel Brayton loops directly coupled 
to a gas reactor, with a water coolant HRS loop dedicated to each Brayton. The TRACE model is built 
and edited with SNAP using four views. These include the primary hydraulic and instrumentation view 
shown in Figure 12-2 ; the HRS hydraulic view shown in Figure 12-12; the Brayton shaft and speed 
controller view in Figure 12-9; and the reactivity calculation and control view in Figure 12-7. 
Overall the TRACE model represents a plant design consistent with interim heat balance case 24 
(HB24). This heat balance was created in September 2005 and was based on an NRPCT-modified 
version of the GRC SRPS OPT spreadsheet (v. 29-NRv9-amgll). An important aspect of this heat 
balance is that it includes a detailed reactor coolant piping design that defines plant piping sizes and 
hydraulic resistances. This two-loop direct Brayton primary plant was combined with the most current 
HRS design available. The water-cooled HRS includes a detailed piping layout that models each 
radiator panel. The Brayton components match HB24 performance. The recuperator is a detailed 
model that was originally designed to match the concept selection heat balance. This design has 
been applied to the jater heat balance with minimal impact on system performance. The TRACE gas 
cooler is a traditional shell-and-tube heat exchanger model. Gas cooler design had not progressed to 
the point that a detailed concept was available to connect a high pressure water HRS with direct gas 
Brayton primary plant. A shell-and-tube heat exchanger using relatively small tubes and external fins 
was selected for the TRACE model primary gas to water HRS interface. Smaller tubes would produce 
a more compact (lightweight) design but be more difficult to manufacture. Using this traditional design 
permitted the rapid development of a relatively high fidelity Mathcad and TRACE model for a design 
with a proven track record of reliable leak-free operation (in many industrial applications). The 
resulting gas cooler design has slightly lower effectiveness than the current heat balance design 
(91.2% vs. 94%). 
Finally, the TRACE reactor design is based on the reference reactor case defined in Enclosure 1 to 
Attachment D of the Reference 12-1 concept selection report. This annular flow block core uses UN 
fuel. The most recent NRPCT core concepts had switched to U02 fuel. The TRACE UN core model 
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results offer a useful comparison to the RELAPS-3D U02 model results. The RELAPS-3D model 
includes a U02 fuel system. The TRACE and RELAP core models produce similar overall plant 
transients. The largest difference is in the peak fuel temperature. U 0 2  fuel designs generally have 
significantly higher temperature drops between the fuel and reactor coolant. Compared with U02 
cores, UN cores have fewer but much longer (long gas plenums) fuel pins. With more fuel pins and 
the same primary flow rate, the UO2 core pin spacing (pitch) can be closer together, reducing the 
hydraulic diameter. These core thermalfhydraulic differences would become more important when 
more detailed core performance and protection analysis was performed. 
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12.4.1 .I Steady State Condition 
The heat balance for the space nuclear power plant direct Brayton concept is provided in Section 5. 
The heat balance methodology evolved throughout the Prometheus Project. A Space Reactor Power 
System program (SRPS-OPT) developed by GRC was initially revised by the NRPCT to perform heat 
balance calculations for two Brayton loop direct gas cooled reactor designs. In the concept selection 
report (Enclosure ? to Attachment D of Reference 12-1) the SRPS-OPT program was used to produce 
an initial set of direct Brayton state points. As the design effort progressed, heat balance sensitivity 
studies were performed to account for design changes as well as variations in gas molecular weight, 
component efficiencies and primary plant pressure drops. Based on the timing to develop a full plant 
TRACE model, one of these interim heat balances was selected as a base case. This base case is 
referred to as Heat Balance 24 (H024) and is provided in Figure 12-3. HB24 is similar to the concept 
selection heat balance, both using the same turbine (88.4%) and compressor (84.0%) efficiencies. 
One significant difference is that the HRS working fluid in HB24 was changed from NaK to water 
consistent with the NRPCT assessment in Reference 12-1 2. HB24 also had a companion piping 
design that included detailed pressure drop calculations. With a matching detailed piping design and 
water HRS, HB24 provided an effective reference for building the TRACE model. 
The TRACE model was built in a modular fashion. Individual component models were built for the 
reactor, recuperator, gas cooler, turbine, compressor and HRS. Each of these "sub-modelsn was built 
and checked against the concept selection heat balance, HB24, and models built using other codes 
(such as Mathcad). For example, detailed Mathcad models of the recuperator and gas cooler were 
used to help determine TRACE code model inputs and verify steady state operating performance. 
This methodology was important to build robust, verified components that could later be connected to 
interact in a full plant model. 
This full plant model captures some system thermal-hydraulic behavior that is not included in the heat 
balance spreadsheet programs. For example, the heat balance programs do not solve the 
momentum and energy equations to define the local working gas temperature and pressure. As 
shown in Figure 12-3, the gas temperature leaving the reactor (1 150 K) is the same as that entering 
the turbine. In reality, and as modeled in TRACE, the gas temperature will be a function of the local 
pressure and yelocity. Therefore, the TRACE results and heat balance spreadsheet calculations will 
never exactly match. 
Table 12-3 compares the HI324 design point data with the TRACE model of the direct Brayton loop 
gas cooled reactor. Both results are based on a Xe mole fraction of 0.216 (the remainder is He), 
resulting in a working fluid molecular weight of 31.5 g/g-mole. As described above, TRACE model 
priority was given to individual component fidelity. The integrated TRACE model is allowed to find its 
own steady state condition. An average temperature controller is used to assist in finding a TRACE 
steady state that has about the same Tave as HB24 (1024 K). The TRACE Tav, was defined as the 
average between reactor inlet and outlet plenum temperatures. TRACE reactor power is allowed to 
float to a new state point. For example, the HB24 reactor power is 851 kW,, 25 kWt of which is 
assumed to be ambient losses and not included in the reactor temperature rise of 252 K (AT). The 
HB24 power can be recalculated using the following equation: 
Q = mdot c, AT = 4.97 kgis 659.9 J/kg-K 252 K = 826.5 kW 
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However, the TRACE model calculates a different steady state power. Consistent with TRACE and 
SRPS-OPT power predictions, the codes also calculate slightly different gas velocities, pressures, and 
temperatures throughout the reactor and primary system. These differences result from higher fidelity 
thermal-hydraulic modeling (TRACE compared with spreadsheet calculations) as well as differences 
in individual component performance models. One way to compare the TRACE and heat balance 
power levels is to compare reactor AT. It is important to clearly define where the TRACE reactor 
temperature rise is measured. By looking at the TRACE temperature rise across the fuel region the 
impact of velocity changes is minimized by eliminating flow area changes that occur outside the fuel 
region. Velocity changes are then limited to changes in gas density and momentum. The TRACE 
fuel temperature rise is about 273K (1 162 K - 889 K). This is larger than the HB24 reactor 
temperature rise and consistent with a reactor power level of almost 900 kWt. Although the HB24 
and TRACE power levels are different, the components are operating at only slightly different points. 
As described above, it is not possible to exactly duplicate the HB24 conditions in a valid TRACE 
model. 
While the TRACE and HB24 state points are not identical, most of the Table 12-3 parameters are very 
close. The TRACE results shown are based on selecting the CCEP direct option for both turbine and 
compressor modets. This option is described in the turbomachinery section (Section 12.4.1.3). Both 
models show the same turbine inlet temperature of 1150 K. The largest differences are in the gas 
cooler water exit temperature and radiator flow rate. The TRACE gas cooler is somewhat less 
effective (91.2%) than HB24 shows (94%). The TRACE model and HB24 gas cooler designs are 
quite different. The SRPS-OPT spreadsheet gas cooler was originally a gas to NaK plate type heat 
exchanger. Additional gas cooler details are provided in Section 12.4.1.4. 
TRACE temperature entries listed in Table 12-3 may require additional explanation. The TRACE 
program (like RELAPS-3D) solves energy and momentum equations throughout the hydraulics model. 
Flow paths are modeled with cylindricaf representations (pipes) that are divided into control volumes. 
Velocity is defined at the interface between control volumes. Pressure and temperature are average 
properties of a control volume. With a compressible primary coolant, the coolant temperature in a 
control volume is a strong function of the pressure in that volume. The pressure will change due to 
changes in flow area (velocity) and hydraulic losses (form and friction). This behavior is responsible 
for what would othewise appear to be inconsistent Table 12-3 temperatures. Examples include the 
difference between reactor AT (273 K) and recuperator high pressure (HP) exit to turbine inlet AT 
(258 K). Also note that the temperature changes on the two sides of the recuperator do not match 
(351 vs. 359 K). Two factors cause this difference. First, the recuperator low pressure (LP) side 
pressure drop is much smaller than on the HP side. The inlet plenum to core LIP on the LP side is 
three times as large as the HP side. This corresponds to a higher plenum to core AT on the LP side. 
The other contributing factor is an error caused by the ratio of inlet to outlet AT (about 355 K) to local 
hot to cold side AT (30 to 40 K). The fewer nodes used between inlet and exit, the greater the error. 
This error is explained in greater detail in the recuperator description, Section 12.4.1.5. 
Future TRACE model updates would have transitioned to an updated gas cooler design. Other future 
TRACE model updates would have included local assignment of ambient heat losses. TRACE heat 
structures were in place to distribute ambient losses throughout the plant. In addition, component test 
results for heat transfer and pressure drop would have been incorporated when available. For the 
TRACE Brayton components, additional detail was planned for bearing and windage losses (as a 
function of speed rather than a constant value), and more accurately modeling the alternator heat 
input (based on variable alternator efficiencies). 
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@ Overall, the TRACE model produces a steady state operating point that is in good agreement with 
separate heat balance calculations. This comparison is important as the first step in qualifying the 
TRACE code and model for a given plant design. 
Table 12-3: Comparison of Heat Balance Case 24 Design Point and TRACE 
Model State Points 
HB24 Design Point TRACE (with CCEP maps) Location 
Temperature (K) Pressure (kPa) Temperature (K) Pressure (kPa) 
Turbine Inlet 1150 1903 1150 1902.8 
( Turbine Exit 
I Recu~erator LP Side Exit 1 570 1 1013 1 574 I 1024 I 
Gas Cooler Inlet 555 101 1 559 1019 
Gas Cooler Exit 390 1000 393 1003 
I I - 1 Compressor hlet 390 1 1 0 0 0  1 392 999 1 
Compressor Exit 538 2000 54 1 1993 
Recuperator HP Side Exit 898 1972 892 1979 
Gas Cooler H20 Inlet 379 377 7744.0 
Gas Cooler HZ0 Exit 530 51 0 7742.8 
System Flows HB24 Design Point Flow (kgls) TRACE Flow (kgls) 
Brayton Loop Flow 2.49 2.47 
Alternator Cooling Flow 0.35 0.34 
Gas Cooler Gas Flow 2.83 2.81 
I Gas Cooler HZ0 Flow 1 I 0.47 0.52 1 
Misc. HB24 Design Point TRACE (with CCEP maps) 
Reactor Power (- losses) 826.5 kW, 899 kWt 
I -- 1 Reactor (AT) 252 K 273 K (through fuel region). 1 
- 
Reactor AP/P,, 2.5% 2.43% 
Turbine PR (AT) 1.84 (221 K) 1.82 (216.6 K) 
Compressor PR (AT) 2.00 (148 K) 1.99 (148 K) 
Recuperator Effectiveness 92% 91.5% 
Recuperator APIPin LP (HP) 1.5% (0.75%) 1.75% (0.73%) 
Gas Cooler Effectiveness 94% 91.2% 
I Gas Cooler Gas AP/Pin I 1 .O% 
Radiator Area Applied 400 m2 (not including margin) 447 m2 (includes margin) I 
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The term AF is the desired average temperature minus the measured average temperature. The 
control drive mechanisms (CDMs) have both discrete positions and a limitation on how often they can 
move. In the model, once the desired position is determined from the PI controller, it is then rate 
limited to one I-mm step by a single slider each second. This is accomplished using a differentiation 
with a minimum and a maximum value and then integrating the result. After being rate limited, the 
position is then quantized to I-mm steps per slider. The resulting position variable is input into a table 
of reactivity versus position. This table is a very rough approximation of typical slider worth for a 
typical center peaked parabolic axial power profile. At the steady state operating point, a single step 
of a single slider produces a temperature step of approximately 3 K in the average temperature. To 
prevent control system oscillations, there is a deadband around the desired average temperature of 
+/- 1.5 K. The controller is capable of maintaining the reactor at the desired operating temperature, 
but also capable of driving changes in temperature. The system has been demonstrated to make a 
step change in temperature or ramp through a range of temperatures. These changes are 
accomplished by making the desired average temperature a function of time. 
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Table 12-4: Concept Selection Reference UN Core Concept as Applied to 
TRACE Model 
I Parameter I Value I I 
Reference Case Coolant Mixture (from concept selection) 72% He, 28% Xe 
TRACE model Coolant Mixture (to match current heat balance) 78.4% He. 21.6% Xe 
-- I Fuel 1 UN I 
~ - -  
Rated Power (MW,) (TRACE model power) 1 .O (0.9) 
Coolant flow rate (kgls) (TRACE model flow, w m C E  31.5 Mw 7.12 (4.94) 
Neutron Spectrum Fast 
Core Geometry Blocklpin, annular flow 
Pressure (MPa) (TRACE model pressure) 1.38 (2.0) 
# Safety Rods 1 
Fuel liner material Re 
I Clad material and core block structure material I Nb-1Zr I 
1 Vessel material 1 Hastellov X 1 
I Number of fuel pins I 192 I 
L 
Fuel diameter (cm) 1.682 
Fuel height (cm) 66.9 
BOL fuel-to-clad gap (cm) 0.037 
Liner thickness (cm) 0.079 
Clad thickness (cm) 0.051 
Gas plenum height (cm) 45 
Core diameter (cm) 49.6 
Vessel thickness (cm) 0.5 ' 
Vessel OD (cm) 55.7 I I Safety rod material I Enr B4C I I Safetv rod OD k m )  I 11.7 
. , ~ ~ 
Radial reflector materiaV percent TD (Theoretical Density) Be0195 
Radial reflector thickness (cm) 11 
Channel thickness (cm) (radial gap in annular passage) 0.384 
Pitch (cm) 3.035 
Total channel flow area (m2) 0.0556 
Max FrFa (radial times axial power peaking factor) 1.49 
Max Fr 1.21 
Estimated Inlet and exit plenum height (cm) 20 
Estimated pin lower extension length (cm) (including core plate) 9.55 
Estimated pin upper extension length (cm) (including core plate) 7 
Total hvdraulic lenath Icm) 128.5 
I Downcomer ID (baffle OD) (cml I 50.1 1 
I Downcomer radial flow gap (cm) 2.3. 
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12.4.1.3 Turbomachinery 
The TRACE model has two parallel Brayton loops, each with a turbine and compressor. This 
configuration allows modeling multiple Brayton transients and confirming the stability of parallel loop 
systems. The TRACE code has been upgraded to include Braytan components. Specifically, a gas 
turbine (GTURB), compressor (COMPRE) and shaft (SHAFT) have been added to the available list of 
plant components available for power plant model building. 
The GTURB component provides the capability to model the momentum and energy relationships for 
a single phase gas turbine. The unique GTURB input includes the following at rated conditions: 
turbine efficiency, head, mass flow rate and speed. For off-design conditions two dimensionless 
curves are available. The first table relates dimensionless turbine flow (function of ratios of actual and 
design mass flow and speed) to a dimensionless multiplier which is applied to the specified design 
pressure ratio. The second table relates dimensionless turbine flow to a dimensionless multiplier 
which is applied to the specified design efficiency. 
The COMPRE component provides the capability to model the momentum and energy relationships 
for a single phase gas compressor. The unique COMPRE input includes the following design 
conditions: compressor dimensionless head, work input coefficient and flow coefficient. The blade tip 
diameter and rated rotational speed are also required. For off-design conditions two dimensionless 
curves are available. The first table relates dimensionless compressor flow (function of ratios of 
actual and design mass flow, speed, and density) to a dimensionless multiplier which is applied to the 
specified design head in the calculation of the actual head. The second table relates dimensionless @ compressor flow to a dimensionless multiplier applied to a design power which is used to calculate 
power. 
The TRACE turbine and compressor off-design tables (maps) have been defined to approximate the 
GRC CCEP performance curves as applied in the CCEP off-design calculation worksheet 
documented in Reference 12-8. This off-design procedure was used to create three dimensional 
maps (pressure ratio, flow rate and efficiency as a function of corrected speed) for a particular Brayton 
design and fluid molecular weight. These design conditions have been redefined as the HB24 
conditions. This translation is based on an assumption that new optimized Brayton equipment would 
behave in a similar manner as the original Reference 12-8 design. The original and extrapolated 
design values are shown in Table 12-5. 
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Table 12-5: Comparison of CCEP and HB24 Design Points 
CCEP / Heat Balance 24 1 
Compressor 
. . .  
Tin 
Pin 
Mdot 
PR 
t 1 111 
~ ~ ~ 
- 
426 K 
0.5 MPa 
1 EFF 
Turbine 
The TRACE Brayton components have the option of acting in accordance with CCEP performance 
maps or in accordance with performance curves. The CCEP maps are three dimensional and 
represent the higher fidelity of the two options. The performance curves are two-dimensional (PR and 
efficiency), and the user has the ability to define these curves as part of the Brayton component 
definition. The curves offer a mare robust behavior in dealing with conditions that would otherwise 
represent the components "running off of the map". The dependent variable on the performance curve 
(PR or efficiency) is a function of an independent variable parameter that combines the flow rate and 
rotational speed. The curves are characterized by a scale and a shape. For SNPP calculations, the 
scale of the performance curves was defined by matching the HB24 design point, and the shape of 
the performance curves was defined by matching CCEP performance map contours that run through 
the desigri point - i.e. the curves were generated by collapsing the maps about the design point. 
Therefore, when the performance curve option is invoked and the component is operating off the 
design point, the component behavior is only an approximation to the CCEP maps. 
2.21 kgls 
2
390 K 
1 MPa 
0.826 I 0.840 
- 
As described above an option was also added to TRACE to directly use the CCEP maps. When 
using this option the TRACE components are bypassed and the Brayton performance is fully defined 
by the CCEP maps. A limitation to this option is the restriction to remain on the curves. TRACE 
cannot extrapolate beyond the supplied curve performance. The TRACE curves and CCEP maps 
provide very similar results near the design point. As you move away from the design point both 
options produce qualitatively similar results. Quantitatively, the CCEP maps produce larger changes 
in mass flow rate for a given change in fluid conditions (density). 
2.49 kgls 
2 
Mdot 
PR 
Tin 
The Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package (SNAP) version 23.1 7 was used as the input and output 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) for the TRACE model and executable. While the TRACE executable 
was updated to include Brayton components, time did not permit the supporting changes in SNAP. A 
simple workaround was used such that GTURB and COMPRE input could be passed through using 
the SNAP PUMP component. Therefore, the input model schematics show the SNAP PUMP 
component to locate both a turbine and compressor. Model option title cards were used to define 
those component numbers that would use SNAP PUMP input for a turbine or compressor. In a similar 
fashion, other TRACE options that are not currently supported in SNAP are input into TRACE using 
the model option title cards. These other options include special heat transfer corretations, .CCEP 
map selection and input values, and SHAFT component data. 
,, . 
Pin 
EFF 
MW 
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2.21 kg/s 
1.87 
1144 K 
2.49 kgls 
1.84 
1150 K 
0.958 MPa 
0.855 
39.9 
1.903 MPa 
0.884 
31.5 
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TRACE alternator torque and power results provided in this report are based on the alternator 
mechanical or thermal performance. For example, at 11 0 kW,, the alternator electrical output must be 
determined using the expected alternator efficiency. Using the HB24 alternator efficiency of 91.2%, 
the electrical output is 100 kW,. A description of the TRACE model speed controller is provided 
below. 
Prior to the development of the SNPP TRACE model, previous MATLABISimulink modeling work had 
shown that a direct gas, recuperated Brayton plant is "non-load following." The phrase "non-load 
following" refers to an inverse relationship between alternator electrical load and reactor power. This 
characteristic is once again illustrated in the partial loss of load transient described in this &port. This 
transient models a load reduction that is not compensated for by the speed control system and is 
therefore a representation of plant response without speed control. In addition, for some plant 
conditions, a Brayton shaft load balance may be satisfied by more than one Brayton speed. In this 
case, only one of these operating points may be stable. The most common solution to the stability 
and load following characteristics is to use a Brayton speed control system (Reference 12-4). In order 
to regulate Brayton speed, two controllers are envisioned, one for each Brayton. The TRACE model 
controller detects operating speed, which is approximately proportional to bus frequency or voltage. 
The operating speed is then compared to a desired operating speed using a Pl controller. The PI 
controller determines a combined Turbine-Compressor-Alternator (TCA) torque required to drive the 
Brayton to the desired operating speed. The TCA torque is equal to the turbine torque minus the sum 
of the compressor, alternator, and alternator cooling fan torque. The constants for the controller are k 
= 0.225 and At,= 10, where the equation is of the form: 
TCA mque = k (AF + I / A ~  ~ A F  dt)
The term AF is the desired operating speed minus the measured operating speed. These constants 
are tuned appropriately to provide a fast response while minimizing overshoot. The alternator torque 
is provided to the shaft component. The shaft component updates the shaft speed based on the net 
shaft torque, the Brayfon inertia, and time integration. 
This speed controller shown in Figure 12-9 is an approximation of a Power Conditioning and 
Distribution (PCAD) system with a PLR. In the actual system the controller would notionally measure 
current, load voltage, or load power and control to a compared desired value. This is done by 
switching on and off portions of the PLR resistors. An actual PCAD system would have limited 
alternator loading capability based on the PLR design maximum power. Therefore, the model has a 
power limitation on the alternator output of 120 kW as an approximation (based on a -100 kW, 
alternator operating point). Similarly, an actual PCAD system could only accommodate a specific 
current in addition to the operating current. Based on the expected PCAD current limit (150% of 
normal current), a maximum model alternator torque is set at 32 Nm which was chosen as a 
reasonable starting point for the model. The TRACE speed controller also requires the alternator 
torque to be a zero or positive value. Finally, the model includes an input constant for the number of 
cables connecting the alternator and PCAD system. Three cables are modeled, corresponding to the 
number of power phases. This feature is used to 'approximate the alternator torque capability during 
partial loss of load casualties. The controller is capable of maintaining a Brayton at the desired 
operating speed, but also capable of driving changes in speed. 
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length is about 2 meters. Including all fin area, the gas side heat transfer area is about 79 m2. A 
relatively short and thin fin design is anticipated to provide moderately high fin efficiency. Using a fin 
efficiency of 0.6, the effective gas surface area is about 47 m2. This fin efficiency is an approximation 
based on Figure 10-38, "Efficiencies for several longitudinal fin configurations" and Figure 10-39 
"Efficiencies for annular fins of constant thickness," of Reference 12-13. These figures relate 
efficiency to the following relationship: 
Where (re - rb) is the fin height and yb is the fin thickness. For the TRACE gas cooler design, the 
quantity "x" is about 1.5, resulting in a fin efficiency of about 0.6. The actual fin efficiency would be 
determined with a more detailed equipment design and subsequent testing. The TRACE model uses 
cylindrical geometry hydraulics and heat structures. The heat structure is nodalized at 40 axial and 5 
radial nodes. Axial conduction is enabled. The material properties applied are for Alloy 600. The 
TRACE heat structure has the same dimensions as an individual tube. A multiplier is used to produce 
the correct total heat transfer area. The fin surfaces are not explicitly modeled in TRACE. Instead, a 
gas (outside tube) heat transfer coefficient multiplier is used to account for the additional effective 
area. 
At steady state conditions the typical water temperatures entering and exiting the gas cooler are 375 
K and 501 K respectively. This temperature drop is significantly less than the HE24 value of 151 K 
(530 - 395 K) .  The TRACE model AT is less because a higher water mass flow rate is used and the 
total cooler power is somewhat lower (303 vs. 309 kW). Later versions of the heat balance 
spreadsheet were updated with more consistent water based HRS design parameters and became 
more consistent with the TRACE results. 
Currently the standard TRACE code heat transfer (Dittus-Boelter) and fluid pressure drop (Churchill 
and Moody) correlations are applied to the gas cooler. Use of the Churchill corretation and Moody 
curves, and mathematical representations of the curves, for calculation of the single-phase friction 
factor in a variety of flow-channel geometries is a common engineering practice. Information on the 
TRACE default correlations is available in the TRACE theory manual (Reference 12-9). A surface 
roughness of 2E-6 m is used with the TRACE single phase friction correlations. In order to match the 
HB24 pressure drop prediction, additional frictional flow factors are included in the hydraulic model. 
The TRACE model also includes plenums to provide a location to specify form loss factors for the gas 
cooler. The heat transfer and pressure drop correlations would have been updated as the cooler 
design was determined and as test data was collected. 
12.4.1.5 Recuperator 
Each Brayton loop contains one recuperator. The recuperator removes heat from the turbine 
discharge fluid and preheats the reactor inlet flow. System efficiency is improved because less heat 
must be rejected to space (through the gas cooler) in order to provide a low temperature compressor 
inlet flow. The recuperator model was based on a very detailed Mathcad model of a strip-fin plate-fin 
surface compact heat exchanger. The applicable design was defined in Figure 10-68 of Reference 
12-10. This reference provides both measured heat transfer and pressure drop correlations. Based 
on the initial concept selection, the initial recuperator model was designed to transfer a power level of 
539 kW. The HB24 power level was increased to 590 kW. At full power steady state conditions the 
TRACE recuperator model power is about 576 kW. The calculated TRACE recuperator effectiveness 
is about 91.5%, very close to the HB24 value. 
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Kays & London (Reference 12-1 0) Figure 10-68 provides the heat transfer correlation that was added 
to the TRACE code and is invoked using the model option title cards. The correlation may be 
specified as: 
Nusself Number = 0.269 ( Re 0.58 Pr I D )  
This correlation is for the specific compact heat exchanger design modeled in Mathcad and TRACE 
for the space Brayton design. This offset strip-fin plate-fin design uses a double fin stack (0.255 
inches) with 630 fins per meter. Currently the default TRACE single phase pressure drop correlation 
is applied with 2E-6 rn surface roughness. In order to match the Kays 8 London pressure drop 
prediction, additional frictional flow factors are included in the hydraulic model. The total recuperator 
pressure drop is also verified to be close to the HB24 values. The TRACE model also includes 
plenums to provide a location to specify form loss factors for the recuperator model. The heat transfer 
and pressure drop correlations would have been updated as the recuperator design was further 
developed and as test data was collected. 
12.4.1.6 Heat Rejection Segment (HRS) 
The HRS in TRACE is modeled after the PBI design described in Reference 12-1 1 and further 
discussed in Section 9.6. There are two water HRS loops in the TRACE model, one connected to 
each Brayton loop as shown in Figure 12-1 2. The gas cooler is the connection between the primary 
gas loop and the HRS water loop. The water flows out of the gas cooler after being heated and 
enters the heat transport loop assembly further discussed in Section 9.6.2.1. Each heat transport 
loop assembly consists of four sections of parallel circular water ducts that are connected to slab heat 
structures. These heat structures represent the radiator panel assemblies as described in Section 
9.6.2.2. The four sections of pipes feed into a larger return duct that leads to a centrifugal pump and 
accumulator before returning to the inlet of the gas cooler. 
As shown in Figure 12-12, the four sections of parallel hydraulic paths that are connected to radiator 
panels contain one, two, four, and six parallel pipe components stemming from a main path by 1.324 
cm inner diameter pipes. Each parallel pipe in the TRACE model represents two coupled circular 
ducts with a hydraulic diameter of 1.024 cm and total flow area of I .65 cm2. With parallel paths of 
equal diameter, there was a large flow maldistribution in each section, so additive flow losses were 
included in the first few parallel pipes in order to achieve velocities among the parallel paths to within 
25% of each other. The length of the parallel pipes is 11.45 rn except for the pipe in the first section 
which is 4.2 m long. At the end of the fourth section, the water returns to a pump and accumulator 
through a 40.55 m long, 2 cm inner diameter pipe representing the tength of pipe needed to bring the 
water from near the end of the boom to the energy conversion unit. For each loop, the total length of 
pipes is 21 2.5 meters. 
There is one pump modeled per loop. The pump component is modeled after a generic compact 
single stage centrifugal pump, prototypic of what would be used in this water system. The pump head 
is 300 m2/s2 with a torque of 0.3 pa*m3 and speed of 356 radls (3400 RPM). At steady state 
conditions, the resulting pressure drop for the loop is 293 kPa with a flow rate of 0.52 kgls. The 
electric power needed to run the pump is 0.530 kW, assuming the pump efficiency is 30%. 
The accumulator is represented with a liquid-separator model. This represents an accumulator with 
metal bellows that allows for water expansion and a separate gas charge to control pressure changes 
from the normal operating system pressure of about 7.75 MPa. System pressure increases due to 
increased average water temperature (density) and a small amount of boiling are damped by the HRS 
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accumulator. The TRACE accumulator volume is 0.03535 m3 and is assumed to be half gas (by 
volume) at nominal steady conditions. The accumulator is a built in TRACE component option that 
has been used without a heat structure. In other words adiabatic conditions apply for the enclosed 
volume. 
The heat structure attached to each parallel pipe represents an assembly of material that is used in 
the radiator panel assembly. As described in Section 9.6.2.2, heat is transferred through the titanium 
water duct walls, the POCO foam saddle, the titanium wall of the heat pipe evaporator, the heat pipe, 
the titanium wall of the heat pipe condenser, and finally out into the carbon-carbon (C-C) radiator 
panels. This assembly of materials is modeled in TRACE using one slab heat structure per pipe 
which represents the associated assembly for that length of pipe. This was done by dividing the heat 
structure up into five radial sections consisting of titanium, POCO foam, titanium, titanium, and C-C 
material in series from the water pipe to the panels. The thickness of each section was determined so 
that the volume of material was conserved but fit to the area of the C-C radiator panels. An additional 
feature that was added was the modeling of the properties of a gas loaded heat pipe. As described in 
Section 9.6.2.2, the gas loaded heat pipe will be fully operational at 343 K and fully off at 31 3 K. This 
function was modeled in TRACE by revising the POCO foam thermal conductivity to be its normal 
value at 343 K and zero at 313 K, effectively stopping heat transfer to the radiator panels. The panel 
area for one loop is 223.7 m2 making the total radiator area 447.4 m2 which includes a 15% design 
margin for heat pipe failure and design uncertainties. The heat structures with an emissivity of 0.9 
are coupled in a radiation enclosure with a view factor of 0.92 to a sink heat structu~e maintained at 
200 K. In TRACE both the emissivity and view factor effectively reduce the surface area used in the 
radiation heat transfer calculation. The view factor was used to tune the HRS performance by 
approximating the HB24 gas cooler primary exit temperature. Future model development would have 
been based on matching certain aspects of detailed HRS models being developed by Northrup 
Grumman Space Technology. 
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12.4.1.7 Reactor Coolant Piping 
An advantage of using HB24 for the TRACE model steady state design points was that HB24 was' 
based on a detailed piping design. The HB24 and TRACE model piping design includes specific pipe 
diameters, lengths and hydraulic loss factors (for bends, tees and fittings). In addition to modeling the 
appropriate pipe diameters, the TRACE model includes insulated common and individual Brayton hot 
legs. The TRACE model includes the appropriate hot leg flow diameter, and a heat structure that 
includes a thin insulation liner, insulation, and thicker outer pipe wall. Total TRACE loop pressure 
drops were matched to those calculated with HB24. TRACE pipe and connected component flow 
parameters are provided in Table 12-6. 
Table 12-6: TRACE Piping and Component Flow Parameters 
BRI HL to Turbine 
. . I 
TURB component 
I 
BRI Turbine to Recup 
1 0.01227 1 1.5 1 see below (*I 1 12.5 I 0 I 
BRA Tee to Cooler 1 0.01423 1 0.42 1 0.27 1 13.46 I 0 I 
, 
All TRACE pipes include multiple fluid nodes and heat structures representing the pipe wall. Four 
radial nodes were used with thermal properties set as Alloy 600 (similar to A61 7 and other nickel 
superalloys). Currently the standard TRACE code heat transfer and fluid pressure drop correlations 
are applied to the piping. TRACE code options are available to modify the Dittus-Boelter heat transfer 
correlation exponents or use a completely different relationship. Currently the default TRACE single 
phase pressure drop correlation is applied with 2E-6 m surface roughness. In the current model the 
outside surface condition is set for adiabatic conditions. Some specialized future models may have 
included distributed heat losses to space. 
0.01315 
0.27 
0.27 
RECUP (LP I hot side) 
BRI Recup to Tee 
BR1 Tee (Alt cool return) 
COOLER 1 0.015 
BRI Cooler to Alt Tee 1 0.01423 
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0.1863 (hyd) 
13.46 
13.46 
0.046 
0.01423 
0.01423 
2.32 
0.3 
4.563 
0.08 
0 
0.924 
2.7 
0.15 
0.1058 
0.27 
0.752 (hyd) 
13.46 
0.20 
0 
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12.4.2 TRACE Transient Results 
In order to start a TRACE transient calculation the code is first run to reach a near steady state 
condition. A significant effort was made to individually model each individual component (reactor, 
recuperator, gas cooler, turbine, compressor and radiator). Each of these "sub-models" was built and 
checked against the concept selection heat balance, HB24 and models built using other codes (such 
as Mathcad). For example, detailed Mathcad models of the recuperator and gas cooler were used to 
help determine TRACE code model inputs and verify steady state operating performance. This 
methodology was important to build the best TRACE components that could later be connected to 
interact in a full plant model. A comparison between the TRACE steady state conditions and HB24 is 
provided in Section 12.3.1. This comparison includes some component inlet and outlet conditions but 
does not highlight many of the differences between the heat balance and TRACE steady state results. 
These differences are due to thermal-hydraulic modeling differences. 
The TRACE full plant model captures system thermal-hydraulic behavior that is not included in the 
heat balance spreadsheet programs. For example, the heat balance spreadsheets do not solve the 
momentum and energy equations to define the local working gas temperature and pressure. The 
H824 model in Figure 12-3 shows the gas temperature leaving the reactor ( I  150 K) is the same as 
that entering the turbine. In reality, and as modeled in TRACE, the gas temperature will be a function 
of the local pressure and velocity. Flow area changes that produce velocity changes, sometimes 
referred to as a recoverable AP, as well as frictional or non-recoverable AP both produce coolant 
temperature changes. Section 12.4.1 .'I provides additional discussion on these temperature 
changes. Therefore, the TRACE results and heat balance spreadsheet calculations will never exactly 
match. 
Detailed TRACE steady state conditions are provided in Figure 12-1 3 and Figure 12-1 4. The first 
figure provides a SNAP animation view of the primary plant. The second figure provides detailed 
results for the TRACE model HRS. Each animation view can be interactively viewed while running 
the TRACE program. Comparing the steady state TRACE results with HB24 (Figure 12-3) illustrates 
some model and program differences. Both results are based on a He mole fraction of 0.784 (the 
remainder is Xe), resulting in a working fluid molecular weight of 31.5 g/g-mole. In order to converge 
at the desired operating temperature, TRACE is run with an average temperature controller that 
moves core reactivity until the desired average reactor temperature is achieved. This controller helps 
move the TRACE steady state to the HB24 average reactor temperature of 1024 K. To find the near 
steady state condition, the TRACE model is then allowed to run unperturbed for a long time interval. 
The TRACE Tave was defined as the average between reactor inlet and outlet plenum temperatures. 
Once the TRACE model has been defined, the only constraints applied to the steady state run were 
the T,, (1 024 *I .5K), Brayton speed (471 2.4 radls), and radiation heat transfer heat sink temperature 
(200 K). TRACE reactor power is allowed to float to a new state point. The TRACE fuel temperature 
rise is about 273K (1 162 K - 889 K) at a reactor power level of almost 900 kW,. 
The TRACE model used in this study was a scoping tool that would have undergone many revisions 
and upgrades as the SNPP design progressed and as test data became available. Future TRACE 
model upgrades may have included new component models (new gas cooler, explicit heat pipe 
components, etc.), and additional energy management detail. However, current model fidelity should 
provide useful transient results. The TRACE transient evaluations can be used to determine 
operating strategy and equipment setpoints as well as identify and recommend potential plant design 
changes. The initial transients were intended to verify multiple Brayton plant stability during normal 
and abnormal operating conditions. The transients are discussed below. Seven different transients 
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@ were analyzed. Transients based on normal and casualty conditions were chosen to evaluate the 
response of the reactor and define the design space within which the reactor and the remainder of the 
plant would need to perform. For some transients, numerous operating andlor protection strategies 
were modeled. Each of those transients is discussed in the following sections. 
12.4.2.1 Mechanical Loss of One Brayton (TRACE) 
The TRACE power plant model (Section 12.4.1) includes two parallel identical Brayton loops. In this 
transient the first loop Brayton (61) is assumed to fail (sudden stop) at time zero. The loss of Brayton 
is initiated using a TRACE code restart from the steady state condition defined in Table 12-3, Figure 
12-13, and Figure 12-14. The loss of Brayton transient is initiated in TRACE by resetting the turbine 
and compressor head and torque to zero. This action effectively stops Brayton loop flow within one 
second. Other models have used a more gradual Brayton flow coastdown for this transient. A variety 
of events could cause a Brayton to shutdown or be isolated. These events may be control actions 
(e.g., valve closure) or mechanical failures in the turbine, compressor, or alternator. While some 
failures could result in a gradual coastdown, others could rapidly stop flow. The TRACE transient 
models the most rapid loss of flow. 
When B l  flow stops, a check valve installed upstream of the compressor prevents gross back flow. A 
small leakage path in the check valve is modeled resulting in an idle loop reverse flow of about 0.007 
kgls. With the check valve feature, the, reactor flow will initiatly decrease by about 50%. At 100% 
power and only 50% reactor flow, the fuel and core block (core structural) temperatures quickly 
increase (Figure 12-1 5). The TRACE model equally distributes temperature based reactivity feedback 
between the fuel and core block. The core block average temperature is used as a measure for the 
geometric reactivity coefficient. As the core block, reactor vessel, and slider (reflector) relative 
positions change with temperature, the core reactivity will change. The core structural temperature 
follows resulting in changes in the coolant temperature. This reactivity feedback will lag the more 
rapid fuel temperature feedback. Figure 12-16 illustrates the reactivity contribution and timing of the 
fuel and core block. 
Future TRACE upgrades may have included a contribution of reactor vessel and reflector 
temperatures as well as redefining the reactivity split between fuel and geometry. Depending on the 
relative contributions between coolant temperature and direct power (gamma) heating of core 
structural materials, the TRACE model could be modified to include both effects. For the current 
TRACE model the contribution of gamma heating to changes in core block temperature was 
considered to be small. 
The negative reactivity added by the fuel and geometry feedback mechanisms reduces the reactor 
power level (Figure 12-77). The reactor power level eventually approaches about 50% power. Figure 
12-18 shows the predicted increase in fuel hot spot temperature during the loss of Brayton transient. 
Other plant operating changes are less obvious. For example, overall system pressure decreases 
when Brayton 1 is lost (Figure 12-1 9). This pressure reduction produces a reduction in the operating 
Brayton flow rate (Figure 12-20). The magnitude of Brayton 2 flow reduction is a function of the 
TRACE turbine and compressor maps selected (as discussed in Section 12.4.1.3). The reference 
CCEP performance maps show the largest change in Brayton 2 flow. This occurs because even 
though the TRACE component curves and CCEP maps are well matched at the heat balance 
operating point, they do not calculate the same off-design performance. Figure 12-20 illustrates this 
effect and the need for accurate Brayton performance maps and models. It is likely that both CCEP 
and TRACE performance curves would be replaced by future Brayton prototypic Brayton testing. 
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The reactor pressure drop is shown in Figure 12-21. Note that as flow decreases by about half, the 
pressure drop decreases to about one-fourth. The reactor flow path is shared by both Brayton loops. 
When B l  flow is lost, a small compensating effect occurs due to additional reactor flow area available 
for the remaining operating loop. The result is an effective decrease in reactor resistance. 
Figure 12-22 shows the remaining operating Brayton component power levels. Compressor and 
turbine torque (and therefore power) initially drop, consistent with the predi~ted~flow reduction. 
However, as the turbine inlet temperature increases, the turbine power increases. After the initial 
system pressure decrease, the constant speed and steady compressor inlet temperature produce a 
constant (lower) compressor power. At the new steady Brayton 2 conditions, the compressor power 
drops more than the turbine power. At the new Brayton torque (power) balance, the alternator load is 
increased by the speed control system to maintain constant shaft speed. The alternator power must 
increase from about 11 0 kWt to more than 125 kWt. The increased Brayton 2 alternator load is 
assumed to be distributed by the PCAD system. 
The plant temperatures throughout the primary loop are shown in Figure 12-23 through Figure 12-25. 
Reactor coolant exit temperature increases as flow decreases faster than power. Figure 12-26 shows 
the gas cooler water side (radiator) temperatures during the loss of Brayton transient. Other than 
operation of the Brayton speed controller, no control actions have been assumed during the transient. 
Therefore, the failed Brayton heat rejection loop water pump continues to run and cools the system to 
an isothermal temperature of about 31 5 K. At this temperature the radiator heat pipes are assumed to 
shutdown, limiting additional (rapid) cooling. If this HRS cool down is undesirable, the TRACE model 
could include HRS pump control to slow heat loss. 
Finally, Figure 12-27 provides a sensitivity study showing the effect on power of moving all the 
negative reactivity feedback into the fuel temperature reactiv~ty coefficient. Because the fuel 
temperature responds faster than the structural temperature, there is less power undershoot, and 
power more rapidly approaches 50% power. 
The TRACE and RELAPS-3D transient results are generally very similar. One difference between the 
two transients is the initiating event. In RELAP, the loss of Brayton is gradual with a 20 second 
coastdown. The TRACE loss of Brayton is modeled as a step change at time zero. Reactor power 
behavior is very similar, both decreasing to about 40% and then recovering to near 50%. Because 
the TRACE transient is more rapid, the minimum power is reached in about 150 seconds while the 
RELAP minimum power is closer to 200 seconds. Other differences include the geometric reactivity 
feedback model, the HRS model (NaK vs. water), and the reactor core model (UOz vs. UN fuel). 
Consistent with a more rapid transient, the TRACE results show primary temperature (That) increase 
somewhat larger (about 25 K) than in RELAP. The RELAP peak fuel temperature reduction (-190 0)  
is about twice as large as in TRACE (-75 K). A consistent difference (for all transients) is that the 
change in RELAP peak fuel temperature is larger than the corresponding TRACE value. The main 
reason for this difference is fuel pin materials and core design. At steady full power operation, the 
temperature drop between the coolant and peak fuel temperature is significantly larger for the UOn 
fuel core modeled in RELAP than the UN fuel TRACE core. Therefore, for a given change in power, 
the change in U02  peak temperature will be larger than for the UN fuel system. 
Another small difference between the codes is the prediction of remaining Brayton flow rate. Using 
the CCEP performance maps, the TRACE model predicts Brayton 2 flow decreases with decreasing 
compressor inlet pressure (by about 15%) from about 2.5 to 2.2 kgls. The predicted flow reduction is 
consistent with SlMULlNK results. No similar flow reduction is shown in the RELAPS-30 results (or 
with the TRACE performance curve option selected). Later in the transient, differences between the 
TRACE and RELAP HRS system models can be seen. Since the TRACE transient uses a faster 
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Brayton coastdown, the gas cooler water exit temperature reaches the inlet temperature sooner than 
the RELAP NaK gas cooler. Once the TRACE water temperatures are equal it takes about one water 
loop transport time (roughly 2 minutes) for colder radiator return water to reach the gas cooler. In 
then takes an additional 400 seconds to reach the heat pipe shutdown temperature (about 315 K). 
12.4.2.2 Complete Loss of Electrical Load for One Brayton (TRACE) 
As stated in Section 12.4.1.3, the turbine, alternator, and compressor are all connected to one shaft 
and operate at identical shaft speeds. The shaft speed is determined by a balance of the torques on 
the shaft imposed by the components plus any parasitic losses, as given by Equation 12-1. 
For a given Brayton and plant design, the shaft speed simply becomes a function of the working fluid 
density (temperature and pressure) and alternator torque. Alternator torque is a function of the 
electrical load on the alternator. In the TRACE model, a speed controller is used to match the actual 
Brayton speed with a desired (or programmed speed). The controller does this by adjusting the 
alternator load to balance the shaft torques at the desired speed. If shaft speed is high, the alternator 
load (torque) is increased to reduce speed. The available alternator loads are the spaceship hotel 
loads, the propulsion loads, the science loads,.and the PLR. The PLR is sized to provide a full power 
electrical load (plus a design margin) even when other loads (like propulsion) are not available. The 
PLR is used to regulate the alternator torque to maintain constant speed. Some features of the 
TRACE speed control model include a representation of the maximum available PLR load (torque), 
and the major cable connections between the alternator and PLR. These speed control model 
features are important in the partial loss of load transient described in Section 12.4.2.3. 
A loss of load transient occurs if there is a malfunction in the speed control system or related 
components, The most severe transient is a complete loss of load where the alternator torque 
decreases to zero. This casualty would likely be caused by an alternator failure, multiple PLR 
component failures, PCAD software failure, or micrometeoroid impact to the electrical cables between 
the alternator and PCAD. This severe casualty may be less credible than partial loss of load and may 
be caused by equipment failures that are not recoverable. 
Complete loss of load results are illustrated in Figure 12-28 through Figure 12-42. The loss of load, 
initiated at time zero, is shown in Figure 12-28. Brayton I alternator power drops from about 11 0 kWt 
to 0 in less than one second. Since the alternator is used to control Brayton speed, complete loss of 
load results in a rapid increase in Brayton 1 shaft speed. Brayton 1 speed (Figure 12-29) increases 
until the turbine, compressor and parasitic mechanical loads reach a new equilibrium. Increasing 
shaft speed coincides with increasing Brayton 1 turbine and compressor power (Figure 12-28) The 
shaft stabilizes at a new speed where the magnitude of the compressor torque approaches that of the 
turbine torque. At higher shaft speeds, both the turbine and compressor efficiencies decrease. That 
tends to reduce the difference in the turbine and compressor torques as can be seen from Equation 
12-1. In addition, while the temperature and pressure entering the turbine are fairly constant, the 
temperature entering the compressor increases (Figure 12-38) and the pressure decreases 
significantly as shaft speed increases because the turbine reduces pressure more and the recuperator 
removes less energy from the gas that flows toward the compressor. That causes the compressor 
density to decrease which also causes the difference between compressor and turbine torque to 
decrease. 
As the compressor speed increases, the reactor coolant flow rate increases (Figure 12-30). The 
coolant flow rate is determined by TRACE using built in performance curves. These curves are used 
instead of the CCEP performance maps because the calculated speed increase moves off the CCEP 
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performance maps. Initially the reactor coolant flow rate increases by about 7%. This flow rate 
change is small compared with the increase in shaft speed (about 40%). The higher shaft speed is 
offset by decreasing compressor density. Figure 12-30 shows a number of different Brayton I flow 
curves, Three of these curves define the changes in Brayton 1 mass flow based on what actions are 
taken to reduce HRS temperature and pressure. These actions include maintaining HRS pump speed 
constant, increasing speed by 50% (1 .5~)  or doubling pump speed (2x). These actions are discussed 
further with the HRS results in Section 12.4.2.7. Two Figure 12-30 curves (in green) show the impact 
of performance map selection on Brayton 2 flow. Compared with using the TRACE curves, the CCEP 
maps result in a larger increase in Brayton 2 loop flow (2.6 vs. 2.5 kgls). The two blue curves show 
that this difference in Brayton 2 flow does not significantly change the Brayton 1 flow. 
The increased shaft speed causes the turbine to remove more energy from the gas coolant and the 
compressor to add more energy to the coolant. As a result, the compressor exit temperature 
increases (Figure 12-33). The resulting difference between the two recuperator inlet temperatures 
(turbine exit and compressor exit) is reduced by about half, as seen in Figure 12-33. That 
temperature difference is directly proportional to the heat transfer rate in the recuperator. Thus the 
recuperator transfers about half as much energy from the hot stream to the cooler stream. The 
reactor inlet temperature is lower as a result (Figure 12-31 and Figure 12-34), causing core reactivity 
(Figure 12-35] and reactor power to increase (Figure 12-36). The change in fuel peak temperature is 
shown in Figure 12-37. As stated above, this transient produces a modest increase in reactor flow 
rate. This would normally lead to an increase in reactor pressure drop. However, with the decrease 
in cold leg temperature shown in Figure 12-31, the net result is a reduction in reactor pressure drop as 
shown in Figure 12-32. 
Figure 12-36 and Figure 12-37 show reactor power and core hot spot temperature. Depending on 
what actions are taken with HRS flow, the power peaks at between 11 1% and 116%. Hot spot 
temperature increases between 20 and 30 K. 
Figure 12-39 shows the HRS water temperatures for the affected loop. The figure illustrates that the 
heat input into the HRS is increasing with increasing power and gas cooler gas inlet temperature. The 
increased heat load causes increasing HRS hot leg temperature. If no control actions are taken, bulk 
boiling in the gas cooler occurs in about 1 minute. This boiling produces a rapid pressure increase 
(Figure 12-40) that could exceed system design pressure. A protective action in the HRS system, 
such as a relief valve lift or rupture disk blow-off may be required to prevent structural failure of the 
gas cooler. The gas cooler must be protected so that the primary gas inventory is not lost. The exact 
pressure reached in this transient is somewhat uncertain. The TRACE code is executed using a zero 
gravity option. The accuracy of the boiling heat transfer correlations in TRACE for zero gravity is 
unknown at this time. Regardless, it is likely that large scale bulk boiling in the gas cooler would lead 
to loss of adequate heat transfer and system overpressurization. 
Figure 12-39 also shows HRS water temperatures for two potential automatic control actions. The 
actions increase the HRS pump speed (or turn on an additional pump) to increase HRS flow. The first 
action is a 1.5 times pump speed increase 20 seconds after complete loss of load. The second action 
is a 2 times pump increase 30 seconds after the toss of load. These flow increases require a 
significant increase in pumping power (between 3 and 8 times). Figure 12-40 illustrates that both 
these control actions are effective in reducing the HRS loop water pressure. Therefore, to minimize 
the size and maximum power of the HRS pump the goal of an HRS control system should be to 
initiate speed change as soon as practical after the initiating transient. Of course, these actions may 
be irrelevant if an alternator load cannot be re-established for Brayton 1. Ultimately, if the load cannot 
be re-established it may be necessary to shut down Brayton 1 using a flow control valve. An analysis 
of this valve closure, including the indication used for valve closure and valve closing timing should be 
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performed to complete this transient analysis. The goal of this analysis would be to demonstrate HRS 
protection to prevent permanent system damage, preventing a loss of coolant and allowing an 
affected Brayton loop to be restarted. 
The coolant flow rate discussion above noted that the Brayton 1 speed increase resulted in moving 
outside the CCEP performance maps. In general the same performance map or curve option is 
selected for both Braytons in the TRACE model. However, CCEP maps were applied to the Brayton 2 
turbine and compressor. The impact of this change on the overall transient results is very small. The 
impact on Brayton 2 and Brayton 1 loop flows shown in figure 12-30 was previously discussed. The 
difference can also be seen in the change in reactor exit temperature (Figure t2-41) and loop 
pressures (Figure 12-42). 
Overall, the TRACE and RELAPS-3D results for the complete loss of alternator load transient are 
similar. RELAP results are presented in Section 12.5.2.2. Both transients produce a peak power 
increase of 1 10 to 117% as illustrated in Figure 12-36 and Figure 12-1 38. As expected, the change in 
peak fuel temperature for the RELAP U02 core is about twice that for the TRACE UN core. Relatively 
small differences are also seen in the calculated Brayton overspeed and resulting loop flow rates. 
The RELAP model predicts a peak Brayton speed of about 62,500 rpm while the peak TRACE speed 
is between 63,000 and 64,500 rpm (depending on actions taken with the HRS). This difference is 
considered small because these speeds move off the available CCEP performance maps. Therefore, 
the specific results depend on how performance characteristics are extrapolated and how the maps 
are incorporated into RELAP or TRACE. The RELAP and TRACE HRS system models respond in a 
similar manner, with the slower response of the NaK system evident in that it takes almost 600 
seconds for the gas cooler NaK inlet temperature to increase. The TRACE gasiwater cooler water 
inlet temperature begins increasing before 100 seconds. 
12.4.2.3 Partial Loss of Electrical Load for One Brayton (TRACE) 
While a complete loss of load transient is conservative in that it produces the highest overspeed 
condition, it may not be the most likely or relevant loss of load event. Failure mechanisms that might 
lead to a complete loss of load are also unlikely to allow system recovery. For example, an alternator 
failure might lead to a complete loss of load but also may result in a loss of Brayton. It is anticipated 
that PLR and PCAD hardware will be single fault tolerant. That is, they will be designed to maintain 
alternator load for most single equipment failures. When the electrical system architecture was 
established for the spaceship, the effects of component and connection failures would be further 
defined. Some failures may produce a partial loss of load. It is currently uncertain if a partial loss of 
load is a more likely event. For example, if power was routed through multiple paths or multiple 
circuit breakers were employed within the electrical distribution system, it is possible that the total 
load, including PLR, could decrease. If the speed control system is not able to maintain the required 
full power load (torque), a partial loss of load transient would occur. Both complete and partial losses 
of toad transients have been analyzed with similar TRACE models. The primary difference between 
the TRACE models is the Brayton performance map or curve option selected. For the partial toss of 
load transient, the increase in Brayton speed is small enough to stay on the CCEP performance 
maps. Therefore, the CCEP option has been used for both Braytons in the TRACE partial loss of load 
analysis. TRACE results are illustrated in Figure 12-43 through Figure 12-57. In many cases the 
results include both Brayton performance map or curve options. These results provide sensitivity 
information for overall plant response. 
The TRACE partial loss of load transient is modeled as the loss of one of three power cables between @ the alternator and the PLR. This represents a notional casualty that in the final system design may 
result in a complete loss of load. The PCAD architecture may not allow operating the speed control 
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system with less than three cables. The Brayton speed control system in TRACE provides the 
flexibility of specifying the number of intact cables. This feature provides a convenient modeling 
method to represent any partial loss of load event. At full power with three cables intact, the alternator 
power is about 110 kWt. With only two cables available the alternator load drops to 80 kW,. This 
difference is illustrated in Figure 12-43 between the alternator loads of Braytons 1 and 2. The 
alternator load imbalance is imposed on the steady state starting conditions at the beginning of this 
transient (time zero). Note that this drop is less than one-third of the initial power level. The decrease 
is smaller because the PLR attempts to compensate for the reduced load (and subsequent overspeed 
condition) by increasing the load with the remaining connections. The Brayton 1 turbine and 
compressor power increases until a new torque balance is achieved with the lower alternator torque. 
The new torque balance occurs at a higher shaft speed as shown in Figure 12-44. Brayton 1 speed 
increases from 4712 to about 5800 radls (or 56,000 rpm). This overspeed is significantly less than 
the 61,000 rpm reached in the complete loss of load casualty. 
The plant response shown for this transient is similar to an alternator load reduction if the Brayton is 
operated without a speed control system. That is, without a speed control system, the Brayton speed 
will increase when electrical load is decreased. This speed increase produces a number of cascading 
effects that change the plant heat balance resulting in an increase in reactor power. Since the load 
reduction results in an increase in reactor power, the system is referred to as non-load following. This 
characteristic is a major reason that a Brayton shaft speed control system is employed. The following 
transient description explains what happens in the overall plant as alternator load decreases and 
Brayton shaft speed increases. The effects are shown based on a load reduction in one loop only. If 
the transient was not due to a casualty, it is likely that a load reduction would be shared by both (all) 
operating Brayton loops. 
Since the partial loss of load transient can be run with either the TRACE performance curves or CCEP 
Brayton performance maps, a sensitivity study was performed to illustrate the differences. Figure 
12-44 shows Brayton 1 overspeed for both Brayton map options. The CCEP option produces a 
higher shaft speed. Figure 12-45 shows an increase in Brayton 1 and 2 flow rates. Flow rate 
changes are targer when using the CCEP performance maps. Applying the CCEP maps, the Brayton 
1 speed increases by about 23% and the flow rate increases 5.7% (reactor flow increases 4.5%). If 
the TRACE curves are applied, the flow increases are only 1.6% for Brayton 1 speed increase of 16% 
(1.2% reactor flow increase). These differences point out the importance of using accurate turbine 
and compressor off-design performance maps. For this study the CCEP maps are assumed to 
represent the most accurate data available. Prototypic test data would be needed to define actual 
Brayton performance. Loop 1 mass flow rate increases less than the shaft speed because of a 
significant reduction in compressor fluid inlet density. Compressor 1 inlet temperature increases 
(Figure 12-53) and pressure decreases (Figure 12-57) resulting in reduced working fluid density. 
Compressor inlet density drops from 9.65 to 7.96 kg/m3. 
The modest increase in reactor flow rate described above will tend to reduce the temperature drop 
across the reactor but have little impact on average reactor temperature. The more important system 
changes are related to the new Brayton I operating speed. As with the complete loss of load 
description, the recuperator heat transfer is reduced as the turbine exit temperature decreases with 
turbine power (Figure 12-48) and the compressor outlet temperature increases with compressor inlet 
temperature. At the higher speed, the turbine pressure ratio increases from 1.8 to 2.1 resulting in a 
corresponding decrease in turbine outlet temperature. Turbine AT changes from 21 7 to 262 K. The 
new turbine exit conditions mean that the recuperator low pressure inlet temperature is lower. 
Simultaneously, the compressor pressure ratio increases from 2.0 to 2.4 with a corresponding 
temperature increase in AT from 148 to 2A4 K. The increased compressor exit temperature means 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-00101 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 12-57 
that the recuperator high pressure inlet temperature is higher. The pressure ratio and temperature 
data described here is based on continuing the transient for 5000 seconds when conditions are very 
close to steady state. 
The impact of the changes in recuperator inlet temperatures described above is a significant reduction 
in the amount of heat transferred between the two gas streams and a reduction in overall plant 
efficiency. The new recuperator high pressure exit temperature (reactor inlet temperature) of 865 K is 
significantly lower than the initial temperature of 889 K. It is this reduction in reactor inlet temperature, 
combined with increased flow rate that produce a lower average coolant temperature. The lower 
average coolant temperature results in a core block temperature change from the initial 1072 K to a 
final 1059 K. This temperature deficit produces the reactivity surplus that increases reactor power 
from 100% to a final value of about 110% (5000 sec). 
As Brayton and reactor flow rate increases, the coolant pressure drop across the reactor increases. 
However, the increased pressure drop is somewhat offset by reduced reactor inlet temperature 
(Figure 12-46) and the resulting increase in density. The resulting balance between flow rate and fluid 
density (shown in Figure 12-47) is somewhat different depending on which Brayton performance 
maps are selected. 
As reactor coolant temperature decreases the core block and fuel temperatures follow (Figure 12-49). 
This temperature reduction produces a reactivity addition shown in Figure 12-50. Consequently, the 
reactor power increases as shown in Figure 12-51. The transient is relatively slow resulting in little 
power overshoot. Depending on the Brayton performance option selected, the peak fuel temperature 
shown in Figure 12-52 increases by about A5 K (TRACE curves) or 23 K (CCEP maps). 
The new system operating point results in increased gas temperature at the gas cooler inlet. This 
higher gas temperature results in higher HRS fluid temperature and higher HRS system heat load. 
Because the reactor power increases during the transient, more heat must be transferred to the HRS. 
In addition, the Brayton 1 alternator is removing less power (from 109.4 to 80 kWJ than at the start of 
the transient. The new steady state plant heat balance results in a 27% increase in HRS heat 
transfer. Figure 12-54 shows the resulting increase in heat rejection fluid (water) temperature. At the 
higher temperatures a significant water pressure increase is predicted (Figure 1 2-55). Depending on 
the final system design and the actual PLR capacity, it may be necessary to increase HRS pump 
speed to maintain an acceptable HRS operating pressure. 
12.4.2.4 Positive Reactivity Addition (TRACE) 
Figure 12-58 through Figure 12-73 show the transient response to selected parameters for this 
transient. It is assumed that the reactivity is increased in the reactor an amount equivalent to about 
50 K increase in temperature. Since the total temperature coefficient of the reactor for this analysis is 
assumed to be -1.36 x 6p/K, the reactivity change required for a 50 K temperature increase is 
6.8E-4 6p. The transient is produced by adding this reactivity over a I-second period. The reactivity 
increase of 6.8E-4 6p was selected to be the same as used in RELAPS-3D transients, facilitating 
model comparison. The selection of a reactivity increase equivalent to 50 K was somewhat arbitrary. 
As a comparison, moving all sliders by about I -mm will produce about the same reactivity change. 
The specific reactivity change is a function of time in life, slider position and core design. For 
example, the equivalent slider sensitivity in a U02 core might be less than a UN design. The TRACE 
transient resulted in a 48 K temperature increase. Figure 12-62 shows the reactivity contribution. 
Positive reactivity addition causes the reactor power and therefore reactor exit temperature to 
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increase as illustrated in Figure 12-58 and Figure 12-59. As the fuel and core block temperatures 
increase, negative reactivity feedback causes a reduction in power and reactor exit temperature 
(Figure 12-68). However, reactor power does not return to the initial power because the turbine 
removes more energy (Figure 12-69) at the increased turbine inlet temperature. 
This transient was run with both the TRACE Brayton performance curves and the CCEP Brayton 
performance maps. Using the CCEP Brayton performance map fit option produced the most severe 
transient and is shown in the attached figures. Using the CCEP map option, the reactor power and 
exit temperature increase is large enough to raise the turbine power from about 350 kWt to almost 480 
kW, (Figure 12-69). The compressor power (opposite in sign) also increases, but by a smaller 
amount. The result is an increase in available alternator power. If the alternator cannot supply the 
corresponding load, the shaft speed will increase until the Brayton component torques (powers) re- 
balance. The shaft speed control system used in TRACE has notional representations of the 
maximum torque and load that the PLR can provide. At the increased turbine power the available 
alternator load (based on the TRACE PLR model input of 120 kWt) is too small to maintain constant 
Brayton shaft speed. Figure 12-61 illustrates the overspeed condition (over 5400 radls) that results. 
Unlike previous transients, the initiating event has a balanced impact on both Brayton loops. The 
Braytons respond-identically and it is only necessary to show plots for one loop. This transient 
illustrates the kind of analysis that might go into sizing the PLR and providing the necessary system 
control. However, other control schemes may be adopted to control this transient. One such control 
system based on average reactor coolant temperature is discussed below. 
Results are also shown with and without an automatic reactor temperature control system. This 
notional control system might be used to keep the reactor coolant temperature at (near) a desired 
operating point. The TRACE Tav, control model uses a 1024 K set point with a 1.5 K dead band. 
Temperature adjustment is accomplished with small reactivity changes based on either a single slider 
(1 of 12) movement or bank slider motion at 1112~~ normal speed. Tave control would provide a 
reactivity correction to account for changes in core reactivity with time in life, changes in HRS surface 
emissivity and other gradual changes in system performance. The results with and without active Tave 
control are provided below. All results shown use the CCEP Brayton performance maps. 
Without T,,, Control 
A maximum reactor power of almost 140% (Figure 12-58) is reached at approximately 20 seconds. 
The maximum Brayton alternator power (load) is reached at about 70 seconds and results in a shaft 
speed increase seen in Figure 12-61. Primary flow rate increases in the Brayton loops (Figure 12-66) 
and the reactor. Higher reactor flow and increasing reactor inlet temperature results in an increased 
reactor pressure drop (Figure 12-67). Increased reactor power results in an increase in the 
temperature and pressure for the HRS (Figure 42-72 and Figure 1 2-73). 
Withve Control 
The transient was run again with an active T,,, controller. Many of the plots provided show system 
parameters with and without Tave control. The Tave controller begins to affect the system at 30 
seconds when the average temperature is more than 1.5 K above the Tave set point of 1024 K. Tave 
control reactivity change is clearly shown as small step changes in shim reactivity in Figure 12-63. 
Peak reactor power (Figure 12-58) is unchanged with Tave control active. However, power turns 
sooner and the resulting change in peak fuel temperature (Figure 12-59 in less than without T,,,
control). The effect of Tave control on primary coolant temperature is clearly seen in Figure 12-68, 
where maximum reactor exit temperature is reduced. Reduced reactor exit temperature results in 
reduced turbine power (Figure 12-69) and eliminates the Brayton I overspeed (Figure 12-61). 
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Figure 12-74 shows the results of a time step size sensitivity study. With decreasing the time step 
size, the results remain very close and do not increase the fidelity of the findings. The smaller time 
steps do show a smoothing of the curves due to decreasing numerical instabilities. 
Positive Reactivity Transient TRACElRELAP5-3D Com~arisons 
Figure 12-58 is a graph of reactor power for TRACE. The TRACE peak power of about 140% is close 
to the RELAP5-3D model result of about 145%. The RELAP discussion of the positive reactivity 
transient is contained in Section 12.5.2.3. Figure 12-59 is a graph of hot spot fuel temperature. When 
compared to the RELAP model, the TRACE model experiences a much smaller change in 
temperature. This difference is consistent with the two core designs modeled: the UN fuel modeling in 
TRACE has a smaller fuel to coolant temperature difference than the U02 fuel modeled in RELAP. 
Figure 12-61 is a graph of Brayton shaft speeds. The TRACE model without T,, control experiences 
a change in shaft speed as explained earlier. The RELAP model does not experience a change in 
shaft speed as illustrated in Figure 12-153. The RELAP shaft speed controller does not include a 
maximum alternator load capacity and therefore functions to maintain constant shaft speed, 
regardless of turbine power. 
Figure 12-62 and Figure 12-151 are graphs of reactor reactivity for TRACE and RELAP respectively. 
Since the TRACE model and RELAPS-3D model are adding the same amount of reactivity, the results 
look similar. Figure 12-66 shows Brayton loop mass flow rate. When comparing the increase in loop 
mass flow rate between TRACE and RELAP models, the TRACE model (without Tave control) show a 
significantly larger increase in flow rate. This difference is only seen when TRACE is run with the 
CCEP map option. 
Figure 12-70 is a graph of the Brayton component and recuperator temperatures. The TRACE model 
has a change in Brayton shaft speed which results in new operating conditions for each turbine and 
compressor. With and without Tave control, all loop temperatures are affected. The TRACE results 
with Tave control active (Figure 12-71) produce a constant Brayton speed and temperature results that 
more closely match the RELAPS-3D model temperatures shown in Figure 12-154 and Figure 12-155. 
Figure 12-72 is a graph of the gas cooler water temperatures. The TRACE model without TaVe control 
shows an increase in the water temperatures leaving the gas cooler (That). This is a result of the 
increased gas temperature entering the gas cooler (leaving the high pressure side of the recuperator) 
in the primary HeXe gas loops. The increase in gas cooler temperature was sufficient enough to start 
boiling in the gas cooler, so this transient should be further monitored with gas cooler boiling under 
consideration. The RELAP5-3D model shows only a small increase in temperature for the NaK in the 
HRS as illustrated in Figure 12i156 and Figure 12-157. 
t 2.4.2.5 Negative Reactivity Addition (TRACE) 
Figure 12-75 through Figure 12-86 show the transient response of selected parameters for the 
negative reactivity addition transient. The transient is produced by reducing the core reactivity by 
6.8E-4 6p between time zero and one second. (This is the same reactivity change modeled in 
RELAP5SD, facilitating the comparison of model results.) This resulted in a 48 K temperature 
decrease. Figure t 2-79 shows the reactivity contribution. This transient causes the reactor power 
and temperature to decrease rapidly, as seen in Figure 12-75 and Figure 12-76. As the fuel and core 
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block temperatures decrease, positive reactivity feedback causes an increase in power and fuel 
temperature (Figure 12-77). However, reactor power does not return to the initial power because the 
turbine removes less energy (Figure 12-84) at the reduced turbine inlet temperature. 
Like the positive reactivity addition case, this transient was run with both the TRACE Brayton 
performance curves and the CCEP Brayton performance maps. Using the CCEP Brayton - 
performance map fit option produced the most severe transient and is shown in the attached figures. 
Results are also shown with and without an automatic reactor temperature control system. The 
results with and without active Tave control are provided below. 
Without Tave Control 
Without T,, control, the reactor coolant temperature decreases by about 50 K (Figure 12-83). Unlike 
in the positive reactivity addition transient, the Brayton speed remains constant. The available power 
from each alternator drops from about 109 to 85 kW,. The PLR is sized such that it has a design 
margin to accommodate an under power situation. However, after this design margin is exceeded, 
the speed controller would no longer be able to maintain speed, and the speed (and frequency) would 
begin to drop. In a reduced frequency situation, one of the propulsion units could trip off and allow the 
speed (and frequency) to recover. If all the propulsion power units are dropped and the system is still 
underpowered, the system will experience "brown-outs" because there is not enough power supplied. 
This behavior is not modeled because it requires a higher level of fidelity before such a system could 
be implemented. 
With Tave Control 
The transient was also run with a T,, controller which begins to affect the system at 30 seconds. 
After about 30 seconds, the controller begins adding reactivity to increase average reactor coolant 
temperature back to the 1024 K set point. As seen in Figure 12-75 the reactor power reduction is 
minimized with the controller activated. In fact, after the Tave controller turns reactor power, enough 
positive reactivity has been added (both shim and fuel/block cool down) that an overpower excursion 
is produced (up to about 120% power). This corrective overshoot would be an important feature to 
tune in an actual Tave control device. As seen in Figure 12-75, the Tave control case returns to 100% 
power, consistent with the initial average temperature. Figure 12-76 shows that the T,,, controller 
also limits the drop in peak fuel temperature. The multiple graphs showing the results with and 
without T,,, control are not shown for negative reactivity because the results are equal in magnitude 
and opposite in direction from the graphs for positive reactivity addition. 
Negative Reactivity Transient TRACEIRELAPS-3D Comparisons 
Figure 12-75 is a graph of reactor power for TRACE. The RELAP5-3D discussion of the negative 
reactivity transient is contained in Section 12.5.2.4. When compared to the RELAP model, both 
produce similar results with the TRACE model predicting a 5% smaller power excursion. Figure 12-76 
is a graph of hot spot fuel temperature. When compared to the RELAP model (see Figure 12-159), 
the TRACE model experiences a much smaller change in temperature (-60K). This difference is 
consistent with the core designs modeled where the UN fuel model in TRACE has a smaller fuel to 
coolant temperature difference than the U02 fuel modeled in RELAP. 
Figure 12-78 and Figure 12-163 are graphs of Brayton shaft speeds for T,RACE and RELAPS-3D 
respectively. The TRACE and RELAP models predict constant shaft speed for negative reactivity 
addition. Figure 12-79 is a graph of the reactivity. Since the TRACE and RELAP models are adding 
the same amount of negative reactivity, the results look similar. Note that the TRACE plot uses 
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reactivity units in 6p while the RELAP plot uses $. (A reactivity change of 6.8e-4 6p is equivalent to a 
change of about $0.1 06.) Figure 12-81 is a graph of mass flow rate. For TRACE, the mass flow rates 
in both loops are identical so only loop 2 is shown. Both TRACE and RELAP models predict a small 
reduction in mass flow rate. The reduction is caused by a slight drop in compressor inlet density 
(constant temperature and reduced pressure). Figure 12-83 is a graph for the reactor inlet, outlet, and 
average temperatures. The TRACE and RELAP models show similar results. 
Figure 12-84 is a graph of Brayton component power. For TRACE, the Brayton component powers in 
both loops are identical so only loop 2 is shown. The TRACE model shows a decrease in power from 
the alternator (-80% of full power operating point). Figure 12-85 is a graph of loop Brayton and 
recuperator temperatures. For TRACE, the Brayton loop temperatures in both loops are identical so 
only loop 2 is shown. The results from TRACE and RElAP5-3D loop temperatures appear to be 
almost identical. Figure 12-86 is a graph of the gas cooler water temperature. Consistent with 
reduced power, the TRACE gas cooler water exit temperature slowly decreases during the transient. 
The RELAP model shows similar results. 
12.4.2.6 Complete Loss of Primary Flow (TRACE) 
Analysis of the complete loss of primary flow was performed to provide a rough estimate of the time 
available to re-establish flow andlor take protective action(s). The ability to either start or restart a 
Brayton, and time available to re-establish.flow will also be a function of backup power reserves. 
Available backup power wilt depend on the plant configuration (spaceship vs. surface installation), 
mission, and time in life. This TRACE analysis is not an exhaustive protection analysis; rather, it is a 
scoping study to provide a first look at complete loss of flow. 
The transient is initiated at time zero from the full power steady state conditions shown in Figure 
12-13 and Figure 12-14. Unlike the TRACE loss of Brayton transient, a flow coast down is used 
instead of an initial zero speed condition. Complete loss of flow results are provided in Figure 12-87 
through Figure 12-96, where Figure 12-91 shows the Brayton coast down (in 20 seconds). This 
Brayton coast down results in the loop flow rates shown in Figure 12-92. The time scale in Figure 
12-92 is expanded to show only the first 25 seconds of the transient. Since the ptotting resolution is 
one second, the expanded figure does not appear as a smooth curve. Figure 12-92 also illustrates a 
small numerical instability that occurs with the turbine calculation as the pressure ratio approaches 1.0 
near 2000 radls (12 seconds into transient). 
The loss of flow and therefore loss of core cooling results in rapid fuel temperature heatup (Figure 
12-89). During the coast down phase, there is an initial increase in core structural temperature. 
However, once the flow reaches zero there is limited heat transfer into the core structural material. In- 
core radiation heat transfer and structural gamma heating are not modeled in this transient. In Figure 
12-89 two curves are shown for the fuel temperature. The very rapid temperature increase curve 
corresponds to no protective action (no scram or shim other than a normal operating condition with a 
T,, controller). The T,, controller removes only one slider and inserts only a small amount of 
negative reactivity (Figure 12-90). On the other hand, Figure 12-89 also shows the effect of a 
protective bank slider high speed shim. The protective action is initiated at 11.5 seconds. The action 
is delayed 1.5 seconds after dropping below half normal operating Brayton speed. The 1.5 seconds is 
based on assumptions concerning I&C system and CDM delay times. 
As the fuel heats up the resulting negative reactivity reduces power. As shown in Figure 12-87, the 
power decrease with no protective action significantly lags the flow decrease. This results in the 
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rapidly increasing peak temperatures shown in Figure 12-88. The peak temperature increases about 
300 K in the first 100 seconds. With a protective action, a much more rapid power reduction (Figure 
12-87) and gradual peak temperature increase (Figure 12-88) is predicted. 
Other system parameters are shown in Figure 12-93 through Figure 12-96. The primary pressure 
(Figure 12-93), primary temperature (Figure 12-95)! and Brayton power (Figure 12-96) graphs are 
expanded with a shorter time scale. The primary temperatures plotted represent the TRACE results 
in the common hot and cold leg piping (outside the reactor vessel). As in the actual plant, loop 
temperature is not a reliable indication once primary flow stops. For primary temperature plots, the 
information past 20 to 30 seconds may not be a reliable indication of nearby temperatures. The 
TRACE flow and heat transfer models are not qualified in a zero gravity environment with no forced 
flow. Once primary flow reaches zero the gas coolant temperature information will be highly 
dependent on the exact location in the plant. Without forced flow or gravity based natural convection, 
there will be large gas temperature gradients. The HRS water temperatures shown in Figure 12-94 
are consistent with continued HRS pump operation. No action was taken to stop the HRS pump(s). 
12.4.2.7 Complete Loss of Flow in One HRS Loop (TRACE) 
These transient results are significantly different from those generated with the RELAPS-3D model 
(Section 12.5.2.5), due to the many differences in HRS models. The TRACE model utilizes 
pressurized water as the working fluid, while the RELAP model utilizes NaK. Water requires less 
pumping power than NaK; however, water has a larger film temperature drop. Descriptions of the 
TRACE and RELAP HRS models can be found in Sections 12.4.1.6 and 12.5.1.6. 
The loss of flow in one of two HRS loops was initiated at time zero with the pump speed set to zero. 
Figure 12-97 through Figure 12-1 11 show the results of this transient with no corrective or protective 
action taken by the rest of the system.. As shown in Figure 12-97, the flow in the HRS loop rapidly 
decreases to near zero in about 5 seconds. With the connected Brayton still rotating at the design 
speed of 4712.4 radls (45000 RPM) (Figure 12-98), the gas cooler is still transferring heat into the 
now idle water loop. This causes the temperature (Figure 12-99) and pressure (Figure 12-100) on the 
water side of the gas cooler to increase resulting in boiling, which commences 27 seconds after the 
HRS pump stopped, at pressure of about 8 MPa. From this point on, the pressure rapidly increases, 
surpassing the anticipated maximum pressure of 8.47 MPa (1 .I x steady state pressure), relief 
pressure of 9.32 MPa (1 . I  x maximum pressure), and design pressure of 10.25 MPa ( 4  .I x relief 
pressure) for the HRS water loop taken from Reference 12-12. The relief pressure is the pressure 
that a burst disk in the HRS would rupture in order to prevent a structural failure or water to gas leak 
in the gas cooler which would compromise the connected Brayton loop. See Section 9.6 for additional 
discussion. 
As gas cooler temperatures increase, there is a corresponding increase in compressor inlet 
temperature (Figure t2-101) and a slight decrease in the Brayton loop flow rate (Figure 12-102). 
Since this flow decrease is not sufficient to alleviate boiling in the gas cooler and increasing HRS 
pressure, corrective or protective action must be taken to prevent failure in the gas cooler and 
maintain primary gas loop integrity. To assess system response to potential actions, the complete 
loss of flow in the HRS was conducted with a corrective action initiated by three different indicators 
and two protective actions. 
One corrective action would be to start a spare pump in the HRS loop that has lost flow. This is 
modeled with three different indicators to initiate the spare pump: pressure, temperature, and an 
electrical switch. The temperature sensor is tripped at the temperature that boiling first starts in the 
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gas cooler (569 K) with a 3 second delay until the pump is fully operational. The pressure sensor is 
tripped at a maximum pressure of 8.47 MPa (1 .I x nominal pressure) with a 3 second delay until the 
pump is fully operational. The third case utilizes an electrical switch activated 5 seconds after 
electrical indication of pump 1 shutdown. The two protective cases are instances where a spare 
pump is not available and the connected primary loop needs to be shut down. This is achieved in one 
case by adding a constant load to the alternator of 32 pa*rn3 (maximum allowable alternator torque) 
and in the other case by closing an isolation valve in the Brayton loop. Both these actions are taken 2 
seconds after the pressure in the HRS reaches 8.47 MPa. Figure 12-1 12 through Figure 12-1 20 
show the comparative results for all of these actions. 
All three corrective actions that turn on a spare pump require approximately 600 seconds to return to 
steady state. They all have the same effect on the system, but are initiated at different times due to 
their triggering indicators. As seen in Figure 12-1 12, the corrective action that results in the earliest 
response is the electrical switch, followed by the temperature sensor, and finally the pressure sensor. 
Boiling does occur in the gas cooler for about 10 seconds with the temperature sensor and about 25 
seconds with the pressure sensor (Figure 12-1 14) but not with the electrical switch case. All three 
return back to the same HRS pressure 100 seconds into the transient but continue to decrease to 
slightly different pressures before increasing to a slightly lower steady state pressure (Figure 12-1 12). 
All three maintain HRS pressure below the anticipated relief and design pressures. As seen from the 
results of these cases, turning the second pump on is an effective way of correcting this transient and 
results in little effect on the rest of the plant. 
The two protective cases in which action is taken in the connected Brayton loop have much different 
results from the previously described corrective actions, since they behave more like loss of Brayton 
transients. As seen in Figure 12-1 13, closing an isolation valve occurs at the same time as the 
second pump being turned on with pressure indication. Closing the isolation valve, however, has a 
more gradual effect on reducing temperature and pressure in the HRS resulting in a longer period of 
boiling (Figure 12-1 14) in the gas cooler. The pressure exceeds the maximum pressure but does not 
reach the relief pressure. Although initiated at the same time as closing the isolation valve, the added 
torque load case does not stop flow in the Brayton loop fast enough to prevent pressure in the HRS 
from exceeding the anticipated relief pressure. Reaching this pressure would cause an unrecoverable 
failure in that HRS loop, Initial evaluations of these two protective actions suggest that closing an 
isolation valve in the Brayton loop may be required to protect the gas cooler and keep HRS loop from 
reaching a relief pressure. It is less likely that applying the maximum available alternator torque (load) 
will not stall the Brayton fast,enough to protect the HRS loop from reaching the relief pressure. 
One design strategy to reduce the severity of a loss of HRS flow event is to operate two pumps in 
each loop. With two pumps normally operating, a single equipment failure would result in a partial 
loss of flow transient. A partial loss of HRS flow was evaluated in the TRACE model by reducing the 
operating speed of a single HRS pump. At time zero, the pump in the loop was set at half rotational 
speed (1 78 radiands). The resulting flow rate is about half, delaying boiling in the gas cooler until 67 
seconds after the partial loss of flow. HRS water coolant begins to boil in the partial loss of flow 
transient about 40 seconds after the complete loss of flow started boiling. As seen in Figure 12-121, 
the HRS loop 1 pressure eventually surpasses the relief and design pressures similar to the complete 
loss of HRS flow. It is apparent that the flow rate in the HRS needs to be appropriately controlled to 
prevent failure in the HRS loop. With a more detailed model of the HRS and a better certainty in the 
boiling calculations, it would be important to understand at what flow reduction boiling would occur in 
order to evaluate pump configurations and redundancy. 
The results of all these transients are subject to uncertainties due to the boiling calculations being 
performed in the gas cooler. TRACE boiling correlations are qualified at gravity conditions on earth 
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while these calculations are being run at zero gravity. The behavior of boiling in the gas cooler in zero 
gravity conditions and its effects on heat transfer through the gas cooler need to be further understood 
and developed to best understand the results for this transient and its associated control actions. 
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Table 12-7: Comparison of Design Point and RELAPSSD Model State Points 
Design Point RELAP5-3D 
Location 
Temperature (K) Pressure (kPa) Temperature (K) Pressure (kPa) 
Turbine Inlet 1150 1934 1149 1933 
Recupetator Low Pressure Side 
Exit I 
Gas Coder Inlet I 553 1 101 0 1 565 1 1037 I 
Gas Cooler Exit I 390 I 1000 I 393 I 1028 I 
Compressor lnlet 
~p -~~p - 
Compressor Exit 538 2000 540 2001 
Recuperator High Pressure Side 
Exit 
Gas Cooler NaK Inlet 1 378 1 1 382 I 276 I 
Gas Cooler NaK Exit I 505 I I 52 I 1 273 I 
System Flows ~ e s i &  point (kgls) R E L A P ~ ~ D  FIOW (kg/=) 
Brayton Loop Flow 2.31 2.28 
Alternator Cooling Flow 0.35 (gas) 0.0"' 
Gas Cooler Gas Flow 2.67 2.28 (2' 
Gas Cooler NaK Flow 2.20 2.36 
Misc. 1 Design Point 1 RELAPS-3D 
Reactor Power (- losses) I 789 kWt I 
- 
Reactor (AT) 259 K 255 K 
Reactor APIP,, 2.5% 2.7% 
Turbine PR (AT) 1.89 (228 K) 1.84 (228 K) 
Compressor PR (AT) 2.00 (148 K) 1.95 (147 K) 
Recuperator Effectiveness 92% 93.4% 
Recuperator APlP,,, LP (HP) 1.5% (0. BO/o) 1.46% (1 .O%) 
Gas Cooler Effectiveness 94% 94% 
Gas Cooler Gas aP/P,, I .O% 0.9% 
Radiator Area Applied 407 m2 (not including margin) 447m2 (includes margin) 
Notes: 
(1) Alternator cooling flow was not modeling in REIAP5-3D 
(2) Bleed path was not modeled in RELAPS-3D 
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Table 12-8: Core Concept DSO-470 Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Pressure (MPa) 1.38 
# Safety Rods 1 
Fuel material U02 
Fuel liner material Re 
Clad material MoRe 
Structure (core block) MoRe 
Vessel material Hastelloy X 
[ Number of fuel pins 354 
-- 
Fuel diameter (cm) 1.643 
Fuel height (cm) 66.4 
8 0 L  fuel-to-clad gap (cm) 0.01 6 
I Clad thickness (cm) 0.051 1 
The reactor downcomer annulus surrounding the core block is modeled as a pipe component. Per 
Table 12-8, the downcomer flow area is based on the annulus thickness (0.0254 m) and the core 
block diameter (0.575 m) (Reference 12-15). Therefore, the downcomer flow area is 0.04791 m2 with 
a hydraulic diameter of 0.0508 meters. 
The reactor inlet plenum accepts flow from the downcomer and directs the flow to the fuel pins. The 
reactor outlet plenum accepts flow from each of the fuel pins and directs the flow to the outlet pipe. 
Reactor vessel height (1.335 m) and the fuel pin height (0.93 m) are taken from Reference 12-45 
This leaves roughly 0.2 m on the top and bottom of the core for the inlet and outlet plenum 
respectively. Each plenum is modeled as a 0.2 m tall cylinder with the inlet plenum having the same 
diameter as the downcomer and the outlet plenum having the same diameter as the core block. The 
core block diameter is assumed to be 0.575 m and the downcomer is assumed to be a 0,0254 rn 
annulus around the core block. These dimensions are also from Reference 12-15. Based on these 
assumptions, the inlet plenum cross-sectional area is 0.3076 rn2 with hydraulic diameter of 0.6258 
meters. The outlet plenum cross-sectional area is 0.2597 m2 with a hydraulic diameter equivalent to 
its diameter (0.575 m). The hydraulic diameter for the inlet and outlet plenum is based on the UN fuel 
system core block diameter (0.575 m) which is slightly different than the U02 core block diameter 
(0.496 m). The small difference between these entries has no effect on the transient model. 
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The reactor inlet and outlet plenum is modeled using a REIAPS-3D branch component to allow 
multiple connections to a single hydraulic component in a condensed input form. Form loss 
coefficients for the plenum connections are tuned to create a reactor pressure drop of approximately 
2.5% of the inlet pressure as dictated by Reference 12-1. No exit flow losses are applied at the fuel 
pin exits; however, fonvard and reverse loss factors of 0.408 and 0.665 are applied between the outlet 
plenum and the outlet pipe. 
There are 354 fuel pins in the core and each fuel pin has its own annular coolant channel. Taking into 
account the fuel pin diameter, the gap between fuel and clad, the clad thickness, and coolant channel 
thickness, the coolant annulus has an outer and inner radius of 1.1 575 cm and 0.8885 cm 
respectively. The core fueled region is 0.664 m tall. The 354 fuel channels are modeled as six 
separate flow paths designed to represent radial variation in power although not utilized, since radial 
power variation has not been calculated. The coolant channel in contact with the fueled 'portion of the 
pin is represented with 10 equal height volumes to adequately model axial power profiles (plus space 
in the top volume for fission gas plenum). 
One channel hydraulic diameter is equal to 0.00538 rn, twice the annular thickness. The same 
hydraulic diameter is used for each channel regardless of how many pins it models. This allows the 
hydraulic combination of the fuel pins into lumped components to minimize computational 
requirements while maintaining the correct hydraulic characteristics. 
There are 66 perimeter pins out of the total 354 pins that, because of their similar flux characteristics, 
are represented with one RELAP5-3D fuel channel. The remaining 288 fuel pins were initially divided 
into four coolant channels with 72 pins each. However, one pin was removed from the first channel 
and modeled explicitly as the "hot pin" for detailed thermal calculations leaving one channel with only 
71 pins. The flow areas through each of the five RELAPS-3D fuel channels are based on multiples 
(66, 71, or 72) of the single pin flow area. 
Based on standard empirical approximations, all of the channels have forward and reverse loss 
coefficients of 0.295 and 0.347 respectively between the first and second sub-volumes. 
The core design for the RELAPS-3D model utilizes uranium dioxide (U02) fuel pellets supported inside 
a molybdenum-rhenium (MoRe) cladding sleeve. The fuel pellets and cladding are sized to nominally 
provide a 0.016 cm gap between the fuel and clad to allow for fuel swelling throughout core life. 
However, this gap was not positively maintained and the potential offset and fuel to clad contact was 
taken into account from both a nuclear and thermal limit perspective. Each cladding sleeve also 
includes a 14 cm gas plenum above the fuel in which the fission gases would accumulate. Several 
methods for maintaining this plenum including spring loading were under consideration. The core 
design consists of a cylindrical MoRe core block that would be gun drilled for each of the fuel pins and 
its attending coolant annulus. 
Figure 12-125 depicts the core block for the uranium nitride (UN) fuel design, which uses less fuel 
pins than the U02 fueled core but has the same basic layout. The fuel pins are staggered on a 2.569 
cm triangular pitch. The core block is surrounded by a 2.54 cm dohncomer annulus between the core 
block and the reactor vessel. The vessel is made of Hastelloy X and is 0.5 cm thick. 
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Fission heat is generated in the fuel heat structure using the point kinetics option in RELAP5-3D and 
distributed, along with decay heat, axially over the heat structures using direct entry weighting factors. 
The fuel pins are grouped in a fashion to allow radial power distribution as well; however, no radial 
power shape information was available, so a flat profile is used. The fission heat is divided between 
the six fuel channels including the center channels, the perimeter channels, and the hot channel. The 
heat structure model in RELAPS-3D uses lumped parameters similar to the hydraulic model. This 
enables the combination of the heat structure from many components to couple their heat transfer to a 
similar representation of many channels. 
Another heat structure is used to model the heat connection between each of the six coolant channels 
and the core block. The core block is divided into a hexagonal mesh with the same pitch as the fuel 
pins. Each individual hexagon in the mesh represents an adiabatic mass which can act as either a 
heat sink or source to the coolant channel. The adiabatic assumption is only strictly valid if all fuel 
cells are producing the same amount of heat. However, this assumption should not introduce any 
significant error even when the radial power shape is known and applied. The heat structure uses 
cylindrical geometry, is composed of a single MoRe region, and has an outside radius of 0.19132 cm, 
which is a cylindrical annulus of equivalent cross sectional area to the hexagonal mesh being 
modeled. 
A portion of the core block is coupled to each of the six fuel channels based on the number of pins 
associated with each channel and their location. For the internal channels, the core block mass is 
connected adiabatically to the channel. For the perimeter channels, a portion of the surrounding core 
block is adiabatically connected to the channel as detaiIed in Reference 12-16. The remaining 
perimeter channel core block is modeled as a heat structure connecting the perimeter fuel channels to 
the downcomer. Since the core block extends above the fueled region of the core to encompass the 
fission gas plenum at the top of each fuel element, the top node of each core block heat structure is 
longer than the remaining nodes by 14 cm. The hot channel is a single channel making that 
component slightly different than the rest of the center channels. Since only a portion of the 
surrounding core block is treated as adiabatic for the 66 perimeter channels, their heat transfer area 
and length cannot be calculated as direct ratios of number of channels modeled. 
The RELAPS-3D model simulates the fast gas reactor with a point kinetics model using separable 
feedback terms and standard fission product decay based on the 1979 American Nuclear Society 
standard for *%. Separable feedback maintains the kinetics feedback due to fuel, moderator, and 
structure temperatures separately. 
The reactor plant requires 660 kW to achieve the design point of a reactor gas outlet temperature of 
1150K and a Brayton shaft speed of 45,000 rpm. This is achieved with a HeXe gas mixture of 72% 
He and 28% Xe by mole fraction. Neutron lifetime for the reactor is 1 ps (Reference 12-1 7) and a 
total delayed neutron fraction of 0.006339 (Reference 12-18). Fissions are modeled to produce the 
standard 200 kW, of usable energy. Delayed neutron production for the fast reactor is characterized 
with six delayed neutron precursor groups based on Reference 12-1 8. 
An assumption is made that the reactivity feedback for the reactor is divided evenly between the fuel 
Doppler effect and feedback from the core structural materials. Doppler temperature feedback is a 
function of the square root of the volume average temperature of the volume to which the feedback is 
being applied. The overall temperature feedback is divided between two heat structures: the fuel pin 
structure for Doppler feedback and the core block structure for geometric feedback. Axial feedback 
coefficients are based on power squared weighting of the Doppler term calculated from the tabular 
input, and a geometric coefficient assumed to be half of the total temperature feedback. The 
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Turbine performance is based off of turbine maps which are input into the model as tables of 
efficiency vs. mass flow rate and pressure ratios vs. mass flow rates for given shaft speeds. Pressure 
ratio and efficiency are determined by linear interpolation based on mass flow and shaft speed. For 
shaft speeds and mass flow rates beyond the range of the turbine maps, linear extrapolation is 
performed based on the closest two data points. Additional control variables and trips are then used 
to calculate the form loss coefficient for the turbine at each time step. The turbine maps and 
discussion of the required calculations for off-design performance are provided in Reference 12-8. 
The Brayton system turbine data is summarized below in Table 12-9. A loss coefficient multiplier is 
calculated as the problem runs based on turbine performance maps and provided to the turbine 
component via RELAPS-3D control variables. 
Table 92-9: Brayton Turbine Data 
=Component Name- 
Component Type 
Flow Area (mL) 
Flow Volume (m') 
Hydraulic Diameter (m) 
Junction Area (mL) 
Reynolds Number Independent Forward Flow Energy Loss Coefficient 
Reynolds Number Independent Reverse Flow Energy Loss Coefficient 
The compressor is modeled with either the new RELAPS-3D compressor component or a pump 
component. The RELAPS-3D compressor component is used for all steady state and transient runs 
except for the complete loss of electrical load (overspeed) transient in which the pump component 
was used. The compressor component requires compressor data that covers the range of flow rates 
and shaft speeds that occur during a transient. Since the overspeed transient takes shaft speed well 
beyond the available compressor data, the necessary data extrapolation introduced too much error 
into the calculation and in many cases made the compressor unstable. The pump model, on the other 
hand, is able to calculate performance at the very high shaft speeds, and the pump performance 
curves were extrapolated to the necessary operating points. More compressor data would have been 
required to refine the analysis of the overspeed transient had the design continued. 
For the compressor component, compressor maps are input directly. Pressure ratio and efficiency 
are provided as functions of relative corrected mass flow rate (CFLO) and corrected shaft speed 
(CORSPD). The compressor maps are further described in Reference 12-8. The compressor model 
uses the default junction control flags except no choking model is applied. The compressor 
performance is entirely described by the compressor maps. It was judged that if the choking model 
were used, choked flow might occur distorting the compressor performance. 
Brayton 
Turbine 
0.007854 
0.01 1218 
0.1 
0.007854 
1 
1 
lnertia (kg*mZ) 1 0.068953 
For the pump component, compressor maps are input as pump homologous curve data in the form of 
non-dimensional pump head curves and pump torque curves. The homologous data for the 
compressor does not fall on a single curve as pump parameters normally do. So the data based on 
shaft speed at the design value are used when using the pump component approximation for the 
compressor. There is significant data scatter as shaft speed diverges from the design value. 
Therefore, the compressor component, which provides the ability to explicitly represent the pressure 
Friction Coefficient 
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ratio and efficiency as a function of shaft speed and mass flow rate, is used for transients other than 
overspeed as previously discussed. 
The non-dimensional homologous curves are calculated based on the ratios of four normalized 
compressor parameters: head loss ( h ) ,  torque ( P ) ,  volume flow rate (v), and rotational shaft speed 
(a ). Each normalized quantity is computed by dividing the compressor off-design values by the 
design values. The performance parameters are converted to homologous form with independent 
variables of v/a or d v  and dependent variables of h/a2, h/v2, p/a2, and p/v2. The entire pump 
performance can be characterized with eight input regimes for head and eight for torque based on the 
relative values of a and v. 
The shaft component in RELAPS-3D calculates shaft speed based on balancing the torques applied 
to it. The moment of inertia of the turbomachinery affects the transient response of the shaft speed. 
To control shaft speed, an additional torque is applied to the shaft. The required torque is calculated 
with RElAP5-3D control variables as the transient is run. The additional torque represents the total of 
the electrical load plus any losses in the turbomachinery. This also represents the power added 
during start-up 
The turbine, alternator, and compressor are all connected to one shaft. Thus, these components all 
operate at identical shaft speeds. The shaft speed is determined by a balance of the torques on the 
shaft imposed by the components plus any parasitic losses. The equation for the load balance on the 
shaft is: 
Equation f2-2 I dddt = tr - rc  - r ~  -rp 
Where: TT = turbine torque = T ] ~ ~ A P ~ ~ ~ ~ o  
'ec = compressor torque = mAPclqcpcw 
TA = torque imposed by the alternator 
TP = torque imposed by parasitic losses 
I = shaft moment of inertia 
q~ = turbine efficiency 
m = mass flow rate 
APT= turbine differential pressure 
p~ = average fluid density in the turbine 
o =shaftspeed 
qc = compressor efficiency 
APc= compressor differential pressure 
pc = average fluid density in the compressor 
12.5.1 .4 Gas Cooler 
The RELAPS-3D gas cooler is a counter flow heat exchanger that transfers heat from the HeXe 
working fluid in the Brayton loop to the NaK working fluid in the heat rejection loop. NaK was one of 
the working fluids considered for the heat rejection loop, although water was later selected for Project 
Prometheus. The heat structure utilizes a staggered coupling scheme developed specifically for 
counter flow heat exchangers that is fully described in Reference 12-20. This is accomplished using 
five separate heat structures: a staggered mesh connecting the two components, a gas side end 
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volume heat correction, a NaK side end volume heat correction, a gas side heat balance structure, 
and a NaK side heat balance structure as described in Reference 12-20. 
The model of the gas cooler uses the default volume control flags except for the following: I) the 
vertical stratification model is not used (since not relevant to single phase flow), 2 )  the ORNL ANS 
narrow channel model heat transfer correlation is applied, and 3) wall friction is not computed along 
the direction of flow. The ORNL ANS model provides the best approximation of experimental data for 
the low Prandtl number gas being used and the laminar flow regime. The Nusselt number from the 
ORNL ANS model is adjusted for both compact heat exchanger effects and Reynolds number 
dependency as described in Reference 12-20, Wall friction is not computed in favor of implementing 
fhe Kays and London correlation directly as a Reynolds number dependent form loss coefficient 
option. 
The flow areas and hydraulic diameters are based on sizing studies performed by GRC and 
documented in Reference 12-6. For the gas side of the gas cooler, the relationship between the 
irrecoverable loss factor (K)  and Reynolds number are shown below. The irrecoverable loss factor is 
obtained as a function of Reynolds number per Reference 12-+l0 modified with a constant multiplier of 
4712 in order to match the pressure drops supplied by GRC. 
For both sides of the gas cooler, wall friction is turned off in order to provide direct control over the 
friction calculations. For the NaK side of the gas cooler, the Reynolds number dependent form loss 
coefficient option in RELAPS-3D is used to accurately represent the Kays and London compact heat 
exchanger 111 0-1 9.35 (Reference 12-1 0). The friction factor data is fit to the exponential format 
required by the code resulting in the following relaiion: 
This relation matches the desired friction factors to within +9/-15% over the entire range of data 
(Reynolds numbers of 200 to 4000). However, in order to match the state point pressure drop 
supplied by GRC, the constant (2.085) in the irrecoverable loss factor is increased to 95.56. 
12.5.1.5 Recuperator 
The recuperator uses heat from the turbine exhaust on the recuperator hot side to preheat the gas in 
the recuperator cold side returning to the reactor, increasing cycle efficiency. The hot and cold sides 
of the recuperator are each 20 sub-volume pipes that are coupled via a heat structure. The heat 
structure utilizes a staggered coupling scheme developed specifically for counter flow heat 
exchangers that is fully described in Reference 12-20. Five separate heat structures are used: a 
staggered mesh connecting the two components, a hot side end volume heat correction, a cold side 
end volume heat correction, a hot side heat balance structure, and a cold side heat balance structure 
as described in References 12-20 and 12-5. 
The model of the recuperator uses the defah volume control flags except for the following: 1) the 
vertical stratification model is not used (since not relevant to single phase flow), 2) the ORNL ANS 
narrow channel model heat transfer correlation is applied, and 3) wall friction is not computed along 
the direction of flow. The ORNL ANS model provides the best approximation of experimental data for 
the low Prandtl number gas being used and the laminar flaw regime. The Nusselt number from the . 
ORNL ANS model is adjusted for both compact heat exchanger effects and Reynolds number 
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For the HRS, all ducts have rectilinear cross sections and so the hydraulic diameter is calculated to be 
0.0424 meters. In the calculation of the hydraulic diameter, the cross sectional area of 0.001824 m2 
and the wetted perimeter of 0.172m is based on 4-cm-by -5-cm ducts with a 0.1 cm thick inner sleeve 
(Reference 12-21). All duct lengths are determined from Reference 12-21. 
Motive force for the WRS working fluid is provided by an AMP. All rated pump conditions and 
performance curves are drawn from Reference 12-22. However, the rated torque, flow, and head are 
adjusted so that the pump performance reaches the conditions established in Reference 12-1. The 
ALlP is modeled as a normal canned motor pump because the code lacks a model specific to an 
ALIP. The design point for the ALIP modeled is based on state points developed by GRC (Reference 
12-6). fo r  that design point, the pump conditions are 100 kPa developed pump head while delivering 
24.4 gprn at a temperature of 359K. 
The ALlP characteristics for a range of pumps and conditions are discussed in Reference 12-22. 
Data for a pump whose rated conditions are 18 psi (124 kPa) developed pump head while delivering 
28 gpm at a temperature of 400K are used in the model since this pump is the closest to the 
Reference 12-6 design point conditions. The data is converted to homologous pump curves as 
required for input to the RELAPS-3D pump model. 
The radiator pipe is the structure through which heat is rejected to space. Wall friction is turned off in 
favor of representing the desired friction factor with the Reynolds number dependent form loss 
coefficient option in RELAPS-3D. Idel'chik (Reference 12-23) Section 8-2, paragraph 15, provides an 
empirical relation to determine the friction factor for flow past a bundle of vertically arranged tubes 
uniformly distributed over conduit cross sections. For a duct that is 3.8 cm wide with heat pipes in one a 
row that have 12.5 cm between heat pipe centers and 2.2 cm outside diameters the equation for 
friction factor is: 
friction factor = 1.52((3.8 - 2.2)/(12.5 - 2.2))-'.'(3.8/2.2 - 1 ) -O5  ~ e - * , '  
friction factor = 2.5867 ~ e - ' . ~  
where: S1 = duct width, 3.8 crn, 
dOut = heat pipe outside diameter, 2.2 cm, 
SZ = distance between heat pipe centers, 12.5 cm, 
Re = Reynolds number, and 
z = number of tube rows in parallel in the duct, 1. 
Thus, from above: 
form loss coeficienr = 2.5867 ~ e - ' ~  ( L I D )
where: L = friction length of the sub-volume preceding the junction and 
D = junction diameter. 
Since the radiator sub-volumes are not constant length, the form loss coefficient varies over the length 
of the component. The form loss values were increased to match the pressure drops specified by the 
GRC state point calculations documented in Reference 12-6. , 
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The primary heat structures for the HRS are the radiator panels used to reject the Brayton cycles 
waste heat to space. This is accomplished by building a heat structure that representative of the 
radiator panels and a heat structure that represents space and coupling the two using the RELAP5- 
3D RadiationIConduction Enclosure Model. The heat structure for the radiator panel included 25 
segments that directly corresponded to the 25 fluid volumes used to hydraulically model the 
components. Each of these segments is assigned an emissivity of 0.9 (Reference 12-21). None of 
the segments are coupled together so their internal view factors are set to 0.0. All of the segments 
have an unimpeded "view" of space so each segments view factor to space was set to 1.0. Heat is 
transferred between the radiator panels and space based on their relative temperature differences, 
ernissivity, and the view factor. 
Originally there were two types of heat structures that made up the radiator panels: one to represent 
the titanium heat pipes (Reference 12-21) and one to represent the face sheets. Each heat pipe has 
a 2.4 cm2 cross section with a 1.0 cm inner radius. An equivalent volume cylindrical pipe is used in 
the heat structure to take advantage of the cylindrical geometry option in RELAPS-3D. The NaK 
boundary condition is set to convective. The heat pipe length and corresponding heat transfer area 
vary significantly throughout the panel. The face sheet heat structure has been taken out of this 
model because the Fourier number for the envisioned face sheet is calculated to be 930, which is 
three orders of magnitude too large. As a result, some non-physical results are obtained when the 
face sheet heat structure is included in the model. This thin sheet of carbon does not significantly 
affect the heat transfer rate in the model. Therefore, it is removed from the model and the heat pipes 
are assumed to radiate directly to space. The view factors are adjusted accordingly. 
Another heat structure represents the constant heat sink of space at 200K to which the radiator @ radiates heat through the RadiationIConduction Enclosure Model. The 200K deep space temperature 
is based on Reference 12-2 1. 
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12.5.2 RELAPS-3D Transient Results 
Six different transients were analyzed with RELAPS-3D. Transients based on normal and casualty 
conditions were chosen to evaluate the response of the reactor and define the design space within 
which the reactor and the remainder of the plant would need to perform. Each of those transients is 
discussed in the following.sections. 
12.5.2.1 Mechanical Loss of One Brayton (RELAP5-3D) 
The assumption in this transient is that one of two operating turbines stops suddenly. This is 
represented in the models by instantly disconnecting the turbine from the shaft that drives the 
alternator and compressor. When the turbine is disconnected from the shaft, the compressor and 
alternator coast to a stop. As a result, the flow to the reactbr is reduced by about 50%. Some of the 
flow from the operating Brayton loops would flow backward through the idie Brayton loop if reverse 
flow were not prevented, reducing the reactor flow to less than 50%. Therefore, check valves are 
represented, one in each loop, in the input model. 
Reactor power and core hot spot temperature are plotted for this transient in Figure 12-128 and 
Figure 12-1 29. Core structure and average fuel temperatures must increase to cause the reactor 
power to decrease. As flow decreases, less heat is being removed from the reactor so there is a 
power mismatch resulting in the core heating the fuel, coolant and core structures to higher 
temperatures. The temperature increase in the fuel and core structures is caused purely by reactor 
power and not by hotter coolant, Increased fuel and core structure temperatures cause reactor power 
to decrease. Since the heat up is driven by the fuel, the hot spot temperatures increase significantly 
before reactor power starts to decrease. The reactor power drops by about the same amount as the 
flow through the reactor, to about 50%, due to temperature feedback from the increasing core 
temperatures. 
Figure 12-130 through Figure 12-1 37 show the responses of additional selected parameters during 
the loss of a Brayton. Loop temperatures immediately start to increase. The loop temperatures 
increase because the flow through the core decreases before power starts to decrease, heating the 
gas to a higher outlet temperature. The idle loop cold leg temperature also increases because less 
energy is removed from the gas in the idie loop as indicated in figure 12-134. There is a slight 
increase followed by a reduction in reactor inlet temperature as flow in the idle Brayton loop coasts 
down. This temperature behavior is the result of hotter gas being supplied by the idle loop as it coasts 
down. Initially, the idled loop is supplying enough flow to increase the bulk reactor inlet temperature. 
However, as the idled loop flow decreases and the operating loop flow increases the reactor inlet 
temperature becomes dominated by the colder temperature of the operating loop. The shaft that 
drives the alternator and compressor in the idled loop coasts to a stop in about 30 seconds (Figure 
12-1 33) after which time reactor inlet temperature is completely controlted by the operating loop. 
HRS loop temperature in the affected loop, Figure 12-136, shows hot leg temperature dropping to 
equal cold leg temperature in about 100 seconds. After that, both temperatures decrease because 
there is no longer much energy supptied by the gas in the loop while the radiator is still removing 
energy. 
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12.5.2.2 Complete Loss of Electrical Load for One Brayton (RELAPS-30) 
As stated in Section 12.5.1.3, the turbine, alternator, and compressor are all connected to one shaft 
and operate at identical shaft speeds. The shaft speed is determined by a balance of the torques on 
the shaft imposed by the components plus any parasitic losses, as given by Equation 12-2. If the 
alternator load were suddenly removed there would be a net positive torque on the turbine shaft 
resulting in an increased rotational speed. Note that there is a control system to regulate shaft speed. 
If it is working properly, excess power would be transferred to a PLR by the shaft speed control 
system and the transient successfully averted. This transient assumes a failure in the shaft speed 
control system. 
Figure 12-1 38 through Figure 12-1 47 show the transient response of some selected parameters. At 
the increased shaft speed the turbine removes more energy from the gas coolant as seen in Figure 
12-144 and Figure 12-145. The higher shaft speed causes the compressor to add more energy to the 
fluid. As a result, the compressor exit temperature increases. The resulting difference between the 
two recuperator inlet temperatures (turbine exit and compressor exit) is reduced by about half. That 
temperature difference is directly proportional to the heat transfer rate in the recuperator. Thus the 
recuperator transfers about half as much energy from the hot stream to the cooler stream. The 
reactor inlet temperature is lower as a result, causing reactor power to increase. 
The shaft speed stabilizes at a new higher speed where the compressor and any parasitic loads are 
balanced by the torque produced by the turbine, as shown in Figure 12-143. In order for the shaft to 
stabilize at a new speed, rather than increase indefinitely, the magnitude of the compressor torque 
must approach that of the turbine torque. At higher shaft speeds, both the turbine and compressor 
efficiencies decrease. That tends to reduce the difference in the turbine and compressor torques as 
can be seen from Equation 12-2. In addition, while the temperature and pressure entering the turbine 
are fairly constant, the temperature entering the compressor increases and the pressure decreases 
significantly as shaft speed increases because the turbine reduces pressure more and the recuperator 
removes less energy from the gas that flows toward the compressor. That causes the compressor 
density to decrease which also causes the difference between compressor and turbine torque to 
decrease. 
Figure 12-142 shows that mass flow rate only briefly increases in the affected loop, even though shaft 
speed increases by nearly 40%. The mass flow rate is reduced by the decrease in compressor 
density described above; resulting in essentially the same mass flow rate as before the laad was lost. 
Figure 12-1 38 and Figure 12-139 show reactor power and core hot spot temperature. The power 
peaks at approximately 117% and hot spot temperature increases by about 75K before approaching 
steady state values of around 11 1% power and 60K above the starting temperatures. 
Figure 12-146 and Figure 12-147 show HRS hot and cold leg temperatures. The hotter gas entering 
the gas cooler from the recuperator in the affected loop causes over 100K increase in hot leg 
temperature. The cold leg temperature eventually increases by about 25K. 
12.5.2.3 Positive Reactivity Addition (RELAPSSD) 
Figure 12-148 through Figure 12-157 show the transient response of some selected parameters for 
this transient. It is assumed that the reactivity is instantly increased in the reactor an amount 
equivalent to a 50K increase in temperature. Since the total temperature coefticient of the reactor is - 
0.0021254 $/K (-1.36 x 10'~ 6plK), the reactivity change required to change the temperature by 50 K is 
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$0.10627 (0.00068 6p). Figure 12-151 shows the contributors to reactivity. This transient causes the 
reactor power and temperature to increase initially, and then reactor power decreases somewhat as 
reactor inlet temperature increases in response to the increased reactor outlet temperature. However, 
reactor power does not return back to the initial power because the turbine removes more energy 
from the gas with a higher inlet temperature causing the system power to increase. The power the 
turbine extracts from the fluid is defined by the following equation: 
P = qmAPlp 
where: q = turbine efficiency 
m = fluid mass flow rate 
AP = pressure drop across the turbine 
- 
. P  - average density in the turbine 
For this transient, turbine efficiency, mass flow rate, and pressure drop are essentially constant. 
However, since the turbine inlet temperature increases, the density decreases both at the inlet and 
outlet of the turbine. Thus, the average density decreases by about 4%. This causes the power 
extracted by the turbine to increase by about 4%. At the same time, the torque required to operate 
the compressor is essentially unchanged resulting in an increase in the electric power produced. 
12.5.2.4 Negative Reactivity Addition (RELAP5SD) 
Figure 12-158 through Figure 12-167 show the transient response of some selected parameters for 
this transient. This transient is the opposite of the positive reactivity addition casualty. In this case 
the reactivity is decreased instantaneously by $0.1 0627 (0.00068 6p), as seen in Figure 12-161. 
Figure 12-158 shows that reactor power decreases then recovers somewhat but does not return to 
the initial power level because the turbine produces less power at lower temperature. This is the 
opposite effect as described in the positive reactivity transient previously. The changes in power and 
temperature are approximately equal in magnitude and in the opposite direction of the positive 
reactivity transient. All other parameters are fairly constant. 
12.5.2.5 Complete Loss of Flow in One HRS Loop (RELAPS-3D) 
Figure 12-1 68 through Figure 12-1 77 show the transient response of some selected parameters in 
this transient. This transient assumes the NaK pump stops operating in one loop. The NaK 
temperature increases slightly initialty, as seen in Figure 12-176, causing the HeXe gas temperature 
exiting the gas cooler to get slightly hatter as well Figure 12-174. 
Since the electric load is held constant in this transient, even small decreases in compressor density 
will cause the compressor torque to increase slowing the shaft speed (Equation 12-2). Figure 12-173 
shows the shaft speeds. At slower shaft speeds the turbine produces less power resulting in further 
slowing of the shaft. At about 250 seconds the shaft stops due to the turbine stalling. If action were 
taken to reduce electric loads, the stall of the turbine could have been delayed. 
Figure 12-178 through Figure 12-186 show the transient response of some selected parameters 
during this scenario. The start-up transient is contingent on the assumptions made. For the start-up 
analyzed here it was assumed that the fluids all start at 400 K and the reactor is critical at the point of 
adding heat, 1% (8 kWJ power. During start-up the HRS would be operated at reduced capacity, 
since it would overwhelm heat added to increase plant temperature. That is represented in this model 
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by holding the heat sink for the radiator (space) at 400K. Once operating temperature and shaft 
speed are reached, normal HRS capacity is restored in this model by reducing the radiator heat sink 
temperature to 200K. Although this is a non-physical method, the effect on the HRS is similar. 
It is assumed that both turbines are initially motored at 25% shaft speed (1 1,250 rpm) to preclude 
damage to turbine bearings. The sliders are moved as required to heat the reactor outlet temperature 
to 1150 K in 2.5 hours (300 Klhr). In parallel, the motor speed of one turbine is increased at 13,500 
rpm per hour until it is self-sustaining (the turbine torque exceeds compressor torque), then shaft 
speed is allowed to be dictated by the turbine and compressor torques until it reaches 45,000 rprn. 
Slider motion is simulated by moving the sliders at 0.5 cmlminute for 8 seconds then holding for 100 
seconds. After the hold period the slider motion process is repeated if required in order to maintain 
reactor outlet temperature within 1 K of the heat up goal. 
During the first 2.5 hours the reactor power increases to about 40% (Figure 12-178) and reactor outlet 
temperature increases to I 1  50 K (Figure 12-179), while shaft speed of the first Brayton increases to 
normal speed (Figure 12-182). After 2.5 hours the motor speed of the second turbine is increased at 
13,500 rpm per hour until it is self-sustaining. At that point, since the temperature entering the 
Brayton loop is at 1150 K, the shaft speed quickly increases to the steady state speed of 45,000 rpm. 
The combination of increased coolant flow rate resulting from the second Brayton loop and the colder 
gas entering the reactor causes reactor power to peak at between 100% and then level off at around 
83% power. Since the HRS capacity is reduced, the power does not reach 100%. Once normal HRS 
capacity is restored at about 5.4 hours, reactor power increases to 100%. 
The oscillation in reactor power during heat-up is caused by the automatic slider motion described 
above. The reactivity caused by the slider motion is shown in Figure 12-180. The plant response to 
the slider motion causes the power oscillations. A person controlling the slider motion may be able to 
make the heat-up smoother. Adjustments to the timing for slider motion and holding the slider could 
also eliminate or reduce this oscillation. 
This transient demonstrates the approximate response of this notional stalt-up and indicates that it is 
not an excessively severe transient. More careful control plus use of the shaft speed controller even 
after self-sustaining turbine conditions are reached could make the start-up even less severe. It is 
expected that start-up would occur over a much longer period which would reduce any power 
overshoot. The shaft speed would not likely increase simuitaneously with temperature. Shaft speed 
and temperature would be increased alternately. The second loop would need to be brought up to 
speed before any temperature limits are violated in the loop components, which may require starting 
the loop before the first one reaches normal operating conditions. The electrical power required to 
motor the shaft indicted is approximately an order of magnitude larger than expected. This is because 
the compressor and turbine maps in the RELAP53D input model had to be extrapolated to perform 
this transient. If the JIM0 program would have continued, compressor and turbine data would have 
been incorporated into the model to cover the range of all transients performed. 
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13 Testing 
13.1 Summary and Conclusions 
A few key observations regarding space nuclear power testing are: 
A minimum level of fundamental research and development must be maintained to 
provide long lead data (e.g., irradiation data, component lifetime, etc.) for space nuclear 
power. 
The NRPCT integrated testing strategy was to use the existing national infrastructure 
(NASA Centers, national DOE labs, etc.) whenever possible to minimize cost and lead 
time, 
The declining nuclear infrastructure in the United States is creating an increased 
challenge for performing nuclear development work in support of space reactors. This 
poses risks to meeting project timing and technical needs. 
This section provides an overview of the Space Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) integrated test 
plans for project Prometheus. While specific test plans were being developed by each 
technical community (e.g., material, physics, reactor safety, etc.), integration of all of these 
individual test plans was coordinated within the power plant organizations at KAPL and 
Bettis. In addition to this responsibility for integration of the various test programs, the power 
plant testing organizations at KAPL and Bettis were directly responsible for establishing the 
internal and external test facilities and programs for reactor plant (including energy 
conversion systems) thermal and hydraulic testing. 
A key strategy in establishing the Prometheus test program was to use the existing national 
infrastructure (i.e., NASA facilities and national DOE labs) to the maximum extent practicable. 
This approach reduced the cost and start-up time necessary to meet the aggressive mission 
milestones originally planned for the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) mission. The Naval 
Reactors Prime Contractor Team (NRPCT) was in the process of reviewing the integrated 
test plan to assess extensibility for a lunar based type of mission at the time of project 
termination; however, no definitive test plans were established. Modifications to the baseline 
test plan were under consideration and they are discussed as appropriate in the specific 
sections. 
At the start of the program, prior to concept down-selection, various reactor concepts 
(including heat pipe and liquid metal reactors) were being testing in parallel. Following 
selection of a direct gas cooled reactor with a Brayton energy conversion system, testing on 
heat pipe and liquid metal reactor concepts was terminated. No testing effort had yet begun 
on Stirling energy conversion systems for Prometheus prior to selection of a Brayton concept. 
Limited bench top testing of thermoelectrics was performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL) and this work was also discontinued as a part of Project Prometheus following concept 
selection. 
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Acronyms used in Figure 13-2 Flowchart 
I ARR 1 ATLO Readiness Review (NGST Terrnl 
1 
ATLO Assembly, Test and Launch Operations 
BPMl Bechtel Plant Machinery, Inc. -Operated by Bechtel Corp. 
BWXT 1 BWX Technologies, Inc. in Lynchburg, VA - The Naval core vendor 
CDBWXT 1 Conceptual Design BWX Technologies, Inc. in Lynchburg, VA - The Naval core vendor 
CDR 1 Critical Design Review (NGST Term) 
DM Develo~ment Model: First-aeneration hardware 
1 " 
E2 E End-to-End 
ECS Energy Conversion System (the Brayton units) 
EM Engineering Model: Second-generation hardware 
EP Electric Propulsion System (ion thrusters) 
ERD 1 Environmental Reauirements Document IJPL document 982-00029) 
1 
FD Final Design 1 
FM Flight Module 
GRC 1 NASA - Glenn Research Center I 
GTR Ground Test Reactor 1 
1 HRS Heat Rejection System (the solar array) 
- .  
INSRP [ interagency ~ u c ~ k a r  safety Review Panel 
JIM0 Ju~iter Icv Moons Orbiter I 
J PL Jet Pro~ulsion Laboratorv 1 
I 1 JSC NASA - Johnson S ~ a c e  Center 
NASA - Kennedy Space Center 
Mission Readiness Review (NGST Term) 
MSFC NASA - Marshall Space Flight Center 
NGST Northrop Grumman Space Technology - The spacecraft contractor 
NRPCT Naval Reactors Prime Contractor Team (Bettis, KAPL and BPMI) 
ORR Operational Readiness Review (NGST Term) 
P1 ~ k n e t h e u s  1- The first flight unit. 
PCD Pre-Conce~tual Desian 
" 
PDR Preliminary Design Review (NGST Term) 
-
PSR Pre-Ship Review (NGST Term) 
QM Qualification Model: Flight design hardware to be tested beyond mission requirements 
RM Reactor Module (RPU + ECSl I 
RMlF Reactor Module Intearation Facilitv I " 
RPU 1 Reactor Power Unit (core, vessel, safety rod, reflectors, shield, CDMs, piping) 
SM Spacecraft Module 
SNPP 1 Space Nuclear Propulsion Plant (RPU + ECS). Terminology is interchangeable w i t k ~ ~  
STM Structural Test Model aka Static Test Model - -~
SVA Shock, Vibration & Acoustic Test 
TTM Thermal Test Model 
ZPC Zero Power Critical test 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 13-8 
This Page Intentionally Blank 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 


Enclosure I to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
6-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 13-1 1 
13.2.1 Overall Assembly, Integration and Test (AIBT) Strategy 
As the designated lead organization for Project Prometheus, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
introduced the use of their "test what you fly, fly what you test" philosophy that had provided them a 
historical success. As the NRPCT testing plans evolved, it became clear that, although this JPL 
approach could be used on a number of components, testing the fueled flight reactor posed 
several problems. First, operating the flight unit reactor at power for any reasonable period of time 
would result in the build-up of a significant fission product inventory which was undesirable both in 
terms of handling requirements and safety concerns under inadvertent re-entry scenarios. 
Second, the NRPCT was unwilling to doubly expose the flight reactor to potentially damaging 
environments (the testing and the mission events). Finally, the large size of the spacecraft, 
combined with a significant quantity of special nuclear material, introduced burdensome logistical 
issues (facility licensing issues, security and safeguards, shipping, etc.) that would not allow 
integrated, fueled flight unit testing to proceed in an affordable, timely manner. Therefore, the 
NRPCT developed an AI&T and ATLO approach involving two paths - nuclear and non-nuclear. 
The paths merge as late in the assembly and test flow as possible to minimize the above concerns. 
The non-nuclear path assumed that the RM would be assembled in a dedicated Reactor Module 
Integration Facility (RMIF). An electrically heated surrogate reactor power unit (RPU) would be 
mated to an energy conversion system (ECS) at this facility to form the RM. The successively 
more prototypical reactor modules would then be used for increasingly more "flight-like" 
development, qualification, and flight test programs. Since the fuel would not be present at this 
stage of the process, the selection of the location of the RMIF was relatively unrestricted. Also, the 
lack of special nuclear material for these activities would have minimized regulatory actions 
required to initiate construction. 
The nuclear path assumed that the flight reactor and power unit would be assembled at the core 
vendor, shipped off-site for physics testing, and then shipped to the launch site for integration with 
the ECS / spacecraft. Acceptance of the flight reactor itself would rely on the qualification work 
performed on earlier test units rather than on direct full power, simulated space environment 
testing. 
The integrated testing flowchart (Figure 13-2) presents a pictorial description of this approach for 
both the ATLO and earlier test phases. A detailed description of each flowchart step is presented 
below. 
13.2.2 Integrated Test Plan 
13.2.2.1 Non-Nuclear Tests (no fuel) 
13.2.2.1.1 Component Testing 
The ramp-up of Project Prometheus was to be dominated by a variety of individual component 
development tests, as summarized in the Space Reactor Program Test Index submitted in 
Reference 13-1 and included as Table 13-4. They are shown here only as a visual reminder of the 
component work required prior to integrated testing. 
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The purpose of the component tests was to: 
r gather basic material property information 
test materials and components at prototypic operating conditions 
investigate fabrication and assembly approaches 
r validate predictive models 
validate and refine designs 
13.2.2.1.2 Energy Conversion System Thermal Test Model (ECS-TTM) 
This test was to provide an early demonstration that the electric propulsion system (ion thrusters) 
can actually be driven from a direct gas Brayton engine. The ECS-TTM was to be performed at 
Glenn Research Center (GRC), since they had both the lead for ion propulsion technology 
development and expertise on space energy conversion. A successful test at this early stage 
would help demonstrate the project's technical feasibility to stakeholders. The energy conversion 
hardware was to be based on the NRPCT pre-conceptual design planned for October 2005. The 
NGST supplied components were to be based on a first-generation development design. 
The test components were to include: 
a heat source capable of generating one-half the design reactor power (100 kW,). The heat 
source could be electric or gas and was not intended to be prototypical for this test. 
r a single Brayton energy conversion unit 
a quarter-scale heat rejection system 
an ion thruster 
The objectives of the test were to: 
r demonstrate that thrust could be achieved using a gas driven Brayton unit 
characterize system response to normal / abnormal operating transients 
assess recuperator and gas cooler performance 
demonstrate gas loop fill and leak check procedures 
a' verify material strength and dimensions after exposure to temperature 
test I&C sensors and the software control package 
obtain test data to support plant model quatification 
13.2.2.1.3 Reactor Module Thermal Test Model (RM-TTM) 
The RM-TTM was to be the initial test of the integrated reactor module (electrically heated power 
unit rnockup + limited energy conversion system). It is the reactor counterpart to the energy 
conversion system thermal test model test. The RM-TTM test article would use "state-of- 
development'' components (prototypic where possible) based on the NRPCT pre-conceptual 
design. This testing was planned for Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) since they were 
leading the reactor development (non-nuclear) testing for NRPCT and had experience working on 
electric mockups of space reactor designs with Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. 
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The test components were to include: 
a one-half scale electrically heated reactor power unit (core, vessel, piping) 
a single Brayton energy conversion unit (development model generation) 
a simulated Heat Rejection System (HRS) to dump excess heat 
The objectives of the test were to: 
validate electric heater element design for reactor simulation 
obtain pressure drop and flow distribution data for validation of analytical models 
characterize system response to controlled startup and loss-of-flow transient behaviors 
verify material strength and dimensions after exposure to temperature 
verify structural design margins 
validate computational fluid dynamics predictions 
It is important to note that as the mission requirements changed, launch dates moved out in time 
and funding reductions for the first several years of the project were anticipated. At the time of 
project cancellation, a strategy to combine the EC-TTM and RM-TTM into a common test platform 
(called TTM) was initiated by the NRPCT. This approach would have reduced costs and enabled a 
comprehensive, system level demonstration of the proposed design to be built and tested relatively 
quickly. 
13.2.2.1.4 Reactor Power Unit Shock, Vibration, and Acoustic Test (RPU-SVA) 
This test was to qualify the reactor for launch and mission loads. The reactor power unit was to be 
based on the NRPCT conceptual design. 
The test components were to include: 
reactor core with surrogate fuel pellets of prototypic shape and mass 
reactor vessel 
reflectors (surrogate material of appropriate size and mass) 
safety rods - use of safety rods in this test was undecided at time of project termination 
The objective of the test was to demonstrate that the reactor internals are not damaged when 
subjected to the vibration, shock and acoustic loads of launch and mission events. Although all 
components would have been evaluated for damage, the focus of the test was on the fuel pellets 
and reactor internals. 
The core, vessel, and reflectors were to be re-used in the subsequent reactor module shock, 
vibration, and acoustic test (RM-SVA). Also, the power unit was to be fabricated in the core 
manufacturing facility using prototypic fabrication processes as part of manufacturing development. 
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13.2.2.1.5 Reactor Module Shock, Vibration, and Acoustic Test (RM-SVA) 
This test was to qualify the integrated reactor module design for shipping, launch, and mission 
loads. The reactor module design was to be based on the NRPCT conceptual design. 
The test components were to include the reactor power unit items described above, plus the 
following: 
coolant piping 
radiation shield 
reflector drive motors 
a full quantity of Brayton energy conversion units (development model generation) 
aeroshell - use of the aeroshell in this test was undecided at time of project termination 
The objective of the test was to demonstrate that the reactor module met mission functional 
requirements after being subjected to the limiting shock, vibration and acoustic loads of shipping, 
launch and mission events. 
It is noted that: 
The reactor power unit was to be re-used for reactor safety impact testing. 
The ECS was to be re-used as a mass mockup for the structural test model (STM). 
The RPU test unit was to be fabricated in the core manufacturing facility using prototypic 
fabrication processes as part of manufacturing development. 
13.2.2.1.6 Impact Testing 
This test was to help qualify the safety basis for the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel 
(INSRP). The reactor power unit was to be the unit previously used in the RM-SVA test and was 
based on the NRPCT conceptual design. It contains non-hazardous surrogate fuel, reflector, and 
radiation shield materials. Testing was to include a series of drop tests from successively higher 
levels, culminating in a "rocket sled" test to simulate the impact from re-entry or an aborted launch, 
The test results were to be evaluated for impact resilience and to characterize the deformation. 
l3.2.2.l.7 Engineering Model (EM) 
The engineering model was to be the first full-scale demonstration of the integrated power plant 
system, and was to make maximum use of prototypic materials and components. The reactor 
module was to be based on the NRPCT conceptual design, while the spacecraft module 
components were to be based on the NGST preliminary design review. 
The test components were to include: 
a full scale, electrically heated reactor power unit 
a full quantity of ECS units (quantity yet to be determined) 
I 
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- 
a suite of I&C instruments, sensors, and control software 
* a full-scale heat rejection system (NGST supplied) 
an electrical propulsion system, if available (NGST supplied) 
The test objectives were to: 
simulate reactor startup and full power and transient testing on the integrated system 
evaluate effectiveness of the reactor control software 
validate 1&C system sensing and control methods 
demonstrate reactor feedback behavior and control with a high-fidelity ECS 
demonstrate the level of success of manufacturing and assembly techniques 
resolve transportation and handling issues associated with the assembled spacecraft 
develop procedural guidance for the qualification and flight reactor module tests 
qualify the HRS design (NGST objective) 
It is noted that: 
The purpose of the radiation shield was to provide thermal and radiation protection to the 
components behind the shield. As this EM unit was to be non-nuclear, the radiation function 
of the shield could not be tested. Therefore, as a cost measure, a simulated shield using 
appropriate thermal materials may have been used. 
Due to the large size of the spacecraft, and NGST's desire to qualify the large heat rejection 
system, testing was envisioned to occur at the Plum Brook Station facility or at Johnson 
Space Center (JSC). The transportation and testing logistics of this EM test were not yet 
planned at the time of project termination. 
This RM would be assembled in the reactor module integration facility (RMIF), if available. 
Upon completion of EM testing, the energy conversion system components and possibly I&C 
hardware could be used in the Ground Test Reactor. 
13.2.2.1.8 Structural Test Model (STM) 
This was to be a structural integrity and frequency response test of the spacecraft primary structure 
and was for NGST use only. Test results may have influenced the spacecraft design by showing 
whether additional structural strength was needed at critical acoustic and thrust frequencies. The 
STM would also be used by NGST as a pathfinder model to determine whether the movement, 
handling and processing operations on the full-scale spacecraft fit into the available envelope(s). 
The reactor module components need only be represented by mockups of approximate shape, 
mass, and center of gravity. However, it was envisioned that the ECS portion of the RM would be 
represented by the full-string ECS previously used in the RM-SVA test since it would be available 
and would save the cost of fabricating mass mockups. 
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I3.2.Z.q .9 Qualification Model (QM) 
The qualification model was to be identical to the flight unit (i.e., uses flight quality hardware) 
except that it would use an electrically heated core mockup. The reactor module was to be based 
on the NRPCT final design, while the spacecraft module was to be based on the NGST critical 
design review (final design). The QM test would drive components to qualification level 
environmental testing, which would exceed mission requirements. 
Test components were to include: 
an electrically heated reactor power unit 
a full quantity of ECS units (quantity yet to be determined) 
a suite of I&C instruments, sensors and control software 
0 a heat rejection system (re-used EM HRS) 
an electricat propulsion system, if needed (undetermined at time of project termination) 
The test objectives were to: 
qualify the reactor module design (validate adequate design margin) 
demonstrate end-to-end mission operations capability 
rehearse assembly and pre-launch processing procedures 
It is noted that: 
Thermal-vacuum testing of the QM would serve as the certification for the subsequent flight 
reactor. This was due to the risk associated with subjecting the flight reactor to 
environmental contaminants during the thermal-vacuum test with no subsequent means to 
verify the absence of material degradation. 
Upon completion of QM testing, the RPU was available for coupling to the flight ECS / 
spacecraft module assembly. This assembly was to be used to support ATLO testing of the 
spacecraft and mission modules. 
This RM would be assembled in the reactor module integration facility. 
f 3.2.2.2 Nuclear Tests 
13.2.2.2.1 Cold Physics Test 
This test would assess the adequacy of the physics design tools in calculating the cold physics 
characteristics for fuel configurations approximating the Prometheus reactor design. The test was 
to consist of a full-size fuel assembly with test specimens approximating the reactor geometric 
arrangement (fuel, structural, reflector, and poison material) and actual core loadings. 
Measurements were to include reflector critical configurations, reflector worth, safety rod worth, 
and neutron flux distributions. The test facility site was undetermined at the time of project 
cancellation. The cold physics testing is discussed in more detail in the Space Reactor Pre- 
Conceptual Report (Reference 13-28) under Mock-up Tests. 
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13.2.2.2.2 Hot Physics Test 
This test would assess the adequacy of the physics design tools in calculating the cold and hot 
physics characteristics of a manufactured Prometheus reactor, including the reactivity effects of 
core geometry changes as the reactor was heated from cold to normal operating temperature. 
Testing would have been performed at the Ground Test Reactor (GTR) site. Measurements were 
to include reflector critical configurations and differential worth as a function of temperature, static 
temperature coefficients of reactivity, and cold-to-hot temperature reactivity effect. If suitable, this 
core was to be used for the GTR. 
f3.2.2.2.3 Ground Test Reactor (GTR) 
The GTR is a comprehensive, nuclear, integrated test program (cold and hot, low and high power, 
and transients) to support mission assurance for PI. The GTR reactor module was to have been 
identical to the P I  core, subject to the terrestrial physics and regulatory requirements unique to 
ground testing (if suitable, the unit used for hot physics testing was to be re-used). Measurements 
were to include reflector critical positions and reactivity worth as a function of temperature, safety 
rod worth, static temperature coefficients of reactivity, power reactivity, kinetics parameters, 
transient response characteristics, nuclear detector response and neutron flux spatial distributions. 
Progress on the Ground Test Reactor Facility (GTRF) at the time of project termination is 
documented in Reference 13-22. 
The test objectives were to: 
assess adequacy of physics design tools and dynamic response-models in calculating 
physics characteristics and transient response of the reactor in the integrated plant 
assess the adequacy of procedures for reactor startup and plant transients (e.g., shimming 
to maintain temperature control, switching to coast mode, switching Brayton engine lineup, 
etc.) 
perform tong term periodic testing to enable assessment of the lifetime trends of physics 
characteristics in advance of the flight unit cores 
The GTR was to use reactor power unit components recovered from the EM test, as well as the 
EM full-string Brayton ECS. 
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13.2.2.3 Flight Unit ATLO Flow 
A notional flight reactor flowchart is depicted in Figure 13-3. The NRPCT defined ATLO to begin 
with the assembly operations for the Prometheus flight unit. Fabrication of the fueled reactor 
power unit at the core manufacturing vendor would proceed in parallel with assembly of the 
unfueled reactor module at the RMIF. Appropriate acceptance testing was to be performed on 
each of these two segments. The two segments were then to be mated at the launch site, 
followed by the necessary fit, function, and performance testing. 
13.2.2.3.1 Fabricate Reactor Power Unit (fueled) 
Fabrication of the reactor core and fueled power unit were assumed to take place at a qualified 
nuclear core manufacturer. A variety of options were considered as to how to best incorporate a 
fueled reactor core into the flight reactor module (RPU + ECS). The baseline assumption 
incorporated into the testing flowchart was that the core vendor would fabricate a complete flight 
power unit (core, vessel, safety rod, reflectors, shield, reflector drive motors, and piping). Only 
basic functional testing would be performed at the core vendor - a mechanical check of slider 
motion, mechanical and electrical interface checks, instrument calibrations, and a check of mass 
properties. The completed flight power unit would be shipped to the GTRF for physics testing. 
13.2.2.3.2 Physics Tests of Reactor Power Unit (fueled) 
The completed flight power unit was to be received from the core vendor. Zero-power physics 
tests were to be performed to confirm that no significant manufacturing errors exist, and to obtain 
an initial physics characterization of the reactor. Measurements include reflector critical positions, 
differential and integral worth of reflectors, and integral worth of safety rod. 
Upon completion of testing, the unit is stored at the GTRF to allow any activation products created 
by the physics testing to decay to a manageable level, and to minimize the amount of logistical 
support time required to safeguard special nuclear material at the launch site. 
13.2.2.3.3 Fabricate Reactor Module (no fuel) 
The reactor module integration facility was to be responsible for assembly, integration, and testing 
of the non-fueled reactor modules. Under the baseline assumption for the P I  flight unit, the RMlF 
would assemble the flight ECS from the supplied parts (Braytons, recuperators, gas coolers, 
support cage, etc.), bend and attach (weld) the coolant piping, and attach the supplied QM 
electrically heated reactor power unit. Only very basic functional testing would be performed at 
the RMlF (e.g., system integrity verification, mechanical and electrical operational and interface 
checks, instrument calibrations, and a check of mass properties). This completed "flightJ1 reactor 
module would be shipped to NGST for integration with the flight spacecraft, and then to Johnson 
Space Center or Plum Brook Station for environmental testing to acceptance levels. 
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13.2.2.3.4 Integrate & Acceptance Test RM I Spacecraft (no fuel) 
The electrically heated "flight" reactor module was to be received by NGST and integrated into the 
flight spacecraft along with the scientific mission module. NGST would then subject the flight 
spacecraft to the mechanical, thermal, and electro-magnetic environmental tests required by the 
JPL Environmental Requirements Document (ERD). This testing was to occur at both the NGST 
integration facility and at an off-site thermal-vacuum facility (JSC or Plum Brook). The early 
preference was for JSC due to more favorable transportation logistics with a spacecraft of this size 
and mass. The flight spacecraft would then be shipped to Kennedy Space Center (KSC -the 
envisioned launch facility) to be mated with the fueled reactor module. 
13.2.2.3.5 Mate Fueled RPU with RM I Spacecraft 
The acceptance tested spacecraft and the certified fueled reactor module were to be received by 
KSC. The electrically heated power unit was to be replaced with the fueled power unit. Cutting 
and seal welding these joints was considered a critical, complex task, requiring extensive 
preparation and training. The HeXe coolant is purified, loaded, and sealed into the RM. Final 
functional, electrical, and software checks were to be performed. A preference existed to perform 
slider motion checks and zero-power critical tests at KSC prior to launch if this is appropriate from 
a regulatory standpoint (this issue had not been resolved at the time of project termination). The 
assembled spacecraft was to be mated to the launch vehicle and prepared for launch. 
Launch Facility - KSC performed a conceptual study to inventory and evaluate existing facilities at 
both KSC and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) for suitability to support the Project 
Prometheus spacecraft processing operations (Reference 13-21). The objective of the study also 
included the conceptual requirements and possible locations for a new spacecraft processing 
facility if no existing facilities were viable candidates. This study determined that no existing 
buildings were suitable and provided a recommendation for a new four-building facility. 
The buildings were to include: 
a spacecraft processing facility large enough to accommodate an unfurled JIM0 spacecraft 
a power unit processing facility to house the reactor prior to integration with the spacecraft 
a ground support equipment storage building 
an operations office building 
Although the conceptual study was conducted with minimal input from the NRPCT, KSC 
recognized that the scope of requirements that would be invoked by NR, to support the presence 
of a nuclear reactor, would need to be developed and assessed for compatibility with existing 
KSCICCAFS requirements. These requirements were expected to dictate some of the design 
attributes of the facility, and as such, they factored into the early phase of the spacecraft 
processing facility plan. 
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13.2.3 Drivers I Issues 
13.2.3.1 Definition of  the Power Unit 
One of the major aspects of the assembly and testing flow process that needed to be resolved was 
the definition of the power unit and the extent of reactor module assembly to be performed at the 
launch site. As discussed below, criticality safety questions still needed to be answered and trade 
studies had yet to be performed. 
13.2.3.1 .I Scope of Power Unit vs. Licensing Requirements 
A concern existed regarding the extent to which the power unit could be assembled at a core 
vendor facility within the existing regulatory framework (10CFR70 license from the NRC). 
Consequently, a core vendor was requested to provide an assessment of the potential impact on 
the existing facility licensing requirements imposed by nuclear operations involving the fabrication, 
assembly, and limited pre-operational functional testing of a space reactor. 
In Reference 13-25, BWX Technologies (BWXT) provided a reactor core and reactor module 
assembly sequence that ensured the system remained within the nuclear criticality safety license 
requirements during all phases of manufacture and test, including postulated accident conditions. 
This information had not been submitted to NR nor factored into the assembly and testing flow 
process at the time of project cancellation. 
13.2.3.1.2 Reactor Module Configuration Control after Zero Power Critical Testing 
Ideally, the reactor power unit would not be disassembled following zero power critical testing. 
However, issues needed to be resolved regarding the configuration of the power unit during 
shipping which may have necessitated power unit disassembly. The open questions involved the 
criticality safety aspects of shipping the core with the reflectors installed and the cost of shipping 
containers large enough to accommodate the additional hardware required to maintain reactor-to- 
reflector relative positioning. 
13.2.3.2 Extent of Reactor Module Subjected to Testing 
An electrically heated surrogate power unit (referred to as the "QM" reactor power unit) would be 
initially installed in the flight unit reactor module to support testing and then replaced by a fueled 
power unit. Related to the above question regarding the scope of the power unit was the question 
of how much of the RM would be replaced during the launch site fueling operation. A range of 
options were being considered from as little as a "core cartridge" to replacing everything from the 
ECS and forward (See Figure 13-4). The former option was attractive from the JPL "fly as you 
test, test as you fly" perspective but posed problems for reactor design and manufacturing and did 
not alleviate the configuration concerns discussed above. The latter option minimized the extent 
of the RM that would undergo flight testing and did not lessen the shipping container concerns but 
did alleviate the configuration concerns. The baseline case chosen for PMSR was the power unit 
(core, vessel, reflectors and some piping) without the shield. However, this was far from final and 
trade studies were to be performed for this issue, preferably early in the design cycle so that the 
disassembly logistics could be factored into plant arrangements studies. 
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I 13.4 NRPCT Component Development and.lntegrated Test Plan 
The Project Prometheus space reactor program required an extensive number of test programs for 
development and qualification of the reactor plant design. To track these test programs and 
monitor their progress towards qualification and delivery of the flight space reactor, a single, 
comprehensive test index was constructed. This index included all the technical disciplines (i.e., 
materials, plant, safety, I&C, etc.) required to deliver the final flight unit. 
The NRPCT submitted the test index to Naval Reactors for approval of the format and content 
only, via Reference 13-1. Technical and funding approval of individual tests would be requested 
separately, as needed, to support specific Project Prometheus development and qualification 
efforts. 
Table 13-4 provides the final version of the space reactor program test index. It incorporates NR 
comments provided in Reference 13-2, as well as NRPCT-initiated revisions made since the 
. original document was issued. At the time of project termination, most of the test programs were 
still in the conceptual stage. Therefore, the test index should be viewed as a work-in-progress at 
the time of project termination. The index is organized into the following eight sections: 
1. Reactor Component Development Testing (non-nuclear) 
2. Plant Component Development Testing 
3. Materials Development Testing 
4, Instrumentation and Control System Development Testing 
5. Integrated System Testing 
6. Fueled Reactor Testing 
7. Assembly, Test and Launch Operation (ATLO) Testing 
8. Reactor Safety Testing 
Additional background and testing details may be found in the individual test plan documents 
(References 1 3-1, 13-2, 1 3-3, 13-4, 13-5, 13-6, and 13-20). 
Table 13-2 provides additional descriptions of the abbreviated test index column headings. Table 
13-3 provides a test numbering system to uniquely identify and track each of the test programs. 
The system categorizes each test by its key discipline (sections 1-8 shown above), type of test, 
sequential test number, and test location. 
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Table 13-2: Description of Test Index Column Headings 
Column 
Test Program 
Test ID 
Objective 
Lead Test S~onsor 
Test Location & Date 
Test Specification 
Approval and 
Concurrence Authority 
NR Approval of Test 
Resume 
Estimated Cost 
Comments l Design Basis 
- - 
Title of the test program. 
A descriptive test number to uniquely identify each test. 
The serialization format is provided in Table 13-3. 
Self-explanatory. 
The lead NRPCT technical organization. 
Test dates refer to either the test start date or an estimated start 
and completion date. 
The organizations required to concur with and approve each test. 
Concurrence - Agreement with the test concept. 
Approval - Officially allowing the test to proceed. 
Essentially all tests require NR technical and funding approval 
because of the magnitude or significance of the testing (with a few 
exceptions). The typical NRPCT method of obtaining test approval 
is by submittal of a test resume or test proposal. 
The estimated costs for the tests were generally not well 
established. A few rough order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost 
estimates were included for information, but more formal estimates 
are recommended. Detailed cost estimates were to be included in 
the individual test program technical and funding approval 
requests. The ROM includes M&S charges for hardware and 
subcontracts to perform the work, but does not include: 
NRPCT labor costs. 
Facility costs to perform the tests, unless those costs are 
solely for the purpose of performing that specific test. 
Self-explanatory. 
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q3.5 In-House Testing 
A key strategy of the NRPCT test program for the Prometheus project was to use the available, 
national testing infrastructure to the maximum extent practical. This included NASA facilities and 
the national DOE labo~atories as well as subcontractor facilities. The goal was to reduce costs and 
better meet the aggressive schedules originally set for the JIM0 mission. However, limited in- 
house testing was necessary to support the reactor plant design efforts and help guide the larger 
test programs that would be performed at these outside facilities. The ability to rapidly test reactor 
concepts early in the design process and iterate on hardware changes with direct input from the 
Bettis and KAPL experimental communities were key drivers in this decision. In addition, providing 
NRPCT personnel with a first hand understanding of the behavior of these systems was an 
important consideration given NRPCT's general lack of familiarity with the closed Brayton cycle 
(CBC) and gas cooled reactors. 
To effectively use the limited resour'ces available for in-house testing and to avoid duplication of 
work, KAPL and Bettis divided the planned testing areas between the laboratories. Initial small 
scale, bench top testing would be completed by each laboratory, as needed, to support the local 
design organizations. Eventually, Bettis would lead the heated loop.and gas leakage testing efforts 
while KAPL would lead the low temperature and pressure flow visualization testing. 
The facilities and tests planned for in-house testing are described below. A joint KAPUBettis 
recommendation for the near term, in-house test facilities was submitted in Reference 13-5 and 
approved by Naval Reactors in Reference 13-6. 
13.5.1 KAPL In-House Testing 
KAPL's in-house test program for the reactor and plant areas was being performed in two facilities; 
the Fluid Mechanics Laboratory and Experimental Engineering. These facilities, and the work 
performed prior to project termination, are summarized below. 
13.5.1 .I Fluid Mechanics Laboratory 
KAPL's Fluid Mechanics Laboratory specializes in low temperature and pressure rnockups of 
reactor core and reactor plant components to guide design decisions through visualization and a 
fundamental understanding of flow behavior. The lab uses special instrumentation such as laser 
Doppler velocimetry (LDV), particle image velocimetry (PIV), high speed video (HSV), hot film 
anemometry (HFA), and other techniques to qualitatively and quantitatively map the flow field and 
provide information back to the hardware designers. Because of the lack of experience with 
compact gas reactors like the one being designed for Prometheus, this type of fundamental testing 
was considered essential in setting design features early in the process. These low temperature 
tests would provide direction and insight for the high temperature tests to be performed at outside 
facilities such as the NASA centers. Local flow field data would also support ongoing computation 
fluid dynamics (CFD) models of the reactor. Longer term, a prototypic, full scale plastic test of the 
reactor was envisioned to parallel these high temperature test programs to: 1) help diagnose any 
unexpected results during qualification and 2) provide detailed hydraulic data that could not be 
readily obtained in the high temperature test sections (velocities, individual channel flow 
- 
0 distributions, etc.). 
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system (see Section 13.5.2.2 below). In this regard, it provided an opportunity to compare the 
various dab obtained in these facilities under different design and operating conditions. Another 
factor in this selection was that GRC had extensive experience in operating the C30 units and had 
provided Capstone with support on the gas bearing design. 
Two C30 units were purchased for a total of $89,000 which included 1 year of technical support 
from the vendor. The plan was to first operate the unit in accordance with its normal operation to 
gain a basic understanding of the unit and allow the engineers to become trained on operating 
procedures. This would provide limited data since the units are designed for emergency or 
auxiliary power and are generally intended to be turned on and off as needed. Next, the unit would 
be operated outside of its normal operating procedures but within the design of the hardware to 
obtain data on performance and behavior during off-normal and transient conditions. This testing 
would require more direct control of the unit. KAPL was in the process of investigating what types 
of testing would be possible with the Capstone control system. SNL and Barber-Nichols, who ' 
modified the C30 units for SNL's closed loop (Reference 13-8), had extensive experience in this 
regard and were assisting with the NRPCT's understanding the control systems of the unit. Finally, 
the Capstone unit may have been subjected to design basis types of testing such as ingestion of 
debris or over-speeding casualties where a high risk of unit failure would exist. This risk was the 
reason for procurement of two units; one to serve as a backup should failure occur early in the 
testing. 
At the time the project was cancelled, the two C30 units were delivered to KAPLand one unit was 
installed in the TF-139 test chamber. The second unit was stored. Since termination of the 
project, both units were returned to Capstone for a refund. No testing was ever performed with the 
Capstone units at KAPL. 
4 3.5.2 Bettis In-House Testing 
Bettis planned to perform the following in-house testing of reactor and plant components (facility 
upgrades were necessary to accommodate these tests): 
13.5.2.1 Acrylic Vessel Test (R-TH-2B) 
Objective 
The objective was to construct and test a half-scale acrylic model of the gas cooled reactor 
concept to qualitatively assess flow distribution and stability. Areas of interest for flow visualization 
were the inlet nozzle, the inlet plenum, the downcomer, and the lower plenum. Pressure 
measurements were to be taken to estimate the parasitic losses in the reactor inlet regions. The 
model was not a prototypical mock-up of the fueled core geometry. Instead, it included a 
perforated plate that simulated the pressure drop across the fuel region of the reactor. Flow fields 
in the outlet plenum and outlet nozzle were not to be evaluated in this test. 
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Functional Requirements 
The focus of the test was to obtain and observe even flow distributions throughout the specified 
regions of interest. Clear acrylic components were planned for the inlet plenum, downcomer, and 
lower plenum regions to allow flow visualization. The test would attempt to match the targeted 
prototypic Reynolds number of 680,000 (based on a 17.8 crn (7 in) inlet nozzle diameter with a gas 
inlet temperature of 880°K (7 124.6"F), and molecular mixture weight of 31.5 g/mol (.OM45 
Ib,/mol)). Simplified core geometries were to be used to mock-up the resistance of fueled core 
region. To achieve the objectives of the test, the following areas of modularity were to be 
considered: 
Inlet nozzle designs 
o Varying diameters 
o Sharp-edged or tapered geometry 
o Side, top, and angled entry 
o Multiple inlets used simultaneously 
Bottom plenum shapes 
o Hemispherical 
o Elliptical 
o Smooth or finned 
Downcomer width - changing outer or inner diameter 
Upper and lower vent geometries 
Testing and Facility Requirements 
Testing was to include two phases: 
Phase I was to be an air test to obtain baseline qualitative behavior of flow at low Reynolds 
number. Patterns were to be observed with "tell tafes" (sewing thread) within the test section. 
Phase I1 was to be a water test to more easily achieve the prototypic Reynolds number of 
680,000. A flow rate of 0.031 5 m3/s (500 gpm) and operating temperature of 31 1 K (1 00°F). are 
necessary to obtain the value. The test loop was to produce up to 0.0631 m3/s (1000 gpm) 
with a maximum operating pressure of 689.5 k ~ / m ~  (100 psi). The test section design was to 
accommodate temperatures and pressures up to 316K (1 09°F) and 344.75 k ~ / r n *  (50 psi) 
respectively. Flow visualization in the water experiment could be achieved in a variety of 
ways, including the use of polystyrene beads, nitrogen bubble injection, and blue dye injection. 
Pressure was to be monitored during testing at specific locations in the vessel to ensure that 
the model accurately depicted the prototypic conditions. Water temperature measurements 
were to be controlled to ensure the acrylic vessel did not exceed its design conditions 
Test Hardware 
As stated, the main areas of interest were the upper and lower plenums, the downcomer and the 
inlet nozzles. In these specified regions of interest, the hardware would be manufactured from 
acrylic: Figure 13-1 3 shows the test apparatus hardware. There were four separate inlet nozzles 
that could be used to vary the angle of entry into the inlet plenum. Aluminum inserts designed to 
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The loop was required to perform the following transients: 
Operate one Brayton at full power and start up the second Brayton 
With both Brayton engines operating at full power, shut down one Brayton 
To support model benchmarking and operational evaluation, other tests under consideration were: 
a Operate each Brayton at a different steady state speed 
Change the speed of one Brayton while the other Brayton operates at a constant speed 
Change the speed of each Brayton simultaneously 
Safety features on the loop included burst disks for over-pressure protection on the gas side and 
pressure relief valves on the water side. An emergency shutdown could be commanded by the 
user, or triggered automatically in the event a safety device was activated. The emergency 
shutdown would command the turbines to shut down and turn off all heater power. A safety barrier 
to provide noise reduction and to protect against debris (in the event of a catastrophic failure) was 
considered. The requirements for the barrier had not been finalized at the time the project was 
canceled. 
Two areas of concern during the design of the loop were addressed. The first issue involved the 
gas foil thrust bearings on the Brayton engines. The bearings on the C30 were designed for 
steady state operation in ambient air. Because of this, the gas foil thrust bearing had less load 
carrying capacity than prototypic bearings would have. This led to a concern about the ability of 
the DCBL to undergo rapid transient evolutions. Resolution of this issue was to add a monitor to 
the control system to evaluate the thrust load the bearings were carrying and compare the results 
to a maximum allowable thrust load. This monitor would then be used to determine how rapidly 
transient evolutions could occur. The second issue was the potential for a non-operating Brayton 
to experience damaging temperatures while the other Brayton was in operation. It was postulated 
that exposing the aluminum compressor wheel to high'temperature gas would overheat the journal 
bearing coatings through conduction down the turbinelcompressor shaft. Resolution of this issue 
was to place sensors in key locations to ensure temperature limits were not exceeded. If 
temperature limits were approached, the non-operating loop would be started to provide cooling 
flow. 
The contract to design and build the DCBL was awarded to Barber-Nichols, Inc. (BNI) of Arvada, 
CO. BNI had recent experience building a similar single closed Brayton loop for Sandia National 
Laboratories (see Reference 13-8), thus most of the design and development work was already 
completed. BNI was to assemble the loop and perform acceptance testing at their facilities. 
Following acceptance testing, the loop was to be disassembled and shipped to Bettis for 
installation in an on-site test facility. The loop was to be fully operational at Bettis in June 2006. 
Upon project cancellation, this contract was terminated. NASA Glenn Research Center planned to 
initiate a new contract with BNI to complete the DCBL. 
Pre-Decisional - For Planning and Discussion Purposes Only 

Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 / 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 13-64 
Functional Requirements 
The purpose of this test was to determine the gas leakage rates of vendor supplied developmental 
electrical feedthroughs to determine if they met mission requirements. A list of design and test 
requirements are listed below, but a more detailed description of the electrical feedthrough design 
is provided in Section 9. 
During initial discussions with the electrical feedthrough vendor community, the NRPCT learned 
that the vendors were unable to supply production feedthroughs that met every design 
specification. While vendors were capable of meeting individual requirements, the combination of 
specifications involved significant feedthrough engineering efforts. Of particular vendor concern 
was predicting and assuring feedthrough lifetime at the elevated temperature and pressure 
requirements. Therefore, the NRPCT provided design requirements on a "best efforts" basis. 
Vendors were allowed to specify a maintenance-free lifetime rather than design to meet a 
contractually specified limit. Feedthrough performance was evaluated by one metric, the maximum 
gas leakage rate., A comparison of the design and vendor requirements is shown in Table 13-5. 
Table 13-5: Design vs. Vendor I Testing Requirements 
Item Design Vendor 1 ~ e z n g  
Gas composition: 78.4 %v He 1 21.6 %v 100% He 
Xe 
Maximum gas temperature: 500K (440°F) 500K (440°F) 
Bleedf low maximum gas pressure : 4000 kPa (588 p i g )  2000 kPa (-300 psig) 
Maximum permitted gas leakage 1 x l 0 - ~  std ccls 1 x l  o - ~  ~ t d  CCIS 
I rate: I I I 
External vacuum: 1x1 0-l4 torr I XI 0-5 torr 
Housing material: TBD Inconel625 
Maintenance free lifetime: 15 yrs Vendor specified 
Alternator output: 3 phase AC 3 phase AC 
Atternator voltage: 440 Vrms line to line 440 Vrrns line to line 
Alternator power: 100 kWe 100 kWe 
_ Alternator electrical frequency: 2250 Hz 2250 Hz 
Vibratory Loading: Launch loads per JPL Launch toads per JPL 
Testing and Facility Requirements 
Testing was to consist of two phases. Phase 1 was to be vendor development and Phase 2 was to 
be thermal and vibratory validation and gas leakage testing of the feedthroughs. 
Phase 1 was to consist of validation testing of developmental feedthroughs provided by selected 
vendors. Threevendors would be selected based on their ability to design and construct a 
feedthrough that met most requirements. Validation testing was to consist of a random frequency 
vibratory test to simulate launch conditions. The test would be conducted at ambient temperature 
and pressure. Table 13-6 provides the random vibratory frequencies requirements established by 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Environmental Requirements Document (ERD). 
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13.6 Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Testing 
Prior to the concept down-select, the NRPCT was conducting parallel-path investigations of 
several competing reactor module technologies, including liquid metal cooled reactors, heat pipe 
based reactors and gas-Brayton systems. MSFC was tasked with several studies, based on their 
past experience in these areas prior to NRPCT involvement in Project Prometheus. Upon 
selection of the Direct Drive Gas - Brayton system, MSFC work was re-directed to focus on 
selected issues associated with that reactor module concept. The following sections provide a 
summary of the testing, completed and in-progress, performed by MSFC. More detailed 
descriptions of the tests are provided in the referenced MSFC final reports. 
13.6.1 Liquid Metal Reactor 
The purpose of the liquid metal test was to provide NRPCT experience with a lithium liquid metal 
system and to understand the nature of liquid lithium, freerelthaw issues, and operational issues. 
The NRPCT directed MSFC to modify an existing stainless steel sodium/potassium (NaK) circuit to 
allow it to be operated with lithium. Basic circuit components included a simulated reactor segment 
(a 37 pin core block, outer pressure shell, inlet plenum, outlet plenum), lithium to gas heat 
exchanger, electromagnetic (EM) liquid metal pump, loadidrain reservoir, expansion reservoir, 
instrumentation, and trace heaters, as shown in Figure 13-21. Testing was to occur in the Early 
Flight Fission Test Facility (EFF-TF) vacuum chamber described in Section 13.3.2. 
The lithium circuit was modeled using a MSFC developed Generalized Fluid System Simulation 
Program (GFSSP) code. tn order to begin to validate the code with lithium properties and behavior 
(freezelthaw) before the entire loop was assembled and tested, small test programs were 
conducted. The GFSSP analysis results provide the numerical predictions of pressure and 
temperature at various locations in the flow circuit. 
Additional small-scale tests were also conducted to gain familiarity with liquid lithium handling. 
Information gained from these tests include: 
Solid lithium out-gases when melted. 
Wetting can be accomplished at the test temperatures. 
The technique for introducing lithium was verified. 
Thermocouples on the outside of the tubes normalize to the lithium temperature. 
Upon concept down-select to a gas-Brayton system, work on the lithium test loop project was 
cancelled prior to commencement of any loop testing. The test loop circuit was removed from the 
EFF-TF vacuum test chamber and put into storage. The final MSFC close-out report for the lithium 
test loop is provided in Reference 13-9. 
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13.6.3 Gas Reactor 
Upon concept down-selection, MSFC work was re-directed to focus on the following areas 
associated with the Direct Drive Gas - Brayton reactor module concept. 
13.6.3.1 Direct Drive Gas (DDG) Cooled Reactor Testing (P-BRY-2M) 
The purpose of this effort was to focus on reactor core thermal-hydraulics and initial system 
integration issues using a non-nuclear, electrically heated reactor core that accurately simulated a 
direct gas cooled nuclear system. Specific work was to include: steady-state and transient testing, 
and development of dynamic models of the system heater controls to simulate reactivity feedback 
(neutronic response) in a non-nuclear test unit. Data from this testing was needed to guide 
development efforts for gas reactor modeling (i.e., heat transfer and pressure drop correlations). 
The testing was also to provide operational experience with testing a gas reactor at relatively high 
temperatures. The DDG reactor mockup was one previously developed jointly by SNL, tANL, and 
MSFC. Its design, annular flow around pins within a monolithic core block, was one being 
considered for Prometheus. As such, it provided a convenient test bed while more prototypical gas 
reactor mockups were designed and built. The DDG reactor mockup was to be refurbished and 
integrated into the EFF-TF vacuum chamber. 
As this workscope was placed with MSFC only three months prior to project termination, no testing 
had occurred. Planned efforts included: 
Steady-state operation at various system pressures, power levels and flow rates to obtain 
baseline thermallhydraulic data for core design models and comparison to transient 
conditions. Specific issues of interest included the pressure drop and temperature distribution 
with this type of annular design. 
Transient testing to understand reactor thermal-hydraulic performance during normal system 
startup and shutdown, as well as off-normal or casualty conditions (loss of flow, overpower, 
loss of coolant, etc.). lnitiat steady-state and transient testing was to be performed with pure 
nitrogen to validate system integrity and performance but the ability to use pure helium, 
heliumlargon or helium xenon mixture was required to more accurately represent prototypical 
fluid properties. 
Incorporation of a closed Brayton component (a modified Capstone unit) into the MSFC test 
loop. Evaluation was to include: 
o Determination of the test conditions that could be achieved with DDG core and the existing 
system (i.e., pressure, temperature, power, etc.) 
0 Determination of the ability to operate the Brayton unit with HelXe or HelAr working fluid 
Recommendation of modifications to better incorporate a Brayton unit in a closed system. 
An engineering assessment of two options for integration of a Brayton cycle to the existing 
DDG cycle. Option 1 was a Sandia National Laboratories developed closed-loop brayton 
cycle using a modified, commercially available open-loop 30-kW, gas turbine. Option 2 was to 
buy a commercially available Brayton cycle and modify it consistent with the modifications 
performed by Barber-Nichols for the SNL funded unit. Analysis, layout drawings, and cost 
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estimates were to be generated for both options. This assessment was subsequently provided 
in Reference 2 3-1 3. 
incorporation of high-fidelity neutronic models to provide simulated reactivity feedback. This 
approach allows a better understanding of system integration issues, system response times 
and response characteristics, potentially atlowing for design improvements prior to large fiscal 
and staffing investments in a nuclear test program. The implementation of the DDG reactor 
operations was to be on a phased basis as follows (see Reference 13-1 5):  
Phase 1: Initial integration of DDG with feedback control system. This phase was to use 
the DDG in a loop, with a compressor (for flow) and pre-heater located external to test 
chamber. No Brayton engine was to be installed. The purpose of this phase was to 
directly examine core responses (uncoupled and controlled) to various feedback signals. 
Phase 2: Investigation of the DDG start-up, shutdown, and transient responses (nominal 
and off-nominal 1 off-design conditions). System response testing was to be carried out by 
studying the interaction between the DDG and the compressor and pre-heater. 
Phase 3: Incorporation of a Brayton engine into the DDG loop. The Brayton engine was to 
be a closed Capstone unit. The Phase 2 tests would be repeated using this more 
prototypic system. Additional testing included a detailed analysis of the Capstone air 
bearings (using a Glenn Research Center algorithm), an assessment of Capstone turbine 
and compressor for other gas mixtures, and an assessment of how the system would 
respond to changes in applied electrical load. 
Figure 13-23 shows the DDG unit assembly. The DDG unit contained an array of electric heaters 
to simulate fuel pins in 37 annular flow channels located within a solid matrix core (see Figure 
13-24). Figure 13-25 illustrates how the DDG unit would be incorporated into MSFC's EFF-TF 
vacuum facility (Reference 13-1 2). The DDG vessel was capable of operating at the following 
maximum conditions: 0.37 MPa (53 psi), 1144K (1600°F) for up to 1000 hours using nitrogen as 
both the coolant gas and the surrounding ambient environment. Strain gauges were to measure 
thermal deformations at various locations on the unit. Locations were selected to measure growth 
in both radial and axial directions. This data was to be used in the thermal expansion finite 
element model and would eventually be used to provide thermal growth feedback for reactivity 
simulation. Thermocouples within the core block were to ~rovide core tem~erature data in both the 
axial and radial directions. Steady-state and transient thermal and hydraulic gas data were 
required for the specified test points. 
The maximum electrical power that could be generated using nitrogen gas was 24.0 kW,. This 
yielded the estimated test conditions shown in Table 13-8. 
Table 13-8: Estimated DDG Test Conditions 
Turbine Turbine Compressor 
,,p across Maximum Compressor discharge 
Overal t 
in'et Flow rate DDG temp. inlet pressure system (RPM) temp. (kwt) pressure DDG efficiency 
1044 K 0.30 kglsec 1144°K 0.1 Mpa 0.37 Mpa 0.38 MPa 99.4 24,,0% 96'300 (1420°F) (0.66 Iblsec) (1600°F) (14.7 psia) (53 psia) (5.54 psia) 
Thermal and structural analyses showed that the DDG and Brayton systems, when combined, 
could operate at acceptable and satisfactory power levels and temperatures. Although pressure 
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Table 13-9: Nominal Flow Passage Dimensions for the Single Channel Test 
Duct 
AF2 Annular 0.625 0.815 0.767 
Duct 
AF3 Annular 0.625 0.875 0.714 
Duct 
AF4 Annular 0.625 1.25 0.500 
Duct 
13.6.4 Electric Heater Development (R-TH-1 M) 
Operational testing of reactor module concepts and components requires a heat source to simulate 
the heat generated by the nuclear fuel. The focus of this effort was to develop and provide 
electrical heater elements that were as prototypic of the nuclear fuel geometry as practical (i-e., 
matching the performance characteristics of the core, not just the fuel temperatures). The possible 
use of refractory metals for the core design introduced material compatibility and contamination 
concerns, thus necessitating a sealed (sheathed) heating element design to prevent contamination 
of the reactor mockup or other loop components. 
MSFC has extensive test experience with un-sheathed solid graphite heating elements. These 
heaters are robust, dependable, and can be machined to provide an axial power profile, if desired. 
They were the heater-of-choice for the DDG testing effort. A graphite rod is split down the middle 
of its axis, and acts like a large resistor (see Figure 13-29). Power is input at one end of the 
graphite, with the current flowing along one side of the rod and returned along the opposite half. 
Alumina shims inserted within the graphite split prevent contact which would short the heater. 
Additional alumina insulator rings place on the outside diameter of the element electrically isolate 
the heater from the test article. Total operating hours for these simulators (combined time of all 
individual simulators in all tests) was in excess of 20,000 hours and hundreds of thermal cycles 
with no heater rod failures. 
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The alumina mandrel provides the necessary structural strength and electrical insulation while the 
refractory wire wrap provides material compatibility with the core materials. The wires were 
wrapped in either a single pass or double pass fashion around a spiral groove etched along an 
alumina mandrel. Axial power profiling can be more accurately controlled than on solid graphite 
heaters by varying the helical pitch along the axis. The wire materials included rhenium, tantaturn, 
niobium, tungsten, hafnium, and carbon fiber, and testing included both single and braided wires. 
Materials recommended for continued development include tantalum and tungsten braid. All 
successfully ran for over 100 hours at 1200 watts (the acceptance criteria) with no faitures. 
Disadvantages of the aluminahire wrap heaters include assembly difficulties (maintaining a tight 
wrapping of refractory wire around the mandrel), interactions between the alumina and wire, and 
higher material and fabrication costs (at least five times higher). 
Future thermal simulator work was to extend testing on the current materials and assembly 
designs. Recommended work included: 
o incorporation of diagnostic instrumentation within the structure of the heater assembly, and 
within the test chamber 
o development of an automated control system 
o adoption of more rigorous cleaning and chamber preparation procedures 
o conduction of tests in both vacuum and high purity inert gas environments 
o incorporation of a heat removal method to better mimic the assembly boundary conditions in 
the full test article 
o development of advanced thermal simulator designs to better match key performance 
properties of nuclear fuel elements 
Just prior to project termination, the reactor core design requiring smaller diameter fuel pin designs 
was losing favor (although the final decision had not yet been made). In addition, MSFC was 
developing refractory metal sheathing to use on all heater designs, including the solid graphite 
rods. The sheathing isolates any heating element contaminants from the core materials. It was 
believed that the best use of restricted funds may be to re-direct MSFC efforts to return to the 
approach judged most achievable in the short term - development of robust, larger diameter, solid 
graphite heaters, sheathed in refractory metal. 
Reference 13-10 provides a thorough review of the work done by MSFC on heater development 
through March 2005. A final closeout report of this work was provided in Reference 13-19. 
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13.8 Final Perspectives 
Because significant test programs had not yet commenced for the project prior to termination, there 
are few lessons learned regarding testing. However, some general testing perspective gained in 
the sixteen months of the project is warranted. 
"Test as You Fly, Fly as You Test" Philosophy 
NASAlJPL discussed with NRPCT their philosophy of "test as you fly, fly as you test." This was 
based upon significant lessons learned from previous missions and the need to do everything 
practical to exercise the actual flight system on the ground, since repair after launch would not be 
possible. The ideal would be to fully test the complete system on the ground in a prototypical 
manner to provide greater certainty of success and help eliminate unknown issues that may not 
have surfaced in more isolated, separate effects test programs. While this approach makes sense, 
it was recognized and accepted early on that the presence of a nuclear reactor would present 
significant limitations in the ability to meet this principle. All plans formulated assumed that the 
fueled reactor would be integrated with the spacecraft after integrated system testing was 
completed. It would not be feasible to launch a reactor that had run at significant enough power to 
produce a fission product inventory that would make the impact of a reentry accident unacceptable. 
Therefore, truly prototypical integrated testing would never quite be achieved. To address this 
limitation, the test strategy relied upon multiple test programs, including ground test reactors, to 
achieve a similar result. For a mission of this type (i.e., space nuclear power), this will always be a 
challenge. 
Test Early and Often 
A major benefit of the gas Brayton concept was that it was viewed as more "testable" than the 
liquid metal systems. This is particularly true when non-refractory materials are used'for the 
pressure boundary. The need to commence testing early in the program and to continually iterate 
between testing and design was recognized because of the lack of significant experience with the 
reactor plant concepts being considered for space applications. While this issue is related to the 
'test as you fly ..." perspective above, it is different in that it drove the desire for early, fundamental 
testing to gain insight into the design, even when the hardware being tested was not prototypical in 
many ways. The value in early testing using commercially available hardware was not universally 
accepted and a source of much debate. This early, fundamental testing was intended to quickly 
lead to testing of first generation hardware, culminating in testing of final flight hardware. The need 
for 3 key test programs (TTM, EM, and QM) was also debated because of time and cost 
. 
constraints. It was also unclear how much the hardware would evolve between these successive 
designs to warrant new testing. Throughout these debates, the philosophy of testing early and 
often weighed heavily, and the decision to reduce the number of test programs would be only 
made later in the project if confidence was gained to provide adequate mission assurance without 
additional data. 
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United States Nuclear Testing Infrastructure 
The selection of a fast reactor with the possibility of refractory alloy or ceramic core materials led to 
the need for significant nuclear and materials test programs that could not be entirely 
accommodated in the United States because of the decline of nuclear energy research facilities in 
this country since the 1980s. Specifically, no adequate fast flux reactors were available to perform 
fuel and materials irradiation testing. For this reason, the Japanese JOY0 reactor was being 
pursued to perform the key materials irradiation testing. Other options, including Russian reactors 
were also being considered to address the lack of facilities in the United States. However, both of 
these options faced significant risk of not being executed in a timely manner due to political and 
security issues. 
The SNAP programs of the 1960s and 1970s had a significant nuclear testing infrastructure 
available and a great deal of data was obtained during those programs. SP-100 had considerably 
less nuclear testing infrastructure available. This was a significant issue with SP-100 and some 
people familiar with that project considered the expense and difficulty of constructing a ground 
based prototype one reason for the project's cancellation. Project Prometheus had even less 
nuclear testing infrastructure available and as a result, performance of critical and power range 
testing (i-e., ground test reactor) were significant issues to meeting the aggressive project 
milestones. A decision to seriously pursue space nuclear power will require an adequate nuclear 
testing infrastructure to provide key data and longer term research and development support. 
Such an infrastructure will likely rely upon a multinational approach unless nuclear power research 
resumes in earnest in the U.S. However, complete reliance on foreign research reactors will pose 
concerns from a security aspect and will significantly reduce the flexibility in the type and timing of 
testing that can be accomplished. 
Loss of Space Nuclear Power Expertise 
At the start of NR Program participation in the Prometheus program and throughout the sixteen 
months of effort, NRPCT solicited input from a variety of individuals who worked on the SNAP and 
SP-100 space nuclear power programs. In addition, personnel who worked on some of the liquid 
metal and gas reactor programs at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the 1960s and 1970s 
discussed their experience in establishing and running these challenging test programs. These 
individuals provided valuable insight into the successes and failures of these prior programs. 
These personal meetings were particularly beneficial since the documentation of these prior 
programs was not always complete and the first-hand accounts of the work provided greater 
perspective than would be gained simply by reading the formal reports. One observation is that 
this expertise is being lost as the number of the engineers and scientists from the 1960s, 70s and 
80s are declining. The SNAP program of the 1960s had the most direct knowledge of space 
nuclear power, since a significant amount of reactor testing was performed and it is the only US. 
program to actually launch and deploy a space reactor. SP-100, while also a key program in the 
1980s, never performed nuclear testing and never delivered flight hardware, so less direct design 
and testing experience is available from this program. Prometheus accomplished a great deal 
during the short time period it was in existence, but this program matured even less than SP-100 
and no significant testing started prior to its termination, so little testing experience is available from 
this effort. 
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Space nuclear power poses many testing challenges and the ability to use the expertise (and 
infrastructure) from prior programs is a significant enabler to quickly and efficiently meet the many 
needs of such an effort. As pursuit of space nuclear power moves further beyond the peak 
research efforts in the 1960s, delivering space nuclear power becomes increasingly difficult. 
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14 Plant Materials Summary 
14.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Two primary concerns for the Reactor Module are the materials capability and longevity. To address 
these concerns the NRPCT established a plan for materials development efforts that concentrated on 
specific materials and manufacturing issues associated with the Reactor Module focusing on the 
pressure boundary and components within. The plant materials portion of this plan is summarized 
herein. Some general conclusions can be drawn from the research and work that was done to date. 
These are: 
Potential pressure boundary materials identified for Reactor Module use were Ni-base 
superalloys and refractory metal alloys. 
Potential pressure boundary Ni-base superalloys were Nimonic PE-16, Alloy 617 and Alloy 
230. Ni-base alloys have a well-developed commercial fabrication infrastructure, and their 
long-term thermal creep behavior is reasonably well known. 
Niobium, tantalum and molybdenum-base refractory metal alloys were under consideration for 
core and pressure boundary materials due to their high thermal creep resistance (FS-85, 
ASTAR-81 1 C, T-I I I, PWC-11, MoRe, and Ta-IOW). 
Silicon carbide maintains excellent high temperature strength and resistance to creep and 
radiation damage but suffers from difficulty in retaining fission products in its composite form 
and poor ductility in its monolithic form. 
Oxide dispersion strengthened (ODs) materials have promising creep behavior, but were 
eliminated due to very poor weldability. 
Use of refractory metal alloys in conjunction with Ni-base superalloys would possibly require 
the use of coatings to prevent the mass transport of impurities such as carbon from the Ni- 
base materials from being adsorbed by the refractory metal alloys and promoting 
embrittlement. 
Candidate pressure vessel materials of Ni-base and refractory metal alloys are susceptible to 
radiation embrittlement at relevant space reactor conditions. Nuclear grade Ni-base alloys 
and cobalt-base alloys may be viable options, but require testing and development. 
Development of passive methods (e.g., getter) for controlling the oxidation and carburization 
potentials in the Reactor Module working gas may be necessary to maintain the mechanical 
properties of any selected structural materials. 
Titanium was being considered for components up to a temperature of 600 K. 
Austenitic and ferritic 1 martensitic steels were not considered for the pressure vessel as they 
do not have sufficient thermal creep resistance. 
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Reference 14-1 documented a materials assessment for Prometheus that focused on reactor outlet 
temperatures up to 1350 K. The purpose of the assessment was to narrow the number of space 
reactor plant concepts being considered to support the Prometheus SNPP development schedule. In 
February 2005, Naval Reactors Prime Contractor Team (NRPCT) decision teams reviewed the 
compiled technical information and analyses and recommended a gas-cooled reactor with a directly 
coupled Brayton energy conversion system to provide space nuclear power in support of Project 
Promet heus. 
The Reference 14-2 Space Materials Plan was submitted for NR approval which presented a strategy 
that was developed to specifically support the delivery of a direct gas Brayton nuclear power plant 
system for the Prometheus JIM0 mission. In this plan the NRPCT outlined the following approaches: 
- Recommend the most promising materials for all major systems in FY-05 based upon 
limited performance data. 
- Carry fuel system options through irradiation testing, but focus the limited fuel development 
resources and national infrastructure of the effort on a primary candidate system and a 
limited effort on backup approaches. 
- Use modeling and bench-top testing, to close gaps in the data, at a level well beyond 
historical experience. 
- Perform simultaneous separate effects and integrated testing activities. 
- Utilize DOE, NASA, commercial and international infrastructure, experience and expertise. 
The Space Materials Plan was approved with comment by Reference 14-3. 
14.2 Discussion 
While plant material selections were not finalized, the NRPCT worked toward narrowing the list of 
possible materiat systems. The Direct Gas Brayton system uses a common reactor coolant and 
Brayton working fluid where materials selected for the fuel, clad, reactor vessel, core structure, piping, 
and energy conversion equipment will be exposed to the same gas in a recirculating loop. This 
design creates the potential for impurity transfer between the loop materials that can significantly 
impact the mechanical properties of the structural materials in contact with the gas. Reference 14-2 
identified material categories on which work continued until the termination of NRPCT involvement. 
These material categories were chosen based on temperature, anticipated stresses and neutron 
fluence for different portions of the reactor module. Refractory metal alloys and silicon carbide were 
identified for the reactor core, refractory metal alloys and Ni-base superalloys for the reactor vessel 
and hot leg piping (piping between the reactor outlet nozzle and the turbine inlet) and Ni-base 
superalloys for the energy conversion equipment (turbine, piping and coolers). In addition, early work 
with Northrop Grurnman indicated that Ti alloys would be considered for use in the Heat Rejection 
Segment. 
Results from a thermochemical analysis between core and plant structural materials showed a strong 
driving force for the mass transport of impurities, such as carbon, from nickel-base superalloys to 
refractory metal alloys that would promote interstitial embrittlement of the latter. Mitigation of this 
effect may require lower operating temperatures, the development of protective coatings, or the use of 
alternate materials of construction. Further details of this work and the results can be found in 
Reference 14-6. 
High temperatures anticipated for portions of the energy conversion system pushed materials 
selection to Ni-base superalloys for the plant ducting and hot-section components of the 
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turboalternator. All materials exposed to the working fluid gas stream need to be considered as 
possible contributors to environmental degradation of the system, but tower temperature regions in 
the recuperator, aft piping, and gas cooler may allow for other material options. Component 
development programs were in progress with various vendors doing scoping studies and evaluations 
for the turboalternators and heat exchangers with each vendor recommending alloys of construction 
for their specific component. 
Two solid solution strengthened Ni-base alloys (Alloys 617 and 230) and one precipitation hardened 
Ni-base alloy (Nimonic PE-16) were selected for the JOYO (Japanese reactor) test program 
(Reference 14-4). Hastelloy X was also considered for use as a pressure boundary material, as this 
material was investigated in previous space reactor programs. However, it was not included in the 
JOYO testing because of inferior elevated temperature properties compared to Alloys 617 and 230 as 
well as the limited amount of test space in the JOYO fast reactor. 
Diffusion of Helium through Ni-base alloys was considered during the material evaluation process. 
Reference 14-8 discusses the permeability of helium through Ni-base alloys and microcracks and 
concludes that diffusion is not a concern and that well constructed and tested systems would have no 
problems with porosity and microcrack leakage. 
14.3 Material Cases 
The combinations of the candidate pressure boundary and core materials comprised a material 
system. The material systems considered were: 
1. A refractory metal alloy core coupled to a Ni-base superalloy vessel and plant equipment, with 
some titanium plant components (cooler tubing). 
2. A refractory metal alloy core coupled to a refractory metal alloy vessel and Ni-base superalloy 
plant system, with some titanium plant components (cooler tubing). 
3. A refractory metal alloy core coupled to a refractory metal alloy vessel with a refractory metal 
alloy hot plant system and a Silicon Nitride turbine, perhaps with Ni-base superalloy and some 
titanium plant components (cooler tubing) in the cboler parts of the system. 
4. A Sic core coupled to a Ni-base superalloy vessel and plant systems, with some titanium plant 
components (cooler tubing). 
Each of these systems was examined for strengths and weaknesses compared to the other cases, 
These are summarized in the following sections. 
14.3.1 Material Case I - Refractory metal alloy core with Ni-base superalloy vessel 
piping and equipment 
Figure 14-1 shows a representation of the material options for Material Case 1. This case shows the 
refractory metal alloy core completely contained within a Ni-base superalloy vessel. Refractory metal 
alloys suffer from interstitial embrittlement after adsorption of impurities such as oxygen, carbon and 
nitrogen, so precluding their exposure to external environmental conditions was a major goal of the 
NRPCT. Protection of the refractory metal core from both micrometeoroids for the flight unit and 
Earth's atmosphere for the Ground Test Reactor (GTR) is provided by the He-Xe coolant within the 
Ni-base superalloy vessel. However, due to their sensitivity to interstitial impurities likely to be present 
in the coolant, core refractory metal alloy components would likely need to be coated for protection. 
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I 5  Space Structural Design Basis (SSDB) Summary 
15.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The main focus of the SSDB effort prior to project termination had been on the identification of 
potential structural failure modes for the Reactor Module, the development of high level required 
contents of the SSDB, and the establishment of a preliminary SSDB to support component sizing in 
the pre-conceptual design of the Reactor Module, an early milestone of the Prometheus project. 
Based on the experience gained in the SSDB development effort, NRPCT recommends the following 
considerations for future projects. 
A balanced approach among analysis, component or sub-component testing to qualify design 
procedures, and component proof tests should be pursued to ascertain the structural integrity 
of the Reactor Module design. 
Early material testing to characterize structural property degradation due to environmental 
effects such as irradiation, thermal aging, gas corrosion, fission product release, and material 
sublimation in vacuum should be pursued to reduce uncertainty in concept designs. 
Creep-fatigue interaction was not a significant structural concern for the planned flight profile 
of the Prometheus deep space missions with few temperature transients. However, creep- 
fatigue interaction is a very limiting high temperature failure mode that could potentially drive 
the structural design for applications with a wide range of operating transients. This would 
have been assessed for the Ground Test Reactor. 
The Preliminary SSDB was based on high temperature design bases developed for land- 
based nuclear reactors. Structural design methodologies employed in various weightfmass 
critical applications such as aircrafts and space vehicles would have been assessed to explore 
ways to reduce the degree of conservatism in the SSDB. 
115.2 SSDB Scope 
The role of a structural design basis is to provide designers with design procedures, design limits, 
design curves, design data, and design analysis methods to ensure the structural adequacy of a 
design, with margin as deemed appropriate for the intended application. 
The SSDB would cover all Reactor Module structural components, including the reactor vessel, core 
structures, control drive mechanism, plant piping, energy conversion components, shield structure, 
primary support structure, and connection of Reactor Module to the main structure of the spacecraft. 
These components would be subject to various temperature environments, from low temperatures 
where the development of structural design procedures and design analysis methods was quite 
mature, to high temperatures where the effect of creep would be significant and structural design 
bases were less well developed. The structural response of these Reactor Module components could 
be broadly grouped into three regimes: transportation and launch, reactor startup, and operating 
mode. Thus a variety of load sources, e.g., acoustic, vibratory, acceleration, shock, pressure, 
thermal, rotary, micrometeoroid impact, interaction, etc., would need to be considered. 
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The Ground Test Reactor and electrically heated integrated system tests were planned to support the 
design and test of the Reactor Module. Relevant Reactor Module structural components employed in 
these tests would also need to be covered by the SSDB. 
15.3 SSDB Development Strategy 
The high-tier SSDB development strategy was developed in Reference 15- 1. It identified potential 
failure modes and environmental effects that could impact the structural performance of the Reactor 
Module components. Based on a technical assessment of various high temperature structural design 
bases and guidelines for land-based nuclear reactor components, it was concluded in Reference 15- 
1 that no single source of design procedures would fully meet the needs of the Reactor Module 
design. AH of the design codes and guidelines reviewed had some common basis with the ASME 
Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) high temperature code. It was recommended that the ASME 
B&PV high temperature code be used as a foundation for the SSDB. This would be supplemented by 
other existing procedures, either directly or with modifications, as well as NRPCT in-house efforts in 
the development of the SSDB. 
The design methodology for the SSDB would be based on the design-by-analysis approach of the 
ASME B&PV Code, Section 111, Division 1. This means that stress analysis results would be required 
to demonstrate conformance with the design limits. The SSDB was envisioned as a sing!e design 
document that would serve as the repository for structural design procedures, design limits, design 
curves, design data, and design analysis methods that would be required to demonstrate structural 
integrity of the Reactor Module structural components. 
A notional assignment of existing procedures to the potential Reactor Module structural failure modes 
was developed in Reference 15- 1 and is shown in Table 15-1. 
Table 15-1: Notional assignment of existing procedures to structural failure modes 
Structural Failure Mode Load TypelLoad Temp. Procedure (*) 
Duration (%) 
Ductile failures: burst, pure shear Single, short term All NH 
Gross deformation Single, short term All NH 
Incremental collapse (ratcheting) Cyclic L NBINRPCT 
I 
Structural instabilities: column I Single, short term 1 All NH 
buckling, external pressure collapse 1 1 
Ductile void growth failure (tri-axial Single, short term ] AH NH 
stressinglstraining) 
Deformationlfunctional limits Single, short term All NHIN RPCT 
Fatigue Cyclic L NBINRPCT 
Brittle fracture Single, short term L XIINRPCT 
Fatigue crack growth Cyclic L XIINRPCT 
Ductile tearing Single,, short term All RCC-RMINRPCT 
Incremental collapse (ratcheting) Cyclic H NH 
Structural instabilities: column creep Single, long term H NH 
I - buckling, external pressure creep - collaose I I I 
Creep rupture [ Single, long term I H NH I 
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Structural Failure Mode Load TypelLoad Temp. Procedure (*) 
Duration (%) 
Fatigue Cyclic H NH 
Creeplfatigue interaction Cyclic plus long H NH 
term dwell 
Creep crack growth Single, long term H R5INRPCT 
Fatigue crack growth Cyclic H RSlNRPCT 
Creeplfatigue crack growth Cyclic plus long H R5lNRPCT 
term dwell 
Micrometeoroid impact (flight units) Single, short term All SPI OOINRPCT 
Footnotes to Table 15-1 : 
(%) Temperature: High (H), Low (L) or All 
(*) Procedure: 
o NH - ASME B&PV Code, Section Itf, Subsection NH 
o NBINRPCT - NRPCT to modify the ASME BBPV Code Section Ill, Subsection NB procedure and to 
meld it to SSDB 
o XllNRPCT - NRPCT to modify the ASME B&PV Code Section XI procedure and to meld it to SSDB 
o RCC-RMI NRPCT - NRPCT to qualify the French RCC-RM procedure (Design and Construction Rules 
for Mechanical Components of Fast Breeder Reactor Nuclear Islands) and meld it to SSDB 
o NHINRPCT - NH provides the structural deformation limits and NRPCT to specify the functionat 
deformation limits 
o R5lNRPCT - NRPCT to qualify the applicable British R5 procedure (Assessment Procedure for the High 
Temperature Response of Structures) and to meld it to SSDB 
o SP1001NRPCT - NRPCT to qualify the applicable SP100 criteria (Structural Design Criteria for the 
SPIOO Space Reactor Power System) or to develop new procedure, and to meld it to SSDB 
Potential structural performance degradation due to internal and external environmental effects had to 
be accounted for in the Table 15-1 procedures in order to ensure an adequate structural design for 
the Reactor Module. The recognized environmental effects from Reference 15- 1 are summarized in 
- 
Table 15-2. 
Table 15-2: Environmental effects for Reactor Module components 
Environmental Effects Potential Structural Performance 
lmoaci 
Irradiation Reduction in strength, ductility, 
Thermal ageing fracture toughness, ductile tearing 
Material incompatibility due to coolant resistance, creep ductility and creep 
impurities and/or materials transport in life 
the primary coolant loop (gas 
corrosion) 
I Fission D ~ O ~ U C ~  release I 
[ Sublimation of materials in vacuum I Loss of structural strength 
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15.4 Required Contents of SSDB 
The required contents of the SSDB were presented in Reference 15- 2. They were grouped as shown 
Table 15-3: Required Contents of SSDB 
I 
I, Design Requirements and Stress and Deformation Limits 
a. Transportation and Launch 
b. Pressure Boundary Components 
c. Core Support Structures 
d. Metallic Fuel Clad and Bonded Liners (pending on the fuel down-select 
decision) 
e. Support Structures 
2. Material Properties 
3. Design Techniques and Structural Evaluation Methods 
4. High Temperature Inelastic Finite Element Analysis Design Guide 
ltem 1 would correspond to the design requirements and stress and deformation limits. Five parts 
were envisioned for ltem 1. Part a would be related to low temperature design requirements and 
limits to guard against structural failure of the Reactor Module during transportation and launch, and 
structural damage induced during transportation and launch that would affect the structural 
performance of the Reactor Module during subsequent operation. Parts b through d would 
correspond to the high temperature design requirements and limits for pressure boundary 
components, core support structures, and metallic fuel clad and bonded liners, respectively. The 
contents from Part d would only be required if metallic fuel clad with bonded liners were to be chosen 
in the fuel down-selection. Part e was for support structures (shield structure, supports for Reactor 
Module components, primary support structure, and supportslfoundations for the ground test reactor). 
ltem 2 would correspond to the necessary physical properties, design limits, design curves, and 
design data that would be required in ltem 1. It would also include material parameters for inelastic 
constitutive equations that were to be specified in ltem 4 to support inelastic finite element design 
analyses. 
ltem 3 would correspond to design techniques and structural evaluation methods. These would 
include evaluation methods for brittle fracture, ductile tearing, fatigue crack growth, creep crack 
growth, and buckling. 
ltem 4 would correspond to the high temperature finite element analysis design guide. This would 
provide guidance and requirements for acceptable methods, models and assumptions necessary for 
design analyses of Reactor Module components using inelastic finite element methods. Qualified 
inelastic constitutive equations for Reactor Module materials would be provided in ltem 4. Results 
from these design analyses were to be used to demonstrate compliance of the deformation limits of 
Part I. This would be necessary when elastic results fail to meet the screening criteria for the 
deformation limits and more detailed inelastic stress analysis is required. Specification for the 
development of finite element post-processing tools would also be established to streamline the 
structural design process. 
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a 
It was understood in Reference 15- 2 that the required contents of the SSDB were evolving and 
revisions would be made, when needed, in the updates of the SSDB. 
15.5 Preliminary SSDB to Support Pre-conceptual Design 
Many required contents of the SSDB as outiined above were yet to be developed. Reference 15- 2 
contained a preliminary version of the SSDB that provided sufficient guidance for the pre-conceptual 
structural design of the Reactor Module components with a Nickel-base superalloy,' Alloy 617. This 
involved the specification of Alloy 617 primary stress limits that would allow the designers to 
determine the component wall thicknesses and basic dimensions. Inelastic strain limits, buckling 
limits and simplified screening procedure were also provided in the Preliminary SSDB for use in 
component scoping analyses. Although the plant structural materials have not yet been selected, only 
Alloy 617 was included in Reference 15- 2 because all the material property test programs for the 
Prometheus project were only at the initiation stage and no test data were as yet available. NRPCT 
was able to obtain a commercial database on the tensile and creep strength of Alloy 617. 
Subsequent to the issuance of Reference 15- 2, a tensile and creep strength database for another 
Nickel-base superalloy, Haynes 230, was obtained by NRPCT from commercial source. Primary 
stress limits similar to those developed for Alloy 61 7 had been developed in Reference 15- 3 for 
Haynes 230. 
15.6 Future Work 
The primary objective of the Reference 15- 2 Preliminary SSDB was to support component sizing in 
the pre-conceptual design of the Reactor Module, an early milestone of the Prometheus project. Thus 
many of the failure modes identified in Table 15-1 as well as property degradation due to 
environmental effects were not addressed in the Preliminary SSDB. They included ratcheting, creep 
ratcheting, creep instabilities, fatigue, creeplfatigue interaction, brittle fracture, ductile tearing 
instability, fatigue and creeplfatigue crack growth, and micrometeoroid impact. Development of 
design procedures to address these issues in any future space reactor efforts would contribute to Item 
1 - Design Requirements and Stress and Deformation Limits of Table 15-3. Work on the development 
of kerns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 15-3, would also be required so that designers would have the necessary 
design procedures, design methods and design analysis tools to ensure the structural adequacy of a 
successful space reactor power plant design in any future space reactor project. 
15.7 References 
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Extensibility 
P RE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1
6-SE{SPS)-001 
Page 16-2 
(Intentionaily Blank) 
PRE-DECISIONAL -   or planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 16-3 
Extensibility 
Table of Contents 
.................................................................................................................................. 16 Extensibility 5 
16 .I Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................... 5 
16.2 Requirements for Extensibility .......................................................................................... 6 
16.3 Summary of Differences in Other Mission Requirements ................................................. 7 
16.3.1 Extensibility to Other Deep Space Missions ............................................................... 7 
16.3.2 Extensibility to Moon and Mars Surface Missions ......................................................... 8 
16.3.2.1 Power Rating and Lifetime .................................................................................. 9 
16.3.2.2 Environmental Conditions ................................................................................... 10 
................................................................................................... 16.3.2.3 Reactor Safety 11
16.3.2.4 Shielding ....................................... ................................................................ 11 
16.3.2.5 Continuity of Power ............................................................................................. 12 
..................................................................................................................... 16.4 References 12 
List of Figures 
Figure 16-1: Illustration of Possible Deep Space Missions (NASA) ..................................................... 8 
List of Tables 
Table 16-1: Power Rating and Plant Lifetime for JIM0 and a Notional Surface Mission ..................... 9
...,................................ .......... Table 16-2: Environmental Conditions for JIM0 and Lunar Missions .: 10 
PRE-DECISIONAL . For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 16-4 
(Intentionally Blank) 
PRE-DECISIONAL - For planning and discussion purposes only 
Enclosure 1 to 
SPP-67210-0010 1 
B-SE(SPS)-001 
Page 16-5 
16 Extensibility 
16.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The Naval Reactors program was specifically chartered to work on a deep space nuclear power 
system for the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) mission. The requirements for the Deep Space 
Vehicle (which includes the Reactor Module) included multi-mission capability for other civilian deep 
space exploration missions. The high level requirements of the Prometheus project also included that 
the nuclear power technologies developed be "extensible" to MoonIMars surface exploration missions. 
This requirement of extensibility was implemented by NASA through Level 1 and Level 2 
requirements as discussed below. 
Key conclusions are: 
The selection of a gas-cooled reactor directly coupled to a Brayton energy conversion system 
for the JlMO mission provides key technologies that would be extensible to both surface 
missions and other deep space missions. 
Significant system design changes would likely be required to support a manned, surface 
mission compared to an unmanned, deep space mission. 
While extensibility was one of many factors in the reactor concept selection, it did drive 
selecting a system with the potential to avoid refractory materials in the reactor module 
pressure boundary that are not compatible with the surface environment. 
The selection of a direct gas cooted reactor coupled to a Brayton energy conversion system would 
best support the envisioned JlMO mission, as well as be extensible to other deep space missions and 
surface missions on the Moon or Mars. Although some features of the nuclear power plant would 
likely be the same, significant modifications to the heat rejection segment (HRS) and shielding would 
have been required for a manned surface mission vs. a deep space mission. Despite these 
anticipated design changes, the underlying technologies (material development, fuel, etc.) would have 
been extensible to a surface mission. The direct gas Brayton concept remains mass competitive with 
other reactor concepts over a range of powers between 25 kWe and 300 kWe. 
Extensibility was one of many factors that influenced selection of the gas Brayton system. The 
reactor operating temperatures at JlMO power levels are several hundred degrees Kelvin lower in the 
direct gas Brayton system than in liquid metal or heatpipe cooled reactors. The Brayton system 
operating temperature offers the potential to allow using more conventional materials, such as nickel- 
based alloys, for the entire system boundary. Use of refractory materials in the pressure boundary 
could be avoided. While refractory materials may survive the high reactor temperatures in the deep 
vacuum of space, they would not easily endure the Lunar or Martian atmospheres without additional 
protection (vacuum chamber, canning, or coating). At JlMO reactor operating temperatures refractory 
metals are extremely susceptible to property changes, corrosion, and degradation when exposed to 
elements commonly found in a lunar or Mars surface environment , specifically oxygen and carbon. 
Such protection would significantly complicate the design and operation, and would make the deep 
space reactor much less extensible to surface missions. Nickel-base superalloys were primarily being 
considered for the reactor and energy conversion pressure boundary, but no final material selections 
were made at the time of project termination. 
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This section discusses some of the alternative mission requirements and how they differ from the 
deep space requirements in place for the JlMO mission. While some aspects of surface missions 
might make the design easier (lower power, shorter lifetime, available manning for operation or repair, 
possible backup solarlbattery power for restart, etc.), the additional requirements for personnel and 
environmental safety associated with a manned mission would be significant and would require a 
major redesign of the shielding, control system, and potentially the core. 
16.2 Requirements for Extensibility 
Requirements for extensibility were formally included in the overall project requirements. The Level 1 
JlMO Requirements established by NASA included the Development Technology requirements, which 
describe 1) the primary technical goals required to enable a deep space mission, and 2) the mission 
and science requirements, which describe delivery of the space vehicle to the Jovian system and 
operation during the science phase. The Level 1 requirements formed the central starting point for 
development of project requirements and conceptual design efforts. 
The specific Level 1 Development Technology requirement that discussed extensibility to surface 
missions was as follows: 
"The following Space Nuclear Reactor technologies shall be developed for Lunar and Mars 
surface power reactors: I)  Nuclear fuel, 2) Reactor core materials and coolants, and 3) 
instrumentation and Control." (This item was indicated as an objective - minimum requirement 
not yet defined.) 
At the time of project termination, this Level 1 requirement was further incorporated into a Level 2 
requirement: 
Key Level 2 Requirement Impact on Reactor Module Implementation 
The Space Nuclear Reactor Drives selection of design and 1 ~ u s t  consider compatibility of 
design shall utilize technologies materials compatible with Lunar and pressure boundaries and - 
that facilitate extensibility fo Mars missions. external surfaces with surface 
surface operations. environments. 
It would not have been practicable to design a single reactor plant that could work equally well for 
. - 
both deep space and surface missions because or the significantly different requirements and drivers 
for such missions (manning, power level, lifetime, etc.). Such a "generic" reactor would have been a 
significant compromise for either application because of the tight mass constraints and the need to 
only include hardware and functionality required for a specific mission. However, the goal was to 
leverage key technology development so that future missions would require less resources and less 
lead time to deliver a reactor module. Also, depending upon the actual mission requirements, it is 
possible the core design would require few modifications but that is not clear since alternative 
missions were not defined. These general requirements on extensibility were factored into the 
nuclear power plant selection process. 
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16.3 Summary of Differences in Other Mission Requirements 
Extensibility can be broken into two broad categories: 
1. Other deep space, nuclear electric propulsion missions 
2. Surface missions, specifically the Moon and Mars 
NASA was also evaluating missions that require nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) technology. 
However, NTP was never evaluated by the Naval Reactors Prime Contractor Team (NRPCT) as part 
of this project and it would likely require a significantly different design and may require some different 
technologies than the space nuclear power plant designs for electrical power generation. 
16.3.1 Extensibility to Other Deep Space Missions 
Some of the overall Prometheus program requirements already factored in extensibility to other deep 
space missions beyond JIMO. As described in Section 1, some of the Level 2 requirements were 
established specifically for the JIM0 mission and some were multi-mission, meaning that they would 
meet the expected requirements for all the deep space missions for the deep space vehicle. For 
example, a target mission lifetime of 20 years was based upon supporting projected follow-on 
missions, even though the JlMO mission was only expected to last 10 to 12 years. Future missions 
that were studied ~ ~ N A S A  include: 
Saturn and its moons 
Neptune and its moons 
Kuiper Belt rendezvous 
Comet and multi-asteroid sample return 
While these possible mission concepts were only preliminary in scope, they were all estimated to be 
achievable within a 20 year lifetime and the power requirements established for JlMO (i.e., -200 
kWe). Other possible missions such as an "interstellar precursor" to the Heliopause (200 AU from the 
sun) were beyond the 20 year mission life of Prometheus requirements and not truly extensible from 
the JIM0 design. Figure 16-1 illustrates the location of these missions relative to earth. In several 
ways, the JIMO mission was more challenging than other envisioned deep space missions because of 
the high radiation fields around Jupiter and the high propulsion power needed to navigate the gravity 
wells of Jupiter's moons. An initial design lifetime requirement of 15 years was established with the 
idea that a 20 year lifetime might be achievable with operating experience and further technology 
maturation. 
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eliminate refractory materials in the pressure boundary if possible. While there were concerns with 
refractory metals in the pressure boundary for even a deep space mission, the difficulty foreseen in 
such a design for a surface mission became a strong influence in selecting non-refractory pressure 
boundary materials as the initial reference case. 
A comparison of some of the key requirements for the JIM0 mission vs. a notional surface mission is 
provided below. 
16.3.2.1 Power Rating and Lifetime 
The plant power ratings and lifetimes for JIMO and a notional surface mission (Reference 16- 2) are 
shown in Table 16-1. 
Table 16-t: Power Rating and Plant Lifetime for JlMO and a Notional Surface Mission 
I JIM0 Mission I Surface Mission 
In terms of these parameters, the JlMO mission was more limiting and the design could be relatively 
easily extended to a surface mission in terms of power and lifetime. Because of the lower electrical 
power rating for a surface mission, there would be greater design and operational ffexibility in terms of 
the number of Brayton engines and possibly lower operating temperatures for a surface mission. 
Lower operating temperatures could be used to reduce thermal stresses, corrosion and creep if 
needed, but given the relatively short plant life for a surface mission, this may not be a key driver 
unless environmental conditions on the moon significantly shortened material lifetime. Instead, a 
smaller reactor could be designed to reduce mass and still meet the power and lifetime requirements. 
Plant Lifetime (Years) 
Full Power Years 
Electrical Rating (kWe) 
A significant difference for surface missions was the lower required power levels as compared to deep 
space missions. At power levels closer to 25 kWe, some alternatives to the Direct Gas Brayton 
concept (such as the liquid-metal Stirling concept) become more competitive, but they still pose 
issues. Further information about other concepts, their design issues, and trends can be found in 
references (16- 3), (1 6- 4), and (1 6- 5). 
Late in the project, the NRPCT began considering a neutronically moderated gas reactor for a surface 
mission with relatively low power levels. A description of this concept is provided in reference (16- 6). 
The primary motivation for considering a moderated gas reactor was to reduce fuel loading and 
enable use of a commercially based fuel system, which has a better experience base for high 
temperature operation than the notional fuels considered for JIMO. This reactor has considerable 
mechanical and thermal design challenges and would require detailed concept development based on 
firm mission requirements to better judge feasibility. 
10-12 (15 design) 
10 
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There are many other environmental factors for these missions but some key observations are: 
1. Surface missions have significant solar flux available to supply an energy storage 
system for backup power. Deep space missions do not have a similar capability once 
the spacecraft travels much beyond the earth's orbit. This availability of solar power 
provides greater flexibility for a moon or Mars mission in terms of backup power and 
may affect the number of components and operating strategy compared to a deep 
space mission. 
2. The issue of material cleanliness is significantly greater for a lunar mission than a deep 
space mission and makes extensibility more challenging if materials are sensitive to 
this contamination. This was a concern with refractory materials in the pressure 
boundary. This is also a concern relative to coating heat transfer surfaces such as the 
radiator, as well as coating electronics and mechanisms. Similar concerns would exist 
for Mars which has a C02 atmosphere and dusty conditions. 
It is unclear whether the net effect of these differences would make the envisioned lunar mission 
easier or harder to achieve. However, if pressure boundary materials were chosen that could 
withstand the atmospheric conditions on the moon, then the radiation conditions seem more favorable 
for a lunar mission. p he HRS would likely be more problematic on a surface mission due to 
environmental contaminates that would tend to reduce heat transfer effectiveness. Also, the higher 
effective reject temperature on a lunar mission would result in a larger required radiator area than for 
an equivalent power deep space mission. 
16.3.2.3 Reactor Safety 
Reactor safety for a surface mission, particularly for a manned mission, poses significantly greater 
challenges relative to extensibility. For unmanned, deep space missions, reactor safety focused on 
ensuring the reactor remained safe during postulated re-entry scenarios during launch and earth orbit 
(if any) prior to starting the reactor. As a result, there were no reactor safety issues once the reactor 
was out of earth's orbit. In this case, a reactor casualty or shutdown would result in the end of the 
mission. While this is clearly undesirable, it would not pose reactor safety concerns that require 
redundant safety features that complicate the system design. However, the lack of such features also 
limits the opportunity to recover from a casualty so operational flexibility is reduced. For a manned 
mission, reactor controls from a safety aspect would become similar to the Ground Test Reactor 
.(GTR) so testing and system design at the GTR would more closety simulate mission operation. The 
specific constraints on a lunar reactor were not yet defined relative to contamination boundaries and 
protecting the lunar surface. However, it is clear that the reactor would need to incorporate safety 
features that would not be present on the JIM0 reactor. The extent of these differences was not 
evaluated in detail. 
16.3.2.4 Shielding 
Shielding represents another area where there would be significant differences between the JIM0 
mission and a surface mission. This is due to the additional requirement to provide adequate 
shielding for human habitability, as well as the ability to locate equipment further away from the 
reactor than possible on a spacecraft. A reactor shield, similar to that designed for a deep space 
mission would still be needed for a surface mission to reduce radiation damage to key components 
close to the reactor. Since some of the electronics could be moved away from the reactor after 
landing, and the surface mission was expected to be shorter than the JIM0 mission, if the local terrain 
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or surface materials could be used for personnel shielding the as-launched reactor shield could 
possibly be less massive. No trades were done by NRPCT to evaluate shield designs for a surface 
mission. 
A NASA evaluation of options for shielding a lunar surface reactor for support manned operation can 
be found in Reference 16-2. 
16.3.2.5 Continuity of Power 
Because lives depend on reliable operation of the power plant for a manned surface application, 
greater emphasis in the design would be placed on reliability and the ability to recover from a fault. 
While the JIM0 mission posed many challenges, one easier aspect of this mission was the relatively 
simple operation of the system once it was started. The reactor plant would either operate at full 
power for the entire mission and shed load to a parasitic load radiator (PLR) as needed or there could 
be some lower power coast and science gathering periods totaling several years during the mission. 
This type of operation minimized the complexity of operating modes and transients on the system. 
However, because repair of any failures during flight would not be possible (except for possible 
software errors), system reliability became a particular concern (see Section 7). 
For a surface mission, the system must still be highly reliable and safe, but the possibility of repair 
exists and provides greater flexibility in the plant design and operation. Also, solar power and energy 
storage could be available for backup power so a restart capability of the reactor becomes much more 
feasible. Also, having astronauts or ground controllers available to perform troubleshooting or take 
adaptive actions if necessary provides additional flexibility. However, the system would stilt likely be 
designed for autonomous operation to minimize the need for operator involvement. 
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